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 ABSTRACT 
 
The present study is divided in two differentiable but conceptually interrelated 
sections. Within the first section (Chapters I, II, and III), the focus is on the 
assessment of the argumentative logic behind the multiculturalist proposal for 
equally divided societies, among equally positioned ethno-cultural groups. A critical 
and analytical review of the multiculturalist argumentative constructions shows that 
its justification lies on the dogmatic assumption of the equal worth or dignity of 
cultures, which is ontologically incorrect. Cultures cannot be axiologically 
compared. Instead, this study proposes a new approach focused on the equal 
functional value of each culture vis-à-vis the cultural producer and beneficiary (the 
individual). Therefore, it is argued that multiculturalism plea for equal ethno-cultural 
partition of the public societal space is based on political aspirations and then 
subjected to –in open, pluralist and democratic societies– the dynamics and 
methodological procedures of the so-called ‘democratic game’.  
 
The second section of this work (Chapters IV, V, and VI) focuses on the specific 
case of indigenous peoples from both a theoretical and jurisprudential point of view. 
First, the very notion of indigenous peoples is deconstructed and critically examined. 
Their special relationship with their traditional lands has been identified as the main 
objective characteristic that sustains their claims for cultural distinctiveness and 
differential legal treatment. Then, Chapters V and VI refer to a critical legal analysis 
of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in connection 
with indigenous peoples’ land claims, and the role that the element of ‘special 
relationship with traditional lands’ has played in the recognition of their right to 
communal property over traditional lands as protected by the American Convention 
on Human Rights (Article 21 ACHR). In this sense, special attention is given to the 
interpretative methods applied by the Court, and –in particular–its underlined 
ontological assumptions.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
The overall purpose of this study is to provide clarification on the 
understanding of different conceptual notions that have been used in socio-political 
and legal international discourses in order to justify the recognition of differential 
and exclusive set of rights to (self)-perceived distinguishable ethno-cultural societal 
groups. In particular, this work addresses –as a case study– the conceptual 
argumentations that have justified the construction of the notion of indigenous 
peoples as a differentiated segment of societies. In their case, the analysis has been 
conducted in two different directions. First, from a conceptual point of view, through 
the identification of the main components of the notion, and second, though its 
practical appraisal in concrete judicial cases, namely, the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.  
The main research question that this study attempts to answer is to clarify the 
role that certain notions have played in the justification of the multiculturalist 
proposal for equally divided societies, among equally positioned ethno-cultural 
groups. That is the role that the notions of culture, culture diversity and culture 
identity have had in the argumentative justifications of demands for the recognition 
of differential set of rights. In this sense, multiculturalism attempts to match the 
alleged cultural distinctiveness of societal ethno-cultural entities or groups. And, in 
particular, this study aims to enquire how these notions have been applied in the 
specific case of indigenous peoples, both from a conceptual and practical point of 
view.  
In fact, from a theoretical perspective, the analysis is focused on the 
epistemological construction of the notion of indigenousness and its conceptual 
implications for the justification of the claims for a separate legal treatment, precisely 
based on their cultural differentness. In addition, this study aims to analyse the 
manner in which the cultural dimension of this notion has been practically 
incorporated into the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
when dealing with cases related to indigenous peoples’ land claims.  
INTRODUCTION 
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The methodological decision to incorporate and combine the jurisprudence of 
this regional tribunal with the theoretical enquiry lies in the fact that the critical 
assessment of this case law provides a concrete and practical opportunity to 
challenge the theoretical framework developed within the first part of this work, but 
not only. This jurisprudence also provides the unique opportunity to test, in the 
concrete case of indigenous peoples, one of the main justifications of the 
multiculturalist proposal for culturally divided societies, which is the assumption that 
through a differentiated set of rights, individuals would be better protected, and fully 
respected in the enjoyment of their cultural identities. In fact, this study takes into 
account the fact that the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence and competence is 
based on an instrument with universal character, namely the American Convention 
on Human Rights, rather than group oriented one. Hence, in its jurisprudence, it 
would be possible to find a completely different approach consisting of culturally 
tailored judicial protection, that is, not through a differential set of culturally 
constructed rights (as in the multiculturalist proposal), but through a culturally 
friendly interpretation of universally constructed rights. 
This study is divided in two main distinguishable parts: the first part –which 
includes Chapters I, II, and III– outlines the general theoretical framework; the 
second one –composed by Chapters IV, V and VI– refers to a critical examination of 
the case of indigenous peoples from both a theoretical and jurisprudential points of 
view. In connection with the latter, the focus is on the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (I-ACtHR) in connection with indigenous peoples’ 
land claims.   
Within the theoretical framework, the complex epistemological notions of 
culture, plurality of cultures and multiculturalism (Chapter I); cultural dynamics 
among majoritarian and minoritarian societal aggregations (Chapter II); cultural 
diversity and cultural identity (Chapter III), are critically analysed, from a 
multidisciplinary perspective. They remain present throughout this entire work, 
providing conceptual anchorage and foundation for the theoretical analysis of the 
specific notion of indigenous peoples, but not only. 
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In fact, in the case of indigenous peoples, the focus is allocated to the very 
same notion of indigenousness, which is critically analysed and logically 
disassembled –as a logical and argumentative construction– under the light of the 
above mentioned concepts (Chapter IV). In this epistemological process, special 
attention is paid to elements regarded as constitutive of their societal cultural 
distinctiveness, and –in particular– to the composed notion of “special relationship 
with traditional lands”, considered as the core element of their distinguishable 
cultural identity.  
Moreover, the above mentioned notions of indigenousness, and its 
argumentative equation with the element of “special relationship with traditional 
lands”, are examined not just from a theoretical point of view, but also in a concrete 
and practical context of indigenous peoples’ lands claims before the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights. As a logical approach toward the critical analysis of the 
decision adopted in connection with these cases, the focus is given –first– to the 
interpretative methodology applied by this Court, which has permitted the absorption 
–within its jurisprudence– of the notions incorporated and discussed in the first 
chapters (Chapter V).  
In this sense, our analysis will move toward the critical legal appraisal of the 
specific jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court in connection with indigenous 
peoples’ cases, in which the question at stake has been the recognition of their 
special relationship with their traditional lands, as an essential part of their 
conventionally protected right to communal property (Chapter VI).  
Additionally, in this final chapter, the discussion is centred on the value that 
the regional tribunal has given to the said special relationship with traditional lands  
as a powerful vehicle for the recognition and conventional protection of the right to 
communal property, as enshrined in Article 21 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR), but not only. Special attention is paid to the interconnection 
that the Court has made between the latter right and the right to life, or to have a 
dignified life, as guaranteed by Article 4 ACHR. In fact, as it is shown in Chapter VI, 
under the jurisprudence of the regional tribunal, the latter right has an intimate 
connection with the notions of culture, cultural identity and, in the specific case of 
indigenous communities, with the notion of special relationship with traditional 
INTRODUCTION 
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lands. Hence, attention is paid to the critical assessment of the epistemological 
notions used by the court and –in particular– on their regarded (or assumed) 
ontological interconnections.  
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER ONE 
THE RELEVANCE OF CULTURE 
 
« Et quel pouvoir, quelle magistrature, quelle royauté 
peuvent être préférables à une sagesse qui, gardant de haut tous 
les biens terrestres, et les voyant au-dessous d'elle, ne roule 
incessamment dans ses pensées rien que d'éternel et de divin, et 
demeure persuadée que le nom d'homme se prend' vulgairement, 
mais qu'il n'y a d'hommes en effet que para la culture des 
connaissances, attribut personnel de l'humanité? » Cicero, La 
République.1  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
If someone asked you what ‘culture’ is, provably your first reaction would be 
to say that ‘everything is culture’, and you will not be wrong. As we will see in this 
chapter, from a wider perspective, every single societal structure is culturally created, 
including –of course– legal systems. In addition, if the same person asked you 
whether there is only just one culture or if culture –as a notion– refers to a sort of 
universally homogenized manifestation, your answer would be most provably 
negative; and you will be right too. As we will also see later in this chapter, in our 
world we find an enormous variety of human expressions and cultural manifestations 
because –in fact– culture “takes diverse forms across time and space.”2  
However, this diversity of cultures, manifestations and expressions not only 
exist across states’ borders, regions and continents, but also within states’ territories.3 
In fact, in our modern societies, strongly shaped by the phenomenon of globalization 
and by its consequential cultural exchange, it is quite difficult to think in terms of 
                                                 
1 M. T. CICERO, La République, Paris, 1823, p. 30. 
2 See, Article 1 of UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, adopted by the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, on 2 November 2001. 
3 As Ermacora has already stressed, “[o]nly 9 per cent of the States in the world today are ethnically 
homogeneous. In all other cases majorities and minorities differ to a varying degree ethnically, 
linguistically, culturally and also religiously.” See, F. ERMACORA, The Protection of Minorities 
before the United Nations, in Académie de Droit International (ed.), Recueil des Cours, The 
Hague/Boston/London, 1983–IV, p. 347. 
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cultural societal homogeneity and even less in terms of “cultural purity”. The reality 
is that our modern societies are heterogenic in cultural terms. They present 
distinguishable cultural features, entities or groups, which have their own visions and 
understandings of the good, of the holy, of the admirable. They bring into the 
common cultural public space different cultural proposals, which are not always 
compatible.  
Moreover, the above mentioned factual cultural heterogenic, which exists in 
almost all modern societies, does not mean that the relations between the different 
cultural entities or groups are established in terms of socio-cultural and political 
equality. On the contrary, the ordinary factual feature in culturally heterogenic 
societies is to find cultural dynamics between the groups that could be characterized 
as majority-minority dynamics.4 Actually, if we pay closer attention to the cultural 
characteristics of common societal institutions (including the socio-political, 
economical structures and legal institutions), it would be most likely possible to even 
identify in them the prevalence of the cultural characteristics, world views, 
understandings and systems of values of the existing cultural majority; and with the 
consequential exclusion of those belonging to the minorities.  
As we show in this chapter, there are different ideological and axiological 
approaches with regard to the management of these societal dynamics. Some of them 
put emphasises on the empowerment of each individual, regardless his or her ethno-
cultural alliances or preferences, prioritising the equal enjoyment –without 
discrimination– of the very same set of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Other approaches, such as that one promoted by multiculturalists, has put –on the 
contrary– the emphasis on the equal protection of cultural entities or groups, 
advocating for an equal partition of public spheres and common societal institutions 
(including legal systems) among the existing cultural differentiated entities, in a 
given society. To put it shortly, the latter approach sees societies composed by 
distinguishable ethno-cultural entities and therefore pleads for cultural groups’ 
equality; on the contrary, the former sees the same societal realities as composed by 
individuals, and hence advocates for individual equality, regardless their ethno-
cultural alliances, appurtenances or preferences.  
                                                 
4 For a detailed analysis of the societal dynamics between majorities and minorities, you can go 
directly to the reading of Chapter II.  
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Therefore, this introductory part of this work, will analyse the above 
mentioned notions and dynamics, not only from a legal perspective, which lies at the 
very base of this study, but –specially in this first chapter– also from a socio-political 
one, paying special attention to the political and ideological discourses that sustain 
these approaches, from an axiological point of view. I find myself positively 
persuaded that this crossover or multidisciplinary approach is the most appropriate in 
order to fully embrace (or at least try to do it) the intrinsically multifaceted aspects of 
these controversial topics.                       
 
          
2. The overarching concept of Culture 
 
Because we will address in this chapter cultural aspects of our societal 
organizations, the most logical way to start our discussion is through approaching the 
overarching concept of culture. The word “culture” has been used in human history 
in so many different ways and many different meanings have been attached to it. 
Culture as an artistic manifestation; culture as a product; culture as an intellectual 
achievement; culture as collective or individual accumulated knowledge; culture as a 
human creation; culture as opposed to nature, etc., etc. For example, if we go back in 
time to one of the greatest civilizations that had existed in the world, namely the 
ancient Rome, we will find that Cicero has already referred to culture as both, a 
human action and a human product, but not only. When this great roman affirmed –
almost 20 centuries ago (51 BC)– that “la culture des connaissances” is the 
“attribute personnel de l’humanité”5, that is culture as a personal attribute of 
humanity, stressed the creative nature of human beings, their capacity to accumulate 
and build knowledge, not only as a product but also as a transformative element of 
the world. Therefore, culture and knowledge appeared under the eyes of this 
experienced orator and earlier humanist as in contraposition with what is none 
essentially human, as in opposition to what is just nature.6  
                                                 
5 See, M. T. CICERO, op. cit., p. 30. 
6 Culture, as a cultivation of the human spirit, knowledge and language, has also been at the vary base 
of the diction between humans and animals. As Cicero said “…what can be more delightful in leisure, 
or more suited to social intercourse, than elegant conversation, betraying no want of intelligence on 
any subject? For it is by this one gift that we are most distinguished from brute animals, that we 
CHAPTER I 
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This liminal example of the potential understanding of ‘culture’ refers 
perhaps to one of the most common meanings of this complex notion, that is to the 
contraposition of culture to nature, to what has remained ‘untouched’ or not yet 
modified, constructed or influenced by human actions. In fact, culture derives from 
the Latin root ‘cultus’, which refers to ‘a tending, take care of, cultivation of a 
thing’.7 For the Romans it existed as an intrinsic connection between the cultivation 
of the soil, as a transformative action of the ‘wild’ nature, and the cultivation of the 
mind, as a transformative action of the ‘wild’ or ‘savage’ human characters and its 
elevation toward a state of knowledge.8  
 
 
2.1. Culture in social sciences 
 
This earlier understanding of culture has remained upon time and today we 
can even recognise its presence in any common definition of this term, like –for 
example– the one provided by the Oxford Dictionary, namely ‘culture’ as ‘the arts 
and other manifestations of human intellectual achievement regarded collectively’, 
or as ‘the ideas, customs, and social behaviour of a particular people or society’9. In 
fact, from a broad point of view, all our societies, social structures, institution, 
tradition, morals, values, understanding and knowledge are part of our culture, and –
in that sense- are cultural creations.  
But, if we pay a very close attention to the way that the term culture is 
currently used, we would be able to identify –at least– three different usages of it. 
First, in a very wide sense, culture is identified with “accumulated material heritage 
                                                                                                                                          
converse together, and can express our thoughts by speech.” See, M. T. CICERO, On Oratory and 
Orators, New York, 1860, p. 14 
7 See The Pocket Oxford Latin Dictionary. Ed. James Morwood. Oxford University Press, 
1994. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press; and J. E. RIDDLE, A complete English-
Latin and Latin-English Dictionary for the use of college and schools, London, 1870. 
8 In this sense, Cicero said that “as the field, however fertile, cannot be fruitful without culture, so 
with the mind, without learning. Thus, either of the two is abortive without the other. The culture of 
the mind is philosophy.” See, M. T. CICERO, The Tusculan Questions, Boston, 1839. 
9 Oxford Dictionary of English. Edited by Angus Stevenson. Oxford University Press, 2010. Oxford 
Reference Online. Oxford University Press. 
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of humankind”10; in other words, culture is understood in this sense as the 
accumulated product of human actions since immemorial times. Hence, under this 
understanding it would be possible to identify the existence of a ‘universal’ culture, 
beside the fact that this universal culture would not be the exact result of the sum of 
each national, sub-regional or regional cultures.11   
Secondly, culture has been understood as ‘creativity’, as the potential 
outcome of the different societies or individuals. The focal point here is the creative 
‘instrument’ of cultural products, or –as Stavenhagen said– who create, interpret or 
perform cultural works.12 This could be considered one of the most common usages 
of the term, especially in everyday life situations, and in general refers to “...the arts 
and artistic practices, in particular the creative and expressive art of high 
culture rather than popular culture or mass culture; [or is] associated with common 
usages such as ‘a cultured individual’ or ‘lacking culture’”.13  
Finally, from an anthropological point of view, culture could be interpreted as 
‘a total way of life’, as “...the sum total of the material and spiritual activities and 
products of a given social group which distinguishes it from other similar groups.”14 
In this different meaning, culture is seen as a ‘self-contained system of values’15, as a 
specific set of practices, customs, understandings and values that distinguish one 
group from another, and which provides content and meaning to the life of its 
members, both individually and collectively. Moreover, as a system of values, 
                                                 
10 See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Cultural Rights: A Social Science Perspective, in UNESCO, Cultural 
Rights and Wrongs. A collection of essays in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Unversal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Paris, 1998, p. 4. 
11 Some authors have nevertheless noticed that the so-called ‘universal culture’ has been over 
emphasised and consequently it has been paid “…little attention to the fact that in any society, at any 
given moment, different conceptions of culture compete witch one another. […] Thus, each 
community, each people has its own concept of what cultural heritage means…” See, among others, 
R. STAVENHAGEN, Cultural Diversity in the Development of the Americas. Indigenous Peoples and 
States in Spanish America, Organization of American States (OAS), 2002, p. 40. The same author has 
pointed out that the so-called universal culture is more often than not “...the world-wide imposition of 
‘Western’ culture through the hegemonic practices of the Western powers, from the time of 
colonialism onwards.” See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Cultural Rights: A Social Science Perspective, cit., 
p. 4 et seq. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See, A Dictionary of Media and Communication. First Edition by Daniel Chandler and Rod 
Munday. Oxford University Press Inc. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. Indeed, it 
is this understanding of the term that has led to a widely held distintion between ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
cultural manifestations.  
14 See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Cultural Rights: A Social Science Perspective, cit., p. 5 et seq.  
15 See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Cultural Diversity in the Development of the Americas. Indigenous 
Peoples and States in Spanish America, cit., p. 41. 
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culture is historically rooted and changes over time, following the changes of the 
societies that represents, and from which it has generated. Hence, under this 
conception, culture is not a static product; it is not an immobile societal picture that 
will remain unchangeable over time. On the contrary, this anthropological view gives 
us the idea of a process that follows the evolutionary changes of the society.16   
 
 
2.2. Conceptualisation of Culture 
 
As we can see, culture has different broad and polysemic meanings and these 
varieties of understandings could generate some ambiguity or vagueness in 
connection with the scope of this work, therefore it would be of a great benefit to 
agree on a ‘conventional’ definition of culture. Especially because –as we will see in 
future chapters–our critical approach to the jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights would be based –to a large extent– on the analysis of the 
notion of culture that has been embraced by the regional tribunal and on the legal 
effects derived from that conceptual assumption.  
For this purpose, and in order to have a solid base upon which start our 
discussion, nothing would be more suitable than the notion adopted by the United 
Nation Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), especially if 
we take into consideration the worldwide support that this international organization 
has gained during the last decades. For UNESCO, culture should be considered as 
“...the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional 
features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and 
letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value 
systems, traditions and beliefs.”17  
Under this definition, culture involves at least two different aspects, which 
cover the individual and societal dimensions of human beings. From an individual 
                                                 
16 In fact, according to Stavenhagen, “...cultural change and the constant dynamic recreation of 
cultures are a universal phenomenon...” See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Cultural Rights: A Social Science 
Perspective, cit., p. 5 et seq.  
17 UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, adopted by the world Conference on 
Cultural Policies, Mexico, 6 August 1982, preamble. This understanding of culture has been a further 
development by the World Commission on culture and Development Our Creative Diversity (1995), 
and of the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development (Stockholm, 1998).   
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perspective, ‘culture’ provides meaning to life, gives the necessary instruments to 
each human to reflect upon himself or herself, allowing him or her to take rational 
and grounded decisions.18 As we will see further in this chapter, this understanding 
of culture is intrinsically connected with the notion of cultural identity.19 Moreover, 
from a societal point of view, culture provides the common meaningful framework 
over which human beings construct their commonness, their living together (or what 
has been called ‘togetherness’), and their common supportive societal structures, 
indispensable of organization and regulation of human societies.20 It is in this sense 
that some authors refers to culture as ‘societal cultures’, because involves not just 
shared memories or values, but also common institutions and practices.21 In short, 
culture is ubiquitous.22 
Furthermore, it would be important to highlight that the above two mentioned 
understandings of culture are interconnected and interrelated, in a sense that societal 
structures not only strongly determined and molded by individual’s identities, but –at 
the same time– the latter contributes to the reproduction, maintenance and 
perpetuation of the cultural societal institutions. Actually, the permanent interaction 
of individuals in a given society generates a dynamic and evolving process that will 
be reflected on its ‘history, mores, institutions and attitudes, its social movements, 
                                                 
18 In fact, it is culture that which “…makes us specifically human, rational beings, endowed with a 
critical judgment and a sense of moral commitment. It is through culture that we discern values and 
make choices. It is through culture that man expresses himself, becomes aware of himself, recognizes 
his incompleteness, questions his own achievements, seeks untiringly for new meanings and creates 
works through which he transcends his limitations.” See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on 
Cultural Policies, preamble. 
19 See, Chapter III, Section 4. 
20 For the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), culture “…encompasses, 
inter alia, ways of life, language, oral and written literature, music and song, non-verbal 
communication, religion or belief systems, rites and ceremonies, sport and games, methods of 
production or technology, natural and man-made environments, food, clothing and shelter and the 
arts, customs and traditions through which individuals, groups of individuals and communities 
express their humanity and the meaning they give to their existence, and build their world view 
representing their encounter with the external forces affecting their lives. Culture shapes and mirrors 
the values of well-being and the economic, social and political life of individuals, groups of 
individuals and communities.” See, Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). 
General Comment No. 21. Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21, Economic 
and Social Council, United Nations, 2009, p. 3-4, para. 13. 
21 See, W. KYMLICKA, Multicultural Citizenship. A liberal theory of Minority Rights, Oxford, 1995, 
p. 76 et seq. Kymlicka defines societal culture as a “...culture which provides its members with 
meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, 
religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres.” Ibid, p. 
76.  
22 See, I. M. YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of Difference, Princeton, 1990, p. 23 et seq. 
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conflicts and struggles, and the configuration of political power...’23 In fact, culture 
is dynamic and continually evolves (or changes) upon time.24 In this sense, we must 
now regard culture as a process rather than a finished product.25  
It is important, in order to have an accurate understanding of culture, not to 
surrender to the temptation to consider culture as a uniform product, as a unified and 
already finished system of ideas and beliefs that enclose all regions, countries and 
societies in the world. In fact, it is quite common to refer to culture as a universal 
culture, as a sort of accumulated (and indistinguishable) material heritage of 
humanity. A kind of ‘world cultural civilization’ which would consequentially reflect 
no division of historical periods, no cultural specificities between different groups of 
human beings, and which would have a moral and logical significance validity of all 
people in the world. I said moral in a sense that it would provide full content, sense 
of life and meanings for all existed and existing societies, from the beginning to the 
end of times; and it would be also logical because it would cover all their (cultural) 
distinguishable features. So far so good, but… it is quite naïve too.26   
                                                 
23 See, UNESCO, Our Creative Diversity: Report of the World Commission on Culture and 
Development, Paris, 1996, p. 24. 
24 In one of its latest reports, UNESCO has affirmed that “[a] current consensus regards cultures as 
systems that continually evolve through internal processes and in contact with the environment and 
other cultures. What is certain is that no society has ever been frozen in its history, even if some 
cultures have been viewed as ´timeless´ from the perspective of others characterized by rapid 
change.” UNESCO, Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue – World Report, Paris, 
2009, p. 25 et seq. 
25 As UNESCO stressed, “[c]ultures are no longer the fixed, bounded, crystallized containers they 
were formerly reputed to be. Instead they are transboundary creations exchanged throughout the 
world via the media and the Internet.” See, UNESCO, Cultural Diversity, Conflict and Pluralism - 
World Culture Report, Paris, 2000, p. 15. In the following chapters I will come back to this idea of 
culture as a process rather than as a product, in particular when addressing the boundaries or limits of 
the indigenous peoples’ cultural legal protection.  
26 This way of thinking perhaps is close to what Bentham has defined as one of the anti-rational 
fallacies (or ad verecundiam), most precisely that one called “too good to be practicable” or even the 
“utopian” one (see, J. BENTHAM, The Book of Fallacies, London, 1824, Ch. 9, p. 295 et seq.) In 
fact, it would be unreasonable to think of ‘culture’ in terms of a universal and a-temporal product, 
applicable to all human societies from the beginning of human history. Thinking that our cultural 
values, mores and understanding could be validly applicable to –for instance– the Ancient Egypt, or 
Ancient Rome, or even to the Middle Ages or the beginning of Modernity, is nothing but a speculative 
or romantic exercise. Thinking that we can morally judge ancient societies with our current moral 
parameters (which are indeed cultural), it could be considered as morally sympathetic and perhaps 
even morally good in theory, but it would be too bad in practice. The mores, values and cultural 
understanding of “the good” had dramatically changed among societies and civilizations, not only in 
different times in human history, but also among societies that are contemporary in time. It would be 
enough to say, in order to exemplify this argument, that just no more than 150 years ago slavery was 
still considered legal… This is nothing but a little example of how societal moral and legal practises 
had dramatically changed over a time. What is today considered as one of the most perfidious 
international crimes, two centuries ago was considered a profitable business enterprise.  
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However, if we look closely to our societies, the reality shows us that not all 
cultural manifestations are and were similar. Societies have been very different in the 
past and they show easy recognisable (cultural) differences in present times. In fact, 
an all-inclusive concept, such as ‘world civilization’27 (as a uniform product) is –at 
least– culturally vague, and perhaps even sketchy and imperfect.28  
Moreover, when ‘culture’ is used in a sense of ‘human creations’ or 
‘products’, we have to necessarily arrive at the conclusion that there is no 
homogeneity in them. In this sense, it would be quite difficult to identify a unique 
cutting-edge trend, or a unique patron or identical cultural standard among all 
different societies that would fairly reflect and embrace all their traditions, practices 
and customs.29 The reality is quite different. Cultural differences are reflected not 
only in the structural societal organisations and in configuration of social-political 
institutions, but also in the values, mores and conventions of each social group.30 As 
                                                 
27 Many authors use the word ‘civilization’ as a synonymous of culture, but we rather prefer to use the 
latter because, as Benhabib stressed, the former term refer more to “material values and practices that 
are shared with other peoples and that do not reflect individuality.” See, S. BENHABIB, The Claims 
of Culture. Equality and Diversity in the Global Era, Princeton/Oxford, 2002, p. 2. From a quite 
different perspective, authors like Samuel P. Huntington consider that it is impossible to think on the 
development of humanity in any other terms than ‘civilizations’. For the latest author, “[c]ivilization 
and culture both refer to the overall way of life of people, and a civilizaiton is a culture writ large. 
[…] A civilization is the brodest cultural entity. […] [I]s thus highest cultural grouping of people and 
the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other 
species. It is defined both by common objective elements, suchs as language, history, religion, 
customs, institutions, and by the subjetive self-identification of people.[…] Civilizations are […] 
meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real.” See, S. P. 
HUNTINGTON, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, 1997, p. 
41 et seq. 
28 One of the leading anthropologist of the last century, Claude Lévi-Strauss, has stressed that “…[t]o 
attempt to assess cultural contributions with all the weight of countless centuries behind them, rich 
with the thoughts and sorrows, hopes and toil of the men and women who brought them into being, by 
reference to the sole yard-stick of a world civilization which is still a hollow shell, would be greatly to 
impoverish them, draining away their life-blood and leaving nothing but the bare bones.[…] There is 
not, and can never be, a world civilization in the absolute sense in which that term is often used, since 
civilization implies, and indeed consists in, the coexistence of cultures exhibiting the maximum 
possible diversities.” See, Claude Lévi-Strauss, cited by UNESCO, Our Creative Diversity: Report of 
the World Commission on Culture and Development, cit., p. 29.     
29 As it has been said, “...nowadays, it is difficult, except at village level or in very isolated 
communities, to find culturally homogenous societies which do not include any strand or cultural 
variety. In the context of increased globalization, the shrinking of spatial and  temporal distance and 
population movements [...]bring with them a multiplication of contacts between different countries 
and internationalization of social movements and political ideas(via disporas) and a diversification of 
cultural life within every State.” See, UNESCO, Towards a constructive pluralism, Paris, 1999, p. 20. 
30 Under the anthropological point of view, culture would be understood as “the sum of all practices, 
activities, and material and spiritual product of a determined social group that distinguishes it from 
other similar groups. Understood in this way, culture can also be seen as a coherent and self-
contained system of values and symbols that a specific (frequently referred to as “ethnic”) group 
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Lévi-Strauss has said, “[t]he true contribution of a culture consists […] in its 
difference from others.”31 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), during its decades of existence has paid special attention to the existence 
and the challenges that cultural pluralism generates in our more closer and 
intertwining world, stressing the fact that “[i]n the world in which [...] 10,000 
distinct societies live in roughly 200 states, the question of how to accommodate 
minorities is not of academic interest only but is a central challenge to any humane 
politics”.32 If we read ‘cultures’ at the place of the term ‘societies’ (societies are –at 
the end of the day– cultural products), and ‘different cultural entities’ instead of 
minorities, then the cultural complexity that indeed exists in the world will come to 
our mind in no time. Hence, plurality of cultures is a self-imposed reality. Human 
beings are witnesses, bearers and producers of culture; in most cases it would be 
quite easy for each of us to identify the approximate boundaries where our own 
culture ends and where someone else’s culture begins, or –at least– what is certainly 
not part of someone’s culture.  
Leaving our cultural self-perception or identity for a future analysis33, what 
really matters after our factual verification, is to enquire about how to deal with, how 
to manage this cultural plurality or... diversity. If a society is pluralist, which means 
that we can identify different and separate groups, with different sets of cultural 
values, structures and institutions, like –for example– as could be the case of 
indigenous communities vis-à-vis the mainstream society in a given country, then 
what indeed becomes relevant is to look upon the way that these different social 
components relate each other. In other words, how societies accommodate their 
differences in the construction of a common societal milieu.  
It is true that different cultures could live next to each other without having 
any contact and mutually and willingly ignorant, but in most cases and especially in 
                                                                                                                                          
reproduces over time, and which provides orientation to its members about the meanings necessary to 
govern social conduct and relations in daily life. (…) [T]hen the right to culture must be recognized 
as the right of social groups to their own culture and their own cultural identity”. See R. 
STAVENHAGEN, Cultural Diversity in the Development of the Americas. Indigenous Peoples and 
States in Spanish America, cit., para. 134–135.  
31 See, Claude Lévi-Strauss, cited by UNESCO, Our Creative Diversity: Report of the World 
Commission on Culture and Development, cit., p. 29. 
32 Ibid., p. 44. 
33 See, Chapter III, Section 4, and 4.1.1 
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our current globalized world this remain nothing but a theoretical speculation.34 In 
today’s world, cultures interact and sometimes even overlap each other to the point 
that it is quite difficult to distinguish them accurately. One clear example of this 
cultural mixture or ‘melting pot’ could be constituted by those indigenous 
populations that live in urban areas, sharing almost the same cultural habits and 
practises than their non-indigenous neighbours. Potential internal and external 
boundaries are less sharply delineated, or intertwined. Therefore, the question of 
management of their interaction and coexistence become imperative.  
In other words, what would be important to reflect upon is how, and to what 
extent, cultural groups with culturally derived differences contribute –or are able to 
contribute– to modelling and shaping a given society. How do societies manage (or 
could manage) the existing cultural diversities? In other words, would it be 
convenient to ask if it is relevant or desirable to stress cultural differences within 
pluralist democratic societies, by means of giving them more visibility and 
distinguishable legal status. Otherwise, would it be better to emphasise what different 
ethno-cultural groups have in common or should have in common in order to 
peacefully live together (e.g. through stressing the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, or with regard to other foundational principles of modern 
democracies, such as rule of law, equality and non-discrimination, secularism, etc.).35 
                                                 
34 Perhaps one of the latest examples of cultural isolation that exist in today’s world are the so-called 
indigenous people communities living in isolation, in a sense that they do not maintain regular contact 
with the majority populations or they are at the stage of having an initial contact.  In connection with 
these populations see, Human Rights Council Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous 
People’s Report called “Draft Guidelines on the Protection of Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary 
Isolation and in Initial contact of the Amazon Basin and El Chaco (UN Doc. A/HRC/EMRIP/2009/6), 
of 30 June 2009. 
35 In order to avoid potential misinterpretation from the readers, I would like to anticipate here one of 
the argumentations that will be introduced later in this chapter, and which will transversally last in this 
work. The fact that almost all modern societies are factually plural does not mean that all societal 
institutions have to institutionally reflect that plurality. Common societal institutions are a synthesis, 
combined entities that reflect –in one way or another– the existing societal dynamics in each society. 
These dynamics include majoritarian and minoritarian relations, which most likely would end being 
institutionally reflected. In democratic and pluralist societies, different cultural entities can –of 
course– legitimately have political aspirations but this does not mean that they would be able to secure 
those political claims through legal or judicial protection, which would be a sort of societal 
institutional guarantee. They will have to openly play the democratic game in order to gain consensus 
and support from all members of the society toward their cultural views and understanding, but 
without having any guaranteed result. What is nevertheless guaranteed, is the enjoyment of 
fundamental rights and freedoms for all members of the society, regardless their cultural views or 
understanding. In short, what is guaranteed and secured is what all members of cultural groups have in 
common, namely the dignity of being members of the same family, as human beings. This, and no 
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The extension and specificity of these questions will certainly take us far 
away from the object and purpose of this dissertation. In fact, a proper answer to 
these essential questions will require –at least– the dedication of an entirely 
autonomous work, devoted not only to a systematic analysis of societal dynamics, 
but also to a profound historical, sociological and legal exploration of the different 
potential organisational models of intercultural relations and management of cultural 
diversity in a given societal context.36  
Instead, the focus will be put only on one of the organizational models that 
have been largely proposed during the last decades but which is nevertheless 
currently under discussion and revision by global influential national governments.37 
Moreover, I will argue that this particular model has –in the context of this work– a 
very important connotation because it has been adopted as one of the most influential 
regional judicial bodies in the Latin American region, namely the Inter-American 
                                                                                                                                          
other, is the common societal agreement that has been reached in our modern societies. For a more 
detail explanation of this point, see in this chapter, Section 4.2.     
36 Many books have been written on this topic. For a general overview in connection with 
multiculturalism and cultural pluralism, in particular from their political, social and historical 
perspectives, see –among other authors– Ch. TAYLOR, The Politics of Recognition, in A. 
GUTMANN (ed.), Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton, 1994; W. 
KYMLICKA, Multicultural Citizenship. A liberal theory of Minority Rights, cit.; and of the same 
author, W. KYMLICKA, Multicultural Odysseys. Navigating the New International Politics of 
Diversity, Oxford, 2007; I. M. YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of Difference, cit.; and from the same 
author, I. M. YOUNG, Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic of Group Political Conflict, in 
W. KYMLICKA (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford, 2004; M. WALZER, Pluralism: A 
Political Perspective, in W. KYMLICKA (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford, 2004; S. 
BENHABIB, op. cit.; B. PAREKH, Rethinking Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity and Political 
Theory, New York, 2006; and, from the same author, B. PAREKH, A New Politics of Identity. 
Political Principles for an Interdependent World, New York, 2008; D. BENNETT, Introduction, in D. 
BENNETT (ed.), Multicultural States. Rethinking difference and identity, London/New York, 1998; 
and G. PAQUET, Deep Cultural Diversity: A Governance Challenge, Ottawa, 2008. 
37 Just as an example of the current debate around multiculturalism, on February 2011, one of the 
leading French newspapers published, in an article titled “Sarkozy: le multiculturalisme est un 
“èchec””, quoting the President of the French Republic when he was quoting as saying that “Nous ne 
voulons pas, en tout cas ce n’est pas le project de la France, d’une socieété où les communautés 
coexistent les unes à côté des autres.” See, P. FREOUR, Sarkozy: le multiculturalisme est un "échec", 
Le Figaro, Paris, February 10, 2011. Almost at the same time, on the other side of the British 
Channel/La Manche, British Prime Minister David Cameron has highlithed the very same problem 
when he said that “[u]nder the doctrine of state multiculturalism we have encouraged different 
cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream. We have failed to provide a 
vision of society to which they feel they want to belong.” See, P. WINTOUR, David Cameron tells 
Muslim Britain: stop tolerating extremists, The Guardian, London, February 5, 2011. Finally, we can 
even quote the German Chancellor, Ms. Angela Merkel, who has said in the same line, but perhaps 
with even more clarity and precision, that “German multiculturalism has ‘utterly failed’”, adding that 
“…the idea of people from different cultural backgrounds living happily “side by side” did not 
work.” See, M. WEAVER, Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has 'utterly failed', The 
Guardian, London, October 17, 2010. 
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Court of Human Rights (I-ACtHR).38 Of course, I am referring to 
‘multiculturalism’.39  
 
 
3. Plurality of cultures and Multiculturalism: The relevance of the difference 
 
As we said before, what we find in our planet is a multiplicity of cultures; a 
different understanding of how to organize society, under which principles, values 
and norms regulate our conducts and behaviours.40 But if we go beyond the 
descriptive analysis of this plural cultural landscape and we enter into a more 
prescriptive discourse, that is, into the domain of what ‘should be’ and not what ‘it 
is’, then we will enter into a different dimension which is related to the 
‘management’ of this plurality. Indeed, if we take into consideration the fact that the 
process of ‘globalization’ has generated “…unprecedented conditions for enhanced 
interaction between cultures”, but –at the same time– represents “…a challenge for 
cultural diversity, namely in view of risks of imbalances between rich and poor 
countries”41, then the analysis of this ‘managerial’ dimension become imperative. 
When a plurality of cultures is present in the bosom of a given society, 
inevitably we have to draw our attention to the dynamics generated among those 
different cultural groups or entities. As we know, in most of the cases these different 
cultural entities do not relate to each other with a perfect sense of fairness and 
recognition but with tensions, clashes and intolerance. And perhaps even most 
relevant for the understanding of this phenomena, is what we will find within those 
societies is a perfect identifiable majority-minority dynamics.  
                                                 
38 As I will argue in Chapter V and –in particular– in Chapter VI that the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights has ideologically embraced ‘multiculturalism’ when dealing with indigenous people’s 
land claims, and in doing so, it has perhaps gone beyond its conventional mandate. But, of course, in 
order to be able to arrive at such hypothetical conclusion, we have to not only analyse the specific 
jurisprudence of this Court, but also critically conceptualize what multiculturalism is and what are its 
societal effects. 
39 Other forms of diversity management, such as assimilation or integration, will be addressed together 
with multiculturalism further in this chapter (see, Section 4.2.). 
40 In this sense, broadly speaking, it is possible to refer to Western, Asian, Oriental, African, Latin-
American, African-American, etc. cultures and societies. 
41 See, Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, adopted 
by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on its 33rd 
session. Paris, 20 October 2005. Preamble.  
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However, in order to have a comprehensive understanding of these dynamics 
we necessarily need to answer some structural questions, such as –for instance– what 
we understand societal entity or social group to be, but not only.42 Other central 
concepts too have to be explored and analysed, such as those of ‘majority’, 
‘minority’, ‘cultural diversity’ and ‘cultural identity’. Therefore, in order to start 
dealing with these notions, we can perhaps start clarifying our understanding of 
‘societal entity’. In this sense, I believe that the definition provided by Iris Marion 
Young is quite accurate; she refers to social groups as “…a collective of persons 
differentiated from at least one other group by cultural forms, practices, or way of 
life.”43  
In fact, when a given aggregation of individuals is perceived, both internally 
and externally, as objectively identifiable by its specific societal characteristics (e.g. 
by its share language, religion, ethnicity, etc.) as different and culturally separate 
than other individuals or groups of individuals, then it would be possible to refer to it 
in terms of societal entity or group.  As we can see, a social group is identified by the 
cultural characteristics of its members, which –at the same time– make them 
different and distinguishable from the members of other groups, which possess 
different cultural features. In short, what really matters here is nothing but culture.  
 
 
3.1. Plurality of cultures and diversity 
 
Members of the same societal aggregation or entity can not only be seen in 
term of cultural similarities among themselves but also in terms of cultural 
differences vis-à-vis members of other groups. These cultural similarities/differences 
can be more or less visible, according to the degree of externalisation that they could 
have.44 However, what really matters here is the self-identification, recognition and 
                                                 
42 Just as a matter of clarification, this approximation to the concept of ‘social groups’ does not refer 
to the legal understanding of ‘group’ as a legal subject in international law. For further reading in 
connection with the latter understanding see, among others, N. T. CASALS (ed.), Group Rights as 
Human Rights. A Liberal Approach to Multiculturalism, Dordrecht, 2006.    
43 See, I. M. YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of Difference, cit., p. 42 et seq. 
44 Differences that could be laid at the bottom of a group configuration could have more evident 
externalization, such as ethnicity, race, colour, language, sex, etc., or less evident one, like in the case 
of education, income, nationality, religion, etc. 
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affinity between the members of a given group, because it is their similar experiences 
or ways of life –as group’s members– which “…prompts them to associate with one 
another more than with those not identified with the group.”45   
Therefore, social groups are not only defined by those similar and objectively 
recognizable attributes shared by its members, but also for what they perceive as 
different in the outsiders, in those that are considered as no-members of the group. It 
is perhaps the ‘sense of identity’ than the highly visible attributes or objective 
characteristics that influence or configure in a more decisive manner the affiliation to 
a given group or even the existence of the group itself.46 But, that sense of identity is 
–at the same time– shaped and influenced by the internal and external perception of 
those visible cultural features.47   
Moreover, because societal groups are not a mere aggregation of individuals, 
like –for example– those statistically constructed that could perhaps include 
individuals that have less than a specific income or a certain age; on the contrary, 
societal entities are composed by individuals that recognise themselves –with 
different degrees of consciousness– as part of that group.48 In fact, self-awareness is 
a key factor for the identification of a social group, but not the only one. The external 
perception that a particular social aggregation constitutes a ‘different social entity’ is 
as well another relevant factor that determinate the existence and individualization of 
the group. When ‘other’ members of the society see all of those that share those 
essential attributes of a given social aggregation as “different” from themselves, then 
the group gain a sort of external objectivization that makes it visible vis-à-vis all 
other different social entities. And it will be this sense of otherness, or separateness 
                                                 
45 See, I. M. YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of Difference, cit., p. 43. 
46 As Young has also said, “…objective attributes are a necessary condition for classifying oneself or 
others as belonging to a certain social group, it is identification with a certain social status, the 
common history that social status produces, and self-identification that define the groups as a group.” 
Ibid., p. 44. 
47 The relationship between the plurality of cultures or the cultural diversity and the cultural identity of 
the members of the society will be addressed later in Chapter III, Section 4. 
48 For Wellman, “…a social group is its individual members in their relationships [which] enable its 
members to act as one or on behalf of the whole and to have joint interests distinct from the interests 
of any or all members as individuals.” See, C. WELLMAN, Alternatives for a Theory of Group 
Rights, in Ch. SISTARE, L. MAY, L. FRANCIS (eds), Groups and Group Rights, Lawrence, 2001, p. 
25. 
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and differentiation, that will most likely condition, determine and shape the social 
dynamics between the different entities.49   
In a given society, no social groups live in a vacuum, in isolation. As it 
happens with individual identities, which are formed, modelled and conditioned by a 
permanent interaction of ‘the self’ with ‘other selves’ (especially with those that are 
part of nuclear social groups, such as family, friends, school, etc.), group’s identity is 
molded and shaped by groups interactions. Even when individuals are not entirely 
aware of their potential connection or appurtenance (membership) with one of those 
societal groups, the perception of that membership by others, either members of the 
same group or outsiders, will most likely condition and shape their socio-behavioural 
conduct.  
From a social theory perspective, self-recognition and voluntary membership 
are not exclusive requirements for being perceived as a member of a given group. In 
fact, membership can be impose by other’s perceptions and, therefore, individuals 
which involuntarily fulfil the externally recognised or visible features of a given 
group, could be subjected to social constrains and affected by the negative or positive 
assumptions related to that affiliation.50 It is in this sense that G.H. Mead has said, 
“[i]t is the social process itself that is responsible for the appearance of the self…”51  
For these reasons, we can logically conclude that the mere idea of a social 
group –as a differentiated societal entity– ontologically requires the existence of 
‘other’ groups.52 People living in complete isolation, without any contact with other 
                                                 
49 As Christine Sistare said, “…the perceived character of the group, its image in the larger society, 
may have these effects of attraction and repulsion […] Self-identification through a group, the 
possible attainment of certain goods only as a member of the group, and external identification by 
others based on one’s group membership(s) are concerns of great significance.” See, Ch. SISTARE, 
Groups, Selves, and the State, in Ch. SISTARE, L. MAY, L. FRANCIS (eds), Groups and Group 
Rights, Lawrence, 2001, p. 7 et seq.     
50  
51 See, G. H. MEAD, Mind, Self, & Society, from the standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, Chicago, 
1934, p. 142. 
52 As the father of the ‘British Empirism’, George Berkeley, was one of the first philosophers to 
elaborate the connection between perception and existence, arriving at a conclusion that it is 
impossible to know the externality of bodies; what we only know is the perception that we have of 
them. His ‘immaterialism’, or ‘subjective idealism’, could be found concentrated in his famous answer 
to the following dilemma: “[But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for 
instance, in a park, or books in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there 
is no difficulty in it]: [but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas 
which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may 
perceive them? but do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while ?] this therefore is 
nothing to the purpose; it only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; 
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social aggregations, are not a group but… just people. In other words, without having 
the image of ‘difference’ mirrored in the eyes of those that look upon us as ‘others’, 
our ‘otherness’ could not possibly exist.  
In fact, individuals define their identity by what they are not; by perceiving 
what make them different from those that they are not; by their differentiation from 
“the others”.53 The same happen with groups. Indeed, in the case of groups, it could 
even possibly happen that the existence of the group as such, as a societal separate 
entity, is identified by outsiders previous to the very self-identification of the “new” 
members of the group that is prior to “…having any specific consciousness of 
themselves as a group”.54  
Moreover, as in the case of individuals, groups’ identity is formed and shaped 
within a dialogical process, in which actions are followed by reactions which –at the 
same time– will condition a chain of new mutual interactions and reciprocal 
influences.55  In fact, it is within a process of cultural dialogical interrelation that 
different social groups construct their own collective identities, and differences 
themselves from others’ cultural entities. Furthermore, it is important to notice that 
this interaction and dialogue is hardly ever based on grounds of equality and pacific 
mutual respect. In most cases, relationships among different ethno-cultural groups in 
a given society is tense, and full of different episodes which involve certain degree of 
violence and which could result –in extreme cases– to an open societal violence, 
clashes and strife.  
                                                                                                                                          
[but it doth not show that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without 
the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing un-conceived or unthought-
of, which is a manifest repugnancy.]” See, G. BERKELEY, Of the Principles of Human Knowledge, 
in G. N. WRIGHT (ed.), The Works of George Berkeley, D.D., Bishop of Cloyne, London, 1843, para. 
XXIII, p. 95. 
53 As Huntington has stressed, “…people define themselves by what makes them different from others 
in a particular context: “one perceives oneself in terms of characteristics that distinguish oneself from 
other humans, especially from people in one’s usual social milieu…” This perception of difference 
has been magisterially exemplified by this author when he argues that “[t]wo Europeans, one German 
and one French, interacting with each other will identify each other as German and French. Two 
Europeans, one German and one French, interacting with two Arabs, one Saudi and one Egyptian, 
will define themselves as Europeans and Arabs.” See, S. P. HUNTINGTON, op. cit., p. 67. 
54 As Young pointed out, “[s]ometimes a group comes to exist only because one group excludes and 
labels a category of persons, and those labelled come to understand themselves as group members 
only slowly, on the basis of their shared oppression.” See, I. M. YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of 
Difference, cit., p. 46. 
55 “Civilizations, societies and cultures, like individuals, exist in relation to one another. As one 
historian has noted, ‘consciously or otherwise […] civilizations observe one another, seek each other 
out, influence one another, mutually define one another.” See, UNESCO, Investing in Cultural 
Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue – World Report, cit., p. 39. 
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When cultural clashes are not so evident, and therefore are not reflected in an 
open violent situation, this does not mean that the existing different cultural views 
coexist in a condition of equal footing. In most cases, societies resemble the cultural 
features of the majoritarian societal entities, and exclude or give less visibility to one 
of the minoritarian groups. In fact, when paying attention to the existing societal 
dynamics in a given society, and in particular the power dynamics between groups, 
some authors have perhaps excessively referred to them as ‘cultural domination’ or 
even ‘cultural imperialism’. In other words, according to them, it would be possible 
to identify a sort of cultural hierarchy that legitimatise as universal what in reality is 
nothing but the very particular experience and views of the majoritarian group… in 
detriment of the minority ones. 56  
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that cultural plurality –and the 
existence of differentiated cultural identities– it is not a characteristic that describe 
modern societies from an exclusive external point of view. Most of the social groups 
that can be seen and individualised as self-sustained cultural entities most probably 
enshrine a multiplicity of identities and sub-groups in their interior. Social groups are 
not themselves homogeneous and –in most cases– they tend to reflect within 
themselves the same ‘cultural’ differentiations (e.g. ethnicity, religion, language, 
gender, etc.) that distinguish them from other groups in the broader society.   
In conclusion, the relationship between different cultural groups in society is 
permeated by social dynamics and tensions which have to be addressed and managed 
in order to avoid anarchy and social disruption. But, of course, the question is how to 
do it. How to address the demands for cultural recognition put forward by various 
types of historically marginalised socio-cultural minorities. Or, how to accommodate 
                                                 
56 It would be quite naïve from our side if we do not take into consideration those situations in which 
the identity of groups is forged, or have been forged by relationships of imposition, oppression and 
exclusion. Some authors, identified with what has been called ‘literature of the oppressed’, consider 
that the structures inherent to a particular social relations are not neutral, in a sense that those 
structures have been built in order to maintain oppressed social groups, for the benefits of those that 
retain the power in a given society. Among them, Young –for example– has identified five different 
faces systems of oppression that describes the interrelations between groups in society. According to 
her, these categories are: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and 
violence. For her, “[c]ultural imperialism involves the universalization of a dominant group’s 
experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm. […] [T]he oppressed group’s own 
experience and interpretation of social life finds little expression that touches the dominant culture, 
while the same culture imposes on the oppressed group its experience and interpretation of social 
life.” See, I. M. YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of Difference, cit., p. 59-60. 
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the cultural differences that exist among those groups. This challenge has been called 
‘the challenge of multiculturalism’.57  
Therefore, in order to gain more epistemological clarity on our incoming 
discourse regarding the accommodation of indigenous people’s claims over alleged 
traditional lands within the regional juridical Inter-American system, it would be of 
particular relevance to clarify which ideas are enshrined under the so-called 
‘multicultural proposal’. And, even perhaps more importantly, whether multicultural 
proposals have or should have legal relevance from a (human) rights based 
perspective, beside –of course– its clear political dimension.  
 
 
4. Management of group diversity: multiculturalism and its concerns 
 
During the last decades the word ‘multiculturalism’ has been used more and 
more in the media, in scholarly and political discourses, but not only. It has had 
positive or negative implications, according to who is using it, for example, by right 
wing or left wing political parties. And for which purpose it has been used, like –for 
instance–  in the case of the legitimation of policies that would eventually broaden 
the access to new minorities –in particular migrants– to welfare state services, or –on 
the contrary– for their disenfranchisement. 
These different or even opposed uses of the term multiculturalism are perhaps 
nothing but a consequence of the vagueness and even ambiguity that surround this 
notion. Some scholars use this concept even as an ‘umbrella term’ in order to cover a 
broad variety of policies designed to provide some level of public recognition and 
support to non-dominant ethno-cultural groups.58 If we paid attention to mass media 
and political discourses, multiculturalism is equally claimed as the responsible policy 
behind acts of ethno-cultural violence and social disturbances (in particular within 
urban metropolitan areas) and –at the same time– as their possible solution. The 
former accused multiculturalism for attacking the sense of national identity, for 
encouraging disrespect towards common social values and principles, which are at 
                                                 
57 See, W. KYMLICKA, Multicultural Citizenship. A liberal theory of Minority Rights, cit., p. 10. 
58 See, W. KYMLICKA, Multicultural Odysseys. Navigating the New International Politics of 
Diversity, cit., p. 16 et seq. 
CHAPTER I 
30 
 
the very base of the common national identity.59 On the contrary, those that find 
themselves at the opposite position advocated for a solution that will incorporate the 
principles, symbols, and values that represent excluded groups into the common 
national identity. For them the solution consists of the transformation of the national 
identity and not its mere acceptance by assimilative policies.60 
These two opposed visions and understandings of multiculturalism reflex the 
political tensions that are intrinsically present within this term, because –essentially– 
multiculturalism is about sharing and exercising political power. Actually, what is all 
about it is ‘how’ social structures and institutions are constructed and –even most 
important– by ‘whom’. In other words, the focus is on “which culture” has been 
incorporated in and it is intrinsically reflected by societal institutions, and on the 
socio-political and power dynamics that have permitted or conditioned the 
constructive process of the common societal enterprise. For Kymlicka, the variable 
fate of ‘liberal multiculturalism’ in different societies may have to do with “…the 
larger framework of power relations into which these normative arguments are 
inserted.”61 Therefore, multiculturalism is nothing but preserving or changing of 
power dynamics within a given society. 
However, multiculturalism is not and has not been the only socio-political 
theory addressed to manage potential conflicts on the distribution of political power 
in those societies in which the component of diversity is present in a high degree. 
Without the intention to make a detailed account of the different kind of theories or 
policies that have been historically implemented in dealing –directly or indirectly– 
with potential or real cultural tension in different pluri-cultural societies, it would be 
important to mention them, at least in connection with the current historical period of 
humanity, in order to understand better what multiculturalism stands for.  
                                                 
59 Just as an example of this position, we can mention the UK Chairperson of the Commission for 
Racial Equality, Trevor Phillips, who suggested in 2005 that “…multiculturalism has brought us into 
a position of racial segregation where we’ve focused far too much on the ‘multi’ and not enough on 
the common culture”. See, A. XANTHAKI, Multiculturalism and International Law Discussing 
Universal Standards, in Human Rights Quarterly, 32-1, 2010, p. 22.  
60 See, in connection with the topic of multiculturalist transformation of national identities, S. 
TIERNEY (ed.), Accommodating National Identity. New Approaches in International and Domestic 
Law, The Hague/London/Boston, 2000; O. P. SHABANI (ed.), Mulciculturalism and Law: A Critical 
Debate, Cardiff, 2007; and M. KOENIG, P. d. GUCHTENEIRE (eds.), Democracy and Human 
Rights in Multicultural Societies, Aldershot, 2007. 
61 See, W. KYMLICKA, Multicultural Odysseys. Navigating the New International Politics of 
Diversity, cit., p. 112. 
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Until the end of the Second World War, or perhaps even further till middle 
sixties, the most common way to deal with diversity in a given society was through 
policies of assimilation. Members of the different minoritarian cultural entities were 
pressed and forcibly (even in some cases violently) assimilated into the majoritarian 
national culture. Language, education, social and dress codes, just for mention some 
areas of public life, were molded under the light of the majoritarian culture and 
imposed on the whole society. Under this paradigm, members of minoritarian or non-
dominant groups had no alternative but to embrace the national uniform and 
monolithic cultural views and understandings. They were pressed to abandon their 
own ethno-cultural views, understanding, practices and languages in order to be 
accepted as part of the main society. Members of minoritarian groups were 
consequentially not able to pursue studies in their mother-tongue languages or freely 
practice their religion or wear their traditional costumes among the mainstream 
society because those cultural manifestations were viewed –in most cases– as 
backwardness and therefore openly rejected by the majoritarian population.   
A second period in the management of the diversity could be identified as a 
period of recognition of cultural differences (but not redistribution or rebalancing of 
power). Most likely, the starting point of this period can be identified with the 
adoption of the two international Covenants on Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, in 1966.62 Through this transcendental step, the international 
community substantiated and made operative those rights that were already 
proclaimed within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sixteen years before, 
but not only. In fact, it also opened the door for the recognition of everyone’s right to 
enjoy his or her own culture, regardless of the more or less dominant position of his 
or her (cultural) group within a given society.63 
                                                 
62 According to Kymlicka, the roots of this second stage on managing diversity can be identified in the 
decolonisation process, from 1948 to 1966, which was followed temporarily and consequentially by 
the racial desegregation movement initiated by the African-American civil rights struggles. These two 
struggles are viewed as inspirational sources for the minority rights revolution, in particular because 
the latter “…shares its commitment to contesting ethnic and racial hierarchies, and seeks to apply this 
commitment more effectively to the actual range of exclusions, stigmatizations, and inequalities…” 
See, W. KYMLICKA, Multicultural Odysseys. Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, 
cit., p. 91. 
63 This clear reference is enshrined in Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) which reads as follows: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
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This new period on the understanding of diversity was deepened by the 
adoption of other very relevant instruments by the international community, such as 
–to just mention but a few– the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
(ICRMW), or the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169 of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO); and gave the possibility and the 
legitimation to members of minority or non-dominant groups to freely exercise their 
right on the bosom of the mainstream society.  
Under this new paradigm of recognition, members of historically 
subordinated groups demanded equal recognition on the enjoyment of common 
recognised rights, they demanded equal treatment and equal opportunities (even 
through the application of concrete positive actions in order to restore unequal 
historical imbalances) but not different rights, tailored on their cultural differentness. 
In fact, under the light of the paradigm of recognition, the principle of equality is 
interpreted as requiring to treat people in a different-blind fashion. The focus is put 
on ‘what is the same in all’ and not what make us different.64 Because every human 
being is equal in dignity and rights, as the UDHR states in famous first article, then 
they deserve to be equally treated or –better– identically treated. But, the rigidity of 
the identical treatment interpretation did not address certain situations of structural 
inequalities that indeed existed and still exist in society (e.g. the societal situation of 
historically discriminated groups, such as blacks or indigenous people). As a solution 
to these structural societal inequalities, legal systems started accepting the 
application of positive action policies, allowing the introduction of specific different 
treatment in favour of the members of those disadvantaged societal groups. The latter 
were not treated alike, because societal factual situation positioned them in an 
objective different situation than the rest of the society. But, as we will see bellow, 
positive actions did not aim to change societal structures; they were designed just for 
                                                                                                                                          
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own 
religion, or to use their own language.” 
64 See, Ch. TAYLOR, op. cit., p. 43. 
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helping members of disadvantaged groups in order to facilitate or elevate the factual 
enjoyment of their rights at the same level as that of non-disadvantages members.65  
However, since middle nineties new revisionist tendencies have gained more 
visibility among international scholars, especially when stressed not only the 
inequalities that members of non-dominant groups faced at the time; to have equal 
access to opportunities and rights, but also started to focus more on legal institutions 
and social structures that are at the base of the societal organisation. Possibly one of 
the clearest examples of this new conceptual approach can be found in 
deconstructive and critical theories put forward by feminist movements66, according 
to which the focus should be given to dynamics of domination and oppression that 
permeate all societies rather than those of distribution of goods and opportunities.67  
 The logic behind deconstructive approaches is the one that identify legal 
systems, social structures, practises and institutions as a reflection of the culture of a 
given dominant group. Normative standards that are seen as ‘neutral’, as 
representative of non-particular group, in reality would be just a normative reflection 
(normative in a wide sense, including moral norms) of the historical cultural 
experiences of the dominant social group. In other words, “[t]he claim is that the 
supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal dignity is 
in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture.”68 As Taylor remarkably put it, “…this 
would be bad enough if the mold were itself neutral-nobody’s mold in particular”.69 
As a direct consequence of this line of thought, we have to conclude that if 
the society ‘only’ reflects on the views, understandings, values and beliefs of the 
majoritarian/dominant group, then those from minoritarian/non-dominant groups are 
necessarily excluded. This sort of ‘universalisation’ of the dominant group’s 
                                                 
65 In connection with this topic, see Chapter II, Section 3 et seq. 
66 According to Young, “…where social group differences exist and some groups are privileged while 
others are oppressed, social justice requires explicitly acknowledging and attending to those group 
differences in order to undermine oppression.” See, I. M. YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of 
Difference, cit., p. 3. 
67 For feminist movements and scholars, “…women’s oppression consists partly in a systematic and 
unreciprocated transfer of powers from women to men. Supporters of this movement affirm –for 
example– that “…freedom, power, status, and self-realization of men is possible precisely because 
women work for them”, and –in more radical cases– arriving at the point to consider marriage “…as a 
class relation in which women’s labor benefits men without comparable remuneration.” See, I. M. 
YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of Difference, cit., p. 50. 
68 See, Ch. TAYLOR, op. cit., p. 43. 
69 Ibid. 
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experience and culture, and hence its establishment as a societal norm for all 
members of the society (including –of course– members of minorities), has been also 
called –by a more actively combatant or “engaged” doctrine– as ‘cultural 
imperialism’.70 Furthermore, before this kind of scenario, the only possible option 
available to them, in order to be accepted as members of the society, is to assimilate 
themselves into a culture which is not theirs; a sort of alienation process that will end 
in the suppression of their former or “original” identity.71 I will come back later to 
this kind of ‘essentialist’ social-cultural interpretation of social synergies and 
dynamics, toward which I still rest quite sceptical.72  
The change in the interpretation of the principle of equality consists in 
shifting the paradigm from the right to have access to the same opportunities and to 
effective enjoyment of all fundamental rights, on equal footing and without 
discrimination based on illegal grounds (such as ethnicity, sex, gender, colour, 
religion, etc.), to the right of equal enjoyment of the differences. In other words, from 
the right to be equal, or to be different in equality, to the right to be equally different. 
What matters for these new flows of recognition is to go beyond inclusion in equality 
to a new model that could be defined as inclusion in difference. In short it is a 
struggle for the incorporation the non-dominant cultural practices, values and 
traditions into the common societal understanding of “good”; it is a struggle for the 
                                                 
70 See, I. M. YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of Difference, cit., p. 58 et seq. 
71 Taylor goes beyond this, when affirming that “…the supposedly fair and difference-blind society is 
not only inhuman (because suppressing identities) but also, in a subtle and unconscious way, itself 
highly discriminatory”. Ch. TAYLOR, op. cit., p. 43. 
72 It is true that power relations permeate all societal structures and even legal systems, but to 
conclude that these structures ‘only’ reflect majoritarian views is –at least– quite far reaching. If we 
understand culture as a permanent process that reflect intra and extra groups dialectic relationships, 
and not as pure separate compartments, then even majoritarian culture intrinsically and necessarily 
reflects views from non-dominant group. In fact, if we see for example human rights movement from 
a historical-power-relation perspective, then we can say that it has appeared as a power limitation for 
dominant groups vis-à-vis non-dominant groups. Therefore, human rights culture, which is part of all 
societies and nations today, have to be considered as a synthesis of all cultural entities present in 
society, and not as an exclusive majoritarian imposition. Actually, if it has to be considered as an 
imposition, it would be the opposite, namely an imposition from non-dominant groups on dominant 
ones in order to limit their power. Or, from a very sceptical and quite cynical point of view, as –at 
least– a self-imposed limitation, were the incorporation of oppressed groups to the enjoyment of equal 
rights has been conceded by dominant elites in order to guarantee social security and peace… from 
which the latter would benefit most. As Giuseppe Tomassi di Lampedusa made say to prince 
Tancredi, in one of the most –perhaps– enlighted paragraph refering to socio-political dynimics in 
literature, “[s]e non ci siamo anche noi, quelli ti combinano la repubblica. Se vogliamo che tutto 
rimanga come è, bisogna che tutto cambi. Mi sono spiegato?” See, G. TOMASI DI LAMPEDUSA, Il 
Gattopardo, Milano, 2002, p. 50. 
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transformation of the so-called ‘conservative assimilationist society’ to a society in 
with cultural differences are not only recognized but also supported and encouraged. 
It is a struggle for a multicultural society. 
 
 
4.1.  Conceptualisation of multiculturalism 
 
As we can see, it is not an easy task to try to conceptualise the meaning, the 
driving idea behind the label of multiculturalism. This is especially because, this 
concept, is often used –as we will see in our incoming chapters– as an inspiring 
driving force (or perhaps… value), upon which judicial interpretations are built, in a 
sense to support and guarantee the recognition of certain specific “cultural friendly” 
rights (or their “multicultural friendly” interpretations). 
Multiculturalism is one of those terms that are conceptually contested, and to 
which different meanings are attached.73 From a socio-political point of view, “…the 
term ‘multicultural’ covers many different forms of cultural pluralism, each of which 
raises its own challenges.”74 In fact, what we can observe often is that, within socio-
political and legal discourses, there exists a sort of interchangeable use of different 
terms that try to refer to the same phenomena. This is the case, for example, of 
multiculturalism, pluralism, and plurality of cultures or multicultural (societies). 
Perhaps the three latter concepts refer more to a factual description of the cultural 
composition of a given society and the former, to a specific socio-political 
organisation of that plurality; how to deal or… accommodate that cultural diversity.  
In this sense, I will argue that multiculturalism is about accommodation of 
cultural differences in society through legal and institutional recognition of the 
ethno-cultural diversity, providing –as a policy– recognition and open public space to 
all cultural entities that are present in a given society. In this sense, multiculturalism 
advocates for the incorporation of non-dominant/minoritarian cultural views and 
understanding into the common societal good. Furthermore, as a policy, it could be 
                                                 
73 See, among others, D. McGOLDRICK, Multiculturalism and its Discontents, in Human Rights Law 
Review, 5:1, 2005, p. 27-56, and J. RAZ, Ethics in the Plubic Domain. Essays in the Morality of Law 
and Politics, Oxford, 1995, p. 170-191. 
74 See, W. KYMLICKA, Multicultural Citizenship. A liberal theory of Minority Rights, cit., p. 10. 
CHAPTER I 
36 
 
seeing as giving the theoretical support for backing up and sustaining the aspiration 
of non- dominant group for a greater accommodation, helping them in gaining more 
visibility and recognition for their cultural specificities.75 In fact, the affirmation of 
this policy “…asserts the value of groups possessing and maintaining their distinct 
cultures within the larger community.”76 
However, if multiculturalism provides theoretical support to States’ policies, 
then it should be something more than just a policy. In fact, as a policy, 
multiculturalism could lay down at the foundation of governmental actions and 
plans77, but those plans of actions, those objectives connected with the organization 
of the society are not self-justified. These policies find their meaning, their raison 
d’être, their justification on a more elaborate and self-standing structure, on a set of 
ideas, values and principles that provide content and information with regard to how 
society “should be” organized and how power “should be” distributed among the 
different cultural entities existing in society. Therefore, as a notion that gives content 
and informs public policies, multiculturalism is nothing but an ‘ideology’.78 It is a set 
of self-standing and driving forced ideas that advocate for the redistribution of power 
in society, not only through the recognition of cultural differences but also –and 
perhaps more importantly– for the legitimation of non-dominant cultural entities 
through the incorporation of their views, values and understanding to societal 
                                                 
75 For Kymlicka, liberal multiculturalism is “…the view that states should not only uphold the 
familiar set of common civil, political, and social rights or citizenship that are protected in all 
constitutional liberal democracies, but also adopt various group-specific rights or policies that are 
intended to recognize and accommodate the distinctive identities and aspirations of ethnocultural 
groups.” See, W. KYMLICKA, Multicultural Odysseys. Navigating the New International Politics of 
Diversity, cit., p. 61. 
76 See, J. KANE, From Ethnic Exclusion to Ethnic Diversity: The Australian Path to Multiculturalism, 
in I. SHAPIRO, W. KYMLICKA (eds.), Ethnicity and Group Rigths, New York/London, 1997, p. 
542. 
77 For policy, I intend “[a] course or principle of action adopted or proposed by a government, party, 
business, or individual; the written or unwritten aims, objectives , targets, strategy, tactics, and plans 
that guide the actions of a government or an organization. Policies have three interconnected and 
ideally continually evolving stages: development, implementation, and evaluation. Policy development 
is the creative process of identifying and establishing a policy to meet a particular need or 
situation. Policy implementation consists of the actions taken to set up or modify a policy, and 
evaluation is assessment of how, and how well, the policy works in practice.” See, "policy", a 
Dictionary of Public Health, J. M. LAST (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2007. Oxford Reference 
Online. Oxford University Press. 
78 For ideology, I intend “[a]ny wide-ranging system of beliefs, ways of thought, and categories that 
provide the foundation of programmes of political and social action: an ideology is a conceptual 
scheme with a practical application.” See, "ideology" The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, S. 
BLACKBURN, Oxford University Press, 2008. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. 
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common standards. To put it in another way, multiculturalism involves – as 
ideology– an ‘operation of production and redistribution of symbolic resources’79 
among the different cultural groups; a redistribution of their cultural influence over 
socio-legal structures and institutions that shape and modulate any given society.80  
Moreover, as an ideology, multiculturalism advocates for a shift from the 
ideology of the ‘enlightenment’, which basically consist in changing the substantive 
focus from individuals to groups. This advocated change would essentially consist in 
the embracement of a new legal understanding that proposes “…the conception of 
equal citizenship embodied in equal rights needs to be replaced by a set of culturally 
differentiated rights.”81 Under this new light, culture is still central, but not as a 
dialogical and relational process and product between individuals, but as a groups 
related process and product. Since groups become the main cultural actor, it becomes 
quite logical that the ultimate ideological protection is given to the group, to the 
entity which it has been ‘culturally generated’ and not to its ‘cultural generator’, 
which is the individual.  
As we can see, the above mentioned cultural shift changes (or pretend to 
change) the centre of protection of the legal system, allocating at the very core of the 
system not any longer the protection of individuals but that one of groups. This is not 
only a pure theoretical or philosophical exercise. If we take this ideological shift 
seriously, hence in all of those conflicting situations in which the interests of a given 
group and those ones of its individual members would not be compatible, then the 
interests of the group would prevail. This is because the ideological shift generates a 
subtle ideological subordination of the interests of individuals to the interest of their 
group of appurtenances.82 Therefore, we can say that multiculturalism –as ideology– 
                                                 
79 See, G. PAQUET, op. cit., p. 54. 
80 According to UNESCO, multiculturalism is a « …modèle pouvant se substituer à l’assimilation et à 
l’integration pour prendre en compte les droits des minorités nationales. […][C]e nouveau modèle de 
multiculturalisme permettait une meilleure préservation de la diversité et de l’autonomie culturelles 
au sein des sociétés, avec l’espoir que les liens de la citoyenneté maintiendraient ensemble des 
personnes de cultures différentes au sein d’un même Etat. » See, UNESCO, L'UNESCO et la question 
de la Diversite Culturelle: Bilan et stratégies, 1946-2004, Paris, 2004, p. 19. 
81 See, B. BARRY, Culture and Equality. An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, Cambridge, 
2001, p. 9. 
82 I will come back to the problematic relationship between groups and their members, when the 
question of minorities within minorities (or diversity within diversity) will be addressed. Beside this, 
and for the sake of the argument, we can also argue that if humans are essentially a cultural product, in 
a sense that their identities are informed by their surrounded cultural circumstances, then the 
protection of the latter would be nothing but a protection of the former. The question that perhaps 
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sees society as constituted by different cultural entities or groups (not by 
individuals). For this reason, it consequently pleads for the adoption of targeted 
policies that would accord different rights to each group, according to their own 
cultural needs and aspirations. However, it would be important to always bear in 
mind that these cultural needs and aspirations could not necessarily be identical to (or 
compatible with) those pursued by their individual members.83 
The struggle for equality and anti-discrimination has been in the last decades 
a struggle for the achievement of equal treatment regardless of the ethno-cultural 
affiliation of the subject; it has been a struggle for the eradication of societal 
differences and for the abatement of group boundaries. Multiculturalism –on the 
contrary– tries to generate a reverse motion on this process, proposing the 
maintenance and encouragement of cultural differences but –nevertheless– without 
reverting the achieved equality. It is an allotment or partition of the neutral public 
sphere into separate cultural clusters, in which each cultural entity follows its own 
cultural rules and traditions.84  
The multicultural reaction against the cultural neutrality of the common 
universal citizenry –as proposed by the Enlightenment– is based on the 
understanding of its supporters that public sphere is not neutral.85 For them neutrality 
is seen as a euphemism for the perpetuation and transmission of one specific culture, 
the culture of the dominant groups in a given society. For multiculturalist, cultural 
                                                                                                                                          
matters is where to draw the line between the protection of individuals and the recognition of cultural 
groups; between human rights and ‘eventual’ group rights. Or even more radically, what matters could 
be the focus of the argument, in a sense that focalises excessively on cultural differences could end up 
being an impediment to effective protection and further realisation of recognised human rights (in 
particular in connection with the members of excluded/non-dominant/vulnerable groups). Again, these 
questions will be addressed infra in Chapter II, Section 4.3., and 5.   
83 For Kymlicka, the targeted element of multiculturalism is essential. Multicultural policies are built 
around it, in a sense that “…the different forms of ethnocultural diversity are governed by different 
pieces of legislation, which are administered by different government departments, using different 
concepts and principles.” See, W. KYMLICKA, Multicultural Odysseys. Navigating the New 
International Politics of Diversity, cit., p. 78.   
84 It would be a sort of society in which individuals would indeed be equal, but only within each 
‘cultural cluster’ (if the given cultural group takes the principle of equality and non-discrimination 
seriously and truly incorporate it into its traditions and practices). With regard to the other members of 
the society, or –better– with members of other cultural clusters, the relations would not be based any 
longer on the principle of equality but rather on the principle of respect of their cultural differences. 
85 According to Barry, “[i]n advocating the reintroduction of a mass of special legal statuses in place 
of the single status of uniform citizenship that was the achievement of the Enlightenment, 
multiculturalists seem remarkably insouciant about the abuses and inequities of the ancient régime 
which provoked the attacks on it by the Encyclopaedists and their allies.” See, B. BARRY, op. cit., p. 
11. 
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neutrality is not only impossible; it is not even desirable. In fact, for its supporters, 
society should not be neutral; on the contrary, it should reflect and give space and 
visibility to all existing cultural manifestations, and –in particular– to incorporate 
into public spheres and common normative standards the views and understandings 
of excluded cultures.86 According to this ideological position, only by embracing the 
principles enshrined within the ‘politics of difference’, would equality and liberty be 
achieved.87 Hence, only through the recognition of the unique identity of every 
individual and –most in particular– of every cultural group, and therefore only 
through the normative and social acknowledgement of their unique distinctiveness 
and the adoption of differential treatments, the ‘distinctive dignity’ of the members of 
each cultural group would be fully respected.  
The paradox of multiculturalism precisely relies on this sort of ‘distinctive 
dignity’ for which humans must be respected for what is different among them and 
not for what is equal in them.  In other words, under this ideological view, humans 
have to be treated not equally (in a sense of identically or difference-blind) but 
differently, according to their cultural affiliations, in order to be… equally respected!  
Moreover, as we already anticipated, it would be possible to say –following 
this line of thought– that the focus of equality is not any longer the individual but the 
group; equal respect is intended for cultures or the different cultural entities in 
society –which have to have equal space and visibility– and not for individuals. 
Consequentially, the latter have to be treated in a different fashion based on his or 
her cultural group’s appurtenance. In a very essentialist and perhaps a little bit forced 
synthesis, for multiculturalism what matters is culture (and special cultural 
differences), not equality.88 As it has been said, “…multiculturalist debate sought to 
                                                 
86 “Looting” public sphere among the different cultural entities present in a society could be of course 
a valid political alternative, but nevertheless we have to ask ourselves if this kind of policy would not 
erode the common societal contract or understanding that lay down at the bottom of each given 
society. The central question here perhaps is the possibility or not of being together in differences, and 
which is the role that the common neutral space (public sphere) plays in society; and in particular if 
that public place should or not be neutral (in a sense of not embracing any cultural particularism) in 
order to facilitate the construction of a common and unifying enterprise, which is the national 
common identity. Without having the pretension of being exhaustive, some of these questions will be 
discussed further in this Chapter, especially in Section 4.2. See also, Chapter, II, Section 5.  
87 See, Ch. TAYLOR, op. cit., p. 38 et seq. 
88 This is because multiculturalist policies seek to provide advantages to individuals, on the basis of 
their membership in some culturally defined groups; membership which is not available to non-
members. See, B. BARRY, op. cit., p. 15-18. 
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emphasise the group differences and their fundamental significance, demanding 
public recognition of groups and their distinct identities.”89  
Further continuing with this argumentation, we can also say that multicultural 
policies not only advocate for group recognition, in a sense of acknowledgement of 
cultural differences, but also –and perhaps most importantly– seeks to transform 
economic opportunities, political powers, and social status available for members of 
those groups. 90 As a policy, we can embrace it or not according to our own 
sympathies, but its adoption or implementation would be indeed subjected to the 
political game existing in every pluralist and democratic society.  
In fact, if multiculturalism is an ideology that permeates correlative policies –
as I am positively persuaded that it is– then it cannot possibly and logically be a 
right. To stay with the obvious, as apples are not pears, policies (and their backed 
ideologies) are not and cannot be rights. Individuals (or even groups) have rights… 
not policies. An individual member of a minoritarian or non-dominant group has a 
right to not be discriminated against on the basis of its ethno-cultural appurtenance or 
membership. This individual has indeed the right to take part in the cultural life of 
the society, in which he or she lives, or –most specifically– to take part in the 
particular cultural life of the group in which he or she is affiliated, but … does this 
person have the right to live in a multicultural society? In other words, has an 
individual the ‘right’ to multiculturalism; the ‘right’ to a society that will 
mandatorily incorporate into its common cultural standards, views, understandings 
and practises of all cultural entities present in its societal bosom?  
Our answer to these pregnant questions is negative, and cannot be otherwise. 
Even if we could have sympathetic inclinations toward multicultural views, we have 
no option but to recognise the fact that individuals, either as members of dominant or 
not-dominant groups, do not have a right to a multicultural society or even to a 
multicultural state. Why? The answer is simple and strait forward; because 
multiculturalism is not a right, therefore it cannot either be enforced or claimed 
                                                 
89 See, T. MAKKONEN, Is Multiculturalism bad for the fight against Discrimination?, in M. 
SCHEININ, R. TOIVANEN (eds.), Rethinking Non-Discrimination and Minority Rights, 
Turku/Åbo/Berlin, 2004, p. 155. 
90 According to Raz, multiculturalism requires “…a political society to recognize the equal standing 
of all the stable and viable cultural communities existing in that society. This includes the need for 
multicultural political societies to reconceive themselves.” See, J. RAZ, op. cit., p. 174. 
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before judicial authorities, neither at the national nor at the international level. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that individuals cannot have ‘multicultural 
aspirations’. But again, aspirations and rights are not the same. Aspirations could 
become rights, following the necessary procedural instances within a democratic 
system. However, I am fully persuaded that multiculturalism –as a politico-
ideological aspiration– has not been incorporated into a format of a self-standing and 
autonomous right.91 And this incorporation has not happened yet, simply because –as 
ideology– it is still quite contested.92  
Non-dominant cultural entities, minority groups, or any other perceived (or 
self-perceived) disempowered cultural group could indeed –within a democratic 
setting– advocate for multicultural policies and push forward a multicultural political 
claim into a general public debate, with the legitimate aspiration to achieve a specific 
and particular level of accommodation to their cultural demands. If this would be the 
case, then multicultural claims would be ideally discussed in an open and inclusive 
democratic arena, in which all of those interested parties would have to find the 
necessary consensus in order to achieve –at the institutional decision making levels–
agreements that would eventually lead to normative or legislative changes. This is 
                                                 
91 This –of course– does not mean that other rights cannot be interpreted from a sort of multicultural 
friendly position. In fact, some individual rights, such as the right to everyone to take part in cultural 
life (Art. 15, para. 1 (a) of the ICESCR), has been interpreted by for instance the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in a quite friendly multicultural manner. Example of 
this is the interpretation made in connection with the requirement of ‘acceptability’ of the mentioned 
right, for which it was not enough to express that “…law, policies, strategies, programmes and 
measures adopted by the state party for the enjoyment of cultural rights should be formulated and 
implemented in such a way as to be acceptable to the individuals and communities involved”, but 
concluded that this means that “…consultations should be held with the individuals and communities 
concerned in order to ensure that the measures to protect cultural diversity are acceptable to them.” 
Consultations and dialogue are always welcome in a democratic life, but –on the other hand– the 
CESCR seems to forget that democracies are in their overwhelming majority indirect and –therefore– 
people took valid decisions through their legitimate elected representatives. If we would take seriously 
the warning made by this body, then we would find ourselves in the paradoxical situation where direct 
participation of each individual in any decision with potential cultural effects or implications would 
paralyse the entire action of the government, just because everything that the government does (even 
ordinary administration) has –by definition– cultural implications. The right to be consulted will be 
addressed in the successive chapters, in particular in connection with those policies that could affect 
indigenous people’s rights over their traditional lands and natural resources. See, CESCR, General 
Comment No. 21: Right to everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, pra.1 (a) of International 
Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights) (Forty-third session, 2009), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21, 21 
December 2009, para. 16. 
92 In one of the most standing critics to multicultural literature, Barry said “…I have found that there 
is something approaching a consensus among those who do not write about it that the literature of 
multiculturalism is not worth wasting powder and shot on. […] ” See, B. BARRY, op. cit., p. 6. 
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what I call “the democratic game”, and in an open democratic society, nobody is 
excluded (or should not be excluded) from it, majorities and minorities alike.   
Finally, it would be important to make a last conceptual clarification on this 
section. It is in the above mentioned sense that I will use in this work the term 
‘multiculturalism’. That is, as referring to an ideology that could be reflected in 
particular policies, which has been advocated by different scholars and non-dominant 
groups –including indigenous people– around the world, and which is aimed to 
change the socio-political and legal structure and power dynamics in a given society. 
I am not using it, and I will not use it for describing the factual ethno-cultural 
diversity or plurality that exists within modern societies. For factual descriptions of 
the existing cultural plurality in society, I will use the terms ‘plurality’, ‘cultural 
plurality’ or even ‘multiculturality’, but not ‘multiculturalism’. In short, 
multiculturalism operates within the normative or prescriptive dimension of “what 
should be” (according to any specific multiculturalist agenda, such as –for instance– 
the programme of the ‘politics of difference’ or ‘group’s identity policies’) and not 
within the descriptive dimension of “what it is”, namely as a description of a given 
societal cultural reality.93 
 
 
4.2. Multicultural aspirations and equality of cultures. 
 
As we said before, multiculturalism not only recognises the cultural variety, 
the plurality that exists in human societies but also added to that factual description a 
moral argument, a valuative dimension, namely the equal value of each culture, but 
not only. Multiculturalism requires equal distribution of public institutions, legal 
systems and social structures among the different cultural entities factually existing 
in society. In the words of its supporters, “...the demand for equal recognition 
extends beyond and acknowledgement of the equal value of all humans potentially, 
                                                 
93 Barry made an ulterior distinction between the terms multiculturalism and pluralism. For him, the 
former should be reserved for reference to political programs of the ‘politics of difference’, and the 
latter for political programmes that aim to institutionalise cultural differences by segmenting society. 
See, B. BARRY, op. cit., p. 23. 
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and comes to include the equal value of what they have made of this potential in 
fact.”94  
In fact, in multicultural societies, the different cultural communities want to 
survive, and therefore they claim to be recognised and accepted as integrative part of 
the societal ethos, but not only. 95  The different cultural entities also claim that their 
worth should be acknowledged, and their equal value institutionally recognised.96 
Because all humans are equal, what they produce, their creations, their social 
structures, their systems of values should then have equal value. As a system that 
provides substantive support for human life, all cultures provide to its members a sort 
of substantive contents regarding the meaning of life and world-views, and therefore, 
from this point of view, from the perspective of the subject that finds meanings and 
practical solutions in those contents for their everyday challenges, cultures have 
indeed equal valuable functions.  
However, this presumption of equal worth among the different cultural 
manifestations has been criticised for having been unreal and groundless, in 
particular because it fails in showing the logical connection between the fact that ‘all 
humans beings are born equal’ and the assumption of the equal value of what they 
produce, namely between cultures.97  The fact that all humans are born equal, as 
members of the same human family, means that all humans have equal potential 
creative capacity, equal opportunities to develop their ideas, beliefs and 
understandings, and –therefore– equal possibilities to create culture. But nothing in 
our ontological equality can guarantee equal success in our creative activities! 
Societal cultural success, in a sense that one specific cultural valuational proposal (as 
a system of values and on the good) will be embraced and supported by larger 
portions of the society and –therefore– incorporated into foundational societal 
institutions, it is not guaranteed in a free, open and democratic society.  
Some individuals, or group of individuals that constitute a cultural entity, 
could be more successful than others in adapting themselves to cultural challenges 
and hence being able to generate better tailored answers to those challenges that –on 
                                                 
94 See, Ch. TAYLOR, op. cit., p. 42 et seq. 
95 Ibid, p. 61. 
96 Ibid, p. 64. 
97 See, among others, G. PAQUET, op. cit., p. 47 et seq. 
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the other hand– would profit them in terms of cultural advantages (in a broad sense). 
Cultural adaptability has been one of the most obvious cultural patterns in human 
history and –therefore– there is no need to go further in it regards. In addition, it is 
obvious too that every human being is entitled to equal respect (at least under our 
contemporary worldwide recognised human rights philosophy); respect that is 
extended –of course– to his or her worldviews, understandings and beliefs, which are 
‘naturally’ culturally created by them. However, what is not obvious is the logical 
extension of the equal respect principle applicable to every human being, to the 
societal cultural entity in which each human could eventually be part of. In other 
words, it is quite difficult to see the logical connection between the principle of equal 
dignity of every human being and the alleged equal dignity between societal cultural 
institutions, which enshrine self-standing set of principles and values, regardless of 
their connection with individuals that could eventually find in them a certain 
inspiration and identification.98  
Taylor has tried to give an answer to this ‘logical disconnection’. In fact, he 
argued that “...cultures that have provided the horizon of meaning for large numbers 
of human beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a long period of 
time–that have, in other words, articulated their sense of the good, the holy, the 
admirable–are almost certain to have something that deserves our admiration and 
respect, even if it is accompanied by much that we have to abhor and reject”.99 This 
could be considered as a very good attempt in giving a reasonable explanation to the 
above motioned logical misconnection, but –I am afraid– that it is still not sufficient 
in order to justify the moral claim of equal worth between cultural entities or cultures 
as such.  
Perhaps, this logical misconception is grounded on what we have already 
described as the philosophical shift that multiculturalist try to introduce, that is the 
removal of individuals from the centre of the protection of our legal systems, to the 
ethno-cultural entities or groups in which they find meaning of life, guiding set of 
values, philosophical conceptions and cultural practises. It seems to me that for 
                                                 
98 As Taylor clearly expressed it, “…demand for equal recognition extends beyond an 
acknowledgment for equal value of all humans potentially, and comes to include the equal value of 
what they have made of this potential in fact.” See, Ch. TAYLOR, op. cit., p. 42-43. 
99 Ibid., p. 72-73. 
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multiculturalist, it would be through the protection of cultural identities or cultures 
that its members would be better protected and respected in their dignity, and not the 
opposite. Therefore, individuals would receive only indirect protection, through their 
membership to or identification with a specific cultural group or entity, which is –of 
course– not quite the same as a direct tutelage based on their individual rights and 
dignity as… humans; regardless of their particular cultural views and understandings.  
In short, for multiculturalist supporters what matter is culture, in a sense of 
collective product of ethno-cultural entities or groups, and not as a creative 
expression of individuals; for to egalitarian-liberal supporters what really matters is 
the latter. For the former, individuals would receive only a mediated protection, 
which is through the direct protection of their culture; for the latter it would be the 
opposite, in a sense that their culture is safeguarded through a direct protection of the 
individuals’ cultural choices. If this interpretation is correct, then the discussion is 
actually conducted in two different parallels and not necessary connected 
dimensions.  
First, if we focus our discussion on the ‘equal value of cultures’, and their 
consequential claim of their equal representation within the public sphere (through 
their equal incorporation into social-political and legal institutions), then we would 
allocate the discourse on a dimension that we can qualify as “political”. This is 
because, this dimension, is connected with the particular way in which certain 
societal actors (cultural groups) would like or aspire to organise a given society, and 
–in particular– to distribute or allocate political, economic and cultural power. On the 
contrary, if the focus is given to the individuals, based on the fact that “[a]ll human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”, as stated in Article 1 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), then the discourse would be 
allocated on a different dimension. This would be a dimension of ‘rights’, because 
we are no longer addressing political aspirations but concrete and enforceable rights.  
All humans have the right to be treated equally and without discrimination, 
according to pacifically recognised international standards; but having a right is –of 
course– something completely different from having a political aspiration. Every 
single cultural entity or societal groups (minorities and majorities alike) could have 
legitimate cultural/political aspirations, but this does not mean that those aspirations 
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will receive legal protection and support. Again, as apples are not pears, political 
claims or aspirations are not rights.100  
As I said before, societal groups or cultural entities could indeed have (and 
they often have) political aspirations for major levels of influence and recognition in 
a given society, but those kinds of political aspirations do not automatically generate 
especial rights for the members of those groups. Therefore, groups’ members would 
not always have the possibility to seek judicial protection for the substantive 
realisation of their political aspirations; what would be indeed protected in a pluralist 
and democratic society is the possibility to propose to the larger society their views 
and understanding, seeking adherences and broader support. This is the participative 
logic behind the recognition, within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to 
all members of the society of the right to ‘freely participate in the cultural life of the 
community’ (Article 27(1) of the UDHR). Alternatively, in the wording of the ESCR 
Covenant, the reference is given to the recognition of the right to ‘take part in 
cultural life’ (Art. 15, para. 1(a), ICESCR), according to whatever cultural 
affiliations, understandings or views individuals might have; but –of course– with 
full respect to the internationally recognised and guaranteed human rights standards.  
Therefore, in a democratic society, governed by the rule of law and with full 
respect of internationally recognised human rights standards, cultural success is not 
guaranteed. As I said before, what is indeed guaranteed is to have the possibility to 
be part of a cultural life of a given society and to participate in the cultural creative 
process. But “to have the possibility” to take part in the cultural life of a given 
society does not mean that the success of our potential contribution (individually or 
in association with others) would be adopted and incorporated into the broad 
common societal enterprise. That is to have a sort of assurance that the society as a 
whole would be –to some degree– shaped or molded by the said contribution. In 
order to do so, the ideas, understandings, views and beliefs of any particular cultural 
entity or group would have to engage in dialogue with other ideas and beliefs, in a 
                                                 
100 Among the ‘fallacies of confusion’ Bentham has identified a fallacy ‘ad judicium’ which he called 
“sweeping classification”, which consist in “…ascribing to an individual object (person or thing), 
any properties of another, only because the object in question is ranked in the class with that other, by 
being designated by the same name.” If we classify cultural entities or groups and human beings in 
the same group, then it would appear (but only appear) quite logical to attribute the essential 
characteristic of the latter to the former, that is their equality in dignity and rights. See, J. BENTHAM, 
op.cit., p. 265. 
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free, open and competitive public space (what we have called “the democratic 
game”), seeking for support and supporters. In addition, those sets of ideas would 
only be culturally successful if they would be stimulating and appealing enough to 
persuade larger portions of the public. If not, those set of ideas, understandings and 
cultural interpretations of life would –nevertheless– remain fully valid on the private 
spheres of those that have produced them, and whom still find meaning and content 
of life on them. As such, those cultural ideas and understandings will be fully 
protected by the different set of individual human rights, which are available in every 
democratic liberal society (even when they do not gain major cultural support in that 
societal milieu).  
In short, in those cases where cultural views are unable to get public support 
within the bosom of the larger society, they nevertheless remain valid and legitimate 
within the private sphere of their bearers. In addition, these practices will always 
have the possibility to be visible in the public sphere, in a sense that their bearers 
would have the possibility to continuously exercise them in public, and even propose 
them to the larger society (as a legitimate socio-cultural political aspiration of that 
particular group or societal entity). But, without broad public and political societal 
support, the pretension of imposing those set of ideas as part of the common societal 
structure will be nothing but illegitimate in a plural and democratic society.  
 
 
5. The equal functional value of cultures 
 
Until now, we have approached in this section the topic of ‘equality of 
cultures’ or the ‘equal value of cultures’ from a sort of self-cultural perspective, that 
is from the perspective of cultures themselves, as autonomous cultural entities that 
compete for societal recognition and visibility. In addition, we have arrived at the 
conclusion that frame the question of the importance of cultures under the 
application of the principle of equality and non-discrimination, or even as covered by 
the protection of human dignity, constitute a logical misconception. The only ones 
‘equal in dignity and rights’ are human beings, and that equality is not ontologically 
extensible to their cultural expressions, processes and products.  
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However, if we change our substantive focus and instead centre our attention 
on cultural groups and entities we turn our eyes toward the individuals again, then 
perhaps it would still be possible to talk in terms of equality, but from a completely 
different angle, from the perspective of the ‘equal valuative function’ that culture and 
cultural entities perform vis-à-vis individuals.  
In fact, from the perspective of the individual, which is not only the cultural 
bearer but as well the cultural creator, cultures must indeed have equal functional 
value, because they proportionate “meaning of life”, philosophical and moral 
contents which are indispensable for the construction of each individual’s life. 
Cultural valuational structures or cultural philosophical constructions of the good 
provide the essential substantive material indispensable for taking meaningful 
decisions and choices in life.  But this –of course– does not mean that different 
cultures would have equal acceptance or equal valuational adoption in society, or 
even equal success (in a sense that they will shape and mould the common societal 
institutions). Hence, from an individual perspective, from the view of the individual 
that expresses himself or herself through cultural manifestations, whatever they 
might be, cultural views and understandings have indeed equal value. Accordingly, 
individuals should have equal protection in their possibility to express, enjoy and 
transmit their cultural understandings and views, without entering into the substance 
of what those views and understandings are.  
I will argue that it is in this sense that the ‘presumption of equal value’ 
proposed by Taylor should be interpreted –instead– as a ‘presumption of equal 
functional value’ that cultures have in connection with views and understandings of 
the cultural bearers. 101  Actually, Taylor has rightfully introduced himself the notion 
of the ‘equal functional value of culture’ in providing horizon of the meaning for 
large numbers of human beings, but from this functional recognition we cannot 
logically derive the axiomatic affirmation of the ontological equal worth of cultures, 
or a presumption of it.102 Individuals are and should be protected on their 
                                                 
101 See, Ch. TAYLOR, op. cit., p. 66-69. 
102 In fact, Taylor has said that “[a]s a presumption, the claim is that all human cultures that have 
animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to 
all human beings.” As we can see, this is nothing but recognition of the functional value that cultures 
have for the individuals. But, he went further, from this assertion he concluded that we owe equal 
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possibilities to hold and embrace whatever worldviews and system of values (as long 
as they do not infringe internationally recognised human rights standards).  
What could be presumed as having equal value is the equal functional 
relevance that each cultural system of values has for each individual, because the 
latter found his or her meaning of life, the sense of good and bad, on those cultural 
references. Cultures –as a system of valuative substantial choices– have societal 
value and relevance precisely because individuals consider them as a valuative 
functional societal guide; but again, in itself cultures are –in principle– ontologically 
beyond any legal or even socio-moral estimation.103 To put it in another way, we can 
indeed have a presumption of equal value in connection with the importance that 
each individual gives to his or her own cultural system of reference, which lies at the 
bottom of all individual meaningful choices, but not to the cultural-valuational 
structure as such.104 As long as cultural principles and views do not infringe 
commonly recognised international human rights standards, their substance and 
content should only matter for the individual that embrace them, not for the whole 
society. Cultural worldviews in themselves, as cultural entities, are outside of 
relevant moral common/societal considerations, and hence it would be irrelevant –
even from a legal point of view– to analyse whether they have –or not– equal 
value.105  
                                                                                                                                          
respect to all cultures because they are basically equally in dignity. See, Ch. TAYLOR, op. cit., p. 66-
68, and 72-73.  
103 For stay at the obvious, if all cultures have equal value, then no culture will have it. Logically 
speaking, it could be a contradiction in terms to highlight a certain characteristic in a member of a 
family of elements, if all members of that family have the same characteristic and there are no other 
families of elements to compare with. If someone has won a competition, it is because someone has 
lost. If beauty exists it is because ugliness exists too; if someone can be considered rich it is because 
someone else it is not… and so on and so forth. If one culture has value, others will not have; but if all 
cultures have equal values… then equal value with regard to what? There are no other cultures to 
compare them with. In conclusion, it is senseless to discuss the equal or unequal value of cultures, as 
such.  
104 As Appiah stressed, “[i]f an individual needs access to his culture to make meaningful choices 
(and to enjoy self-respect), these sorts of protections are simply in the service of garden-variety 
liberal individualism.” See, K. A. APPIAH, The Ethics of Identity, Princeton, 2005, p. 122. 
105 From even a more critical perspective, Barry has considered the claim of ‘equal recognition of 
cultures’ as “…an absurdly inappropriate demand.” According to him, the absurdity is based on the 
fact that, the proposal in itself, is logically incoherent, just because “…cultures have propositional 
content”. All cultures include propositional ideas on the good, the bad, on what is true, what is 
false…, and precisely because of that, those contents –in themselves– are incompatible with any final 
assessment. In other words, in order to be sure that all cultures have equal value we would have to 
make a comparative analysis between them. However, a comparative cultural analysis is indeed a 
cultural valuational exercise, in a sense that it will require to establish a set of common standards 
under which to evaluate cultures, and –of course– those set of standards would be nothing but 
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Egalitarian discourse is not about cultural equality but individuals having 
equal (abstract/concrete) opportunities, equal recognition of (universal) rights as –for 
instance– the right to take part in cultural life.106 With regard to culture, this principle 
could be translated into the possibility for each individual to produce and to enjoy 
culture, within the bosom of a common societal space. Hence, ontologically 
speaking, what has equal value –at last– is the function that cultures performs vis-à-
vis human beings, namely cultures equally provide propositional content to those that 
are eager to build their identities upon them.107 Hence, the right to take part of the 
cultural life (individually or in association with others) and to produce and share 
culture, should be protected by law and should be enjoyed by all humans, regardless 
their ethno-cultural appurtenance.  
Societies can appreciate differently the different cultural proposals existing in 
its bosom and –based on evaluative choices– they would organise their common 
institutions, including common legal frameworks, mores and traditions, under the 
most convincing and appealing cultural light. Logically, the societal support would 
be most likely given to those cultural proposals coming from the majoritarian 
                                                                                                                                          
culturally created/chosen! As we can see, the argument becomes circular. Perhaps the only possible 
exit to this circular reasoning would be to conduct the comparative analysis under the light of 
universally accepted common standards, and these cannot be others than the internationally 
recognized human rights standards which constitute what has been called ‘our common universal 
moral (cultural) system’, as I will argue in the incoming chapters. But then, our comparative study 
will be focused on the respect of those standards by the different cultures, and not any longer on the 
equal value between them. See, B. BARRY, op. cit., p. 269-270.  
106 Even Taylor is hesitant to consider that his proposal of the “presumption of equal value of cultures” 
could have right based implication from the perspective of the individuals. See Ch. TAYLOR, op. cit., 
p. 68. 
107 Intellectual fairness obliges me to notice that even when it would be ontologically inadequate to 
talk about equal value between cultures, for the reasons already expressed, UNESCO has nevertheless 
incorporated in one of its conventions, namely the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005), the so called ‘Principle of equal dignity of and respect for 
all cultures’. According to its Article 2(3), the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural 
expressions presupposes ‘the recognition of equal dignity of and respect for all cultures’. Hence, 
according to it, the diversity of cultural expressions has to be protected because the cultures that 
generate them are equal in value. But, I am afraid, that there is not logical connection between these 
two elements. Even if we would arrive at proving the equal value of cultures, which is ontologically 
impossible, international community (or any other potential law maker) could legitimately decide not 
to give any particular protection to their products (their cultural expressions), liberalizing the “cultural 
market”. Consequentially, in this hypothetical case it would be the free choices on hand human 
societies that will uphold or not, or promote or not, any particular cultural expression. In any case, we 
have to always take into account that cultures are nurtured by constant exchanges and interactions and 
therefore their cultural products or expressions would be –as well– subjected to constant changes. And 
those changes would –at the end– reshape the same original cultures. Thus, in a liberal society where 
cultures interact freely, individuals would have the possibility not only to change their own culture but 
also to abandon it, without putting in danger diversity. On the contrary, any cultural change, any free 
cultural choice enhances human cultural diversity.         
THE RELEVANCE OF CULTURE 
51 
 
cultural entity present in a given society. Consequently, minoritarian cultures would 
have less visibility and participation in the moulding process of the common societal 
institutions. Their articulated sense of good, of the holy and of the admirable will 
most probably remain confined within their own cultural milieu.  
In free, pluralist and democratic societies, numbers count… and cultural 
matters are not excluded from this general rule. For this reason, it is almost 
unavoidable that majoritarian/minoritarian dynamics will end up reflected in the 
political choices that societies take, especially when defined in its mores and socio-
institutional and legal structures. But if numbers count –as they do– then we can 
rightly ask if minority cultures would have any chance not only on the achievement 
of equal rights for its members, but also on developing and flourishing within a 
society which does not reflect or does not embrace their cultural specificities.108 In 
other words, we can rightfully ask whether minority cultures are entitled to receive a 
special protection as such, as entities/groups differentiated from their members, in 
order to be able –for instance– to have assured participation and guaranteed visibility 
in public spheres, even against the cultural choices of the larger majority. 
Alternatively, even whether those non-dominant groups, with specific 
political/cultural consciousness, are entitled to have specific tailored set of rights that 
would ideally guarantee their participation and visibility within the common societal-
cultural-institutional enterprise.  
In the following chapter, we will try to find some answers to these essential 
questions, especially taking into account the perspective of the social dynamics that 
exist between majorities and minorities in most of the plural societies. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have analysed different notions, from culture to 
multiculturalism, from different angles and perspectives, and from several scholarly 
                                                 
108 As it has been said, “[w]here democracy is still straight majority rule […] the minority question, if 
recognized as such, poses itself in its most elementary form: as protection ‘conceded’ by the majority 
and as an exception from the principle of equality.” See, F. PALERMO, J. WOELK, From Minority 
Protection to a Law of Diversity? Reflections on the Evolution of Minority Rights, in European 
Yearbook of Minority Issues, 2003/4, 2005, p. 8 et seq. 
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fields, including anthropology, sociology, political science and philosophy and –of 
course– law. In particular we have focused on the way that multiculturalism and 
multiculturalist supporters –including even UNESCO109– have attempted and are still 
trying to introduce a multiculturalist re-interpretation of society, in a sense of 
granting cultural groups (not individuals) the right to diversity in the public sphere, 
through pro-active deconstruction and rebuild of the main socio-political and legal 
societal institutions.   
As we also have had opportunity to discuss, multiculturalist theories find their 
legitimation in two main arguments. First, in the experience of disenfranchisement 
and vulnerability that certain ethno-cultural non-dominant and –in most cases– 
minoritarian groups have endured in a long period of time, both in the past and 
present societal organisations. Thus, because of that cultural exclusion, it is argued 
that those societal organisations have reflected and mirrored almost exclusively the 
cultural practices, system of values and organisational understandings of the most 
“culturally dominant” groups or entities, which in most cases are the societal 
majority. Secondly, multiculturalists have argued –and still argue– that substantive 
equality and justice would only be achieved when all cultural groups would also 
achieve the same equal level of visibility, representation and space, within societal 
public spheres in each given society.  
The logic behind this argument is subtly clear; each ethno-cultural group or 
entity has its own unique, specific and essential culture and cultural manifestations, 
which represent and reflect the essence of the group’s identity and which provide the 
essential valuative information for a meaningful life of its members. Therefore, 
always following this multiculturalist logic, if the socio-economic, political and legal 
institutions of a given society do not specifically and institutionally incorporate those 
cultural features that specifically and institutionally represent, reflect or otherwise 
mirror those cultural particularities that explicitly characterise a given ethno-cultural 
group (which for reasons of historical processes of domination and oppression have 
                                                 
109 See, UNESCO, Cultural Diversity, Conflict and Pluralism - World Culture Report, Paris, 2000, p. 
16-17. 
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been excluded from that public societal participation), then that given society would 
be –under the light of this multiculturalist logic– essentially unequal and unjust.110    
As we can see, the multicultural ideal conception of justice is based on 
equality between groups, between ethno-cultural societal entities, and not necessarily 
between individuals. In fact, at the core of multicultural ideas we find the dogmatic 
assumption (or presumption under the wording of Taylor111) of the equal value of 
cultures; dogmatic assumption that has been even incorporated within the official 
discourse of UNESCO, under the wording of “Principle of equal dignity of and 
respect for all cultures”.112  Again, if all cultures (and cultural manifestations of each 
ethno-cultural entity or group) have equal dignity, then it would be quite reasonable 
to argue –under the multiculturalist logic– that each of them should have equal 
representative institutional space, within the public sphere of every single human 
society. This is –of course– regardless of the socio-political and historical processes 
and societal dynamics that have been and most likely are still in place in those 
societies. 
The call for the empowerment of historically disenfranchised, vulnerable or 
oppressed portion of the population in our modern and democratic societies is not 
only an appealing call, but also a moral duty under our current universal 
philosophical framework, that is under internationally recognised human rights 
standards. However, the question is how to do it. Multiculturalist proposal focus the 
answer to this question not only on the societal centrality of ethno-cultural entities or 
groups (and on the power dynamics between oppressor and oppressed groups), but 
also –and even most importantly– on the dogmatic assumption of equal axiological 
dignity of all cultures and groups’ cultural manifestations. The provided answer 
could be perhaps appealing, but it seems to me that its content is both axiologically 
and ontologically incorrect.  
As it has been already maintained, our current internationally recognised 
philosophical and moral standards, which are nothing but international human rights 
                                                 
110 As Young has said, “Social justice […] requires not the melting away of differences, but 
institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without oppression.” See, 
I. M. YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of Difference, cit., p. 47. 
111 See, Ch. TAYLOR, op. cit., p. 66-69. 
112 See, Article 2(3) of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions, adopted by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization, meeting in Paris from 3 to 21 October 2005, at its 33rd session. 
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standards, have recognised and allocated at the very centre of its axiological 
protective system not the dignity of ethno-cultural entities or groups, but the dignity 
of each individual as members of the human family. If amid all international human 
rights instruments there is one that has incontestably recognised value among the 
international community, that one is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR). And, in its very first article, we find nothing but the undisputable 
axiological centrality of the individuals when its states that “[a]ll human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights.”113   
Therefore, even in the case of disenfranchised members of non-dominant or 
vulnerable ethno-cultural entities, the axiological solution would come –as shown 
within the following chapters– from their individual empowerment in their 
enjoyment of those fundamental rights that have been equally recognised to all 
human beings, just because of their condition as members of the unique human 
family. This is, regardless of their potential ethno-cultural affiliations or 
appurtenances. Moreover, through the protection of the human dignity of each 
member of every potential cultural group, and hence through guaranteeing their 
possibility to freely enjoy all recognised fundamental rights (including the right to 
take part in cultural life, in governance, and in all institutional aspects of the society 
in which they live), those potential ethno-cultural entities would be indirectly 
protected and guaranteed. But only, as long as their members consider it worthier 
and actively seek that cultural preservation.  
If cultural entities, or ethno-cultural groups become the axiological centre of 
our system of international protective norms, societal structures and institutions 
would –consequentially– be reshaped and redesigned in order to fully incorporate 
groups’ cultural practices, institutions and particular valuative systems, but not only. 
In this case, we would also face a sort of new cultural ‘ghettoization’ of our societies, 
because the legal status of individuals would depend not on the very fact of their 
human nature, but on their societal ethno-cultural appurtenances. As it has been 
already maintained, this is nothing but turning back the page from one of the most 
enlightened times in human history, namely, the stage in which each human –
regardless his or her ethno-cultural appurtenance– is equal in dignity. Why? Because 
                                                 
113 See, Article 1, of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
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if we follow the multiculturalist path and recognise a different set of special rights 
that would ideally meet those unique particularities that each ethno-cultural group 
has –allowing their members to have specific culturally tailored rights– then the 
axiological foundation that lies at the bottom of our fundamental set of rights would 
change. In fact, it would not be any longer grounded on the equal dignity of each 
individual, and on the consequential recognition of their equal legal status vis-à-vis 
the enjoyment of an equal set of rights (as is –for instance– the case of human rights), 
but on a model based on the equal enjoyment of different legal cultural status. That 
is, the model based on different sets of recognised rights, based on group 
membership.  
To put it in another way, multiculturalist proposals lead to an axiological 
paradigm that could be summarised as ‘equal in differences’, which is not the same 
as ‘different but equal’. The former stresses the equal acknowledgement of our 
cultural differences114 –what we do not have culturally in common– through 
recognition of a different culturally tailored set of rights that would lead to the 
existence of different legal status based on group membership. On the contrary, the 
latter stresses our commonality, what make us equal besides the potential cultural 
differences or alliances. 
Secondly, I said above that multiculturalist proposals are ontologically 
inappropriate because they are built upon a dogmatic assumption of the equal worth 
or dignity of cultures. As it has been already maintained, it is a fallacy115 or logically 
incorrect to enter into a comparative analysis of the value or ontological worth of 
cultures simply because we lack an external comparator. In fact, in order to analyse 
the ontological “equal value” of cultures, we would have to make a previous step, 
which would logically consist in a comparative exercise of their cultural “worth”; 
but –in order to do so– we would need to have an external parameter or yardstick that 
would ideally provide the cultural (moral) comparative guidelines. Indeed, even in 
the case that we would be able to identify such parameter, it would undoubtedly be a 
cultural element! It would be, in fact, a cultural product that would inevitably 
enshrine a cultural system of values and understandings, which would be ultimately 
used to assess other systems of values and understandings… As you can see, if we 
                                                 
114 See, I. M. YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of Difference, cit., p. 174 et seq. 
115 See our considerations developed in footnote 100. 
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use one culture (system of values) to assess the “worth” of other cultures, then we 
cannot simply and logically talk of “equal worth” of cultures; neither as a dogmatic 
assumption nor even as a presumption.116 Humans have ontologically equal universal 
worth; cultures are beyond moral or valuative comparisons because –at the end of the 
day– the understanding of good and the nature of “moral goodness” is just culturally 
attributed, that is according to each system of values and understandings, and 
therefore subjected to an axiological relativity.  
Notwithstanding, even if it would be impossible to assess the ontological 
value of cultures, we cannot deny their functional value. Taylor has grounded his 
proposed presumption of equal value of cultures, on the fact that cultures “have 
provided the horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings, of diverse 
characters and temperaments, over a long period of time…”117 Nevertheless, this 
fact, the fact that individuals have found their meaning of life, their understanding of 
the good and their behavioural guide on their surrounding cultures or cultural 
manifestations, does not allow us to conclude (or even to presume) that those 
cultures have ontological equal value. There is no logical connection between this 
factual and historical proposition and its axiological (I would rather say dogmatic) 
predicate.  
However, what we can indeed reasonably conclude, from the above 
mentioned historical societal function of cultures, is precisely that the meaningful 
function that they perform –vis-à-vis human beings– is to provide them with an 
articulated sense of good, of the holy, of the admirable. Cultures supply a pre-
assembled system of morals and values that would ideally serve as guidelines and 
behavioural parameters for life. In short, if there is a presumption that would be 
applicable to culture, that presumption could only be with regard to the equal 
valuable function that cultures perform in human societies. All of them, without 
exception, provide valuative and substantial meaningful options to individuals, 
regardless their intrinsical moral value. In other words, cultures have an equal 
societal function, regardless their ontological goodness or badness.118    
                                                 
116 See, Ch. TAYLOR, op. cit., p. 42 et seq. 
117 Ibid., p. 72. 
118 For an ontological analysis of the meaning of “goodness”, see, D. ROSS, The Right and the Good, 
Oxford, 2002, in particular, p. 75 et seq. 
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Nevertheless, the fact that all cultures execute an equal societal function does 
not mean that all of them would have equal levels of societal success. In a modern, 
pluralist and democratic society, cultures compete or should openly compete for 
societal support and, as in any other competition, it could happen that some specific 
cultural valuational proposals (as proposed system of values and institutional 
organisations) would naturally have more support and wider acceptance than others. 
In a competition we always have different levels of performance, and cultural 
grounds are not an exception. Some cultural proposals would definitely be more 
appealing and responding than others to cope with the specific time and space 
circumstances that condition a given society in a specific historical period. In fact, 
“natural” –or better– cultural process of “cultural selection”, if we would like to see 
it in a Darwinist terms119, it is what is behind what the UNESCO’s Universal 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity states in its very first article, namely that 
“[c]ulture takes diverse forms across time and space.” The ontological changeable 
character of culture is based precisely on the humans’ creative capabilities, as almost 
unlimited source for cultural (including technological) innovation and societal 
adaptability to the different geo-socio-political, historical and even natural challenges 
that humanity have faced, faces and will face in the future.  
Therefore, because the changeable character of culture is essentially based on 
the cultural adaptability of humans, then we have to forcibly conclude that cultural 
success would only benefit those cultural proposals that would provide better cultural 
answers to the specific geo-socio-political challenges that each society has to face in 
different historical stages. If a given cultural proposal becomes successful enough, in 
the sense as to be able to persuade large numbers of individuals in assuming and 
adopting its cultural propositions, then that cultural manifestation or proposal would 
not only be able to perpetuate itself but also to most probably become majoritarian in 
                                                 
119 Darwin called “natural selection” to the natural process of “…preservation of favourable variations 
and the rejection of injurious variations [within the nature].” See, Ch. DARWIN, On the Origin of 
Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, 
New York, 1864, Chap. IV, p. 77 et seq. In connection with the use of the notion “Cultural 
Darwinism”, in the contexts of indigenous populations, see R. STAVENHAGEN, Cultural Diversity 
in the Development of the Americas. Indigenous Peoples and States in Spanish America, Organization 
of American States (OAS), 2002, p. 20 et seq. 
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a given societal context.120 Hence, the existence of cultural majorities in societies 
tells us nothing but their cultural success.  
However, what about cultural minorities? One could reasonably argue that if 
in societies only successful cultural majorities would be able to ‘culturally survive’, 
then this would necessarily mean that unsuccessful cultural minorities would be 
condemned to perish and vanish from those societies. This kind of argumentation 
could be considered reasonable but not accurate. As we will see in the following 
chapter, in an open, pluralist and democratic society, cultural competition does not 
put under essential threat the survival of cultural entities or cultural manifestations 
(majorities and minorities alike), as long as they would be appealing enough to 
maintain the loyalties of a reasonable number of cultural supporters. 
 
 
 
                                                 
120 As UNESCO has stressed, “[p]rotecting cultural diversity thus meant ensuring that diversity 
continued to exist, not that a given state of diversity should perpetuate itself indefinitely. This 
presupposed a capacity to accept and sustain cultural change, while not regarding it as an edict of 
fate.” See, UNESCO, Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue – World Report, 
Paris, 2009, p. 3. 
  
CHAPTER TWO 
THE RELEVANCE OF CULTURE AND SOCIETAL DYNAMICS 
 
MAJORITARIAN AND MINORITARIAN DYNAMICS IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 
 
“The cultural identity of a people is renewed and 
enriched through contact with the traditions and values of others. 
Culture is dialogue, the exchange of ideas and experience and the 
appreciation of other values, and traditions; it withers and dies in 
isolation.” Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, 1982.1  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In societies characterised by the presence of a plurality of cultural groups or 
entities, and in which these different groups relate to each other following 
majoritarian and minoritarian dynamics, individuals that identify themselves as 
members of one of those minoritarian cultural aggregations would most likely find it 
uneasy to advance and fully develop in the society compared to the members of the 
majority. The reasons for this different performance within the common societal 
organisation could be found in the fact that cultural majorities would most probably 
dominate, with their numerical presence, most of the areas of the society, including –
of course– its economic, social, and cultural aspects.2  
                                                 
1 UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, adopted by the World Conference on 
Cultural Policies, Mexico, 6 August 1982, para. 4. 
2 There were and there are exceptions to the majoritarian rule where a cultural minoritarian group was 
able to dominate the society, from a civil, political, economic, social and cultural point of view. An 
historical example of it could be found in the extreme case of the Apartheid in South Africa, which 
established an institutionalised discriminatory system. Today, we can find that certain ethno-cultural 
elites (e.g. the criollos elites in certain Latin American countries) are still able to economically, 
socially and culturally dominate the society. The reasons behind these historical situations vary and it 
would not be possible address them here, but it would be important to keep in mind that one of the 
most decisive factors that allowed these power and economic imbalances, in particular throughout the 
colonization process, was the broad cultural gap between the different cultural entities in the 
possession and control of technological knowledge and related devices. In fact, the overwhelming 
cultural differences (with their consequential power asymmetries) were translated into overwhelming 
institutional/factual inequalities. In fact, ‘transfer of technology’ has been identified as one of the 
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In fact, from a cultural perspective –as we said before– numbers count, and 
this would be indeed reflected on the socio-political choices that a given society will 
take, especially when establishing its legal framework or socio-institutional set up. 
But, the rule of the majority is not and should not be without any sort of limitation. 
As history taught us, the inexistence of limits on the exercise of the majority’s 
potential power could create a situation where members of minoritarian cultural 
groups would be unequally treated or even deprived of their fundamental/universal 
rights.  
However, because in modern democratic societies rights are equally 
recognized without discrimination to all humans, members of cultural minorities 
would have –at least from a theoretical legal perspective– equal rights like those that 
regard themselves as members of the majoritarian culture. But –as it has been also 
quite clear in history– the fact that the same rights are recognised to both, members 
of majoritarian and minoritarian groups, does not necessarily mean that they will 
have the same equal opportunity to effectively enjoy them. 
If we turn our eyes to history, we find that minorities have been mistreated for 
centuries, suffering not only structural discrimination and exclusion from mainstream 
societies, but also persecution, violence and destruction. Only few decades ago 
international community witnessed the extermination of Jews and other ethno-
cultural minorities in Europe under the oppressive boots of the Nazi Germans; or –
even more recently– the “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide” that took place in the 
former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. These are just examples –among many others in 
history– of extreme discrimination and persecution based on ethno-cultural and/or 
religious motives.  
Yet, discrimination and disfranchisement of members of cultural minorities 
have not always resulted in those extreme violent situations, or even to 
institutionalised discriminatory legal systems, like those racial segregation laws that 
have been enforced in U.S. or the Apartheid regime in South Africa. In fact, 
structural discriminations of cultural minorities could have –and often has– more 
                                                                                                                                          
possible effective remedies/redress that the Durban Programme of Action envisaged with regard to 
historical injustices and for develops programmes for the social and economic development of 
developing countries and the Diaspora. See, Report of the World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Durban, 31 August - 8 September 2001 
(A/CONF.189/12), p. 61, para. 158. 
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subtle and less visible forms, especially when the legal framework of a given society 
is a reflection of the cultural parameters of the ethno-majoritarian group (as in 
general it is). Nevertheless, even when non-discrimination laws are enforced, and 
States have taken a neutral position with respect to cultural and religious diversity 
through the establishment of difference-blind societal institutions, new societal 
movements still see unfair distinction and cultural exclusion in these settings. 
According to their line of thought, a difference-blind society does not guarantee full 
cultural equality, because without a profound deconstructivist societal process, 
societal institutions will just continuously mirror or implicitly lean towards the 
cultural inclinations and needs of the majority.3  
Perhaps, one of the most quoted examples of less favourable structural 
conditions for members of minority groups could be found in the education sector.  
In many countries (not to say in the large majority of them) education is only 
available in the official recognised languages, which is usually the same language of 
the ethno-cultural majority of the population. Thus, members of minoritarian cultural 
groups would most likely have difficulty to have access to instruction in their 
respective mother tongues. As we know, even when the right to education has been 
recognised as one of those fundamental rights which are intimately connected with 
‘the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity’4, 
international human rights standards still do not impose on States the obligation to 
organise an educational system that would include instruction to minorities in their 
mother tongues.5 However, in order to enhance the possibilities of members of 
                                                 
3 As it has been said, “[t]he choice of public holidays, official languages, national symbols and the 
content of schooling, not to speak of the many far less obvious social structures and processes, reflect 
and sustain the identity and the preferences of the culturally dominant group.” See, T. MAKKONEN, 
Is Multiculturalism bad for the fight against Discrimination?, in M. SCHEININ, R. TOIVANEN 
(eds.), Rethinking Non-Discrimination and Minority Rights, Turku/Åbo/Berlin, 2004, p. 168 et seq. 
4 See Article 13(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
5 It is true that the Article 13(1) of the ICESCR imposes on the States the indirect obligation to 
“…fulfil (facilitate) the acceptability of education by taking positive measures to ensure that 
education is culturally appropriate for minorities and indigenous peoples…” (See, General Comment 
No. 13, The Right to Education (Art. 13), 08/12/99 (E/C. 12/1999/10), UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)), but this general obligation does not impose –unfortunately– the 
specific obligation to organise formal and substantial education in minority languages. In the same 
line of thought, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, states in its Article 4(3) that “States should take appropriate 
measures so that, whatever possible, persons belonging to minorities may have adequate 
opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue.”  If we pay 
attention to the linguistic configuration of the phrase, and in particular to its verbal tenses, we have to 
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minority groups to have full access to the right to education, many States (sometimes 
under the auspices of regional organisations6) have ‘accommodated’ their national 
legislations, and gradually incorporated the use of minority languages into their 
educational systems.7  
In any case, even when States decided to accommodate their educational 
systems, in order to facilitate the access of minority groups’ members, this does not 
mean that the State has recognised and put in place a new differentiated set of rights, 
specifically tailored to meet the differentiated cultural needs of these groups. On the 
contrary, the accommodation of public policies is nothing but the full 
implementation of the same individual right to education that all members of society 
have. It is just an interpretative extension of the State’s duties outside of what is 
technically and legally required vis-à-vis the substantial nutshell of these rights.  
International human rights standards establish a minimum set of rights that States 
must respect, protect and fulfil, but nothing impede them to recognise a higher 
standard of protection, based perhaps on their own perception of fairness, in their 
internal political or even groups dynamics. If we continue with the example of the 
right to education, when the national legislator has decided to include –for instance– 
bilingual and multicultural education at the primary level, this does not mean that a 
pre-existing right has been finally recognised to those favoured minoritarian ethno-
cultural groups. This only means that their socio-political aspirations have finally 
found political support within the society. In a democratic society, it is the so-called 
‘democratic game’ that provides open channels for the realisation of the socio-
political and cultural aspirations of the minority groups, and not forced re-
                                                                                                                                          
necessarily conclude that the direction taken by the international community is that one of trying to 
induce the States into an accommodation of minority languages in their educational systems. 
However, there is not a concrete (legal) obligation to do so. Even if the Declaration imposes on the 
States the (moral) obligation to protect the linguistic identity of the members of minorities groups (as 
stated in Article 1(1)), it leaves nevertheless a broad margin of appreciation to the States in connection 
with the legislative and other measures that they will have to adopt in order to do so (Article 1(2)).  
6 Among regional organisations, the Council of Europe has been very active in enhancing the 
protection of (national) minorities. In this front, two important instruments have been adopted: the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992) and the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities –FCNM (1995). In both, State parties are encouraged to incorporate 
minority languages into their national educational systems; but, as even the explanatory report of the 
FCNM states, these kinds of provisions “[have] been worded very flexibly, leaving Parties a wide 
measure of discretion.” See, FCNM’s Explanatory Report, para. 75.  
7 A reflection on this tendency could be found in the fact that, up to date, the European Charter for 
regional or Minority Languages has been ratified by 25 European States. 
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interpretations or even de-constructions of the existing rights and standards.8 In 
short, the question is not about how to reinvent the wheel (as some scholars perhaps 
wish it, under the auspicious of new fashionable deconstructivist theories9), but just 
how to make a full use it!10  
The ‘democratic game’ –as I called– is basically a dialogical and 
methodological process which is contextual by nature, in the sense that the cultural 
dialogue between minorities and majorities does not happen and cannot occur in an 
institutional vacuum, but in the bosom of a concrete society which has –of course– 
its own socio-political institutions. In other words, cultural dialogue cannot occur 
without a cultural context, which will naturally, substantially and methodologically 
influence and condition the content of that dialogical process. Therefore, 
minoritarian socio-cultural and political aspirations and claims will be unavoidably 
subject to socio-culturally and politically institutionalised channels of the main 
society. However, once engaged in dialogue and taking into consideration that 
disagreements cannot always be satisfactorily resolved, we can do nothing but 
conclude together with Parekh that “[i]t is difficult to see how a decision can be 
reached other than by minorities accepting the society’s established decisionmaking 
                                                 
8 Even when the CESCR has already interpreted Article 13(2) of the ICESCR as including the 
obligation to “…fulfil (facilitate) the acceptability of education by taking positive measures to ensure 
that education is culturally appropriate for minorities and indigenous peoples…” However, this 
extensive interpretation of the text of covenant does not mean that official education has to be 
bilingual. On the other hand, as Article 5(2) of the Covenant states, the fact that the present Covenant 
“does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent” is nothing to prevent 
States to do it in a wider degree, following their internal socio-cultural and political dynamics. 
Therefore, it is not for international committees or even international judicial bodies to enlarge the 
scope of the recognised rights, but for the States, which in doing so enjoy a large margin of 
manoeuvre, following –as I said– their own internal democratic game. (See in connection with the 
right to education, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). General Comment 
No. 13 (Twenty-first session, 1999) - The right to education (article 13 of the Covenant). UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1999/10, United Nations, 1999). 
9 See, among others, I. M. YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of Difference, Princeton, 1990, p. 174-
206 et seq. 
10 Minority’s members can always organise themselves and –for instance– settle private institutions 
where the minority language is the main language of instruction, or –at least– to be taught as a second 
language. In this sense, a full exercise of their rights to freedom of association, freedom of expression, 
and to take part in cultural life, in combination with the right to education, gives to members of 
minorities a full range of possibilities for conservation and dissemination of their cultures and 
languages, among the members of the mainstream society. In this case, States are not obliged (just 
encouraged) to provide subsidies for these private schools but, if it does it in connection with one 
cultural group, by virtue of the application of the principle of equality and non-discrimination, it has to 
extend it to all the other ethno-cultural entities. See, A. EIDE, Commentary of the Working Group on 
Minorities to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2), UN Working 
Group on Minorities, 2005, para. 59-64. 
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procedure and the values embedded in it.”11 Democracy is substantially a method of 
taking common valid decisions and peacefully resolving disputes. Therefore, as long 
as minorities would have genuine possibilities to take part within the democratic 
dialogical process, putting forward their political aspirations and having concrete 
chances to gain support and to convince the majority, the outcome of the democratic 
institutional methods should be respected. In short, ‘if the majority remains genuinely 
unpersuaded, its values need to prevail’.12  
Because the discussion has been quite abstract until now, I would like to 
briefly put the minority/majority dynamics in their historical contexts (at least the 
most recent one); in this way, it would be easier to understand how important this 
matter was and still is for our modern pluralist societies.  
 
 
2. Historical perspective of majority-minority societal dynamics 
 
Minority’s demands for overcoming structural and systematic hardships have 
received –at the international level– different answers over the past decades. If we 
focus our attention on the developments following the Second World War in 
connection to the protection of minorities13, it would be possible to identify an initial 
period where all legal discriminatory laws that formally targeted minority members 
were eliminated. Therefore, all individuals were treated equally, irrespective of their 
ethno-cultural affiliations (e.g. with the elimination of discriminatory laws based on 
religious or race/ethnic grounds).14 This phase could be characterised as a culturally–
blind or difference-blind equality, which basically means that cultural differences are 
                                                 
11 See, B. PAREKH, Minority Practices and Principles of Toleration, in International Migration 
Review, 30-1, 1996, p. 259. 
12 Ibid. 
13 For an historical overview of the different stages that the protection of minority rights had passed, 
see –among others– N. LERNER, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law, The 
Hague/London/New York, 2003, p. 7 et seq. 
14 We can also identify previous historical phases in connection with the treatment of minorities and 
the minority question, but this would take us out-side the scope of this work. Just as a summary, we 
can generally say that immediately before this period of ‘blind equality’, we can generally identify the 
existence of a period in which the relations between minorities and majorities were characterised by 
‘toleration’. In fact, in the latter period, minorities were not restricted or even criminalised for 
developed their own culture ‘as long as they do not interfere with the culture of the majority’. See on 
this regards, J. RAZ, Ethics in the Plubic Domain. Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, Oxford, 
1995, p. 172-173.  
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not determinant for the equal enjoyment of recognised rights, and not as a policy-
period in which minorities were subjected to policies of assimilation, as it has been 
wrongly considered.15 In addition, this period could be identified –within 
international law– by the adoption of the main human rights instruments, namely the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the two Covenants on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
together with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD).  
However, it was clear that the full application of the principle of equality did 
not resolve those situations of structural hardship that contextually affected the full 
enjoyment of certain rights by members of cultural minorities. Hence, several 
exceptions to general rules were introduced in order to enhance the effective 
enjoyment and protection of those rights (e.g. through the introduction of quotas or 
grants to facilitate the access of minority members to superior education). This 
period of targeted protection and recognition of the specific challenges that members 
of minority groups faced in society were characterised by the introduction of the so-
called affirmative or positive actions. These actions or measures allowed to 
exceptionally treat minority members, not like all other members of the society, but 
in accordance with their own cultural particularities, in order to diminish less 
favourable preconditions existing in society. As example of this new minority 
approach, we can mention the ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples16, or the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of 
                                                 
15 Assimilation policies require positive actions from states organs aiming specifically to overturn or 
disassemble minority cultural entities. Full application of the principle of equality and non-
discrimination never allows to negatively target any cultural practice in society, simply because it 
would be a negation of the full exercise of the individual (culturally-blind) right to freedom of 
association, to freedom of expression, to take part in the cultural life, among others. As an avoidable 
consequence of the full exercise of these individual rights, members of cultural minorities would have 
the real possibility to enjoy and develop their own cultural views and understandings, and therefore 
with real and concrete chances of not being assimilated to the mainstream culture. The non-
intervention of the State in cultural matters, and therefore their allocation within private spheres, can 
never be compared with certain assimilative policies that had been applied by certain States against 
specific sectors of their population (e.g. the case of the removal of aboriginal children from their 
families by the Australian Federal and State government agencies, under the Aborigines Protection 
Amending Act of 1915 ).  
16 In fact, in its Preamble, the ILO Convention No. 169 expressly recognizes the “aspirations of these 
peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to 
maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions, within the framework of the States in 
which they live…” 
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National Minorities –FCNM17, or even the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Form of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).18  
Finally, in the Post-Cold War World, with the revival of cultures under the 
auspicious of globalisation, new multicultural winds were blowing over the minority 
question (in general) and above the managing of diversity (in particular).19 In fact, 
under the new fashionable lights of multiculturalism and diversity, scholars and 
minority advocates started asking for the introduction not just of exceptions to 
general rules but new group-differentiated, targeted and culturally separate set of 
rules, which will ideally reflect and promote the distinguishable colours of diversity 
in society.20 What it pursued is not only rainbow societies but also colourful legal 
and institutional systems. In connection with these new approaches, it would not be 
easy to find –outside of the specialised and self-reflected literature21– so many 
examples of its international codification. In fact, most of the few international 
instruments that have –to certain extent– incorporated it are in most cases 
declarations, which constitute in themselves a quite clear indicator of –at least– lack 
of political will among the States to advance in this matter with more legally 
constrained instruments. As example of these soft law arrangements, we can mention 
the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity22 or even the recent UN 
                                                 
17 In this sense the Council of Europe’s FCNM clearly states in its preamble that “…a pluralist and 
genuinely democratic society should not only respect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious 
identity of each person belonging to a national minority, but also create appropriate conditions 
enabling them to express, preserve and develop this identity.” This stresses the necessity to undertake 
all adequate measures to promote effective equality between persons belonging to a national minority 
and those belonging to the majority (Article 4(2)). But also highlights the need to ‘…promote the 
conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their 
culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity’ (Article 5(1)).  
18 States Parties of the CEDAW undertook the obligation to introduce ‘temporary special measures 
aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women’, as stated in Article 4(1). 
Additionally, they are also obliged to ‘…modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and 
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices 
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped 
roles for men and women’ (Article 5(a)). The latter obligation clearly introduced a pro-active 
duty/function on the hands of the States in order to diminish those less favourable preconditions 
existing in society.  
19 See, S. P. HUNTINGTON, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New 
York, 1997, p. 21 et seq.  
20 See, W. KYMLICKA, Multicultural Odysseys. Navigating the New International Politics of 
Diversity, Oxford, 2007, p. 61 et seq. 
21 See, B. BARRY, Culture and Equality. An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, Cambridge, 
2001, p. 6-9. 
22 The Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, adopted on 2 November 2001, partially shows 
this linguistic shift, from individual protection to group recognition, when –for example– states that 
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Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which has fostered indigenous 
people’s political claims for more political and legal autonomy and even self-
determination.23 
The reason for this sort of lack of political will from the international 
community could be seen as quite evident. States were and still are very reluctant in 
sharing –within their territories– their sovereign powers with other entities, even 
when the ‘devolution’ of powers will not –in theory– affect or threaten their physical 
integrity and political independence.24 However, because these new tendencies in the 
management of the so-called “minority question” include –in general– claims for 
decentralisation processes, based on the configuration of ethno-cultural sub-state 
entities, it is quite understandable that States would be inclined to fear that this would 
eventually generate a potential redrawing of their internal political borders, but not 
only. It could also be seen as a strong encouragement for territorial secession.25 In 
fact, under this new interpretative position, what would be required in order to 
accommodate claims from members of cultural minorities would be to recognise and 
effectively grant equal rights (together with specific exceptions from general rules). 
The multiculturalist alternative would be –instead– to cede or transfer public powers 
and competences from the States –at national, regional or municipal level– to the 
                                                                                                                                          
‘[i]n our increasingly diverse societies, it is essential to ensure harmonious interaction among people 
and groups with plural, varied and dynamic cultural identities as well as their willingness to live 
together’ (Article 2). 
23 The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, adopted on 13 September 2007, by the UN 
General Assembly, starts its preamble by affirming not only that indigenous peoples are equal to all 
other ‘peoples’ but also by recognising the right of all peoples “…to be different, to consider 
themselves different, and to be respected as such.” Thus, from its beginnings, the declaration strongly 
emphasises the needs of the recognition of the differences, within a cultural diversity framework, but 
not only. The Declaration also utilises a subtle language that put indigenous peoples in a sort of equal 
entity position vis-à-vis the State, inter alia, when it calls for ‘a strengthened partnership between 
indigenous peoples and States’, to ‘enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the State 
and indigenous peoples’. The use of the language is quite clear in its intention, namely to uphold 
indigenous peoples as a group with (separate) rights vis-à-vis States. It would be quite unreasonable to 
talk about a partnership between States and its citizens (which by the way include indigenous 
peoples). Citizens are a constitutive part of the State; therefore –ontologically speaking– they cannot 
be in partnership with themselves. But why should indigenous peoples be able to do it, when they 
themselves are also citizens of the same State in which they live? It seems that the explanation is more 
political than a legal, and perhaps much connected with a well-articulated indigenous peoples’ 
international lobby…  
24 See, among other authors, K. HENRARD, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection. 
Individual Human Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination, The 
Hague/Boston/London, 2000, p. 306 et seq. 
25 See, W. KYMLICKA, Multicultural Citizenship. A liberal theory of Minority Rights, Oxford, 1995, 
p. 71. 
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ethno-cultural groups themselves.26 In other words, instead of fully vesting 
individuals with their rights, regardless of their ethno-cultural affiliations, this new 
trend of institutional and political recognition of ethno-cultural minorities proposes 
nothing but to vest the group as such, as a separate and self-standing entity, with 
differentiated rights…, which is not quite the same.27 In fact, the recognition of 
minorities as self-standing entities not only opens a collective legal dimension, which 
the consequential shift from individuals to groups as a subject of protection, but even 
most importantly involves a discussion in a different dimensions, namely a struggle 
for division of political power within a given society.28 
I will come back later on in this chapter to the question of the validity of these 
minoritarian claims for a multicultural division of political power, under current 
international law standards, and –in particular– together with the analysis of the 
international standards applicable to the case of indigenous people. However, before 
continuing with this thematic focus, it would be important to make some further 
clarifications with regard to one of the concepts that has been touched upon in this 
section and laid just at the bosom of the majority-minority dynamics. Of course, I am 
referring to affirmative or positive actions and their potentiality in bolstering 
substantial equality in society. 
 
 
3. Affirmative actions and substantive equality for groups in vulnerable situations  
 
As it has been already stressed, in our modern societies it could happen (and 
often happens) that members of ethno-cultural minorities finds themselves affected 
more adversely of conditions in society which would affect their possibilities to fully 
enjoy their equal rights and development. These unfavourable conditions are most 
likely generated by the fact that general rules and social structures in society reflect 
                                                 
26 See, for general overview on this matter, F. PALERMO, J. WOELK, Diritto Costituzionale 
Comparato dei Gruppi e delle Minoranze, Padova, 2008, p. 139 et seq. 
27 This shift on the paradigm of protection of members of minority or non-dominant groups has 
irresistibly called to my mind one of those old but wise Italian proverbs that says “Chi tiene un santo 
in Paradiso, non va a casa del Diavolo”. See, N. CASTAGNA, Proverbi Italiani. Raccolti e 
Illustrati, Napoli, 1866, p. 12. 
28 Rightfully, Henrard called this dimension a “systems of power-sharing”, which can include –in a 
broad sense– federalism and other forms of territorial as well as personal autonomy. See, K. 
HENRARD, op. cit., p. 313 et seq. 
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and are molded by the cultural dimension of the majority29. Hence, it would be 
possible and even natural to conclude that, for members of minority groups, it would 
be more culturally demanding to adequate their practices and behaviour to rules that 
are seen –by the large majority of the society– as culturally neutral.30 What is 
perhaps seen as a neutral cultural practice for the wide society, for minority members 
could be culturally unfamiliar or could even generate an insurmountable burden for 
the perpetuation of the minoritarian way of life.31   
However, the recognition or factual acceptance that in each given society, 
common public societal structures and institutions would most likely be influenced 
by its predominant cultural entity, but this does not and must not mean that those 
institutions would necessarily create privileges or prerogatives for members of 
cultural majorities, to the detriment of non-dominant groups. Of course, it would be 
naïve to dismiss the fact that the existence of those privileges was a common 
historical societal feature in our societies, but in today’s world our common shared 
minimum cultural standards (and human rights are indeed a core example of them) 
do not allow their existence any longer. In fact, any unjustified distinction on the 
basis of ethno-cultural grounds (or any other prohibited ground) will be considered a 
discriminatory practice under the light of our current international human rights 
standards.32 Thus, before the law, all individuals have the right to be equally 
                                                 
29 See, F. PALERMO, J. WOELK, From Minority Protection to a Law of Diversity? Reflections on 
the Evolution of Minority Rights, in European Yearbook of Minority Issues, 2003/4, 2005, p. 8 et seq. 
30 As many scholars have already said, from a cultural point of view, that neutrality is unattainable. 
Societies are cultural products, they are a sort of cultural synthesis that reflects the social and power 
dynamics that exist in them, and therefore they will not be externally neutral, vis-à-vis other societies, 
or even internally because they will always have the tendency to reflect the cultural choices of the 
majority of its population… In free, open and democratic societies, individuals have the possibility to 
freely decide their cultural alliances and openly propose their cultural views to the society as a whole; 
but –as it has been already said– there is no guarantee that the latter will embrace, incorporate and 
reflect them. And this sort of lack of assurance makes societies advance and develop more tailored 
cultural responses to all current socio-cultural challenges. As Appiah wrote “…without some 
racialized conception of a group, one’s culture could only be whatever it was that one actually 
practiced, and couldn’t be lost or retrieved or preserved or betrayed.” See, K. A. APPIAH, The 
Ethics of Identity, Princeton, 2005, p.137. 
31 See, B. PAREKH, op. cit., p. 263 et seq. 
32 For example, a typical non-discrimination clause present in almost all international instruments 
could be the one that we find within the ICCPR and ICESCR, in their respective Articles 2(1) and 
2(2). These provisions almost equally state that “…the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” A more specific non-
discrimination clause could be found in Article 1(1) of the ICERD. This article conceptualises the 
term "racial discrimination" as “…any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, 
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing 
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positioned or to be treated –as a rule– in the same way, regardless of their ethno-
cultural affiliations.  
Nevertheless, even when the principle of equality treatment for all individuals 
is the general rule in democratic societies, the fact that its application in concrete and 
specific situation can eventually generate situations of uneasiness or disadvantages 
for certain part of the population, cannot be negated. Precisely for this reason, when 
the application of an apparent neutral-general-abstract rule will disproportionately 
affect a specific parts of the population, due to their ethno-cultural characteristics, 
modern legal systems have introduced tailored special measures that, operating as 
exceptions from general rules, would ideally equalise the conditions that affect the 
substantive enjoyment of certain rights by the members of the affected group. 
In this sense, the so called affirmative or positive actions could be designed to 
strengthen the position of universally defined individuals who find themselves 
disadvantaged in the enjoyment of their fundamental rights, within societies where 
certain reminiscences of past systemic discriminations, whether social or political, 
are still present. In this sense, their main goal is to achieve equality in the enjoyment 
of human rights for all individuals, majorities and minorities alike.33 Because the 
disadvantaged/discriminatory situation that could affect members of minorities is in 
most cases based precisely on their ethno-cultural affiliation to or identification with 
a minoritarian group, positive actions are designed to create “targeted privileges” (or 
exclusive rights) only for the members of those groups.34 In fact, affirmative action 
refers –in general– to specific measures that are aimed at preventing or compensating 
disadvantages that are linked to ethnicity.35 
As we said before, specific affirmative provisions have to be considered as an 
exception, in favour of members of the disadvantaged groups, to the general equal 
rule that is applied to all members of the society. This general rule, which establishes 
                                                                                                                                          
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.” 
33 In fact, affirmative action has been defined as a “…preference, by way of special measures, for 
certain groups or members of such groups (typically defined by race, ethnic identity or sex) for the 
purpose of securing adequate advancement of such groups or their individual members in order to 
ensure equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” See, A. EIDE, Possible ways 
and means of facilitating the peaceful and constructive solution of problems involving minorities, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34, United Nation, 1993, para. 172. 
34 This would be the case, for example, of members of a given ethno-cultural group that are so 
overwhelmingly overrepresented among the poor, ill-educated, or unskilled labour force.  
35 See, T. MAKKONEN, op. cit., p. 159. 
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that people are to be treated equally regardless their colour or ethnic background, 
would have been equally applied to minority members (in a sort of colour and 
cultural-blind fashion) if the exception would have not been granted. In fact, this 
exception to the general rule would actually allow minorities to have access to the 
enjoyment of certain rights that otherwise they would not have had the possibility to 
enjoy. Therefore, under the light of the previous considerations, it would be possible 
to say that the implementation of these measures would be in line and compatible 
with the accomplishment of the equality principle, especially from a more 
substantive (or effective) point of view.36 In other words, the recognition of these 
kind of privileges would consequently generate a situation of ‘reverse 
discrimination’ for non-minority members (all those considered as culturally 
affiliated with the majoritarian group) which would be excluded from the enjoyment 
of these particular benefits. However, this different treatment would be considered 
justified due the fact that members of the majority are already able to enjoy those 
targeted rights. In fact, due to their position, members of the majority are not in need 
of any extra protection, and –even most importantly– they would not be affected by 
the concession of highest level of protection for those that are not in the same factual 
position.37   
Furthermore, since affirmative action creates a privilege situation in favour of 
members of disadvantaged groups for the achievement of equal enjoyment of certain 
rights, it would become not only reasonable but also necessary that, when that equal 
enjoyment is achieved, those privileges would cease. Otherwise, the recognised 
different treatment would become unjustifiable and therefore would amount to a 
discrimination vis-à-vis those that are excluded from its enjoyment.38 To put it in a 
different way, when structural imbalances in society, that objectively put members of 
                                                 
36 See, F. PALERMO, J. WOELK, From Minority Protection to a Law of Diversity? Reflections on 
the Evolution of Minority Rights, cit., p. 8 et seq. 
37 As UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Capotorti, has said, “…equality and non-discrimination imply a 
formal guarantee of uniform treatment for all individuals, whereas protection of minorities implies 
special measures in favour of members of a minority group–the purpose of these measures 
nonetheless is to institute factual equality between the members of such groups and other 
individuals.” See, F. CAPOTORTI, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, United Nation, 1979, p. 98, para. 585. 
38 It is important to notice that this interpretation of positive actions has been incorporated into Article 
1(4) in fine of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD), which rules that “[special measures]shall not be continued after the objectives for which 
they were taken have been achieved.”  
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minority groups in adverse positions vis-à-vis members of the majority –with regard 
to the enjoyment of certain rights– have disappeared, then the maintenance of those 
privileges would be unjustified. In fact, their preservation would violate the very core 
of the principle of equality, in a sense that people in the same situation would be 
treated differently and not alike, as it is required by the said principle. Moreover, 
under the new equal situation, the maintenance of special measures would be nothing 
but the maintenance of separate sets of rights, based on ethno-cultural group 
affiliation or even race, under the old-fashionable anthropological and legal 
denomination.39 
At this point and for the sake of argument, it would be important to clarify 
that, even when special measures are established for the benefit of the members of 
certain cultural groups, this is for the individuals and not for the benefit of the group 
as such. These measures are not designed to guarantee the survival of any cultural 
entity (or their specific characteristics) within the framework of a free, open and 
democratic society.40 Affirmative action just facilitates the enjoyment of individual 
(abstractly designed) rights by a certain (disadvantaged) segments of the society.  
 
 
3.1. Affirmative action and cultural groups’ demands for a separate set of rights 
 
As it has been said before, when we discuss affirmative action, the reference 
is always made on individual rights or to the equal protection of individuals in 
connection with the enjoyment of their rights. The aim of these measures is to 
remove the existing structural societal inequalities in order to allow equal 
possibilities for its members in the enjoyment of their rights, regardless their cultural 
alliances. But, if we continue with this line of thought, we have nothing to do but 
arrive at the conclusion that the legal scope of affirmative actions does not include 
                                                 
39 See, K. A. APPIAH, op. cit., p.130 et seq. 
40 Some less radical and non-utopian version of multiculturalism, in particular those that are grounded 
on philosophical-liberal roots, consider that even this ideology is not opposed in principle to the 
assimilation of one cultural group by others, “[s]o long as the process is not coerced, does not arise 
out of lack of respect for people and their communities, and is gradual…” See, J. RAZ, op. cit., p. 
182. 
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the possibility to grant different set of rights to groups, defined by their distinctive 
cultural features.41  
In fact, one thing is temporary exceptional measures granted for the reduction 
of factual imbalances in society, and another –quite different– is to grant permanent 
differentiated rights to ethno-cultural groups’ members, in order not just to foster 
their equality vis-à-vis the majority, but to conserve, strengthen and develop their 
differentness through a permanent system of ‘group-conscious policies and rights’. If 
this would be the case, then affirmative action would have as its aim not the ‘equal 
enjoyment of the same set of rights’ but, on the contrary, the ‘equal enjoyment of a 
different set of rights’, established in accordance with each cultural groups 
particularities and differences. The dangerousness of this pretended new approach is 
self-evident. In fact, it would imply that the legal and institutional division of the 
society according to ethno-cultural appurtenances, a sort of new ‘ghettoization’ 
which is nothing but turning back the page from one of the most enlightened time in 
human history, namely, the stage in which each human, regardless his or her ethno-
cultural appurtenances, is equal in dignity. To put it in another way, the recognition 
of a different set of rights would lead to a model not any longer based on the 
individual equal enjoyment of the same legal status (as it –for instance– is the case of 
human rights), but to a model based on the equal enjoyment of different legal status, 
based on group membership.42  
In addition, this new proposed model of societal division and segmentation 
would also be contrary to the ‘principle of neutrality’, in a sense that in modern 
democracies, national states should not set out to encourage, discourage or take 
active position with regard to the success of any particular form of life or 
                                                 
41 See, B. BARRY, op. cit., p. 12-13. 
42 In fact, the aim of positive measures is to strength the situation of members of vulnerable non-
dominant groups, in order to enhance them to a similar equal position as that held by members of the 
dominant cultural entities. The goal here is to increase the possibilities of those disadvantages sectors 
of the society in the enjoyment of the same rights, and the participation in the same societal 
institutions, as full members of the same society. A quite different thing is what Taylor and other 
scholars that support what we have called “politics of recognition” proposed as the goal for especial 
measures for non-dominant groups. In a few words, we can say that “politics of recognition” proposes 
a paradigm that could be summarised as ‘equal in differences’, which is not the same than ‘different 
but equal’. The former stresses the equal acknowledgement of our differences, of what we do not have 
in common, and lead to the existence of different legal status; on the contrary, the latter stresses our 
commonality, what make us equal beside the potential cultural differences or alliances. See, for an 
opposite opinion, I. M. YOUNG, op. cit., p. 174 et seq. 
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understanding of the good. In a plural, open and modern democracy, States should 
only create those fair structural conditions that would allow an open cultural 
competition between the different proposed ways of life and understanding of the 
good, without helping or hindering any of them. Therefore, if States would recognise 
different sets of rights to all potential groups existing in the society, this would 
consequentially spawn the artificial perpetuation and even imposition of a certain 
form of life, or understanding of the good, to those seen as members of those 
different ethno-cultural groups, but not only. In addition, it would also generate –as I 
said before– a sort of regression in connection with one of our most important 
cultural achievement of the modern era, namely, “that all humans beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights”, as worded in Article 1 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).  
 
 
3.2. A multicultural (and deceptive) reinterpretation of the principle of equality 
 
As we can see in the former section, what would be at stake with this new 
multicultural proposal is actually the content and scope of the fundamental principle 
of equality. Why? Well if we read carefully the following sentence written by 
Young, then perhaps we will start to see the connection, or –better– dis-connection 
(or a misleading interpretation) between groups’ multicultural revindications and 
equality. According to Young, “[a] culturally pluralist democratic ideal […] 
supports group-conscious policies not only as means to the end of equality, but as 
intrinsic ideal of social equality itself. Groups cannot be socially equal unless their 
specific experience, culture, and social contributions are publicly affirmed and 
recognized.”43 As we can see, for her (and other multiculturalist scholars), the final 
aim of the principle of equality in a democratic society would not be the achievement 
of formal or even substantial equality among individuals, among all human beings 
regardless their ethno-cultural affiliations (as stated in Article 1 and 2 of the UDHR). 
For Young, equality is about groups, and concerns the equal division of power and 
socio-cultural societal influences among them.  
                                                 
43 Ibid., p. 174. 
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For this multiculturalist vision, equality is about equal division of powers 
between ethno-cultural groups. For multiculturalist supporters, what matters is the 
group rather than its members; not the individual human beings whose fate would be 
normed and regulated by the ethno-cultural norms of the group in which they just 
happen to be born or otherwise be part of.  In fact, instead of being born ‘free and 
equal in dignity and rights’, as any other human being, a member of a given group –
for the fact of being born within a group– would be equal in rights and dignity only 
with regard to his or her fellow group members. However, this person would not be 
in equal position vis-à-vis members of other groups, which would have different sets 
of equal group rights. Under this light, only groups would be equal in dignity and 
rights, in a sense that they would have the equal possibility to regulate the fate of 
their members. And as human beings? As humans, as individuals… they would not. 
What would define the essence of their rights would not be their very nature as 
human beings, but just their group membership.  
Most likely, the logical conclusion reached in the previous paragraph would 
be, I believe, enough to understand why I am saying that multiculturalism and 
politics of recognition could lead toward a regression on the protection of 
fundamental rights. If not, then allow me to say that this ideological position could 
generate a scenario comparable –to certain extent– the one existing prior to the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), at least from the 
perspective of the protection of individuals. Let me explain this more in details.  
As we know, before the arrival of the current system of human rights 
protection, whose formal starting point could be identified with the adoption of the 
UDHR in 1948, the level of recognition of fundamental rights were to a great degree 
(if not all) in the hands of national states. Therefore, it was a common internationally 
recognised feature that citizens of different states had not only different levels of 
effective enjoyment of their rights but also different sets of fundamental rights.44  
In fact, before our current human rights based era, it would be accurate to say 
that the legal system in place was not a system of clear and equal common minimum 
international standards available for the enjoyment (and protection) of all individuals, 
just for the fact of being humans beings. What was in place was a system of rights 
                                                 
44 See, F. PALERMO, J. WOELK, Diritto Costituzionale Comparato dei Gruppi e delle Minoranze, 
cit., p. 67 et seq. 
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recognition and protection based on the membership to a certain politically defined 
group, namely to be a citizen of one or another country. And it is precisely here 
where we find similarities with these new multiculturalist ideologies, because –at the 
end of the day– they propose nothing but to subordinate the recognition of rights to a 
group membership. What in the past was nationality and citizenship today will be 
ethno-cultural membership45; and all of us know what had happened in the first half 
of the XX Century to those that did not have any strong international entity or 
national state able or keen to defend them from State organised and sponsored 
terror.46 Our current system of human rights protection has been precisely developed 
to protect and defend all human beings, regardless of their nationality and ethno-
cultural alliances, especially from institutional organised violence and 
disenfranchisement.47   
                                                 
45 Example of the old school of thoughts can be found in Mill, who is in fact advocating for the 
importance of the concept of nationality saying that “[n]obody can suppose that it is not more 
beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the current of the ideas and 
feelings of a highly civilized and cultivated people–to be a member of French nationality, admitted of 
equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship, sharing the advantages of French protection, 
and the dignity and prestige of French Power–than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of 
past times, revolting in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general 
movement of the world.” Besides the obvious observation that these words should be considered under 
the contextual historical light in which they were written, they are more than adequate to illustrate the 
importance given to nationality and national membership at the end of the second half of the XIX 
century. For Mill, the path that will lead to the enjoyment of equal rights and laws is the path of 
nationhood and citizenship; for multiculturalism is a sort of “grouphood” and ethno-cultural 
affiliations that pave the way toward equality. See, J. S. MILL, Considerations on Representative 
Government, New York, 1862, p. 314    
46 Perhaps one of the most enlightening pages on this subject have been written by Hannah Arendt in 
the aftermath of Eichmann’s trial. When analysing the conditions and policies that paved the way for 
the deportation to concentration camps of millions of Jews from the Nazi occupied or otherwise 
controlled territories in Europe, she rightfully pointed out that “[t]he legal experts drew up the 
necessary legislation for making the victims stateless, which was important on two counts: it made it 
impossible for any country to inquire into their fate, and it enabled the state in which they were 
resident to confiscate their property.” Moreover, when commenting on the factors and circumstances 
that have allowed the trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem (in particular with regard to his kidnapping in 
Argentina), she again sensitively conclude that “…it was Eichmann’s de facto statelessness [he was 
never deprived of his German nationality], and nothing else, that enabled the Jerusalem court to sit in 
judgment on him. Eichmann, though no legal expert, should have been able to appreciate that, for he 
knew form his own career that one could do as one pleased only with stateless people; the Jews had 
had to lose their nationality before they could be exterminated.” As we can see, both the victims and 
the victimiser, although all the differences between them,  were affected by the same sort of weakness 
of a system exclusively based on the protection of those considered members of a certain given group, 
namely state’s citizens. See, H. ARENDT, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil, 
London, 1992, p. 115 and 240. 
47 See, F. PALERMO, J. WOELK, Diritto Costituzionale Comparato dei Gruppi e delle Minoranze, 
cit., p. 75. 
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Furthermore, if the appurtenance or group’s membership is stressed as a 
decisive factor for the recognition or allocation of rights, then what would matter 
would be no longer the simple fact of our “humanity”, of what we have in common 
as human beings, but rather the membership criteria. Ironically, what will make us 
members of a given group, and therefore entitled to the enjoyment of certain specific 
rights, would make us –at the same time– legally excluded from the enjoyment of 
other fundamental rights recognised to the members of other ethno-cultural groups. 
This is nothing but a sort of new disenfranchisement under the name of the old 
disenfranchisement! In addition, as a consequence of the fact that group membership 
would became the decisive factor for the enjoyment of rights, not only the question 
of “how” we become member of a given group would be essential,  but also –and 
perhaps even more importantly– the question of “who” would decide upon this 
crucial matter would be essential too. In other words, if we start granting rights based 
solely on the criteria of our ethno-cultural alliances, then the entitlement of rights 
will depend not on our common nature as humans but on “how”, “where” and by 
“whom” the line between groups would be draw.  
Last but not least, the recognition of rights only under the bases of ethno-
cultural appurtenances could also lead us to the slippery and dangerous path of race. 
In order to explain this, I will start considering one affirmation made by Kymlicka. 
He, talking on the natural –and even desirable– changeable characteristic of cultures, 
stressed the fact that we must “distinguish the existence of a culture from its 
‘character’ at any given moment”48, in a sense that process of modernisation or 
adaptability to new cultural conditions does not change the essence of each given 
culture or ethno-cultural group. He also added that “[t]he desire of national 
minorities to survive as a culturally distinct society is not necessarily a desire for 
cultural purity, but simply for the right to maintain one’s membership in a distinct 
culture…” 49 Therefore, if what counts is the ‘essential character’ of certain ethno-
cultural group, and not its cultural manifestations –which are subjected to change, 
modification and adaptation to new societal circumstances– then it seems to me that 
the concept of culture (in this multiculturalist version) is not very far from the 
                                                 
48 See, W. KYMLICKA, Multicultural Citizenship. A liberal theory of Minority Rights, cit., p. 104-
105. 
49 Ibid. 
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concept of race. As Appiah rightfully stressed, what is left without addressing the 
character or the expression of a given culture “is just the fact of descent.”50 And… if 
rights would be granted only because of “descent”, then allow me also to say that we 
are not happily navigating the sunny and safety waters of a human rights based 
system but –on the contrary– we are entering into those dark and dangerous waters of 
a “cultural/race” based conception of rights.51  
Therefore, it would be important to explore –for the sake of the argument– 
certain concepts that appear to be relevant to this argumentation. I am referring to the 
notion of minority and in particular the question of group’s membership. In fact, until 
now we have explored different concepts, such as culture and social groups, which 
helped us to understand the basis of what is considered a multicultural society. The 
need for their study is grounded in the fact that these concepts have gained more 
visibility day after day within the legal and political international discourses, but also 
because their comprehension would be indispensable in order to critically analyse the 
legal and jurisprudential (and even perhaps multicultural) developments of 
indigenous people standards within the following chapters. In effect, if we come 
back to the central topic under discussion, which is the relevance of culture in society 
and its potential use in the re-interpretation of fundamental rights, we would realise 
that much of the discussion has been connected to the existing societal dynamics 
between the different ethno-cultural groups. These dynamics are –in most cases– 
influenced by the existing socio-political relationships between majoritarian and 
minoritarian groups in a given society. But… how do we identify these two different 
kind of groups? Even a very simplistic analysis over this question will tell us that the 
mere numerical element would not be enough for a proper identification of majorities 
and minorities. In fact, the number of members affiliated to each group does not help 
us to identify the necessary requirements that have to be fulfilled by each of their 
members, in order to be considered as such.  
                                                 
50 See, K. A. APPIAH, op. cit., p.136 et seq. 
51 Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “Everyone is entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.” The wording of this norm absolves me to further explain why a system of rights based on 
ethno-cultural group membership is a far away conception not only from the wording but 
fundamentally from the spirit of our very human rights milestone.  
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Therefore, before continuing with our analysis, and specially before entering 
into the consideration of the specific case of indigenous people, it becomes 
indispensable to evaluate these constitutive elements. In fact, it would be relevant for 
this study to properly answer the question of under which criteria we can consider an 
ethno-cultural entity or group as a minority, and what role the notion of cultural 
diversity plays vis-à-vis securing the efficacy of the norms that specifically protect 
minority members.   
 
 
4. What is a minority? 
 
Without trying to make an historical account of the development of the notion 
of minority, it would be –nevertheless– adequate to say that the first attempts to 
conceptualise this societal notion started at the time of the League of Nation, and 
especially through the jurisprudence of the late Permanent Court of International 
Justice (P.C.I.J.).52  
In fact, in its famous advisory opinion on minority schools in Albania, the 
P.C.I.J. made an attempt toward the conceptualisation of the notion of minorities. It 
stated that “[t]he idea underlying the treaties for the protection of minorities is to 
secure for certain elements incorporated in a State, the population of which differs 
from them in race, language, or religion, the possibility of living peaceably alongside 
that population and co-operating amicably with it, while at the same time preserving 
the characteristics which distinguish them from the majority, and satisfying the 
ensuing special needs.”53 From this wording we can preliminarily identify two 
elements that –for the late P.C.I.J.– were necessarily involved within minority 
provisions: a) the equal treatment that members of minority groups deserve vis-à-vis 
members of the majority and b) the need for protection and preservation –due to their 
                                                 
52 Actually, we can say that the ‘minority question’, started before together with the notion of national 
state. In fact, it was with the “Peace of Westfalia” that ended the religious wars in Europe in the XVII 
Century, and gave birth to the new conception of national sovereign states. See, F. PALERMO, J. 
WOELK, Diritto Costituzionale Comparato dei Gruppi e delle Minoranze, cit., p. 67 et seq. 
53 P.C.I.J., Advisory Opinion of April 6th, 1935, Series A./B. No. 64, Minority Schools in Albania, p. 
17.  
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special situations– of their “racial peculiarities, their traditions and their national 
characteristics.”54  
Beside the relevance of this obiter dictum of the P.C.I.J. with regard to the 
affirmation of the principle of equality55, there is no much clarification on it in 
connection with the necessary differentiation criteria between majorities and 
minorities. However, this was not the only time that the P.I.C.J. dealt with the notion 
of minority or with similar notions. In fact, even before the issue of the above 
mentioned advisory opinion, this Court had already the possibility to deal with the 
fairly similar notion of “community”, in its advisory opinion in connection with the 
issue of emigration of the Greco-Bulgarian “communities”. In that opportunity, this 
Court defined the latter notion as “the existence of a group of persons living in a 
given country or locality, having a race, religion, language and traditions of their 
own, and united by the identity of such race, religion, language and traditions in a 
sentiment of solidarity, with a view to preserving their tradition, maintaining their 
form of worship, securing the instruction and upbringing of their children in 
accordance with the spirit and traditions of their race and mutually assisting one 
another.” 56 Therefore, two other elements can be identified as essential under the 
view of this Court. First, the specific external characteristics of the community, such 
as race, religion, language and traditions, that make it different from the rest of 
population ‘living in a given country or locality’. Secondly, the sentiment of 
solidarity among the members of the community, which can be characterised as a 
sort of an internal self-identification of group members, among themselves and with 
the group as such. As we will see, all these four characteristics have been 
incorporated into (with just little modifications) the later attempts of definition of the 
term minority. 
Nevertheless, after this short but promising attempt of the League of Nations 
to deal with the minority question, and especially after the traumatic experience of 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
55 In fact, the P.C.I.J. has emphatically affirmed that “[e]quality in law precludes discrimination of 
any kind; whereas equality in fact may involve the necessity of different treatment in order to attain a 
result which establishes an equilibrium between different situations.” And, after arguing that it would 
be easy to imagine cases in which equality of treatment would result inequality; in fact this Court has 
concluded that “[t]he equality between members of the majority and of the minority must be an 
effective, genuine equality…” See, P.C.I.J., Series A./B. No. 64, Minority Schools in Albania, p. 19. 
56 See, P.C.I.J., Advisory Opinion of July 31st 1930, Series B – No. 17, The Greco-Bulgarian 
“Communities”, p. 33. 
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the Second War World, the discussion of minority issues (and therefore the attempts 
for its scientific conceptualisation) entered into a stalemate. This, of course, has been 
also widely influenced –under the wording and spirit of the UDHR– by the belief 
that general protection of universal human rights would be sufficient to protect 
minorities.57   
However, after this initial period and within the new international institutional 
umbrella of the United Nations, the question of minorities came back to the 
international arena under the vests of the decolonisation process, in particular under 
the self-determination wins that were blowing from the south of the Mediterranean 
sea, but not only. In fact, as result of the encroachment of the process of 
decolonisation with new movements, such as civil rights and racial desegregation, 
minority issues gained a new force among the international community, and within 
the new codification process of international law.58 The first, and perhaps still the 
most important example in international law in connection with the rebirth of the 
minority question, for its universal range and authoritative character, can be found in 
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
which specifically addresses and recognises the right of persons belonging to 
minority groups. 59 
But, because the express recognition of the right to persons belonging to 
minority groups was only made through the incorporation of a quite general rule 
(Article 27 ICCPR), a need for deeper clarifications appeared, and –most in 
particular– for a conceptual framework with regard to the notion of minorities itself. 
                                                 
57 See, P. LEUPRECHT, Minority Rights Revisited: New Glimpses of an Old Issue, in P. ALSTON 
(ed.), Peoples' Rights, Oxford, 2002, p. 116-117. 
58 For a more detailed account in connection with the rebirth of the minority rights political process, 
see W. KYMLICKA, Multicultural Odysseys. Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, 
cit., p. 27 et seq ; and for a historical-legal perspective, in particular in connection with the regime that 
was established by the League of Nations (and even before), see –among others– G. SCELLE, Précis 
de Droit des Gens. Principes et Systématique I et II, Paris, 1984, p. 187-256; A. MANDELSTAM, La 
Protection des Minorites, in Académie de Droit International (ed.), Recueil des Cours, Paris, 1923, p. 
364-519; N. FEINBERG, La Juridiction et la Jurisprudence de la Cour Permanente de Justice 
Internationale en matière de Mandats et de Minorités, in Académie de Droit International, Recueil des 
Cours, Leyde, 1937-I, p. 591-705; and F. ERMACORA, The Protection of Minorities before the 
United Nations, in Académie de Droit International (ed.), Recueil des Cours, The 
Hague/Boston/London, 1983-IV, 247-370. 
59 Article 27 of the ICCPR reads as follow: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own 
religion, or to use their own language.” 
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Under the light of these new needs and trends, the former UN Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (“Sub-Commission”) gave 
a concrete mandate to its Special Rapporteur to develop this conceptual framework. 
In exercise of his mandate, Mr. Francesco Capotorti presented his “Study on the 
Rights of persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities” in 1977. 
In it, he proposed a definition of minorities which is still today one of the most 
accurate working definition of the term, even though it was only intended to be 
understood within the scope of application of Article 27 ICCPR.  
Caportorti’s definition of the term “minority” reads as follow: “A group 
numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant 
position, whose members–being nationals of the State–possess ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, 
if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, 
traditions, religion or language.”60 
As explained by the Special Rapporteur, his definition is deconstructed in two 
different criteria, one objective and one subjective (as it was also introduced before 
by the I.P.C.J.).61 The first criterion can be described as “objective” and refers to the 
factual existence of a minority group within a State’s population. This criterion could 
be also deconstructed into different elements. That is: a) the existence of “distinct 
groups possessing stable ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics that differ 
sharply from those of the rest of the population”62; b) in connection with their 
numerical size, “they must in principle be numerically inferior to the rest of the 
population”63; c) with regard to dynamics of “power” and “domination”, in a sense 
that considers minorities as those groups which find themselves in a “non-dominant 
position” vis-à-vis the rest of the population.64 Finally, the last objective criterion 
                                                 
60 See, F. CAPOTORTI, op. cit., p. 96, para. 568. 
61 See supra note 56. 
62 See, F. CAPOTORTI, op. cit., p. 96, para. 566. 
63 Capotorti stressed that “…in countries in which ethnic, religious or linguistic groups of roughly 
equal numerical size coexist, article 27 is applicable to them all”; but he nevertheless clarified –
especially in connection with those factual situations in which the existing groups are numerically 
small– that “… States should not be required to adopt special measures of protection beyond a 
reasonable proportionality between the effort involved and the benefit to be derived from it.” Ibid. 
64 According to Capotorti, “dominant minority groups do not need to be protected”, especially 
because “…they violate, sometimes very seriously, the principle of respect for the will of the 
majority…” Clearly, the reference is made to the case of South Africa –at the time– ruling Apartheid 
regime. Ibid. 
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refers to d) the juridical status of the members of minority groups in connection with 
the State of residence, which is that “they must be nationals of the State”. In this 
sense, “new minorities”, such as immigrants, are considered neither under the 
protection of Article 27 ICCPR nor as minorities as such. 
With regard to the second component of the notion of minorities, namely the 
“subjective” criterion, Capotorti defined it as “…a will on the part of the members of 
the groups in question to preserve their own characteristics.” According to him, 
“…the will in question generally emerges from the fact that a given group has kept 
its distinctive characteristics over a period of time”, and –for this reason– he has 
concluded that this subjective criterion actually “…is implicit in the basic objective 
element, or at all events in the behavior of the members of the groups.”65 If a given 
minority is officially recognised, as for example the Sami in Sweden or Ladino in 
Italy, then it would be no need for the application of this sort of iuris tantum 
presumption, precisely because the recognition of the State will give to that group the 
right to claim the special benefits enshrined in Article 27 ICCPR. But, if this is not 
the case, then –in case of controversy– even this presumption would not be enough to 
prove the existence of a minority group; it would be necessary to look for ‘objective 
indicia’ which would externally indicate the existence of such differentiated cultural 
entity within a given society.  
The need for a sort of “objectivisation” or “externalisation” of the 
“subjective” criterion is required not only in order to enhance the principle of 
certainty of the law, but also because the need to avoid potential abuses –due the 
controversy that always surround minority issues– of the special protection 
recognised as guaranteed by Article 27 ICCPR. Some of this necessary external 
‘indicia’ has been even enumerated by Capotorti in his report. In fact, the Special 
Rapporteur –when referring to the subjective criterion– has stressed that it would be 
logical to conclude that members of a given group would have the will to develop 
and preserve their own characteristics when they “…display in their everyday life a 
strong sense of identity, unity and solidarity, when they strive to maintain their 
                                                 
65 If we read carefully Capotorti’s report, it would be possible to assume that the later affirmation was 
perhaps done in order to avoid potential dangerous inquiries –as a tool to avoid the application of 
Article 27– tending to determine whether or not groups themselves intend to preserve their 
individuality. Therefore, it would be fair to say that this iuris tantum presumption has been preferred, 
as the “lesser evil”, than open the “Pandora box”. See, F. CAPOTORTI, op. cit., p. 96, para. 567. 
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traditions and culture and persevere, sometimes against heavy odds, in the use of 
their language, when they regard themselves and are regarded by others as 
belonging to a distinct group…”66  Hence, a contrario sensu interpretation will 
clearly lead us to say that if a minority group is not able to keep alive its own ethno-
cultural traditions and practices, with the consequential non-external visualisation of 
them, then such a group cannot and should not be regarded as protected under the 
scope of Article 27 ICCPR. This is simply because –as he also said– the said group 
could not be considered as a “minority” or a distinctive “cultural entity” any longer.67 
Most of the time, the existence of minority groups is a self-evident factual issue68, 
but if it is not, then it would be necessary to look for clear objective indicia which 
will support the claim of its existence as distinctive cultural aggregation, otherwise it 
would be nothing but a mere ‘cultural mirage’.  
Finally, it would be important to stress that the subjective element of this 
notion cannot be interpreted as providing room for an essentialist protection of a 
given “minority culture”, or absolute tutelage to what could be considered the given 
“minority identity” of a specific ethno-cultural group. As the proposed definition 
said, its subjective element refers to the existence of the “sense of solidarity” among 
the members of a minority group, a ‘sense’ which tends toward the preservation of 
that given culture. Therefore, what is indeed included within the notion of minority is 
the ‘will’, the purpose of minority members to continue with their cultural practices 
and to preserve and develop what they consider as their own identity as members of 
such a group.69 However, this is not exactly the same as the protection of a given 
minority culture “as such”, as a perpetual and unaltered societal entity that should be 
guaranteed against any influence of change, in order to preserve its “cultural 
essence”. To put it in another way, what is included within the proposed definition –
and hence potentially protected by minority provisions– is the individual ‘will’ of 
                                                 
66 Ibid., p. 97, para. 571. 
67 See, F. CAPOTORTI, op. cit., p. 97, para. 572.  
68 See, G. ALFREDSSON, Minorities, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, and Peoples: Definitions of 
Terms as a Matter of International Law, in N. GHANEA, A. XANTHAKI (eds.), Minorities, Peoples 
and Self-Determination, Leiden – Boston, 2005, p. 172. 
69 Even when the notion of cultural identity will be developed in the following sections, it is 
nevertheless important to say that nobody should be forced to belong to a minority group; individuals 
must always have the possibility to leave any given ethno-cultural group. Individual appurtenance to a 
given ethno-cultural group is and should always be based on individual choices and not on group’s 
will. For this reason, this element has been called also ‘self-identification’ requirement. See, G. 
ALFREDSSON, op. cit., p. 166-167. 
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each member of the minority group to express and develop himself or herself through 
the practice and exercise of a “minority” tradition or culture. What is at stake is the 
respect for the ‘will’ of members belonging to minorities to preserve their 
characteristics70; a ‘will’ that is manifested and identifiable through the exercise of 
the cultural freedoms of each of the members (the individuals) of a given ethno-
cultural entity, and not by the entity itself. However, this cultural individual choice 
(the ‘will’), in order to be relevant, should be exercised together (collectively) with 
the other members of the same given societal entity. In fact, the “sense of solidarity” 
is nothing but the collective manifestation of this individual will; this collective 
dimension –nevertheless– does not change the essential individual protective purpose 
of the minority notion and legislation.71 
If we continue with the analysis of the international attempts that have been 
conducted in order to define these notions, seven years after the Capotorti’s report, a 
new definition was introduced by one of the members of the UN Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Mr. Jules Deschênes. He 
considered that minority refers to “[a] group of citizens of a State, constituting a 
numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that State, endowed with 
ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority 
of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only 
implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with 
the majority in fact and in law.”72 The fortune of this new definition did not differ 
from the fate of Capotorti’s definition, in a sense that none of them was adopted by 
the Sub-Commission as official definition of the term. However, a general agreement 
was constructed –among the members of the Working Group charged with drafting 
of the future declaration on the rights of persons belonging to national, ethnic, 
religious and linguistic minorities– with regard to the need to develop a working 
                                                 
70 See, F. ERMACORA, op. cit., p. 299. 
71 It is always important to keep in mind that it is the “person belonging to such minorities”, and not 
minorities themselves, who is the object of protection of all minority provisions, including –of course– 
Article 27 ICCPR.  
72 See, J. DESCHÊNES, Proposal concerning a definition of the term "minority, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31 and Corr.1, United Nations, 1985, para. 181. 
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definition, as a base on which further norms could be elaborated for the protection of 
the rights of minorities.73  
Notwithstanding, what is interesting to highlight on Deschênes’ definition is 
the notion of temporality, in a sense that the existence of a minority is a factual issue 
that would depend on the existing concrete socio-temporal circumstances in each 
given society (a sort of factuality in a broad sense). A given group would not be 
regarded as a “minority” if its position in society has –for instance– changed into a 
“dominant position”, or does not differ any longer from the mainstream part of the 
society (because it has lost its cultural particularities), or even when the situation of 
legal and factual equality (vis-à-vis the mainstream society) has been achieved. In 
fact, these elements –identified by Deschênes– go in a contrary direction of seeing a 
minority from an essentialist point of view, as an unchangeable entity that always 
conserve (and will conserve in the future) its ethno-cultural salient characteristics, 
regardless of time and historical circumstances. On the contrary, the notion that 
emerges from this new definition is a notion characterised by its fluidity and 
adaptability and which follows the changeable circumstances of each society. In 
short, a “minority” is a factual entity (and facts always change), not certainly an 
ideological entity.    
Last but not least, a new working definition of “minority” was proposed in 
1993, within the framework of the Sub-Commission’s decision for the preparation of 
a report on national experiences regarding peaceful and constructive solutions for 
problems involving minorities.74 Mr. Asbjørn Eide was entrusted on this task, and 
the definition proposed by him reads as follow: “a minority is any group of persons 
resident within a sovereign State which constitutes less than half the population of 
the national society and whose members share common characteristics of an ethnic, 
religious or linguistic nature that distinguish them from the rest of the population.”75  
As we can see, in Eide’s working definition there is neither a reference to the 
nationality of the persons belonging to a minority group (the reference is only made 
on their residence within a sovereign State), nor to the non-dominant position with 
                                                 
73 See, UN Commission on Human Rights, Compilation of proposals concerning the definition of the 
term "minority", UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/WG.5/WP.1, United Nations, 1986, p. 9, para. 19. 
74 See, A. EIDE, Possible ways and means of facilitating the peaceful and constructive solution of 
problems involving minorities, cit. 
75 Ibid., p. 7, para. 29. 
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regard to the majority of the population. Furthermore, no references are made with 
regard to the sense of solidarity and aim of perpetuation between its members, as it 
was mentioned in both Capotorti and Deschênes’ definitions. Therefore, for this 
‘minimalistic’ approach to the definition of the term “minority”, the relevance is 
placed on the numerical and ethno-cultural aspect of the group. In this sense, this 
definition includes members of groups which also go by other names, even when the 
group “…demands –and is entitled to– more than the minimum minority rights.”76 
The latter could in fact be the case of indigenous people, which could be considered 
as minorities too, as we will see in the following sections and –in particular– within 
the next chapters.77  
As a conclusion, it would be possible to say that to try to define the term 
“minority” is not an easy and pacific exercise, as it is any legal attempt to define an 
existing societal factual entity. However, the fact that we are trying to address a 
factual situation, that is, whether an existing societal group could be considered or 
not a “minority”, actually imposes in itself the need for its legal conceptualisation. 
That is, in a sense that it would be through its “legal” recognition that legal 
consequences (e.g. the enjoyment of a set of specific protective rights) would be 
attributed to that societal factuality.78 To put it in another way, even when the 
existence of minority groups is a question of fact, not a question of law (as the PCIJ 
has said with regard to the notions of ‘communities’79), facts need nevertheless to be 
identified through –at least– a working legal notion of what minorities are.  
                                                 
76 Ibid., p. 8, para. 32. See also, in connection with those groups that could be considered included 
within this definition, A. EIDE, Possible ways and means of facilitating the peaceful and constructive 
solution of problems involving minorities. Second Progress report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/37, 
United Nations, 1992, p. 12 et seq., para. 55-72. 
77 As I will argue in the following chapters, the alleged difference between minorities and indigenous 
people are not substantial. Being prior in time than the current majorities or even having close ties 
with the territories in which they inhabit are just factual specifications that do not change their main 
equal characteristics, that is, their ethno-cultural difference with the majority of the population in a 
given country. The fact that within international law we can identify certain distinctions in terms of 
drafting and adoption of different standards and creation of separate forums and monitoring 
procedures are just a reflection –I will argue– of the better articulated political lobby that indigenous 
peoples’ groups were able to conduct at different international fora, but not of their ontological 
differences. This, beside the fact that the members of both, minorities and indigenous people alike, are 
just human beings and therefore equal in dignity and rights (Article 1 UDHR), regardless of their 
ethno-cultural specifications. See, G. ALFREDSSON, op. cit., p. 168-169. 
78 See, A. EIDE, Possible ways and means of facilitating the peaceful and constructive solution of 
problems involving minorities, cit., p. 14, para. 66. 
79 See, P.C.I.J., Advisory Opinion of July 31st, 1930, Series B. No. 17, The Greco-Bulgarian 
Communities, p. 22. 
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Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that minority rights –as any other 
human rights– have universal character, in a sense that they are recognised to all 
members of whichever ethno-cultural minoritarian group, as long as… those groups 
qualify as a “minority”. 80  In other words, in order to enjoy the especial protection 
recognised –for instance– in Article 27 ICCPR, prior to establish whether a person 
belongs to a minority group, it would be indispensable to identify the “minority” 
character of that group, and in order to do so a common legal notion of that term is 
indeed required.81 Minorities, as factual societal aggregations are subject to temporal 
and spatial changes, therefore what has been considered a minority in the past, could 
not be considered as such in the present, or vice versa. For example, it would be 
possible to say that an ethno-cultural group would not be considered any longer as a 
minority –under international law– if there is no longer manifest ‘will’ in their 
members to be seen and considered as a differentiated ethno-cultural entity. If the 
sense of solidarity (or sense of self-minority-consciousness) is lost, or has lost its 
relevance and external indicial manifestations (its objectively recognisable 
expression), this situation would consequentially prevent us from positively 
identifying the presence of the subjective element of the definition. Therefore, it 
would no longer be possible to consider that specific ethno-cultural group –from a 
legal perspective– as a minority. This, of course, does not absolutely mean that 
members of ethno-cultural groups which do not qualify as “minority” would not 
receive any protection from international law. They are and still remain what they 
always have being, that is human beings, and hence they remain under the full 
protection of international human rights law and standards as any other member of 
human society.82  
                                                 
80 Minority rights are –in fact– nothing but human rights which are oriented to redress a specific 
situation characterised by factual disadvantages, by means of strengthening the position of a person 
belonging to a non-dominant or vulnerable group. According to UN Special Rapporteur –Mr. Eide– 
“[t]he purpose of minority protection is not and should never be to create privileges or to endanger 
the enjoyment of human rights, on an equal level, by members of the majority”, and adding that “…the 
reason why rights of members of minorities are required is that they make explicit the limits on the 
power of majority groups, which otherwise might use their majority position to establish or maintain 
privileges for themselves.” A. EIDE, Possible ways and means of facilitating the peaceful and 
constructive solution of problems involving minorities, cit., p. 14, para. 2 and 66. 
81 As it has been said, “[t]he paradox is that the more controversial minority protection is, the more 
we need an accepted definition of “minority””.  See, A. SPILIOPOULOU ÅKERMARK, 
Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law, London/The Hague/Boston, 1997, p. 87. 
82 See, F. ERMACORA, op. cit., p. 300. 
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Therefore, considering that Capotorti’s definition is the most general one, not 
only because takes into consideration both aspects of this notion, namely the 
objective and subjective ones, but also because it was built upon a preceding large 
and comprehensive debate within the bosom of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights83, we will therefore adopt it as our working definition within the framework 
of the present work.  
As a conclusive comment of this conceptual section, it is important to 
highlight that within the reported definition we can identify many notions that we 
have already discussed in this chapter. This is –for instance– the case of the 
dynamics between dominant-non-dominant groups and the value of ethno-cultural 
appurtenances for group members, but not only. There are other important notions 
that have not yet been developed, but are –nevertheless– very important within the 
framework of the present work. I am referring to the related notions of people and 
indigenous people. For this reason, and in order to gain continuity and more clarity 
from a methodological point of view, I will confront –within the following 
paragraphs– the notion of “people” within international law, and leave the following 
chapters the conceptualisation and analysis of the term “indigenous people”. In 
effect, the particular relevance that the latter notion has for the overall structure of 
this thesis imposes its analysis –at least– in an autonomous and independent section. 
 
 
4.1. Cultural societal groups and “peoples” 
 
As we saw in the previous section, individuals could be considered (both by 
an internal self-identification and by an external recognition) as belonging to a 
minority group. This would generate for them not only a factual challenging position 
vis-à-vis the main society –as a consequence of that identification–, but also legal 
effects, including –for instance– the possibility to be entitled to enjoy the benefits of 
special measures or targeted protective rights specifically established for addressing 
the factual imbalances imposed by the minority/majority societal dynamics.  
                                                 
83 In the words of Ermacora, the process that ended with the elaboration of the proposed definition of 
the term “minority”, “[it] was really a success as to the willingness of States to collaborate with the 
United Nations in a delicate field of problems.” Ibid., p. 276 and 292. 
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However, to be a minority is not the only factual/legal situation that could 
generate a particular legal international status to a given group. In fact, in 
international law and in particular in international human rights instruments we can 
find indications to other notions that directly or indirectly refer to ethno-cultural 
entities or societal groups. In this sense, we can find in those international 
instruments notions such as “indigenous people”, “tribal people” or just “peoples”, 
which have important socio-political and fundamentally legal implications in 
connection with the ethno-cultural aspirations of the members of cultural entities or 
societal groups. As in the case of minorities, members of an ethno-cultural group 
could successfully frame or package their socio-cultural and political aspirations as –
for instance– “indigenous people’s claim” or even “peoples’ claim”. Under this new 
“group label”, they would have access to a specific set of rights that have been 
internationally and exclusively recognised to the members of those groups, or to the 
groups themselves (as in the case of peoples). Therefore, it seems that the relevance 
or legal importance of the identification of an ethno-cultural group as part of one (or 
more) of these categories is quite clear. However, because we lack clear legal 
definitions, then it would be important to briefly clarify which are the requirements 
that a group has to fulfil in order to be considered as part of them, and –perhaps most 
importantly– which are the specific legal consequences of that categorisation.  
Just in order to show the practical relevance of this “categorial” 
identification, and even for the need for further clarification in connection with the 
involved notions, it would be enough to say that what is at stake here is nothing but 
the ‘sovereignty’ and ‘territorial integrity’ of States, especially with regard to the 
notion of “peoples”. In fact, common Article 1 of the two international Covenants 
recognises the right to self-determination of “peoples”84, but as long as the latter 
concept has not been defined in international law, it would be possible to ask… who 
these peoples are. Are they just the entire population of an existing State, or –on the 
                                                 
84 Common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR reads as follow: “(1) all peoples have the rights of 
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development. (2) All peoples may, for their own ends, freely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of 
international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international 
law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. (3) The States parties to the 
present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing 
and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall 
respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”  
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contrary– can they be just only a part of it, or even a different part from different 
countries? As it would be possible to imagine, for obvious reasons States have had 
and still have strong concerns in connection with this notion85, and perhaps they 
would rather prefer to leave it undefined.86  
Last, but not lease, there is the problem of intertwinement or superposition 
between these different notions or legal categories, because the very same ethno-
cultural groups could be considered as included within one or more of these notions. 
For example, what would happen if one specific indigenous peoples’ group, which 
finds itself in a minoritarian situation within the borders of a given country, claims 
that has the right to be regarded as “peoples” according to international law, and 
therefore that they are bearers of the right of self-determination. Are they entitled to 
do so? The question is whether the fact that indigenous or minority groups could be 
regarded as having specific ethno-cultural characteristics, entitle them to be 
considered as “peoples”, under the meaning of international law. In other words, are 
minorities and indigenous groups “peoples”, and hence bearers of the right of self-
determination, as recognised within Article 1(2) of the UN Charter and common 
Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR? 87 
These questions need to be answered, not only because of their self-
epistemological importance but also due their intimate connection with the resolution 
of the indigenous people’s land claim cases introduced before the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, as we will see especially in Chapter V and VI. Therefore, 
for the sake of the argument, and perhaps for a better methodological comprehension 
of this topic too, we will continue –within the next paragraphs– with the analysis of 
                                                 
85 Clear examples of the concerns that this disposition has generated could be found at the travaux 
preparatoires of the UN Charter, in which –for example– the Venezuelan delegation expressed that 
“[s]i le principe de libre disposition signifie le droit pour un people de se donner un gouvernement, 
bien sûr nous voudriouns qu’il soit inclus; mais s’il devait au contraire être interprété dans le sens 
qu’il comporte le droit de secession, nous le considèrerions alors comme identique à l’anarchie 
international et nous ne voudrions pas qu’il soit inséré dans le texte de la Charte.” See, A. 
CASSESE, Article 1 - Paragraphe 2, in J.-P. COT, A. PELLET (eds), La Charte Des Nations Unies. 
Commentaire article par article, Paris, 1991, p. 42. 
86 See, G. ALFREDSSON, op. cit., p. 163-164. 
87 See, J. CRAWFORD, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and 
Future, in P. ALSTON (ed.), Peoples' Rights, Oxford, 2002, p. 58 et seq. See also, in connection with 
this topic, G. ALFREDSSON, Different Forms of and Claims to the Right of Self-Determination, in D. 
CLARK, R. WILLIAMSON (eds.), Self-Determination. International Perspectives, London, 1996, p. 
58-86; and A. EIDE, Peaceful Group Accommodation as an Alternative to Secession in Sovereign 
States, in D. CLARK, R. WILLIAMSON (eds.), Self-Determination. International Perspectives, 
London, 1996, p. 87-110. 
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the notion of “peoples” and we will leave for the next chapter the analysis of the 
notion of indigenous people.   
Then, who are “peoples”? As any other concept, this term could have more 
than one meaning, according to the perspective from which we will approach 
it.  Anthropologists, archaeologists, political and social scientists, and many others, 
have different ways of defining who ‘peoples’ are.88 However, because the interest 
within the present work is put on the legal consequences that the identification of a 
group as “peoples” could generate under the light international law, our focus should 
be restricted to the latter.89 For instance, if we start with the foundational document 
of our modern international legal system, namely the UN Charter, we will find that 
one of the purposes of the United Nations –according to its Article 1(2) – is to 
“…develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace.”  
A literal interpretation of the above paragraph, in accordance with Article 31 
VCLT90,  will lead us to the obvious conclusion that “peoples” are those that hold the 
right of self-determination, but not only. Additionally, a careful reading of this 
paragraph will also allow us to conclude that the term “peoples” is not exactly equal 
to that one of “nations”, because the latter refers –in the wording of Article 1(2) of 
the Charter– to those entities that have the obligation to respect –within their own 
friendly relations– the principle of self-determination of “peoples”. Consequently, 
“peoples” as the addressee or the receiver of that respect, need to necessarily be a 
different entity; otherwise, this disposition would have said …to develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of ‘nations’ (or states), and not “peoples” as it actually says.91  
                                                 
88 See, R. McCORQUODALE "peoples"  The New Oxford Companion to Law, in P. CANE, J. 
CONAGHAN, Oxford University Press Inc. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.  
89 See, A. CRISTESCU, The Right to Self-Determination. Historical and current development on the 
basis of United Nations instruments, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1, Special Rapporteur of the 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, United Nations, 1981, 
p. 40, para. 275. 
90 As we know, Article 31 of the UN Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969), states 
that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 
91 In fact, if “people” and “nation” would mean the same thing, as it has been said “…one cannot but 
wonder why these words are sometimes used in the same phrase or sentence of important national 
and international instruments in a redundant way?” See, E. GAYIM, People, Minority and 
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Therefore, the term “peoples” could mean something different from the 
notion of “nations”92, even in those cases where a given “nation” has organised itself 
as “State”. The latter situation happens when a given ethno-cultural and linguistic 
unity or societal entity gains international recognition as a “State”, that is, as an 
institutionalised political and juridical organisation with exclusive sovereign 
authority upon the internationally delimitated territory in which its population live).93 
Indeed, if this would be the case, then it would be possible to interpret that other 
groups, different from nations, could constitute also “peoples”, under the 
understanding of international law, such as –for instance– minorities (including 
indigenous people). 
Although the logical configuration of the former hypothesis, this liminal 
interpretation has been quite contradicted by the UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Aureliu 
Cristescu, who extensively discussed this topic within the framework of a study 
commanded by the UN Sub-Commission in 1974.94 Mr. Cristescu defined “peoples” 
as “a social entity possessing a clear identity and its own characteristics”. 
According to him, this notion “implies a relationship with a territory, even if the 
people in question has been wrongfully expelled from it and artificially replaced by 
another population”, but which “should not be confused with ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities, whose existence and rights are recognized in article 27 of the 
international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”95 As we can see, for the 
Special Rapporteur, minorities cannot be considered as “peoples”. The reason is that, 
under the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
                                                                                                                                          
Indigenous: Interpretation and Application of Concepts in the Politics of Human Rights, Helsinki, 
2006, p. 57 et seq.  
92 According to the Oxford Dictionary, the word “Nation” “…came via Old French from Latin natio, 
from nasci, meaning ‘to be born’. The link between ‘country’ and ‘birth’ was the idea of a people 
sharing a common ancestry or culture.” On the contrary, the origin of the word “People” “…is from 
Anglo-Norman French poeple, from Latin populus ‘populace’…” See, "nation" and 
“people” in Oxford Dictionary of Word Origins, by J. CRESSWELL. Oxford Reference Online. 
Oxford University Press.  
93 See, H. KELSEN, Théorie du Droit International Public, in Académie de Droit International (ed.), 
Recueil des Cours, Leyde, 1953-III, p. 70 et seq. 
94 Mr. Aureliu Cristescu was appointed as Special Rapporteur by the Sub-Commission on Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities at its twenty-seventh session, by its resolution 3 
(XXVII) adopted at the 706th meeting on 16 August 1974. 
95 See, A. CRISTESCU, op. cit., p. 41, para. 279. 
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United Nations96, “…the principle of self-determination cannot be regarded as 
authorizing dismemberment or amputation of sovereign States exercising their 
sovereignty by virtue of the principle of self-determination of peoples.”97  
Without fully addressing here the question of whether minorities could 
exercise the right of self-determination98, it would be important just to say that the 
latter interpretation of this notion has its rightful logic too. In fact, if “peoples” have 
already exercised their rights of self-determination and –consequentially– 
constructed a sovereign State by themselves and for themselves, then the exercise of 
this right would have been already fulfilled, and therefore leaving no room for any 
other group within that society, such as potential minorities, to attempt a similar 
exercise. The logic of this interpretation is based on the idea that both minorities and 
majority have exercised all together the same right of self-determination, as one 
group, as one “peoples”.  As it has been said, in international law the emphasis is put 
on political entities with geographically recognised boundaries (the State, the colony, 
etc.), rather than on popular or ethno-cultural entities (the nation, the people –without 
“s”– or any other ethno-cultural group). This would be the case, even when the latter 
could have a consistent presence and associated configuration within a given the 
territory, as –for example– it could be the case of indigenous people.99  
Additionally, one could also argue –in support of this interpretation– that the 
rights of self-determination cannot be exercised individually, but only by all 
members of the group(s) as a group, as a collective cohesive societal entity. Hence, a 
portion or a minority sector within that collectivity would not be able (or be allowed) 
to reneged or disavow the decision that has been taken by the entire societal entity as 
composed by all the sub-societal potential factions, or even by its majority in 
representation of that collectivity; at least as a matter of principle.100 
                                                 
96 See, General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV). 
97 See, A. CRISTESCU, op. cit., p. 41, para. 279. 
98 This topic will be discussed later in this chapter, in section 4.5. 
99 G. ALFREDSSON, Different Forms of and Claims to the Right of Self-Determination, cit., p. 59-60. 
100 Only in a very few and extreme situations, will international order accept the exercise of the right 
to self-determination by a portion of population, which is specific in ethno-cultural characteristics, 
within a given State. As Prof. Casesse has said, “…la libre disposition a été conçue soit comme un 
principe anticolonialiste, anti-néocolonialiste et anti-raciste, soit comme un principe de liberté contre 
l’oppression par un Etat étranger. En revanche, le principe ne couvre pas le droits des minorités ou 
des nationalités qui vivent dans un Etat souverain, sauf les cas où l’on refuserait l’accès des groups 
raciaux ou religieux au processus de décision politique.” See, A. CASSESE, op. cit., p. 49. 
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Nevertheless, the interpretation of the term “peoples” that exactly equalises 
this legal notion to the current population of a given State (considered as a unity) is 
actually quite reductive. In fact, this would not be in line with the widest formula 
adopted by the UN Charter and by the Covenants, which –as we have already seen– 
refers to “all peoples”, regardless of the fact that they have attained or not their own 
independence101, but not only. Additionally, it would not be adjustable to States’ 
practice, which has shown –at least– that “…the international law of self-
determination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence for 
peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation.”102 According to Nowak, the right of self-
determination, and hence the qualification as “peoples”, is also available in 
independent multinational States to those peoples not protected as minorities by Art. 
27 ICCPR.103 In addition, Prof. Nowak added in his commentary that, in any case, 
“…the question of which ethnic or national groups are to be qualified as “peoples” 
in the sense of Art. 1 is, highly disputed…”104 
Therefore, even if “all peoples” living in a territory of a given State have 
already exercised their right of self-determination, they still remain holders of this 
right and –consequentially– they can potentially regain its exercise in the future, as 
one group (all together, minorities and majority), and decide to change –for instance– 
the political constitution of the country.105 However, if just one portion of the 
                                                 
101 See, M. NOWAK, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. CCPR Commentary, 2005, p. 20, 
para. 28. 
102 See, I.C.J., Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, Report 2010, No. 141, p. 30, para. 72. 
103 M. NOWAK, op. cit., p. 22, para. 31. 
104 Ibid. 
105 If we think carefully, this is what actually happened in Tunisia and Libya as a consequence of the 
so-called “Arab Spring”. After decades of living under authoritarian regimes, perhaps with a sort of 
tacit or even unconscious consensus from larger portions of the population, the political lethargy was 
broken and Tunisians and Libyans decided to re-exercise their right of self-determination as 
“peoples”, and not just as citizens subjected under the former constitutional regime. The case of Egypt 
is quite different, because the transition process, after the fall of Mubarak, was largely made under the 
constitutional rules and political organizational structure of the “old regime”. I am aware that this 
affirmation could be controversial, in particular in connection with the possibility of tacit or 
unconscious consensus vis-à-vis a totalitarian or dictatorial regime. In the past, political and legal 
philosophers have tried to make a similar analysis with regard to the potential consensual attitudes of 
Italians or Germans vis-à-vis the Fascist and Nazi regimes, without perhaps arriving at final 
conclusions. This is not –of course– the right venue for exploring the legal and constitutional meaning 
of “consensus”, but allow me to say that consensus constitute a broader notion than the individual act 
of giving “free and informed consent”. Consensus involves a collective process and a collective 
outcome, which can potentially be reached not only by conscious active actions but also by tacit 
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population of that State claims the exercise of this right, as could happen in the case 
of a minority group (including indigenous people), then again, we would face the 
strict limit established in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. That is, the defence of the 
territorial integrity or political independence of State parties. In fact, this limit has 
been ratified by the “Declaration on the grating of independence to colonial 
countries and peoples” of 1960, and by the “Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” (UN Friendly Relations 
Declaration) of 1970. Both instruments ratified the principle of territorial integrity 
and political unity of the States, which remains as one of the most important and 
central principles in international law. Indeed, it is in this sense that it has been 
recognised that “[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national 
unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter…”106 Therefore, any potential claim to secede should be 
interpreted in a very restrictive way.107  
Nevertheless, this principle –as many other principles in international law– is 
not an absolute one. In fact, the Declaration on Friendly Relations went one step 
further and added one potential exception, stating that “[n]othing in the foregoing 
paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above 
and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the 
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour”.     
In my opinion, the possible answer to our initial question, namely, whether 
minorities (including indigenous people) could be considered as “peoples” under 
                                                                                                                                          
passivity. And it seems to me that, in politics, a passive attitude, consolidated through considerable 
periods of time vis-à-vis concrete politico-constitutional organisational models, could perhaps end in 
being a tacit or even unconscious support for those political models.  
106 See, UN Declaration on the grating of independence to colonial countries and peoples, General 
Assembly Resolution No. 1514 (XV), of 14 December 1960, Article 6; and UN Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly Resolution No. 2625 (XXV), 
of 24 October 1970, preamble.  
107 See, A. CASSESE, Self-Determination of Peoples. A legal Reappraisal, Cambridge, 1996, p. 108 
et seq. 
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international law, could be found precisely in the above mentioned clause.108 In fact, 
a literal and logical interpretation of the text of the referred clause –under the rules of 
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT– would certainly lead us to the following 
conclusion. The respect of the principle of territorial integrity of States is 
conditioned to the compliance by the same States with the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples, but not only. Additionally, the latter principle 
would have to be respected as long as States would possess “… a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to 
race, creed or colour.”  
Moreover, a contrario sensu interpretation would allow us to say that if the 
government (for it we understand the existing political system in a given State), 
exclude, disenfranchise or does not allow a portion of its population to take part in 
the political life of the State, then it would be hypothetically possible for these 
excluded groups to be granted –by international law– with the possibility to hold and 
exercise the right of self-determination as “peoples.”109 In this sense, the exclusion or 
disenfranchisement would take place when the affected populations would not be 
able to –directly or indirectly– participate in the government and in other essential 
socio-political institutions, but not only. In addition, the reasons of the said exclusion 
would have to be exclusively and particularly grounded in the ‘race, creed or colour’ 
of the excluded group, that is in their particular ethno-cultural common 
characteristics, which make the group homogenous, distinguishable and diverse from 
the mainstream society.  
 
 
4.2. Minorities as “peoples” 
 
As we can see from the precedent paragraphs, the answer to the question of 
whether minorities could be considered as “peoples” is –at least– quite complex; a 
                                                 
108 Ibid., p. 111. 
109 According to Cassese, the Declaration “simply demands that States allow racial and religious 
groups to have access to government institutions.” A. CASSESE, Self-Determination of Peoples. A 
legal Reappraisal, cit., p. 114-115.  
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complexity which imposes the argumentative need to strive for analytical clarity and 
further clarifications. 
First of all, it is important to bear in mind that the possibility for minorities 
(including indigenous people) to be considered as “peoples”, and therefore to be 
regarded as holders of the right of self-determination, constitute an exception to the 
application of one of the most basic principles in international law, namely, the 
principle of territorial integrity and political unity of the States. In addition, and as a 
direct consequence of this exceptional character, the interpretation of this legal 
possibility should always be done in a very restrictive manner. Therefore, if a 
minoritarian group argues that it has been excluded from governance, based on the 
grounds referred within the Declaration on Friendly Relations, this plea should be 
interpreted very strictly. Again, the applicable legal principle is that minorities do not 
have the right of self-determination; the very exception to this rule is that they might 
have it.  
The first consequence of the above mentioned restrictive interpretative 
character consists in the fact that –in case of minorities– it would not be possible to 
talk of “guaranteed” participation, in a sense of having secured chances to 
effectively take part in government or even to being able to modify or otherwise 
influence public policies.110 In fact, the guiding rule is that the government should 
represent the whole population of the State ‘without distinction as to race, creed or 
colour’, and this means that the population (which in most cases coincides with 
“peoples”) has to be seen as a whole integral entity, and not as a sort of aggregation 
of different ethno-cultural groups. In other words, a representative and democratic 
government should represent all individuals (which are at the same time the 
population of a distinct territorial or geographical entity)111 and not the potential 
existing groups (regardless the fact that individuals could see themselves as affiliated 
                                                 
110 I am referring here to “guaranteed chances” to participate in governance exclusively from the point 
of view of the exercise of the right of self-determination. Therefore, these comments are not directly 
applicable vis-à-vis those potential positive actions that, in different and concrete socio-political and 
societal circumstances, could be seen as needed by the application of the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination and the need to deal with those potential factual imbalances in society.  
111 See, G. ALFREDSSON, Minorities, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, and Peoples: Definitions of 
Terms as a Matter of International Law, cit., p. 170. 
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to those groups).112 Hence, the participatory requirement could only refer to a “real 
and effective participation of the people in the decision-making processes”, 
understanding “people” as the aggregation of individuals that –in most cases– 
constitute the whole population of a given State, and not as referring to potential 
ethno-cultural groups that could be present within the State’s territory.113  
The above mentioned interpretation finds –in my opinion– a clear further 
support on the wording of the UN Vienna Declaration and Plan of Action, adopted at 
the World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna in 1993. The Declaration, 
when making references to the Friendly Relations Declaration, has strongly and 
emphatically reaffirmed the principle of territorial integrity and political unity of 
sovereign and independent State. In fact, it clearly states that that Declaration “shall 
not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember 
or impair, totally or in part [their] territorial integrity or political unity…”114, but 
not only. The Vienna Declaration also –and perhaps more importantly– has clarified 
the condition under which this essential principle will be respected by the 
international community. That is, that independent States have to conduct themselves 
“…in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole people…”115  
But again, it would be possible to ask which is the “people” referred by the 
latter Declaration. The people that represent the entire population of the said State or 
might it also refer to an ethno-cultural minority that occupies just a portion of its 
territory?  In my opinion, the answer is given in the final line of the above mentioned 
                                                 
112 To put it in another way, “peoples” is always composed by individuals that conform “a group” 
which is seen by the international community as holding the right to self-determination in a sense of 
Article 2(1) of the UN Charter and common Article 1 of the two international Covenants. Moreover, 
“groups” are also composed by individuals who hold special ethno-cultural affiliations, but within the 
bosom of a larger aggregation, namely that one that constitute “peoples”. For further reading on this 
topic, see among other authors, M. SCHEININ, What are Indigenous Peoples?, in N. GHANEA, A. 
XANTHAKI (eds.), Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination, Leiden/Boston, 2005, 3-13. 
113 See, Article 67, UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. Just in addition to the topic 
under discussion, and with the purpose to make a further clarification, if the clause of this Declaration 
target individuals who conform the population of a given State, and not potential existing groups, then 
it could not be used as a valid argument, for exemplified lack of participation in the decision-making 
process, the fact of the inexistence of a quota system that will guarantee and secure the participation of 
minority groups or even the fact that they do not enjoy certain degrees of political, legal or territorial 
autonomy. As it has been already said, the latter are valid potential political claims, based on 
legitimate political aspirations, but certainly not in existing rights.  
114 See, Vienna World Conference on Human Rights Declaration and Programme of Action of 12 July 
1993, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, I.2. 
115 Ibid. 
CHAPTER II 
100 
 
paragraph when the Declaration refers to “a Government representing the whole 
people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind.” The Declaration 
always makes reference to a Government of an independent State; therefore the 
referred “territory” should necessarily be the territory of that State, and not a 
potential territory in which a potential ethno-cultural minority has consistent 
presence. And if this argumentation is not convincing enough, as I think it is, the 
very final wording of the paragraph erases any potential doubts; the “people” 
belonging to that territory has to be considered “without distinction of any kind.” 
Hence, ethno-cultural considerations are not allowed, as a matter of principle.116          
Having this general principle in mind, one could argue that members of 
minorities (as part of a whole population of a given State) would have the very 
exceptional possibility to exercise the right of self-determination in so far as they 
could be considered as “peoples”, under the above mentioned extremely unbearable 
conditions and circumstances. The latter would include a systematic and grave denial 
of their fundamental rights that would generate their complete marginalisation from 
the political decision-making processes, with exclusion from or any likelihood for a 
possible peaceful solution within the existing State’s institutional structure.117   
Last but not least, an additional extreme factual situation should be added to 
those exceptional circumstances that would pave the way for the potential exercise of 
the right of self-determination by minorities. This would be the case in which 
members of minorities would face a concrete threat of physical elimination, not just 
in their individual capacity, but as members of a given ethno-cultural group.118  
                                                 
116 Therefore, the current “people” in a given State’s territory, is still –as a matter of principle– the 
very same “people” or ethno-cultural societal aggregation that has exercised in the past their right of 
self-determination. As Grotius has said, “…a People […]is reckoned the same now as it was a 
hundred years ago, though none of those who lived then is alive now, as long as that communion 
which makes a people and binds it together with mutual bonds preserves its unity, as Plutarch 
expresses it.” As we can see, for this great jurisconsult, “peoples”, as a societal entity, does not 
change with the past of time if it can still be seen as a unity. See, H. GROTIUS, The Rights of War 
and Peace (De Jure Belli et Pacis), 1st. ed. 1625, London, 1853, Chap. IX., p. 135, para. III(2).     
117 See, A. CASSESE, Self-Determination of Peoples. A legal Reappraisal, cit., p. 119-120. 
118 In fact, another particular circumstance that could lead to the consideration of members of minority 
groups as “peoples”, it would be the case of genocide, as understood in the UN Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, which is aimed at 
protecting national, ethnical, racial and religious groups from “acts committed with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part,” those groups (Article II). As it has been said, Genocide is directed against the 
national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their 
individual capacity, but as members of protected groups. Therefore, if an ethno-cultural group is 
persecuted and face physical extermination, then they would be allow under international law to 
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As we can see, there are exceptional situations in which ethno-cultural groups 
can exercise the right of self-determination, even when they do not constitute the 
whole population of a given country. In current international law, the case of Kosovo 
is perhaps a clear example of it.119 But there is one last question that still has to be 
answered. As it has already been maintained, minority or other differentiated groups 
can be exceptionally considered as holders of the right of self-determination, but… 
which version of it? In fact, nowadays it would be possible to recognise in the 
practice of international community –at least– two different kinds of self-
determination, namely internal and external self-determination. Therefore the 
question that still remains unanswered would be whether minorities (including 
indigenous people) and other ethno-cultural groups with specific territorial projection 
are entitled or not to either both understanding of these rights, or just one of them, 
and in this case, to which of them. In the following section, I will attempt to answer 
this relevant issue.   
 
 
4.3. Minorities and Self-determination: a ‘rights’ based approach  
 
As we saw, when analysing within the precedent pages the UN Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States, there were two hypothetical situations that could be considered as 
potential exceptions to the principle of territorial integrity and political unity of the 
States. The first one refers to the absolute political exclusion and disenfranchisement 
in a democratic system of an ethno-cultural minority. Secondly, to the case in which 
members of a minority group are under threat of physical destruction and 
annihilation, just because of their ethno-cultural appurtenance to the said group. In 
my view, these two different situations lead toward different exercises of the right of 
self-determination.  
                                                                                                                                          
exercise the right of self-determination, as long as they occupy a homogeneous territory. As a matter 
of clarification, it is necessary to say that the so-called ‘cultural genocide’ is not included within the 
legal definition of ‘genocide’ and –therefore- it cannot be used as a weapon against the territorial 
integrity and political unity of States. On this regard, see –among other authors– F. ERMACORA, op. 
cit., p. 312 et seq.    
119 See, I.C.J., Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, Report 2010, No. 141, p. 29, para. 78 et seq. 
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In fact, if the complete political exclusion and disenfranchisement of minority 
groups does not arrive at extreme situations in which their very physical integrity or 
survival would be at stake, they would only be entitled to be granted with a sort of 
internal autonomy in governance, but within the political organisational structure of 
the national State in which they live. In other words, if ethno-political minorities are 
absolutely excluded from political participation in a democratic society, which means 
that they do not have access to the institutional channels in which they would be able 
to strive for their legitimate political aspirations, and if that exclusion is based 
exclusively on their ethno-cultural differentness, then the principle of political unity 
of the State will be at stake. This means that totally politically excluded minorities, 
whose members have been systematically and gravely impaired in the very exercise 
of their most fundamental rights (because of their ethno-cultural membership), would 
have the possibility to rightfully claim for the recognition of political autonomy –but 
not only– within the territorial borders of the State.120 
Hence, because the territorial integrity of the State is not at stake, then it 
would be possible to conclude that –in this first case– we are facing a situation of 
potential exercise of the right of internal self-determination.121 This right is the right 
that has been recognised within common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR, and 
basically means the possibility to have broad autonomy in the administration of their 
internal affairs, that would allow them to achieve political and –to a certain extent– 
economic, social and cultural self-determination, within the democratic political 
framework of the existing national State.122 
                                                 
120The right to internal self-determination has been defined –in a very broad sense– as “…le droit d’un 
peuple d’exercer un libre choix dans le cadre d’un système étatique don’t on ne veut pas modifier le 
statut international.” See, A. CASSESE, Article 1 - Paragraphe 2, cit., p. 45. Nowak interpreted this 
right in a more restrictive manner, strassing that this right can be achieved by “…providing broad 
autonomy within a given State and by granting the relevant people corresponding participation in the 
State’s political decision-making process.” See, M. NOWAK, op. cit., p. 24, para. 34. For detailed 
explanations in connection with the potential scope and extension of the right of internal self-
determination, see –among other authors– G. ALFREDSSON, Different Forms of and Claims to the 
Right of Self-Determination, cit., p. 58 et seq.  
121 In the same words of Cassese, “le principe [de la libre disposition] ne couvre pas les droits des 
minorités ou des nationalités qui vivent dans un Etat souverain, sauf les cas où l’on refuserait l’accès 
des groupes raciaux ou religieux au processus de décision politique.” See, A. CASSESE, Article 1 - 
Paragraphe 2, cit., p. 49. 
122 In his commentary, Nowak in fact stressed the democratic essential nature of this right, when he 
said that “[t]he right to internal political self-determination is based on a democratic element, which 
is to be exercised together with the Covenant’s other political rights and freedoms…”See, M. 
NOWAK, op. cit., p. 23-24, para. 34. 
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However, if the political exclusion of an ethno-cultural entity, that has 
consistent geographical territorial presence within the boundaries of a given State, 
would be accompanied with other actions leading to grave and gross violations of 
fundamental human rights, to the extreme point in which the very physical survival 
of the members of that given ethno-cultural group –as individuals, as human beings– 
would be under specific threat (just because of their ethno-cultural appurtenance), 
then the legal implications with regard to the right of self-determination seems to be 
quite different. In effect, if the life, liberty and physical existence of the members of 
an ethno-cultural entity are under concrete and specific threat, and if their complete 
political exclusion leads also –as Prof. Cassese has said– to an ‘exclusion of any 
likelihood for a possible peaceful solution within the existing State structure’, then it 
would be perhaps possible for that specific ethno-cultural group to claim the exercise 
of fullest version of the right of self-determination.123  
In other words, under the most extreme and existential threat (e.g. as the case 
of genocide, Apartheid, colonial domination, or even foreign military occupation), 
and without having any possibility to resolve this extreme violent situation within the 
institutional channels of a democratic system, then it would be possible for a 
threatened ethno-cultural group to claim and exercise a right of external self-
determination. In this sense, the threatened group would be able to build their own 
political organisational structure, with clear territorial borders, and to seek –in the 
vest of “peoples”– its international recognition.124   
As we know, this version of the right of self-determination has been called 
“external”, and –in my opinion– it is the version referred by the UN Charter (Article 
1(2)).125 The exercise of this right would involve the possibility to choose the 
international status of the peoples and territories concerned, and –for this reason– it 
would be only open to those persecuted groups that also occupy a clear and 
                                                 
123 As Prof. Cassese has said, “denial of the basic right of representation does not give rise per se to 
the right of secession. In addition, there must be gross breaches of fundamental human rights, and, 
what is more, the exclusion of any likelihood for a possible peaceful solution within the existing State 
structure.” See, A. CASSESE, Self-Determination of Peoples. A legal Reappraisal, cit., p. 119-120. 
124 In the words of Prof. Cassese, «[a] racial or religous group may attempt secession, a form of 
external self-determination, when  it is apparent that internal self-determination is absolutely beyond 
reach. Extreame and unremitting persecution and the lack of any reasonable prospect for peaceful 
challenge may make secession legitimate. » See, A. CASSESE, Self-Determination of Peoples. A legal 
Reappraisal, cit., p. 120. 
125 See, A. CASSESE, Article 1 - Paragraphe 2, cit., p. 49. 
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homogeneous territory and who are politically and economically sustainable and 
organised. To put it shortly, ethno-cultural groups facing potential or current acts of 
genocide would have the possibility to self-determine their international status only if 
they could also be considered as “peoples” under international law.126  
Additionally, it would be important to bear in mind that the recognition of the 
right of external self-determination has to be interpreted in a very restrictive 
manner.127 This is the case, especially because of the fact that the possibility to 
legally secede from the territory of an already recognised State, could basically be 
seen as a sort of revolt against a previous exercise of the very same right. Indeed, the 
previous exercise of the right of self-determination by the population of the State in 
question has led –precisely– to the creation of the said State.128 Hence, the exercise 
of this sort of “remedial secession”129 should be considered limited to those very 
exceptional cases in which the targeted ethno-cultural population would face 
absolute extreme circumstances which do not give any room for any other action 
than to revolt against their own imminent physical destruction.130 Therefore, beyond 
these very exceptional and specific cases in which it would be possible to consider 
ethno-cultural groups as “peoples”, minorities (including indigenous people) are not 
holders of the right of self-determination.  
As we can see, although our slight digression in connection with the right of 
self-determination has been quite extensive, in my view it has helped us to confirm 
                                                 
126 See, G. ALFREDSSON, Minorities, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, and Peoples: Definitions of 
Terms as a Matter of International Law, cit., p. 170 et seq.  
127 We have to always remember that ‘[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the 
national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations’. See, UN Declaration on the granting of 
independence to colonial countries and peoples, No. 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, Article 6. 
128 As Cassese said, ‘the peoples’ right to external self-determination is seen to have been limited by 
the perceived need to safeguard territorial integrity and political unity.’ See, A. CASSESE, Self-
Determination of Peoples. A legal Reappraisal, cit., p. 73-74.   
129 As Weller has said, “[w]here a central government persistently and systematically represses a 
territorially organised, and perhaps also constitutionally recognised, segment of the population, a 
right of secession might be constituted. Similarly, it is argued that persistent and discriminatory 
exclusion from governance or a constitutionally relevant or recognised segment of the population 
gives rise to a right to remedial self-determination.” See, M. WELLER, Escaping the Self-
Determination Trap, Leiden/Boston, 2008, p. 59 et seq. 
130 Nevertheless, even in those absolute extreme cases, the proposed solution is not pacific among 
members of the international community. In fact, the ICJ, in its advisory opinion regarding the case of 
Kosovo, has recognised that “…differences existed regarding whether international law provides for 
a right of “remedial secession” and, if so, in what circumstances”, and preferred to not take a clear 
stand in the matter. See, I.C.J., Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, Report 2010, No. 141, p. 31, para. 82. 
THE RELEVANCE OF CULTURE AND SOCIETAL DYNAMICS 
105 
 
our main liminal hypothesis with regard to the connection between multiculturalism 
and ethno-cultural groups’ political aspirations. In fact, only under very exceptional 
circumstances will general international law provide the necessary legal grounds 
over which ethno-cultural groups would be able to channel the realisation of their 
own political aspirations and claims for a multicultural society. That is a society in 
which public societal institutions would ideally reflect and mirrored the ethno-
cultural particularities of that given ethno-cultural group, and which will back up and 
give visibility to their cultural diversity and differentness.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
As it has been already maintained, in an open, pluralist and democratic 
society, all individuals, regardless their ethno-cultural appurtenances, should be able 
to freely and culturally express themselves, individually or in community with the 
other members of the ethno-cultural entity or group in which they culturally 
recognise themselves. Hence, in this sense, they would be able to freely ‘enjoy their 
own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own 
language’.131 
In an open, pluralist and democratic society, societal entities or cultural 
groups –majorities and minorities alike– should have (and they indeed have) the 
possibility to freely express and make public their cultural proposals. This basically 
means that all their members would not only be able to culturally express themselves 
–in their own individual societal interventions– but also to seek larger societal 
support for their cultural views and understanding from the rest of the society, 
including –of course– members of the cultural majorities. In other words, members 
of cultural minorities could –in an open, pluralist and democratic society– freely and 
publicly advocate for the societal adoption of their cultural proposals, including their 
pleas for deconstruction or rebuild of the common socio-political and legal societal 
institutions and structures, as multiculturalist supporters have suggested.132  
                                                 
131 See, Article 27 ICCPR. 
132 See, I. M. YOUNG, op. cit., p. 174 et seq. 
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But again, to be able to freely advocate for one specific socio-politico-cultural 
programme does not mean that cultural minorities would have the “right” to impose 
on the mainstream society the assumption of their legitimate political aspiration for 
institutional cultural change. To put it in a different way, to have political aspirations 
of cultural change is perfectly legitimate in an open, pluralist and democratic society. 
For this reason everybody (members of minorities and majorities alike) are and 
should be guaranteed the exercise of their cultural rights, including –of course– the 
right to enjoy their specific culture ‘in community with the other members of their 
group’. What is not (and should not be) guaranteed in a democratic society is the 
success of those political cultural aspirations.133 Let me explain this more in detail. 
In an open, pluralist and democratic society, political aspirations of all 
societal entities or ethno-cultural groups are subjected to what has been called above 
the “democratic game”, which basically consists of a dialogical process that permits 
to methodologically channel all political aspirations and cultural understandings and 
views into a common societal decision-making process. In fact, the ‘democratic 
game’ not only guarantees a fair decision-making procedure, where the views and 
aspirations of the majority find their institutional mould, but also where members of 
cultural minorities find the possibility to freely express and pursue their own views, 
cultural understandings and political aspirations. Within this democratic framework, 
members of minoritarian societal groups are indeed guaranteed in the enjoyment of 
their fundamental rights (including –of course– cultural rights); what they do not 
have guaranteed is their socio-political and cultural success.134  
Therefore, even when the socio-political structures, cultural and legal 
institutions of a democratic society have incorporated and mainly mirror the cultural 
views, understandings and meaningful valuative systems of the societal majority, 
                                                 
133 See, UNESCO, Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue – World Report, Paris, 
2009, p. 3. 
134 In connection with the degree of success that minorities could achieve within a democratic 
framework, and the difficulties that they objectively face in trying to gain support, within democratic 
institutions, for their proposals, has been clearly pictured by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP), which has stated that “[a]lthough parliamentary systems differ, 
indigenous parliamentarians should have access to leadership positions within the parliament. 
Without the support of parliamentary leaders, indigenous parliamentarians experience difficulty in 
getting their proposals onto the parliamentary agenda and in moving them through the parliamentary 
process.” See, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP), Progress report on 
the study on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/15/35, Human Rights Council, 2010, in particular, p. 19, para. 78. 
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members of the societal minorities do not have the right to legally impose the de-
construction of the common societal institutions –as claimed by multiculturalists– in 
order to forcibly incorporate into them their own cultural views and understandings. 
As I said before, “in a pluralist and democratic societies, numbers count… and 
cultural matters are not excluded from this general rule.”135  In democratic societies, 
minority members would have indeed guaranteed the possibility to freely and openly 
engage in dialogue and publicly advocate for incorporation of their own cultural 
views and value systems within the common societal institution, but not only. They 
also would have the possibility to claim and compete for broad public support vis-à-
vis their own cultural position, trying to persuade the mainstream society on the need 
for cultural change and on the necessity of culturally deconstructing common societal 
institutions. They can even propose the embracement of the multiculturalist societal 
model. However, what they cannot do –as a matter of principle– is to culturally (or 
even legally) force the common cultural will/understandings of the entire society, 
which would be most likely influenced by the cultural preferences of the majoritarian 
cultural societal aggregation.  
In a democratic society, common societal cultural institutions (including legal 
systems) are constructed through societal consensual agreements among all its 
members, including –of course– minority members. However, within a democratic 
framework, a consensus based agreement does not mean –of course– to require the 
specific and active consent of all individual members of the society. In fact, a 
democratic consensus means the acceptance of the decision that has been built 
through the dialogical, inclusive and methodological channel, which guarantees the 
effective (direct or indirect) participation of all members of the society, including –of 
course– members of minoritarian societal aggregations. In other words, what is 
absolutely required in a democratic society is to have inclusive participatory 
decision-making procedures, which guarantees the effective –direct or indirect– 
participation of all societal members, majorities and minorities alike, in an open, 
constructive and inclusive socio-political dialogue.136  
                                                 
135 See above, Section I.  
136 According to the UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993, “[d]emocracy is based on the freely 
expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems 
and their full participation in all aspects of their lives. In the context of the above, the promotion and 
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However, what is not guaranteed in a democratic society is the cultural 
outcome of this dialogical process. Majority and minority members alike, have to 
democratically accept the cultural outcome of this “democratic game”, even when 
this process would most likely lead to the ratification and enhancement of cultural 
values and worldviews of the majority. As I said before, in democratic systems, 
numbers count as long as they respect and do not infringe internationally recognised 
human rights minimum standards and fundamental freedoms, which protect 
minorities from any potential forced cultural alienation.   
In our modern world, democracy and human rights are interdependent and 
mutually reinforced concepts.137 This means that there is no truly democratic system 
if the human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to effectively 
participate in the socio-political and cultural life of the society, are not respected and 
guaranteed. For this reason, the dialogical outcome of the “democratic game” cannot 
and must not lead to neither the disenfranchisement, limitation, or otherwise arbitrary 
restrictions on the enjoyment of fundamental human rights by the members of the 
ethno-cultural minorities, nor to threaten their physical survival. But, in the event that 
those grave violations occur, the overall validity of those foundational principles 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, “including promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, peace, democracy, 
justice, equality, rule of law, pluralism…”138, could be at stake. It is for this reason, 
that international law exceptionally recognises, and restrictively admits, just a very 
few exceptions to another foundational principle of our international legal 
construction, which is the so-called “principle of territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States”.139  
In fact, as we have already maintained140, when members of minorities –just 
because of their ethno-cultural appurtenance to a minoritarian societal entity– are 
                                                                                                                                          
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels should 
be universal and conducted without conditions attached.” (See, para. I.8). 
137 Ibid. 
138 See, UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Preamble. 
139 See, UN Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly 
Resolution No. 2625 (XXV), of 24 October 1970. 
140 See in this Chapter, Section 4.3. 
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subjected to unbearable conditions, then it would be possible for them to 
exceptionally exercise the right of internal self-determination141, not as minorities 
but just as “peoples”.142 The recognition of this exceptional right is grounded on the 
gravity of the conditions, which would not only implicate a systematic and grave 
denial of their fundamental rights, but also their complete marginalisation from the 
political decision-making processes, and therefore the absolute impossibility of any 
dialogical peaceful solution within the existing State’s institutional structure. Hence, 
ethno-cultural minorities, which are totally excluded in political terms, would have 
the possibility to rightfully claim the recognition of political autonomy (including 
economic, social and cultural aspects), within the territorial borders of a given State, 
under the right of self-determination, recognised within common Article 1 of the 
ICCPR and ICESCR.143 In other words, in this case they will have the possibility to 
rightfully and legally claim the incorporation of their world views, institutional 
understandings and system of values within the common societal institutions, as a 
guaranteed remedy against structural and fundamental human rights violations. 
Notwithstanding, this does not mean the recognition of a multiculturalist society, but 
just a remedial arrangement for a dysfunctional democratic society.  
Last but not least, in case of threat to the very physical existence of the 
members of an ethno-cultural minority, based on their membership in a group (as in 
the case of genocide), it would be even possible for that specific societal entity to 
claim the full exercise of the right of self-determination. This means, to rightfully 
claim and exercise a remedial secession, under the light of Article 1(2) of the UN 
Charter.144 In this case, the threatened minority group would have the possibility to 
build –under the vest of internationally recognised “peoples”– its own socio-political, 
cultural and legal state-organisation, with clear territorial borders. Hence, this latter 
case cannot be considered either as an example of acceptance and forcible imposition 
                                                 
141 It is important to notice that, the use of the term self-determination for these cases that refer to the 
possibility of minorities gaining socio-political and institutional autonomy and self-governance label 
does not help, on the contrary, it may create false expectations and negative reactions. As it has been 
said, “[t]he self-determination label does not offer improved chances of obtaining autonomy; on the 
contrary, it is more likely to alienate states and to disappoint the beneficiaries. The rights offered, in 
this case autonomy, should be called by their correct names and their image not misrepresented by 
convenient labelling.” See, G. ALFREDSSON, Different Forms of and Claims to the Right of Self-
Determination, cit., p. 72.      
142 See, A. CASSESE, Self-Determination of Peoples. A legal Reappraisal, cit., p. 119-120. 
143 See above, footnote no.120. 
144 See, M. WELLER, op. cit., p. 59 et seq. 
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by international law of a multiculturalist society. On the contrary, it would just be a 
remedial construction of a “cultural” –rather than “multicultural”– State. 
However, if open, pluralist and democratic societies cannot guarantee the 
politico-cultural success of ethno-cultural minorities, in a sense of shaping and 
moulding common societal institutions, then we can still introduce the question of 
what minority members can do in order to effectively achieve their legitimate ethno-
cultural-political aspirations. My answer to this question is simple and quite 
straightforward, and perhaps for that reason it could be quite controversial too. In an 
open, pluralist and democratic society, members of minorities can make full use of 
all recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms, in order to freely enjoy and 
practice their cultures, individually or in community with others, but not only. In 
addition, and perhaps even most importantly from a socio-political perspective, they 
would be able to broadly and publicly make full advocacy and promotion –vis-à-vis 
the mainstream society– of the “ontological” goodness of their own differential 
cultural understandings, world views and overall system of values.  
But, if in that open, inclusive and pluralist dialogical process they are not 
culturally convincing, and therefore they do not succeed in attracting wide public 
societal support for their own cultural proposals, then the very same democratic 
principles that guarantee their freedom of expression and open participation, impose 
them to accept the fair cultural outcome of the ‘democratic game’. Within the said 
“democratic game”, everybody is taken on board and welcomed to participate, but –
in ultimate terms– not everybody would politically (or even ideologically) win. 
Nevertheless, everybody would have a dimension that is excluded from the said 
game, a dimension that cannot be discretionally restricted or subjected to political or 
even ideological bargain; in a democracy, everybody –members of majorities and 
minorities alike– has human rights and fundamental freedoms fully guaranteed… or 
should have.   
In short, as it has been already mentioned, the question is not about how to 
reinvent the wheel (or to deconstruct common societal institutions in multicultural 
terms), but just how to make full use it (in human rights terms)!  
 
 
  
CHAPTER THREE 
CULTURE DIVERSITY 
 
“[T]here are nowadays many multicultural societies, and 
the attention due to the cultural diversity seems to us to constitute 
an essential requisite to secure the efficacy of the norms of 
protection of human rights, at national and international levels. 
Likewise, we consider that the invocation of cultural 
manifestations cannot attempt against the universally recognized 
standards of observance and respect for the fundamental rights of 
the human person.” I-ACtHR, Community Mayagna (Sumo) 
Awas Tingni case.1  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we have been slightly introduced to the idea that 
culture diversity is a notion that lies at the very bottom of multiculturalist discourses 
and –therefore– gives continuous nourishment to political multiculturalist aspirations 
of disenfranchised ethno-cultural minorities.  
It has also been maintained that culture or cultural diversity and 
multiculturalism are notions intimately related. Multiculturalism has built its 
ideological proposals upon a concrete factual description of the societal reality 
existing in our modern societies. The diversity of cultural expression, ideas, practices 
and understanding that indeed exist in our societies have provided the necessary 
factual substratum for the ideological construction of an “ideal” society in which 
each ethno-cultural entity or group would have the possibility to recreate and build 
its own socio-cultural institutions, that would ideally reflect its own cultural 
specificities and particularities. In this sense, cultural diversity is a notion that lies at 
the very bottom of multiculturalist discourses and –therefore– gives continuous 
nourishment to political multiculturalist aspirations of disenfranchised ethno-cultural 
                                                 
1 See I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, I-ACtHR, 
Series C No. 79. Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs of August 31, 2001, Joint Separate 
Option of Judges A.A. Cançado Trindade, M. Pacheco Gómez and A. Abreu Burelli, para. 14. 
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entities, in their deconstructivist attempts of building (perhaps, the most accurate 
term would be… rebuilding) a different society. That is, a society in which each 
ethno-cultural group and cultural expression would be equal in dignity and –
therefore– equally able to shape, mould and influence all economic, social, cultural 
and legal institutions that regulate societal dynamics within the society.  
However, what is cultural diversity? Is it possibly a factual reality that just 
refers to the existing plurality of cultures? Or is it perhaps an ideology such as 
multiculturalism, and therefore giving substance to rallying calls among those who 
denounce persistent socio-economic inequalities in developed societies? Is it maybe 
a societal value, just like justice or tolerance, which could possibly be articulated into 
a legal principle, as for instance the principle of equality and non-discrimination, or 
even providing potential content and substance to a concrete and exercisable right, 
such as the right to take part in the cultural life of a given society? Does a right of 
cultural diversity exist?  
As we can see, all of the above mentioned questions not only indicate that 
cultural and culture diversity are not only those kinds of notions that are difficult to 
be conceptualised, but also –and perhaps even most relevantly– that they are located 
at the centre of large and complex ideological battles. For these reasons, and for the 
importance that culture diversity has gained within the human rights discourses and 
in particular –as we will see in the following chapters– within the jurisprudence of 
one of the main regional human rights courts, that is, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, it would be important to try to conceptualise or –at least– to sketch a 
basic understanding of the concept of culture diversity. 
 
 
2. The notion of Culture (or Cultural) Diversity 
 
The point of departure in any discussion in connection with cultural diversity 
is obviously the notion of culture; notion that we have already discussed in the 
previous chapter, together with the social implications that the plurality have within 
our modern societies. In this sense, it has already been maintained that for the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), culture 
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“…should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and 
emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition 
to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and 
beliefs.”2 But if we take into consideration the fact that in the world exist a wide 
range of distinct cultures, then our research analysis will be necessarily led toward 
the notion of plurality, versus the idea of coexistence between more than one cultural 
manifestation within the same societal milieu. In fact, we have already seen that 
when societies have at their bosom a presence of diversified ethno-cultural 
expressions, different societal dynamics appear between those cultural entities and –
in most cases– those relations reflect majority-minority dynamics. Moreover, a 
sociological and even ethno-political analysis of these dynamics will certainly place 
them –as we saw in the preceding chapter– at the centre of potential multiculturalist 
claims, put forward by disempowered ethno-cultural groups.  
But, if the existing cultural diversity in a given society lies at the very base of 
multicultural political aspirations and claims, then it could be possible that we are 
facing a different dimension of this notion, that is not just a mere factual dimension 
but perhaps a sort of valuative, moral or even legal dimension. As a factual notion, 
culture diversity could be substituted with those other similar notions that we already 
analysed, such as –for example– cultural plurality or cultural pluralism.3 But then 
again, if cultural diversity has been used as justification for the reorganisation of 
societal institutions and the redistribution of powers and rights among existing socio-
cultural entities, then we have to do nothing but recognise that these notions have or 
could have strong valuative or moral aspects that have to be explored.  
Consequently, it seems necessary to analyse the normative implications that 
the presence of a diversified number of cultural entities could have, that is the way 
that culture diversity is perceived and incorporated into the international legal order 
                                                 
2 This definition is in line with the conclusion of the World Conference on Cultural Policies 
(MONDIACULT, Mexico City, 1982), of the World Commission on culture and Development Our 
Creative Diversity (1995), and of the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for 
Development (Stockholm, 1998). 
3 According to UNESCO, these two notions have not exactly the same meaning. For this institution, 
plurality of cultures in a given society is a necessary but not a sufficient pre-condition for cultural 
pluralism, ‘because the simple juxtaposition of diverse cultures does not in itself create the 
interconnections and bonds which characterize cultural interplay’. In fact, for UNESCO, cultural 
pluralism is “…less about this coexistence of cultures than about an interaction which leads them to 
break out of their isolation and become part of a wider context.” See, UNESCO, Towards a 
constructive pluralism, Paris, 1999, p. 19.  
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and –in particular– its potential or concrete impact on human rights standards. 
Indeed, in order to continue with our critical analysis (in particular vis-à-vis 
multiculturalist postulates), it would be important to consider whether diversity could 
condition the legal interpretation of the scope and content of those individual rights, 
under the interpretative light of the ethno-cultural appurtenances.  
In this sense, and coming back to UNESCO’s consideration of culture and 
cultural diversity, this organisation has recently published a large and deep study, 
integrally dedicated to the question of culture diversity, in which the latter is seen not 
only as factual description but also as having important political implications, in 
particular in connection with its role as a “resource” for managing –and perhaps 
accommodating– cultural differences.4 In fact, cultural diversity is defined as the 
“positive expression” of one of the general objectives that this organisation sees as to 
be attained, namely “the promotion and protection of the cultures of the world, 
which are faced with the danger of uniformisation.”5  
As we can see, reference to ‘resource’ or even ‘positive expression’ gives us 
a clear understanding that cultural diversity is seen from a normative perspective or –
at least– as a valuative element that could be used for the achievement of a societal 
aim. Furthermore, the fact that cultural diversity has to be protected against 
“uniformisation”, against –for instance– the loss of diversity, put the notion of 
cultural diversity in a sort of pro-active and political role. Indeed, it would be 
possible to argue that cultural diversity becomes a “societal value” that has to be not 
only protected but also pursued, and therefore with the potentiality to inform and 
give content to legal principles and rights. In other words, if cultural diversity might 
have to be considered as a guiding value that would ideally provide a sort of roadmap 
to socio-cultural and institutional organisation of our modern societies, then it would 
also provide axiological contents to those fundamental legal principles over which 
the entire legal system of a given society is constructed, such as the principle of 
equality and non-discrimination, but not only. Its potential axiological interpretative 
incorporation within those basic legal principles would also pave the way for a 
                                                 
4 See, UNESCO, Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue – World Report, Paris, 
2009, p. 21 et seq.  
5 See, UNESCO, Meeting of the Experts Committee on the Strenghening of Unesco’s role in 
Promoting Cultural Diversity in the context of Globalization, (Doc. No. CLT/CIC/BCI/DC.DOC 5E), 
2000, para. 7.  
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possible reinterpretation of recognised fundamental rights, in a “cultural diversity 
friendly” sense.  
This axiological understanding of ‘cultural diversity’, as a societal value, is 
again reaffirmed by UNESCO when said that “[a] more constructive view of cultural 
diversity is that it should not simply be tolerated, but fully recognized and integrated 
into the democratic game-plan.”6 In fact, the integration of cultural diversity within 
the “democratic game-plan” is nothing but a reaffirmation of the axiological 
importance that cultural diversity has within a democratic system. In this sense, in 
this valuative vest, it would be possible to use cultural diversity as an axiological tool 
for social, political and institutional re-organisation of the society. This would be 
possibly done through the incorporation, into the socio-political system, of the 
different cultural views and understandings that are already present in society; or –at 
least– through their ‘difference-friendly’ reinterpretation. Furthermore, as a value, 
cultural diversity would necessarily have an intimate connection with principles and 
rights that are part of the legal system of a given society, and therefore, would bring 
into the operative interpretation of those rights and principles the existing different 
societal cultural views. In other words, as it happens within all legal systems, culture 
and even cultural diversity –as societal values– would axiologically inform legal 
principles, and they would provide interpretative substantial content to 
fundamentally recognised rights. 
The above analysis of the notion reflects –without any doubt– a social view of 
the worth of cultural diversity for a given society. If cultural diversity is a societal 
value, it is because it has an axiological worth for that society, and hence indeed 
represents a societal point of view. But this is not the only valuative aspect of 
cultural diversity. In fact, from an individual perspective, the existence of a plurality 
of cultures in the world also means that different human beings, different groups and 
cultural entities enjoy the benefit of culture in different ways. That is, allowing them 
to recognise themselves in a different understanding of ‘the good’, finding meaning 
for life in the variety of views and traditions proposed by the different cultures.7 In 
                                                 
6 As it has been said, “[c]ultural pluralism thus leads to a conception of personal identity open to the 
most diverse influences, using any of them according to its needs and free of the obligation to move 
within a single cultural sphere…” See, UNESCO, Towards a constructive pluralism, cit., p. 23 et seq. 
7 Referring to the notion of  ‘national identities’ UNESCO has highlighted the fact that “[i]n a world 
made more complex by the unprecedented reach, intensity and immediacy of human interchanges, 
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addition, if we consider that their individual identities would most likely mirror those 
cultural peculiarities that characterise one or more of those cultural traditions, then it 
is quite clear that the acknowledgement of the value of cultural diversity would have 
a considerable impact on the ‘culture bearer’. In fact, the latter is the person who 
would ideally find himself or herself in front of a diversified variety of cultural 
choices, and who would also see legitimised his or her own cultural traditions vis-à-
vis other members of the society.8  As it has been said, the right to culture “...must be 
understood not as an abstract right, but as the right of a social group (nation, 
people, tribe, community) to its own culture. Thus, each community, each people has 
its own concept of what cultural heritage means.”9  
Consequently, it would be important to keep in mind that the notion of 
‘cultural diversity’ could not only refer to a multiple manifestations and conceptions 
of culture that exists in almost all societies (factual aspect), but also a societal value 
that could operate not only as an argumentative political tool that provides 
legitimation for different groups or cultural entities in their struggle for having 
positive recognition and presence in the societies where they live, but also as an 
axiological tool for the interpretation (or perhaps re-interpretation) of legal principles 
and fundamental rights. From this political angle, the notions of cultural diversity 
and multiculturalism overlap, in a sense that both could be used to channel political 
aspirations which ideally pursue a re-dimensioning of the socio-political structures 
and institutions of a given society. The differences between them are nevertheless 
substantial. Multiculturalism is –in essence– an ideology, and cultural diversity is in 
essence a factual situation whose preservation has become –according to UNESCO– 
an axiological standpoint for modern societies. But, when the factual situation is 
penetrated with axiological content, that is when cultural diversity is not seen any 
longer as a mere description of the reality but as a societal value that has to be 
protected and pursued through its institutional articulation in democratic societies, 
then the difference between these two concepts still remain substantial but at a 
                                                                                                                                          
national identities no longer represent the sole dimension of cultural identity. Reflecting a reality 
defined and constructed in response to projects of a political nature, the foundation of national 
identity is typically overlaid with a multiplicity of other affiliations.” Ibid., p. 20.  
8 As we will see further in this chapter, in terms of rights, the enjoyment of someone’s culture it has 
been labelled as the right to cultural identity. 
9 See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Cultural Diversity in the Development of the Americas. Indigenous 
Peoples and States in Spanish America, Organization of American States (OAS), 2002, para. 130. 
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different level. In this sense, as an ideology, multiculturalism provides the political 
“ideological” content for the identification of those essential societal values that a 
multiculturalist society should pursue; instead, cultural diversity could be (and 
perhaps is) one of those identified societal values. To put it bluntly, cultural diversity 
is –or could be– a factual reality in a given society; multiculturalism provides –or 
could provide– the socio-political ideological foundations for its axiological 
interpretation as an essential societal value.  
After having explored these conceptual but nevertheless important angles, it 
is time to focus on another essential aspect of the multiculturalism-cultural diversity 
tandem, which is nothing but the legal aspects or consequences of the 
(multiculturalist) re-interpretation of cultural diversity, and –in particular– its 
potential effect upon individual human rights. Within the following section, we will 
briefly analyse this interrelation and, in order to do so, we will shortly review 
UNESCO’s Convention and other international legal instruments that have dealt with 
this topic.  
 
 
3. The UNESCO understanding of Cultural Diversity and Pluralism 
 
In the last decades the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) has engaged itself in a process of normative regulation of 
the concept of cultural diversity. Since the creation of the World Commission on 
Culture and Development in 1992, with the mandate to prepare a World Report on 
Culture and Development, UNESCO convincingly turned its eyes toward the world’s 
needs for respect of culture and management of diversity. But even before the issue 
of this report, UNESCO had approached cultural diversity and cultural policies in its 
“Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies” of 1982. This Declaration, not only 
ratified the understanding that every culture represents a unique and irreplaceable 
body of values, but also that the recognition of the presence of variety of cultural 
identities constitutes the very essence of cultural pluralism.10  
                                                 
10 See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, adopted by the World Conference on 
Cultural Policies, Mexico, 6 August 1982, para. 1 and 6.  
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Additionally, the ‘inseparable’ connection between cultural diversity and 
cultural identity has also been expressly acknowledged by this international 
organisation, especially by means of putting emphasis on the fact that individual 
cultural identities are enriched in diversity. That is through the contact with the 
traditions and values of others.11 In addition, it has opening the institutional doors of 
the international community for the establishment of active policies that would 
‘protect, stimulate and enrich each people’s identity and cultural heritage’.12    
In fact, after its first institutional approach to the topic of cultural plurality in 
the world, UNESCO issued other four reports directly concerning the question of 
culture and, two of them, specifically addressing the challenges generated by the 
world cultural diversity.13 As a result of this long process of institutional reflection, 
conducted mainly during the 1980s and 1990s,  in 2001 UNESCO produced one of 
its most relevant contributions in this field, namely the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity (here in after “UNESCO Declaration” or 
“UDCD”).14 
The 2001 Universal Declaration, not only ratified the central value of culture 
within the contemporary debate in connection with identity, social cohesion, and the 
development of a knowledge-based economy (preamble), but also stressed the idea 
of multiplicity of cultures, when affirming that “[c]ulture takes diverse from across 
time and space” (Article 1). In addition, this instrument has highlighted the value of 
cultural diversity in human life, saying that “[t]his diversity is embodied in the 
uniqueness and plurality of the identities of the groups and societies making up 
humankind”, but not only. It also added that “culture diversity is as necessary for 
humankind as biodiversity is for nature, [because] it is the common heritage of 
humanity and [therefore] should be recognized and affirmed for the benefit of present 
and future generations” (Article 1).  
                                                 
11 Ibid., para. 4. 
12 Ibid., para. 8.  
13 See, UNESCO, Our Creative Diversity: Report of the World Commission on Culture and 
Development, Paris, 1996; UNESCO, Culture, Creativity and Markets. World Culture Report 1998, 
Paris, 1998; UNESCO, Cultural Diversity, Conflict and Pluralism - World Culture Report, Paris, 
2000; and UNESCO, Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue – World Report, 
Paris, 2009. 
14 The Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity was adopted by the 31st session of the United 
Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) General Conference, Paris, 2 
November 2001. 
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Moreover, under the reading of the UNESCO Declaration, the notion of 
“plurality of cultures” goes hand in hand with the need to open the common or public 
space. The Declaration claims for the accommodation –within the public sphere– of 
all different cultural manifestations present in a given society; not only in order to 
give them more public visibility but also –and perhaps more importantly– more 
public legitimation under a pluralist and democratic umbrella. In fact, the 
Declaration also states that “[i]ndissociable form a democratic framework, cultural 
pluralism is conducive to cultural exchange and to the flourishing to creative 
capacities that sustain public life” (Article 2). UNESCO sees the protection of 
cultural diversity as a guarantee for social cohesion and peace, because it ‘ensure[s] 
that harmonious interaction among people and groups, with plural, varied and 
dynamic cultural identities as well as their willingness to live together’ (Article 2).  
Under this logic, “living together” in a democratic setting would necessarily 
lead toward the accommodation of cultural differences and to a construction of a 
common space in which all cultural identities would be able to freely develop and 
flourish. But the question, of course, is how? One way could be to forcibly impose a 
cultural change; to undergo into a deep deconstruction of societal institutions and 
socio-cultural practices –including the legal systems– in order to give space, 
visibility and legitimation to those cultural minoritarian expressions that have been 
partially or totally excluded from the public sphere. On the contrary, another way 
would be to just set up minimum guarantees that would ideally secure fair 
possibilities to all existing cultural expressions in order to be present, develop and 
compete within the democratic societal game. In this latter sense, the different 
cultural proposal would have the possibility to openly and fairly compete for societal 
public support, within a neutral and equidistant public space, but without having any 
institutionally secured or guaranteed results.  
In my opinion, the second of the above mentioned approaches is the one that 
generate better conditions for the accommodation of cultural diversity within an 
open, pluralist and democratic society. But, one can rightfully ask whether this 
interpretative view is in line with the understanding enshrined within the UNESCO 
Declaration, in particular because a first-glance analysis of its dispositions could 
actually give us the opposite interpretative impression. In fact, this Declaration 
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stands for a sort of ‘multiculturalist’ accommodative solution. However, an 
appropriate and careful critical examination of its provisions would certainty lead us 
toward the reaffirmation of the interpretation that I am arguing here. Why? Well, 
because it is the same text of the Declaration that support this interpretative view, if 
read it –of course– accurately and under the light of Article 31(1) VCLT. In fact, the 
Declaration states that “…cultural pluralism is conducive to cultural exchange and 
to the flourishing of creative capacities that sustain public life”, which basically 
means that the quintessence of pluralist societies is to have an open ‘cultural 
exchange’. And cultural exchange is and should be free; it cannot and must not be 
forced. It is in the open, neutral and public sphere where the different understanding 
of “the good” compete to provide meaning to people’s life, but nobody can be and 
should not be forced to accept and to internalised the worth of one of those specific 
cultural proposal. In a democratic system, individuals always remain (and should 
remain) free to choose their cultural alliances, and to embrace those meaningful 
cultural philosophical views that best fit their cultural needs.15 In other words, 
cultural diversity –in fact– not only widens the range of options open to everyone in 
a given society, but also become a “means to achieve a more satisfactory 
intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual existence” (Article 3).  
Furthermore, in order to create the conditions that would allow a free and fair 
development of cultural choices, public sphere should and must be neutral. Public 
neutrality constitutes an essential factor for the protection of cultural diversity. This 
means that it establishes those minimum elements indispensable for the creation of a 
balanced relationship between the necessary normative framework that would 
guarantee to each cultural manifestation, the possibility to express and propose 
themselves to the society. In addition, it would also generate the rightful conditions 
that would ideally guarantee the essential space of freedom that would allow a fair 
competition among them. In fact, it is the cultural neutrality of the public sphere that 
generates the necessary institutional framework that would make possible for all 
persons to have “the right to participate in the cultural life of their choice and 
conduct their own cultural practices…” Moreover, it also consents “the possibility 
                                                 
15 See, K. A. APPIAH, The Ethics of Identity, Princeton, 2005, p.130 et seq. 
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for all cultures to have access to the means of expression and dissemination…”16  
Indeed, it is only in a free and neutral (public) cultural space that culture can freely 
interact and be a “source of exchange, innovation and creativity” (Article 1).17  
The idea that the notion of cultural diversity intrinsically involves a free flow 
of cultural expression, and therefore within a neutral space of fair cultural 
competition, has been effectively embraced by the definition of this term 
incorporated in the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions of 2005. In fact, this Convention states that 
“Culture Diversity refers to the manifold ways in which the cultures of groups and 
societies find expression. These expressions are passed on within and among groups 
and societies” (Article 4(1)).18  As we can see, the second phrase refers to the free 
exchange of cultural expression and contents; exchange that not only put cultures in 
contact across (cultural) borders, but also modifies and constantly reshapes them in a 
perpetual process.  
For all of these reasons, we can do nothing but conclude –together with 
UNESCO– that “culture diversity, flourishing within a framework of democracy, 
tolerance, social justice and mutual respect between people and cultures, is 
indispensable for peace and security at the local, national and international 
levels.”19 Additionally, it would be also possible to conclude that “[t]he defence of 
cultural diversity is an ethical imperative, inseparable from respect for human 
dignity.”20 However, the defence of the diversity must not be understood as a forced 
imposition of diversity or even artificial perpetuation of one specific cultural 
expression. The essence of culture is freedom. Culture takes diverse forms across 
time and space in a free perpetual movement, and then is necessarily subjected to 
changes that –under certain circumstances– could bring it toward its natural societal 
disappearance…21 But, of course, the natural societal vanishing of one particular 
                                                 
16 See, Articles 5 and 6 of the UNESCO Declaration. 
17 In the same line the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions of 2005 states that “culture diversity is strengthened by the free flow of ideas, 
and that it is nurtured by constant exchanges and interaction between cultures” (preamble). This 
Convention entered into force on 18 March 2007, and until today it has 118 States Parties.  
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., preamble. 
20 See, Article 4, Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. 
21 If we will accept the biological parallel proposed by the UNESCO Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity, in which the importance of cultural diversity for mankind is compared with the relevance 
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cultural expression from the societal milieu cannot be considered as endangering the 
diversity of the society. On the contrary, it would be just part of its perpetual process 
of renovation and adaptability to the changeable socio-temporal conditions existing 
in a given society22; processes which are nothing but the veritable channels for 
cultural creation, innovation and regeneration.   
Finally, it is important to highlight that cultural diversity not only influences 
societies –taken as a whole– but also –and perhaps most importantly– individuals. 
That is, cultural diversity provides a plural framework in which cultural identities are 
shaped and moulded. In effect, as long as every person’s life is immersed within a 
specific cultural framework, the latter will always substantially shape his or her 
identity. This means that his or her identity would reflect those cultural ties that he or 
she has with the society in which he or she lives or feels connected to by bonds of 
appurtenance and membership. Therefore, it would be possible to state that one of 
the most important cultural manifestations of our societal cultures is precisely our 
identity, our cultural identity.23 The latter, is unavoidably influenced and constructed 
by the former; but for its future perpetuation, the former also depends on the 
collective interaction, acknowledgment and visibility of the latter. And this is 
because, as we will see below, culture and cultural identity are –at least– 
interdependent notions. However, they do not relate to each other as merely two 
sides of the same coin; but rather, they relate to each other perhaps as fruit to root, 
where the former is a consequence of the vital support of the latter, but also permit 
the regeneration of the entire natural cycle. 
                                                                                                                                          
that biodiversity has for nature, then, we perhaps would have to also accept the natural “biological” 
decadence of cultures. (See, Article 1 of the Declaration). However, in my view this biological 
parallel is quite (if not all) misleading. Culture, as a human expression, never dies; it just suffers 
transformation, and changeable adaptations. What could indeed perish is just one or more cultural 
expressions, as many cultural expressions did in history, without prejudice of the cultural legacy that 
they could leave for the posterity.    
22 In this line, the first objective of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions is precisely “to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expression” 
(Article 1(a)), which is not exactly the same as to protect and promote ‘each’ cultural expression… 
23 In this sense, at the 1st paragraph of the Istanbul Declaration on Cultural Diversity, made at the 
UNESCO Third Round Table of Ministers of Culture on 17 September 2002, it was recognised that 
“The multiple expressions of intangible cultural heritage constitute some of the fundamental sources 
of the cultural identity of the peoples and communities as well as a wealth common to the whole of 
humanity. Deeply rooted in local history and natural environment and embodied, among others, by a 
great variety of languages that translate as many world visions, they are an essential factor in the 
preservation of cultural diversity…” 
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In the following section, we will explore the above mentioned intimate 
relation between cultural diversity and identity and –in particular– we will try to 
briefly analyse what has been called the right to cultural identity, as one of the 
current potential manifestation of the value of culture, from a legal point of view.  
 
 
4. Cultural diversity and Cultural Identity 
 
If it is true that it is culture that ‘makes us specifically human, rational beings, 
endowed with a critical judgment and a sense of moral commitment’, and that 
through culture we not only discern values and make meaningful choices, but also 
recognise and express ourselves, as it has been stressed by UNESCO’s Mexico City 
Declaration.24, then we have to do nothing but recognise that culture (in all its 
diversified forms) shapes, conditions and moulds our ‘identity’. In this sense, our 
identities are nothing but a ‘cultural creation’. To put it in another way, identities are 
culturally constructed by definition; they are ontologically relational in a sense that 
they ‘indicate a relationship between two persons or groups’.25  
In fact, it is within the group, through the interaction with other group 
members (e.g. within our own families), and after with the dialectic interactions with 
members or other groups, that peoples and cultural entities build and define their 
own identity. To put it bluntly, what represents and constitutes ‘us’ and ‘them’ (or 
just ‘others’, in a sense of outsiders) is the historical and cultural interrelationships 
between societal cultural entities, which live and interact within the same societal 
framework or through their culturally created borders.26  
Paradoxically, the constitutive process of our common cultural identity, as 
members of a given group, is –essentially– a process of separation and 
differentiation from other cultural entities, which are generally considered as 
                                                 
24 See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, cit., preamble.  
25 In fact, as it has been said, identities imply an affirmation of difference and possibly an antagonism. 
See, UNESCO, Cultural Diversity, Conflict and Pluralism - World Culture Report, cit., p. 27 et seq.  
26 As Donders has said, “…the identity of an individual or a community is based on opposing other 
communities that are considered different or subordinate in the sense of class, race, culture, etc. This 
creates the image of ‘the rest’ or ‘us and them’. See, I. M. DONDERS, Towards a Right to Cultural 
Identity?, Antwerpen/Oxford/New York, 2002, p. 34 et seq. 
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outsiders.27 The common features of a group, which conform the base of the group 
cultural identity, are defined externally rather than internally, in a sense that the 
common characteristics of the members of a given group are those that make them 
different from ‘other’ groups. In this sense, internal similarities are less constitutional 
than external differentiations.28 In other words, having an identity requires defining 
that identity in relation to other local cultures and also to regional and international 
ones.29 As UNESCO has stressed, “[t]he elusive notion of identity stands at the 
intersection of self-perception (what we notice and consider important about 
ourselves) and other-perception (what others notice and consider important about 
us), neither of which is inherent or immutable.”30 
In fact, the same Mexico City Declaration stresses the importance of this 
notion which states that cultural identity is “a treasure that vitalizes mankind’s 
possibilities of self-fulfilment by moving every people and every group to seek 
nurture in its past, to welcome contributions from outside that are compatible with 
its own characteristics, and so to continue with the process of its own creation.”31 In 
this sense, cultural identity is an exogenous and endogenous cultural product (and 
very changeable too); exogenous because is generated by the external cultural 
circumstances, by the cultural inputs that each individual receive since he or she was 
born; and endogenous because this cultural information is subjected to a unique and 
unequalled process within each human being.32  
Moreover, cultural identity has both a collective and an individual dimension. 
The collective dimension represents and tends to mirror the cultural inputs received 
from the ethno-cultural group in which the individual belongs, and represents what 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 As we said earlier in this chapter, indigenous people could be considered ‘indigenous’ (and not just 
people) because they can be compared with and differentiated from other cultural groups or people 
whom ‘indigenous’ are not. Before the discovery of the Americas by European settlers, the inhabitants 
of the Americas were just simple inhabitants, the people living and ruling their lands. But, when the 
colonisation process began, it was certainly the cultural encounter that made them ‘indigenous’ people 
by opposition with the European colonisers/settlers.  
29 See, UNESCO, Cultural Diversity, Conflict and Pluralism - World Culture Report, cit., p. 37. 
30 See, UNESCO, Towards a constructive pluralism, Paris, 1999, cit., p. 9. 
31 See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, cit., para. 3.   
32 As Jeffrey Weeks said, “[i]dentity is about belonging, about what you have in common with some 
people and what differentiates you from others. At its most basic it gives you a sense of personal 
location, the stable core to your complex involvement with others…” See, J. WEEKS, The Value of 
Difference, in J. RUTHERFORD (ed.), Identity - Community, Culture, Difference, London, 1990, p. 
88. 
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members of the group have in common and make them different from the ‘outsiders’ 
or members of other groups. On the contrary, the individual dimension reflects what 
is unique in each individual, what makes that specific individual a different human 
being vis-à-vis members of another given ethno-cultural group.33 In this sense, it 
would be possible to say that one individual has a predominant cultural identity (that 
would match its collective dimension) and several specific cultural identities, which 
would reflect all of those unique individual experiences that each human being 
would have during his or her life.34  
For all of these reasons, we have to consider cultural identity as a “dialogical” 
in nature, in a sense that it “is renewed and enriched through contact with the 
traditions and values of others.”35 Indeed, as more numerous cultural options would 
be, as richer and more diversified, the meaningful choices for each individual would 
be. Therefore, the protection and promotion of a diversified number of cultural 
choices could be considered as a positive societal value, in order to stimulate and 
enrich each people’s identity. 36 In addition, it would be in the interest of the States to 
establish and foster cultural policies in order to facilitate this dialogical process, but 
this does not mean that those policies would have to be addressed toward the 
perpetuation of one specific cultural expression. If culture, cultural expressions and 
even cultural identities are subjected to change, then they must not and should not be 
artificially frozen or essentialised by any public policy, action or intervention, under 
the misleading justification of their protection against cultural perishability.37 This 
interpretation of culture as a sort of ‘perpetual product’ is nothing but a 
                                                 
33 As it has been stressed by the UN independent expert in the field of cultural rights, Ms. Farida 
Shaheed, “[e]ach individual is the bearer of a multiple and complex identity, making her or him a 
unique being and, at the same time, enabling her or him to be part of communities of shared culture.”  
See, F. SHAEED, Report of the independent expert in the fild of cultural rights, Ms. Farida Shaheed, 
submitted pursuant to resolution 10/23 of the Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/14/36, United 
Nations, 2010, p. 10, para. 23. 
34 See, I. M. DONDERS, op. cit., p. 33 et seq. 
35 See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, cit., para. 4. 
36 The inseparable relationship that exist between cultural diversity and cultural identities has been 
highlighted by the Mexico City Declaration, when states that “recognition of the presence of a variety 
of cultural identities wherever various traditions exist side by side constitutes the very essence of 
cultural pluralism”. See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, cit., para. 6. 
37 When the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity states that States have to 
formulate “…polices and strategies for the preservation and enhancement of the cultural and natural 
heritage…” does not refer, of course, to the forceful maintenance of cultural practises by members of 
cultural groups. The lively maintenance of the culture is a cultural group’s affair, but if they do not 
want to continue with that traditions, then States would have the possibility to preserve and protect 
that cultural information for the benefit of posterity (See, Annex II of the Declaration, para. 13). 
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misrepresentation of the changeable and dialogical essence of culture.38 To put it in 
another way, if identities are dynamic and multi-layered rather than monolithic and 
static, then the cultural identity of a given group is never truly homogeneous. This is 
because no culture is truly ‘unmixed’, ‘pure’ or ‘uncontaminated’ (the only exception 
to this general rule, that I can imagine in our modern world, could be constituted by 
those indigenous populations that still live in absolute and complete isolation; but 
because they live in isolation, this exception is just a mere hypothesis). 39 Cultures –
and the identities that they generate– are always subjected to processes of change, 
modification and regeneration that make ontologically impossible –and rationally 
unfeasible– any attempts to artificially freeze or essentialise them.40  
Therefore, if we accept that culture, and then cultural identities, are in essence 
subjected to time and socio-geographical factors, if we accept that they are 
impermanent and mutable, then the modification of cultural structures and 
understandings of past generations –to the point in which they are no longer 
recognisable in the features of current societal structures– cannot be considered as a 
destruction or annihilation of those previous cultural expressions. On the contrary, it 
must be seen as just their “natural” cultural mutability, adaptation or regeneration 
within a permanent and unavoidable process of cross-cultural fertilisation.41 In this 
sense, cultural enrichment is ontologically incompatible with a sort of essentialist 
                                                 
38 Even from a biological metaphorical point of view, we can say together with Raz that “[t]he dying 
of cultures is as much part of normal life as the birth of new ones.” The extinction of a cultural entity 
has to be seen as just a normal stage in our perpetual changeable cultural journey; its contents will 
remain as part of our human heritage. See, J. RAZ, Ethics in the Plubic Domain. Essays in the 
Morality of Law and Politics, Oxford, 1995, p. 182. 
39 For an accurate report on the current situation of indigenous people living in isolation see the 
Human Rights Council Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous People’s Report called “Draft 
Guidelines on the Protection of Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and in Initial contact of the 
Amazon Basin and El Chaco, UN Doc. A/HRC/EMRIP/2009/6, of 30 June 2009.  
40 As Appiah wrote, quoting Walter Been Michaels, “without some racialized conception of a group, 
one’s culture could only be whatever it was that one actually practiced, and couldn’t be lost or 
retrieved or preserved or betrayed.”  The only way to think about culture as something “pure” would 
be in biological terms, and that would necessarily conduct us to the idea of race, to a genetic-
descendant-based idea of culture. But, because history has taught us the barbarous implications of a 
race-based idea of humanity, then we must accept that culture and cultural identities cannot be lost, 
they are just subjected to change. See, K. A. APPIAH, op. cit., p. 136-137; see also W. B. 
MICHAELS, Our America: Nativism, Modernism, and Pluralism, Durham, 1996, p. 125, and 128-
129. 
41 Appiah magisterially exemplified this sort of cultural essentialism saying that “… the words and 
images with which people speak of cultural destruction–or, more neutrally, cultural change–typically 
refer to the destruction of human life. Assimilation is figured as annihilation.” See, K. A. APPIAH, 
op. cit., p. 130 et seq. 
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view of culture and culture identity, which relegates cultural expressions to perpetual 
isolation, and pretends to freeze them out of time.42  
Perhaps it would be important to clarify one important aspect of culture 
identity and diversity. As the UNESCO’s Universal Declaration states “[i]n our 
increasingly diverse societies, it is essential to ensure harmonious interaction among 
people and groups with plural, varied and dynamic cultural identities…”43 This 
means that what should really be protected and promoted is the ‘interaction between 
cultures’, from a neutral standpoint, and not certainly one specific cultural expression 
or manifestation. Therefore, it is quite clear that cultural separateness, or the partition 
of the public spheres among the different cultural entities recognisable in a given 
society, as trumpeted by multiculturalist, is not a positive value pursued by the 
Declaration. On the contrary, what is promoted by this instrument is ‘harmonious 
interaction’ between cultural expressions, which is basically a dialogical cultural 
exchange and mutual cross-fertilisation.44 Furthermore, this is the only possible 
interpretation that makes compatible the respect and promotion of diversity on one 
hand, and the respect and protection of individual autonomy and cultural freedom, on 
the other hand.  Individuals cannot and must not be subjected to any group’s cultural 
imposition, not even that one that could come from their own cultural group of 
appurtenance.  
However, the concern for survival that members of one specific ethno-
cultural entity could have is perfectly consistent –in abstract terms– with respect for 
individual autonomy. In fact, if our current values, views and understandings are or 
would be appealing to our next generations, most likely they would embrace them 
and –hence– that specific cultural expression would survive, with –of course– the 
necessary geo-temporal societal adjustments.45 In other words, it is perfectly 
understandable and culturally consistent that each societal entity –including minority 
                                                 
42 As the Mexico City Declaration states “[c]ulture is dialogue, the exchange of ideas and experience 
and the appreciation of other values, and traditions; it withers and dies in isolation.” See, UNESCO, 
Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, cit., para. 4. 
43 See, UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, Article 2. 
44 The value of cultural exchange has been repeatedly stressed by UN related bodies. Just as an 
additional example, we can mention the Human Rights Resolution 2005/20 of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, which expressed its determination to “…prevent and mitigate cultural homogenization 
in the context of globalization, through increased intercultural exchange guided by the promotion and 
protection of cultural diversity” (Preamble). 
45 See, K. A. APPIAH, op. cit., p. 137. 
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groups and indigenous people– would have the legitimate expectation to perpetuate 
their own cultural understandings and views and traditions to the next generation and 
further. However, these expectations cannot and must not impose any limits on the 
free and autonomous development of individual identities of group’s members. The 
autonomy and cultural freedom of the individuals shall be protected also against the 
legitimate desires of cultural perpetuation that a given ethno-cultural group could 
have, even at the price of cultural extinguishment or –better– substantial change.46  
In fact, it is in the above mentioned understanding that UNESCO states that 
“[c]ultural policies should promote creativity in all its forms, facilitating access to 
cultural practices and experiences for all citizens regardless of nationality, race, sex, 
age, physical or mental disability, enrich the sense of cultural identity and belonging 
of every individual and community and sustain them in their search for a dignified 
and safe future”, but “…within the framework of national unity.”47 Whatever 
cultural future individual would like to have, search and build for themselves, public 
policies have to provide the supportive societal framework that would generate the 
rightful conditions for them to do it. In this sense, all cultural practises would have 
the possibility to freely and openly compete for societal support, with the only 
requirements –of course– that those cultural practises would have to be fully in line 
with the principle of respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, but not only. 
Additionally, they would also have to respect the territorial integrity and political 
unity of the State in which they exist. These are the limits that protection and 
promotion of cultural diversity cannot and must not cross. Even when we consider 
that the defence of cultural diversity is an ‘ethical imperative’, this defence is always 
subjected to the ‘respect of human dignity’, as stated by the same UNESCO’s 
Universal Declaration.48 Indeed, the same instrument expressly clarify that “[n]o one 
                                                 
46 As Appiah said, “…it is far from clear that we can always honour such preservationist claims while 
respecting the autonomy of future individuals.” Even when parents, relatives of wider cultural circles 
would like to preserve cultural practises and expressions, and therefore ‘impose’ them on the next 
generation, such as could occur with arranged marriage practises in India or Pakistan, their 
preservationist views could be protected against the individual will of the person that would be 
subjected to the said practise. See, K. A. APPIAH, op. cit., p. 130 et seq.     
47 See, UNESCO, Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development - Final report, 
CLT-98/Conf.210/5, Stockholm, 1998, Preamble, para. 6 and 7. 
48 See Article 4, UNESCO Universal Declaration on Culture Diversity, cit. The principle of respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms has been also expressly adopted by the UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, in its Article 2; 
and also by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 13th September 2007, which in 
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may invoke cultural diversity to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by 
international law, nor to limit their scope.”49 
As we can see, respect for human rights and cultural identity are intimately 
connected. The process of construction of the latter cannot infringe the inviolability 
of the former. And this conclusion leads us toward one extra question that would be 
important to answer before we start analysing the specific case of indigenous people 
and the way that the tutelage of their cultural diversity has contributed to the 
protection of their right to traditionally occupied lands. This last issue is connected 
with the legal understanding of cultural identity, and in particular whether cultural 
identity has been incorporated –and therefore protected– as human rights. In the 
following section, we will attempt to provide a brief answer to this question.  
 
 
4.1. Cultural identity as a ‘legal’ concept 
 
If we come back to Article 4 of the UNESCO’s Declaration, which states that 
“[t]he defence of cultural diversity is an ethical imperative, inseparable from respect 
for human dignity”, then we have to necessarily conclude that the respect for cultural 
identity intrinsically involves the respect for every person’s human dignity. And this 
is not irrelevant. If human dignity is involved, in a sense of providing valuable 
justification for the protection of the societal cultural diversity, then individual’s 
cultural identity gains another dimension. As we know, the notion of human dignity 
lies at the very core of the system of human rights protection, starting with Article 1 
of the UDHR. The latter states that “[a]ll humans beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights…”; it is our equal dignity as humans that make us equal subjects 
entitle to an equal set of fundamental rights.50  
                                                                                                                                          
its Article 46(2) states that “[i]n the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected”, but not only. The Declaration also 
establishes that all its provisions must be interpreted in accordance with “the principles of justice, 
democracy, respect of human rights, equality and non-discrimination, good governance and good 
faith” (Article 46(3)).  
49 See, Article 2(1), UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions. 
50 According to the Inter-American Court, “[h]uman rights must be respected and guaranteed by all 
States. All persons have attributes inherent to their human dignity that may not be harmed; these 
attributes make them possessors of fundamental rights that may not be disregarded and which are, 
CHAPTER III 
130 
 
Respect for human dignity implies that individuals should not be treated as 
objects, as mere instruments on the hands of others, deprived of their own will, of 
their own selves.51 And if we consider the respect of human dignity not just in 
abstract terms, but in connection with concrete and real situations in which 
individuals are involved within a specific societal milieu, then the circumstances that 
surround and condition individuals’ life must be taken into account.52 In other words, 
what makes a case “a concrete case”, and not just a mere hypothetical and abstract 
case, is –of course– the circumstances of the case, and in a human society those 
circumstances are nothing but cultural.  
Therefore, human dignity and cultural identity are intimately related, they live 
in a permanent and uninterrupted interrelation that could be described as from the 
general to particular. Our identity, as an individual representation or manifestation of 
our cultural appurtenance or appurtenances, is a channel in which our abstract and 
universal dignity, as humans, finds its concretisation, its personification.53 And it is 
for this reason that each individual must have the possibility to develop his or her 
own cultural identity, even against or in a different direction from the predominant 
identity of the ethno-cultural group which she or he feels affiliated with, because it is 
through our identity that our dignity –as humans– finds its concrete meaning. Then it 
becomes quite natural that the protection of human dignity –as a core value of our 
human rights system54– should include as well the protection of our cultural identity 
under a format of a right, or at least as integrative part of already recognised human 
rights.55 
                                                                                                                                          
consequently, superior to the power of the State, whatever its political structure.” See, I-ACtHR, 
Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion AC-18/03 of 
September 17, 2003. Series A No. 18, para. 73. 
51 See, I. M. DONDERS, op. cit., p. 16 et seq. 
52 As Donders has said, “[c]ultural identity is important to individuals and communities, because it 
gives them a sense of belonging and, as such, concerns their human dignity”. Ibid., p. 30 et seq. 
53 I. M. DONDERS, op. cit., p. 45-47. 
54 The core value of human dignity has been ratified, in connection with the Council of Europe system 
of human rights protection, by the European Court of Human Rights, which has said –for example– 
that “[t]he very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom.” See, 
Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, § 65, ECHR 2002-III. 
55 As the UN independent expert in the field of cultural rights, Ms. Farida Shaheed, has said, 
“…cultural rights are pivotal to the recognition and respect of human dignity, as they protect the 
development and expression of various world visions –individual and collective– and encompass 
important freedoms relating to matters of identity.” See, F. SHAEED, op. cit., p. 3-4, para. 3. 
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It would be too ambitious, in connection with the objective of this work, to 
undertake a full-range legal analysis of this so-called right to cultural identity. 
However, it would be a positive contribution to –at least– briefly describe its legal 
nature and scope in order to be able to better understand the way in which this right 
could affect the enjoyment of other fundamental rights (interdependency). This could 
be the case –for instance– of the right to communal property over traditional lands in 
the case of the indigenous people.  
 
 
4.1.1. The right to cultural identity 
 
As we know, the so-called right to cultural identity has not been expressly 
incorporated into international human rights instruments. However, it would be 
possible to consider and interpret that this right constitutes an integrative part of the 
right to take part in cultural life, as recognised by Article 15(1.a) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). This is without 
prejudice of all other international legal provisions that refer to culture in general, 
and therefore, incidentally raise issues connected with this right.56  
The right to take part in cultural life in fact protects and includes our right to 
cultural identity in a sense that the “cultural life” that we can take part in is basically 
the life that we would be able to choose in liberty (in socio-cultural terms, that is a 
liberty which is always and ontologically conditioned). This means, in essence, the 
cultural life that better reflects our inner identity and in which we can freely develop 
                                                 
56 The same right it has been recognised at the UDHR, in its Article 27(1), which states that 
“[e]veryone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community”, or indirectly in 
Article 27 of the ICCPR, when states that “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture…” And, the right to enjoy our own 
culture is nothing but the right of our own cultural identity. Partial reference to the right to take part in 
cultural life could be found it also –among other international instruments– in the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), Article 5 (e) (vi); 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Article 13 
(c); Convention on the Right of the Child (CRC), Article 31, para. 2; International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), Article 
43, para. 1(g); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), Article 30, para. 1; 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, Article 2, paras. 1 and 2; UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP), 
Articles 2, 5, 8, and 11-15.  
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ourselves, and our project of life. The decision of taking part in a particular cultural 
life, and the respect that it is indeed endowed to that decision by the other members 
of the society, have to be seen as part of the larger freedom that each individual 
should enjoy free from unlawful discriminations, and –in particular– those based on 
his or her ethno-cultural affiliations and choices.57   
In fact, according to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR), the right to take part in cultural life can be characterised as a 
freedom.58 For the CESCR, the decision to take part in cultural life, either in the life 
of the mainstream society or in that one of a specific ethno-cultural minority group, 
is a cultural choice that should be protected and respected.59 Additionally, it includes 
–as one of its main components– the right of everyone to “choose his or her own 
identity, to identify or not with one or several communities or to change that 
choice…”60 The recognition of this right allows persons belonging to diverse cultural 
communities to engage freely and without discrimination in their own cultural 
practises and those of others, and –perhaps even most importantly– to choose freely 
their way of life. 
Furthermore, because the right to cultural identity could be considered as an 
integral part of the right to take part in the cultural life of a given community, then 
States would have, vis-à-vis the individuals who are the right holders, a certain 
number of obligations. In fact, as duty bearers, States would have to respect the 
enjoyment of the right to cultural identity by everybody without discrimination 
(including –of course– the complete exclusion from forced assimilation), which 
requires States to refrain from directly or indirectly enacting any illegitimate or 
                                                 
57 As Adalsteinsson and Thórhallson have stressed, “[t]he core content of the right to participate in 
cultural life may be thought to include a number of aspects, such as: the right to manifest one’s own 
culture;  freedom to choose one’s own culture (or whether to belong to a certain culture) and the right 
to change one’s mind in this regard; respect for one’s culture, its integrity and dynamism; equality of 
access; respect for the principle of non-discrimination; and protection and development of cultures in 
which to participate.” See, R. ADALSTEINSSON, P. THÓRHALLSON, Article 27, in G. 
ALFREDSSON, A. EIDE (eds.), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A Common Standard 
of Achievement, The Hague/Boston/London, 1999, p. 592. 
58 See, Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 21. 
Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21, United Nations, 2009, p. 2, para. 6. 
59 Ibid., p. 2, para. 7. 
60 According to this Committee, this right covers also the rights of everyone –alone, in association 
with others or as a community– “to know and understand his or her own culture and that of others 
through education and information and to receive quality education and training with due regard for 
cultural identity…” Ibid., p. 4, para. 15(a) and (b). 
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arbitrary interference with that enjoyment, but not only. States should also protect 
this enjoyment from potential violation or interferences generated by third parties or 
non-state agents; and finally they have to fulfil this enjoyment through the adoption 
of the necessary measures, at administrative, judiciary and parliamentary levels, that 
would allow the full realisation of this right.61     
 
 
4.1.2. Limits of States’ obligations  
 
As it has been maintained, States have to take a different variety of measures 
(including positive actions) in order to facilitate the enjoyment without 
discrimination of the right to take part in cultural life (including the right to cultural 
identity). These measures would include –among others– the institutional recognition 
of cultural practices, and the refrainment from interfering with their development and 
enjoyment, but not only.62 Because we are dealing with cultural rights, one might 
argue –under the light of Article 2(1) ICESCR– that the obligation of States to 
provide for “progressive” full realisation of this right must involve the continuing 
obligation to take deliberate and concrete measures (including –of course– positive 
actions) aimed at the its full implementation.63  
States obligations are –therefore– quite far reaching, but this –of course– does 
not mean that these obligations are unlimited. In fact, the same ICESCR has 
                                                 
61 This obligation will include the responsibility of States to establish the conditions that would make 
the enjoyment of this right not only available, but as well accessible, acceptable, adaptable and 
appropriate. This would include positive actions –when necessary– in order to facilitate, promote and 
provide better conditions for the full enjoyment of this right. As an example of these measures, the 
members of the Committee has mentioned the need to adapt national legislations in order to facilitate 
the enjoyment of “the rights of indigenous peoples to their culture and heritage and to maintain and 
strengthen their spiritual relationship with their ancestral lands and other natural resources 
traditionally owned, occupied or used by them, and indispensable to their cultural life.” I mention this 
example here because this interaction, between the right to cultural identity and the right to have 
access to their traditional lands, will be assumed by the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights that refers to indigenous people land’s claims. As we will see, the reasoning used by 
this Court was even further reaching. In fact, the Court drew a direct connection not only between the 
access to land and cultural identity, but also between the latter and the right to property, which it is not 
exactly the same. I will come back to this topic in the following chapters, when we will discuss the 
above mentioned jurisprudence. See, CESCR, General Comment No. 21. Right of everyone to take 
part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, cit., p. 4-5, para. 16, and p. 11 et seq. 
62 Ibid., p. 11, para. 44. 
63 Ibid., para. 45. 
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established the obligation for States Parties to take steps “…to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant”. This is nothing but a clear recognition of 
the budgetary limitations that all States have to face at a given time to set public 
priorities within the State’s budget. Because economic resources are limited, States 
parties of the Covenant have to –at least– ensure the satisfaction of minimum 
essential levels of each of the recognised rights, including –of course– the right to 
cultural identity as integrative part of the right to take part of the cultural life. It is in 
this sense that the CESCR Committee has stressed that “[i]n order for a State party 
to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a 
lack of available resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to 
use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of 
priority, those minimum obligations”64  
The recognition of the division between core obligations, and others less 
essential obligations, in connection with the level of protection that should be 
guaranteed by each State party to the Covenant, is nothing but the recognition –by 
the CESCR Committee– of the existing gap between ideals and aspirations, on one 
hand, and what is possible in reality, on the other hand. This realistic approach, 
which is coming closer to my personal understanding of human rights as minimum 
standards and not just as unachievable ideals, have to be considered as a positive step 
toward the effective realisation of human rights in the world. Unfortunately, the 
tendency today is quite the opposite one. Instead of focusing on the concrete and 
effective enjoyment and realisation of a common minimum standard of human rights 
for all individuals in the world, international organisations, judiciary and quasi 
judiciary bodies and scholars focus on how to better expand the scope and content of 
recognised human rights, extending their limits almost to their impossible realisation. 
Of course, I have nothing against the recognition of new and tailored rights, but –for 
practical and ontological reasons– I am against their incorporation as “human rights”.  
                                                 
64 See, Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 3 - The 
nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, par. 1), United Nations, 1990, para. 10. See also, 
Commitee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 17 (2005) - The 
right to everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author (article 15, paragraph 1 (c), 
UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/17, United Nations, 2006, p. 11, para. 41. 
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Let me explain this, because I think it is vital for the understanding of my 
philosophical position, which will surely be reflected along this entire work. As we 
said above, the very foundation of human rights is the recognition and protection of 
human dignity; dignity that is equally present and shared by all humans in the world. 
Therefore, every single human right that we incorporate within our common human 
rights standards, should be available and ready to be enjoyed by all humans around 
the globe. However, how we can consider –for example– the right to have access to 
internet as a new human right, when still larger parts of the world population do not 
have access to safe and clean drinking water or even a minimum amount of food? 
Minimum standards means minimum; that is a short catalogue of indispensable rights 
that should be respected, protected and fulfilled in order to guarantee that human 
dignity would not be at stake, even not within the most recondite or isolated part of 
our planet.  
It is for the above reasons that I am absolutely convinced that all efforts of 
international community, including the judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, as –for 
instance– the UN Treaty or Charter based bodies, should be addressed to make those 
minimum standards a daily reality for all humans in the world. This is not certainly 
the same as what could be seen as an impracticable and methodologically –or even 
ontologically– misguided effort of over-expanding the scope, nature, and even the 
numbers of human rights. The latter possibility is impracticable because it would 
only lead to the enjoyment of a far-reaching and extensive (and expensive) range of 
rights by a very small part of the human population. In addition, it would increase the 
gap between different regions in the world in connection with the enjoyment of what 
is meant to be just a “minimum standard” of rights, and also –and even most 
important– condemning large portions of human population to live undignified life, 
just because they would not be able to match the “new” minimum standards.  
Moreover, this kind of approach would be methodologically misguided, 
because it involves a fallacy, which would consist in fictitious divisions between 
“human” rights and rights in general; if all rights ended being “human rights” then it 
would be pointless to used different conceptual categories for them.65 Furthermore, it 
                                                 
65 This fallacy could be considered as a fallacy of false classification, in a sense that one object cannot 
be classify in two or more different exclusive categories. Human rights is an exclusive category of 
rights, therefore if one right is classify as human rights, is not just “a right” any longer, but if all right 
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would be ontologically misguided, because if the raison d’être of human rights 
consists in their connection with human dignity, then their scope and nature should 
be restricted exclusively to those situations in which this core value would be at 
stake. In fact, all other situations within the society should not be regulated by these 
kinds of specific and fundamental rights. Instead, they could just be addressed by 
normal rights (rights tout court), that is by a societal recognition of an exclusive legal 
position made by the legislative organs of a given society. This recognition would 
depend –in our modern democratic societies– on the dialectic political and societal 
dynamics, rather than on the fulfilment of those obligations that universally protect 
human dignity, as in the case of human rights.  
Therefore, when CESCR Committee has stated that “[i]f the Covenant were 
to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would 
be largely deprived of its raison d’être”66, we can do nothing but to applaud. But 
core obligation, should be interpreted as “core”, nucleus or the very nutshell of the 
right that we cannot do without, because if that very essential part of the right is not 
protected, then what would be infringed would not be just a right, but our essential 
human dignity. It is vis-à-vis these minimum “core obligations” that States Parties 
have to “…demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are 
at its disposition in an effort to satisfy [them], as a matter of priority.”67 Indeed, it is 
in this sense that I personally consider that priorities have to be settled at the level of 
an achievable minimum for all humans, regardless their ethno-cultural affiliations or 
geographical locations.  
Coming back to the CESCR Committee’s interpretation and understandings, 
the minimum core obligations enshrined within the right to take part in cultural life 
(Article 15, para. 1(a)), includes –among others– the obligation to take the legislative 
measures tending to guarantee the application of the principle of non-discrimination 
and equality. And also the obligation “…to respect the right of everyone to identify 
or not identify themselves with one or more communities, and the right to change 
                                                                                                                                          
became human rights, then it would be no human rights any longer! See, J. BENTHAM, The Book of 
Fallacies, London, 1824, Ch. 10, p. 316 et seq. 
66 See, CESCR, General Comment No. 3 - The nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, par. 1), cit., 
para. 10. 
67 Ibid. 
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their choice…” In short, States’ minimum obligations include the respect for every 
person’s cultural identity.68 
However, it is important to bear in mind that when we talk about budgetary 
allocations, it is a primary and exclusive responsibility of States to set their policy 
priorities and therefore to allocate and divide the limited public resources among 
them. For this reason, the ‘maximum available resources’ principle has to be 
interpreted within the framework and under the light of the all-comprehensive and 
wide-ranged State’s obligations and responsibilities.  Consequently, States should 
have –and they indeed have– a large margin of appreciation and autonomy in 
deciding and establishing their own policies and budgetary priorities. Judicial quasi-
judicial international bodies cannot and must not substitute States in the fulfilment of 
their governmental responsibilities, not even in those cases in which they rightfully 
exercise their authoritative interpretative competencies attributed by the very same 
international instruments.  
The impassable frontier between political decision making processes and 
judicial or quasi-judicial conflict resolution mechanisms should always remain as 
such… if we still would like to talk in terms of rule of law and democracy. Any other 
options will certainty lack of democratic legitimation. This does not mean –of 
                                                 
68 See, CESCR, General Comment No. 21. Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 
1 (a), of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, cit., p. 14-15, para. 55. 
In the latter mentioned paragraph, the Committee also recognised as one of the core obligations of the 
States under this article,  “to allow and encourage the participantion of persons belonging to minority 
groups, indigenous peoples or to others communiiteis in the design and implementation of laws and 
policies that affect them”, which is a basic requirement in any democratic system, but also considered 
that States “should obtain their free and informed prior consent when the preservation of their 
cultural resources, especially those associeted with their way of life and cultural expression, are at 
risk” (para. 55 (e)). The need for ‘free and infromed prior consent’ in connection with the use of 
resources (especially natural) will be examinated in detail in Chapter IV and VI. However, it would be 
important to say that its interpretative incoporation as a “core obligation” of the right to take part in 
cultural life seems to be quite forced. Cultural resources could cover a vast variety of goods, or natural 
elements that could have a cultural symbolic meanings, dimentions or values, therefore to condition 
their public use, which will benefit the entire popolation of a given society, to the will of those 
individuals or groups of individuals that give cultural meaning to those resources (and which are 
indeed included as benefeciaries of the potential public use of the same resources), it would be quite 
disproportionate and even potentially anti-democratic. In pluralist and democratic societies, the public 
interest cover the entire popolation of a given country, which means that its contents are decided 
through those democratic and representive channels which do not always uphold the cultural 
aspirations of minority groups. This –of course– without prejudice of the protection and guarantee of 
the human rights of the members of those minoritarian groups. But even human rights can be 
restricted in their enjoyment if that is so required by pressing needs in a pluralist and democratic 
society. And the right to take part in cultural life is not and must not be considered an exception to this 
general rule. In the following section I will continue with the analysis of the lawful limitations that can 
rightfully restrict the enjoyment of this right.  
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course– that judicial or quasi-judicial bodies cannot review politically grounded 
administrative and legislative decisions, or actions. These actions or decisions can 
and should be reviewed every single time when there is a possibility that an 
infringement of rights has been committed, especially if the violated right is a 
fundamental right. But again, one thing is to recognise –to those judicial or quasi-
judicial bodies– the competence to judicially review or monitor a given 
governmental action or omission with regard to the fulfilment of States’ obligations, 
vis-à-vis the protection of fundamental human rights. But, another quite different 
one, would be to explicitly or implicitly recognise –to those same monitoring bodies– 
the faculty or competence to create new fundamental rights, or to extend the scope 
and nature of those already recognised rights, beyond any acceptable degree of 
proportionality and reasonability. 69  This would be nothing but an undue use of their 
judicial competences, or –even better– a politically motivated use of them. 
Therefore, as we can see, budgetary constraints are not the only and perhaps 
not even the main possible limitations that the recognition and enjoyment of the right 
to cultural identity could face within a pluralist and democratic society. As any other 
economic, social and cultural rights, its enjoyment could be legally restricted and 
subjected to limitations. This could happen when they are “…determined by law only 
in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the 
purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.” 70 The latter of 
course include the protection of the rights of others. These are lawful limitations, 
because their content and nature are intimately connected with the margin of socio-
political appreciation that States and governments should have in order to politically 
accommodate differences within society. Additionally, these limitations could be 
                                                 
69 In connection with the budgetary constraints, the interpretation of the CESCR has been also ratified 
by the most important regional judicial bodies dealing with human rights issues, namely the Inter-
American and European Courts of Human Rights. In fact, the former has stressed that “[t]aking into 
account the difficulties involved in the planning and adoption of public policies and the operative 
choices that have to be made in view of the priorities and the resources available, the positive 
obligations of the State must be interpreted so that an impossible or disproportionate burden is not 
imposed upon the authorities.” See, See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community 
v. Paraguay, Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs of March 29, 2006. Series C No. 146, para. 
155. With the same talk, the European Court of Human Rights has said that “[b]earing in mind the 
difficulties in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational 
choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the positive obligation must be 
interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the 
authorities.” See, Kiliç v. Turkey, no. 22492/93, § 63, ECHR 2000-III. 
70 See, ICESCR, Article 4. 
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seen as nothing but a reflection of the non-absolute nature of the right to take part in 
cultural life, which is shared with most of the currently recognised human rights.  
Because of its transcendental importance, within the following section, we 
will analysed the ontological connection between the above mentioned legal 
restrictions and the protection of cultural diversity and cultural identity, making 
particular references to those cultural practices that are considered as against 
international human rights standards.  
 
 
5. General limits to the legal protection of cultural diversity and cultural 
identity 
 
As it has been already maintained, the protection and promotion of cultural 
diversity (including cultural identity) is intimately connected with the respect and 
protection of human dignity, and –consequently– with the respect and promotion of 
human rights. In fact, for the UNESCO’s Universal Declaration, the defence of 
cultural diversity ‘implies a commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms’, 
not only because it is ‘an ethical imperative’, but also –and perhaps most 
importantly– because ‘cultural rights are an integral part of human rights’.71  
But, as we have already said, the fact that cultural diversity and identity are 
protected as cultural rights, and most in particular as contained by the right to take 
part in cultural life, ontologically implies their own limit of protection. In other 
words, because their protection is enshrined within a cultural right, their enjoyment 
can be restricted by State authorities, so far as they do it lawfully. In fact, the same 
UDHR states –in its Article 29(2)– that “[i]n the exercise of his rights and freedoms, 
everyone shall be subjected only to such limitations as are determined by law solely 
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms 
                                                 
71 See, Article 4 and 5, UNESCO Universal Declaration on Culture Diversity, supra note 14. In the 
same line, the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions recognises in its Article 2(1) –as guiding principle– that ‘[c]ultural diversity can be 
protected and promoted only if human rights and fundamental freedoms […] as well as the ability of 
individuals to choose cultural expressions, are guaranteed.”   
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of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the 
general welfare in a democratic society.”72  
The wording of the above paragraph is clear; the exercise of rights and 
freedom can and must be restricted in order to guarantee the general good of 
everybody, in a context of a democratic society.73 The enjoyment of someone’s 
rights and freedoms ontologically depends on the respect of the rights and freedoms 
of others.74 This is nothing but a consequence of the equal dignity of all human 
beings, announced in Article 1 of UDHR, in a sense that the respect of the dignity of 
others ontologically requires a limitation or a self-restrain on the exercise of our own 
freedoms and liberties.75 Article 4 of the ICESCR follows the same rationale, but 
making a more general reference to “the general welfare in a democratic society.” In 
fact, regardless of the differences in wording, the scope of the limitations of these 
two articles are similar, namely to make possible the general good in a pluralist and 
democratic society. The said scope allows not only the respect of each individual’s 
rights and freedom, but also the satisfaction of the common societal needs, which 
allow governance and socio-political-economical-cultural preservation of the 
common societal enterprise. However, pursuing ‘general welfare’ is not the only 
requirement that a limitation in the exercise of a recognised right should observe in 
order to be lawful. They have to be imposed by law and they must be proportional in 
connection with the societal need that they intend to fulfil (e.g. national security, 
public safety and order, health, morals, rights and freedoms of others, etc.).    
                                                 
72 For a detailed explanation of the meaning and scope of Article 29 of the UNDHR, see –among 
others- T. OPSAHL, V. DIMITRIJEVIC, Article 29 and 30, in G. ALFREDSSON, A. EIDE (eds.), 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A Common Standard of Achievement, The 
Hague/Boston/London, 1999, p. 633-652.  
73 The limitation to the exercise of the recognised rights contained in Article 29(2) of the UDHR is 
complemented in the same Declaration by the prohibition of misuse (or abuse of rights) contained in 
the subsequent Article 30. This provision reads as follow: “Nothing in this Declaration may be 
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to 
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.” 
74 As it has been said, “[t]o define a right is, in fact, to limit it: what a right does not cover, it 
excludes, and what is positively described as the content of a right at once indicates its limits.” T. 
OPSAHL, V. DIMITRIJEVIC, op. cit., p. 642-643. 
75 As Rousseau has said “…le pacte social établit entre les citoyens une telle égalité qu’ils s’engagent 
tous sous les mêmes conditions et doivent jouir tous des mêmes droits.” In fact, the mutual obligations 
that each member of the society must have vis-à-vis all the other members, not only constitute a 
guarantee against a violation of their rights but also implies a limitation on their exercise. In other 
words, it would be possible to “…c’est demander jusqu’à quel point ceux-ci peuvent s’engager avec 
eux-mêmes, chacun envers tous, et tous envers chacun d’eux.”  See, J.-J. ROUSSEAU, Le Contrat 
Social ou Principes du Droit Politique, Paris, 1839, Livre II, Chapitre IV, p. 65. 
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Without entering or anticipating here the analysis of the so-called ‘necessity 
test’, which will be examined in Chapters V and VI, it is nevertheless important to 
stress –for the sake of the argument– that the restriction or interference that could 
affect the enjoyment of the recognised rights, in this case the right to take part in 
cultural life and the right to cultural identity, should be established by law (principle 
of legality), but not only. Additionally, it should pursue a legitimate aim in a 
democratic society (such as public order, protection of morals or even protection of 
the same cultural diversity, as societal value), should be necessary in order to achieve 
that aim. Last but not least, it should also be proportional in connection with the said 
aim. This means that there should exist a reasonable relation of proportionality 
between the measure adopted (the restriction in the enjoyment of the right) and the 
aim or the purpose to be achieved, such as –for example–the protection of the general 
welfare in a democratic society.76  
However, as you can imagine, perhaps the key element of this legal approach 
consists in defining whether a restriction of a given recognised right, such as the right 
to take part in a cultural life of a community (including the right to cultural identity), 
is necessary or not in a democratic society. But, how could it be done? I believe that 
the answer to this question is simpler than what could appear from its first glance, 
                                                 
76 In connection with the application of the ‘necessity test’ as an interpretative tool for the evaluation 
of the lawfulness of the interference in the enjoyment of a recognized right, there is almost a general 
convergency on the practice of the different international or regional judicial or quasi-judicial bodies. 
As a matter of examples it would be possible to make reference –among others–  to the decisions 
adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), in connection with Article 27 ICCPR, on 
Communications No. 24/1977, Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, 30 July 1981(UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977), para. 15-16; No. 197/1985, Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, 10 August 1988 (UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/33/D197/1985), para. 9.8; No. 549/1993, Francis Hopu and Tepoaitu Bessert v. France, 29 
December 1997 (CCPR/C/60/D/549), para. 10.3. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has 
also systematically applied this test, which is today a nutshell of its jurisprudence. See, among other 
judgements, Case "relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in 
Belgium v. Belgium (Merits)" (Plenary), nos. 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64, 
judgment of 23rd July 1968, § 10, ECHR Series A no. 6; Thlimmenos v. Greece (GC), no. 34369/97, § 
44-47, ECHR 2000-IV; Handyside v. The United Kingdom, no. 5493/72, Judgment of 7th December 
1976, § 48-49, ECHR Series A n° 24; The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom (N° 2), no. 13166/87, 
Judgement of 26th April 1979, § 50-56, ECHR Series A n° 30. Finally, in the same line with the 
precedent bodies, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (I-ACtHR), has also introduced in its 
jurisprudence the use of the ‘necessity test’. Just as an example of the use of this interpretative tool by 
this Court, and without prejudice of subsequent specific analysis of its application in those cases in 
which the I-ACtHR has dealt with indigenous people’s claims, see –among others– I-ACtHR, Case of 
the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 
March 29, 2006. Series C No. 146, para. 138; and See I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs of June 17, 2005. Serie C No. 
125, para. 143-149. 
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but –nevertheless– not deprived of controversy. Within the international system, 
which is guided by the principle of justice and international law (Article 1(1) UN 
Charter), and intended to maintain international peace and security together with 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
(Article 1(2) UN Charter), the main responsibility to respect, protect and fulfil 
human rights lies fully upon the shoulders of the main international actors, namely 
the States.77 Thus, the search for a fair balance between the protection of the ‘general 
welfare’ and the fulfilment of that responsibility should repose on the same States’ 
shoulders. This is nothing but coherency.  
Therefore, States should have –and indeed they have– a sort of margin of 
appreciation or political space for manoeuvring not only with regard to the 
identification of the general needs that have to be pursued in a democratic society, 
but also in connection with the means or measures to be adopted for the achievement 
or fulfilment of those needs. And, if the situation or the circumstances of a given case 
so justify, those measures could include a lawful restriction in the enjoyment of a 
given recognised right, including –of course– the right to take part in cultural life and 
to develop our cultural identity. In other words, in the realisation of the general 
welfare, or in the selection of the appropriate measures for guaranteed respect, 
protection and fulfilment of all recognised rights, States have a wide margin of 
                                                 
77 The general obligation to respect and ensure human rights is enshrined in various international 
instruments. Among these instruments we can mention: Charter of the United Nations (Article 55(c)), 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Preamble), International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (Article 2(1) and 2(2)), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Article 2(2)), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families (Article 7), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (Preamble), American Convention on Human Rights (Articles 1 and 2), 
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights “Protocol of San Salvador” (Article 1), European Convention for the Protection of 
the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 1), European Social Charter (Preamble), 
African Charter of Human and People’s Rights “Banjul Charter” (Article 1), and the Arab Charter of 
Human Rights (Article 2). Moreover, according to Article I(1) of the UN Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993, 
“[h]uman rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings; their protection 
and promotion is the first responsibility of Governments.” The message of the Declaration is quite 
clear; but, in case of remaining doubts, additionally states that “…it is the duty of States, regardless of 
their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” (Article I(5)). 
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political discretion –within a plural and democratic framework– in perusing the 
concretisation of the legitimate political aspirations of a given society.78   
However, the fact that States have a margin of appreciation on the 
determination of when and to what extent a limitation on the enjoyment of a right is 
“necessary in a democratic society” does not absolutely mean that States can apply 
them arbitrarily. States have to always observe not only the strict application of the 
principle of legality and rule of law, in a sense that the said interference has to be 
imposed by law, but also all other above mentioned requirements (necessity, 
proportionality, and legitimacy). Furthermore, States can be –and they are indeed– 
supervised by monitoring mechanisms which are part of the international and 
regional systems of human rights protection, such as the UN Treaty Bodies, Special 
Procedures, or Regional Courts (e.g. the I-ACtHR and the ECtHR). In fact, the 
ECtHR has repeatedly said that “[t]his margin of appreciation goes hand in hand 
with a European supervision embracing both the law and the decisions applying 
it.”79 This is because the European Convention gives to its Court that monitoring 
mandate80, but not only; according to the ECtHR “[t]he Court’s task is to determine 
whether the measures taken at national level were justified in principle and 
proportionate.”81 The Inter-American Court has as well expressly exercised this sort 
of supervisory power, as its late jurisprudence has revealed, under the denomination 
of “conventionality control”.82 
Last but not least, there is one specific limitation to the exercise of the right to 
take part in cultural life and the right to cultural identity, which has not been 
                                                 
78 See, CESCR, General Comment No. 21. Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 
1 (a), of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, cit., p. 17, para. 66-67. 
79 See, among others, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey (GC), no. 44774/98, judgment 10 November 2005, 
Reports 2005-XI, § 110; and Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, no. 18748/91, judgment of 26 
September 1996, Reports  1996-IV, p. 1364 § 44;  
80 See Article 19 and 46 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedom (ECHR). 
81 See, ECtHR, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey (GC), cit., § 110. 
82 See, among other authorities, I-ACtHR, Case of Gomes-Lund et al. (Guerrilha do Araguaia) v. 
Brazil. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 24, 2010. 
Series C No. 219, para. 176; Case of Cabrera-García and Montiel-Flores v. Mexico. Preliminary 
Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 26, 2010. Series C No. 220, para. 
225-226, and –in particular– the Concurring Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor 
Poisot, para. 13-63; Case of Almonacid Arellano v. Chile. Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 154, para. 123-125; and Case 
of the Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado - Alfaro et al.) v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 24, 2006. Series C No. 158, Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado-Trindade, para. 6-12. 
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commented upon, but which deserves –for its transcendental importance– an analysis 
on its own. I am referring –of course– to the limitation of the recognition and 
protection of ethno-cultural practises, expressions or manifestations that infringe or 
harm human rights guaranteed by international law, or otherwise limit their scope.83    
 
 
5.1. Harmful cultural practices, cultural diversity and international human rights 
standards 
 
As it has already been maintained, cultural diversity –as such– cannot be 
considered as a right that an individual can effectively claim as protected by 
international law (it could be considered as a factual reality or even a guiding 
principle or societal value, but not a right). This, nevertheless, does not exclude a sort 
of subsidiary right based tutelage through the protection of those rights that are 
intimately connected with it. In fact, we have already sustained that it is precisely 
through the protection and guarantee of the enjoyment of certain individual rights, 
such as the right to take part in cultural life, that individuals can enjoy and freely 
exercise their own culture, individually or in association with others.  
In addition, we have to bear in mind that exercise of a right is –in most cases– 
never absolute. Just a few rights could be considered absolutely free from legal 
limitations. Among those rights, it would be possible to mention the right to be free 
from slavery or servitude; not to be subjected to torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment; the right to access to justice and fair trial; or the right not to 
be unjustifiably discriminated against; and not to be arbitrarily deprived of his or her 
life. As we can see, in the case of the last two rights, they are subject to rightful 
conditions, which means that someone could be lawfully subjected to a 
discriminatory or differentiate treatment84, or even lawfully deprived of his or her 
                                                 
83 See, UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, Article 4. 
84 According to current human rights standards, when the discriminatory act, that is an act that treats 
differently persons in analogous situations, has an objective and reasonable justification then it is not 
considered discriminatory any longer but just a “justifiable different treatment”. In this sense, the 
Inter-American Court has expressly said that “[t]he term distinction will be used to indicate what is 
admissible, because it is reasonable, proportionate and objective. Discrimination will be used to refer 
to what is inadmissible, because it violates human rights. Therefore, the term “discrimination” will be 
used to refer to any exclusion, restriction or privilege that is not objective and reasonable, and which 
adversely affects human rights.” See, I-ACtHR, Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented 
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life.85 Hence, without the consideration of those legal conditions, these two different 
actions would have to be considered as a violation of fundamental rights. Therefore, 
we can do nothing but conclude –as we already did– that the right to take part in 
cultural life (including the right to cultural identity) can and must be lawfully limited. 
This, of course, has to be done according to the circumstances of the each given case, 
in order to guarantee the ‘general welfare’ of the entire society and without unlawful 
discriminations of any kind, in particular, those based on ethno-cultural features.86 
For the above mentioned reason, international human rights instruments have 
paid strong attention to avoid any violation of fundamental human rights meanwhile 
upholding or promoting cultural diversity. To put it bluntly, international human 
rights standards protect and/or promote cultural diversity, and therefore guarantee its 
enjoyment though the protection of the exercise of individual cultural rights, only if 
                                                                                                                                          
Migrants…, cit. supra note 50, para. 84. See also, among the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, Thlimmenos v. Greece (GC), no. 34369/97, § 44-46; and from the Human Rights 
Commitee (HRComm.), the General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination, United Nations, 1989, 
para. 13. 
85 This without prejudice of the provisions of the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, adopted by the 
General assembly resolution 44/128 of 15 December 1989, which has just 73 States parties (updated 
until 27/12/2011). In addition to this universal instrument, at the regional level, the Council of Europe 
has adopted two different instruments equally aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, namely 
Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty (18/4/1983), and Protocol No. 13 concerning the 
abolition of death penalty in all circumstances (3/5/2002). These two latter instruments have received 
almost a full ratification by the State members of this regional organisation, and for this reason, the 
ECtHR has considered not only that “…the right under Article 1 of Protocol No. 13 not to be 
subjected to the death penalty, which admits of no derogation and applies in all circumstances, ranks 
along with the rights in Articles 2 and 3 as a fundamental right, enshrining one of the basic values of 
the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe” (see, mutatis mutandis, Al-
Saadoon and Mufdhi v. The United Kingdom (No. 61498/08), judgment of 2 March 2010, § 118), but 
also that due to the psychological suffering that this penalty has generated to the convicted, it 
constitutes in itself, and by its nature and degree, an inhuman treatment (see, Ibid. § 144). Therefore, 
at regional level, it would be possible to consider that –in Europe– the application of death penalty has 
been fully banned. Unfortunately, this regional development cannot be applied as universal human 
right standards, beside the latest developments within the UN machinery, calling for moratorium on 
executions with a view of abolishing the death penalty (See, General Assembly Res. No. 65/206, 
Moratorium on the use of the death penalty, of 28 March 2011 (UN Doc. A/RES/65/20).    
86 According to the Inter-American Court, “[t]he notion of equality springs directly from the oneness 
of the human family and is linked to the essential dignity of the individual. That principle cannot be 
reconciled with the notion that a given group has the right to privileged treatment because of its 
perceived superiority. It is equally irreconcilable with that notion to characterize a group as inferior 
and treat it with hostility or otherwise subject it to discrimination in the enjoyment of rights that are 
accorded to others not so classified. It is impermissible to subject human beings to differences in 
treatment that are inconsistent with their unique and congenerous character.”  And differences in 
treatment that are basically anchored on ethno-cultural features always hint – as a matter of principle– 
the equal congenerous nature of humans. See, I-ACtHR, Legal Status and Human Rights of the Child.  
Advisory Opinion OC-17/02 of August 28, 2002.  Series A No. 17, para. 45. 
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no other fundamental human rights are violated or endangered, including –of course– 
cultural rights of others.     
We find explicit examples of this limitation in almost all international 
instruments that have been cited until now. In this sense, the UNESCO’s Universal 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity states that “[n]o one may invoke cultural diversity 
to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor to limit their 
scope” (Article 4). And additionally that “…all persons have the right to participate 
in the cultural life of their choice and to conduct their own cultural practices, 
subjected to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Article 5). The 
message is clear: protection of cultural diversity (including someone’s cultural 
identity) can never be used as an excuse for justification of human rights violations 
or unlawful restrictions. 
The idea of human rights standards, as a clear limitation of the protection of 
cultural diversity, is reinforced by the subsequent UNESCO’s Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. This Convention 
considers the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as a ‘guiding 
principle’, stressing the fact that “[n]o one may invoke the provisions of this 
Convention in order to infringe human rights and fundamental freedoms […], or to 
limit the scope thereof.” Again, this is a clear prohibition for the subordination of the 
enjoyment human rights and fundamental freedoms to cultural practises that would 
not be in line with these international consented standards. Indeed, the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and 
the ILO Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries, have adopted the same approach. In fact, they have 
established, as a limit for the protection of indigenous ethno-cultural institutions, the 
respect of international human rights standards.87  
Furthermore, in addition to these instruments referring to indigenous people, 
it would be possible to mention other relevant instruments that indeed recognise 
                                                 
87 See, Articles 4(2) and 8(2)(4) of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities; Articles 34 and 46 UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples; and Articles 8(2) and 9(1) of the ILO Convention No. 169 concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. 
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stricter limitations on harmful cultural practises based on ethno-cultural societal 
understandings. These are the cases of UN Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Convention), in its Articles 3, 
5(a) and 1388, and the two mentioned international Covenants. In fact, both 
Covenants contain in their common Article 5(1) exactly the same ‘prohibition of 
misuse’, which also corresponds to almost the same wording of Articles 30 of the 
UDHR, Article 17 of the ECHR, and 29(a) ACHR. Thus, this prohibition prevents 
persons, groups or even States from misusing the rights ensured by those 
international instruments to limit, hinder or even destroy the enjoyment of someone 
else’s rights.89 Therefore, the principle that clearly emerges from international human 
rights instruments (and practise) is that nobody can claim the exercise of his or her 
rights to dismiss or prevent the exercise of the rights of others or preclude the general 
welfare of the society. 90  
Consequentially, the exercise of the right to take part in cultural life (or even 
the enshrined right to cultural identity), and –hence– the possibility to enjoy and 
contribute to the cultural diversity of a given society, cannot and must not be 
considered as an exception to this general rule. In fact, the CESCR Committee, when 
commenting on the limitations that could affect the enjoyment of the right to take 
part in cultural life (Article 15, para. 1(a) of the ICESCR), has clearly said that “…no 
                                                 
88 The UN CEDAW Convection clearly states in its extensive introduction that “the third general 
thrust of the Convention aims at enlarging our understanding of the concept of human rights, as it 
gives formal recognition to the influence of culture and tradition on restricting women's enjoyment of 
their fundamental rights. These forces take shape in stereotypes, customs and norms which give rise to 
the multitude of legal, political and economic constraints on the advancement of women. […] States 
parties are therefore obliged to work towards the modification of social and cultural patterns of 
individual conduct in order to eliminate "prejudices and customary and all other practices which are 
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for 
men and women" (article 5).”  
89 Common Article 5(1) of the both international Covenants reads as follow: “Nothing in the present 
Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any 
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or freedoms recognized 
herein, or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.” 
90 On this regard, the Human Rights Committee has clearly said, referring to lawful limitations of 
cultural practises that, “[s]tates parties should ensure that traditional, historical, religious or cultural 
attitudes are not used to justify violations of women’s right to equality before the law and to equal 
enjoyment of all Covenant rights. States parties should furnish appropriate information on those 
aspects of tradition, history, cultural practices and religious attitudes which jeopardize, or may 
jeopardize, compliance with article 3, and indicate what measures they have taken or intend to take to 
overcome such factors.” See, Human Right Commitee (HRComm.), General Comment No. 28: 
Equality of rights between men and women (article 3): 29/03/2000, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, United Nations, 2000, para. 5. 
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one may invoke cultural diversity to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by 
international law, nor to limit their scope.” Thus, it has concluded saying that 
“[a]pplying limitations to the right of everyone to take part in cultural life may be 
necessary in certain circumstances, in particular in the case of negative practices, 
including those attributed to customs and traditions, that infringe upon other human 
rights.”91   
As an example of these negative ethno-cultural practices, we can mention the 
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and other practises that are harmful to the health 
of women. These practices generate serious consequences to the health and well-
being of women and children, which are so obvious and severe that their prohibition 
under the light of international human rights standards is out of any question92, but 
not only. There are other ethno-cultural practices that could also be considered as in 
violation of our current international human rights standards.93 In fact, the respect of 
the principle of equality and non-discrimination between men and women requires 
the elimination of all those ethno-cultural practices and traditions that prevent 
women form participating fully in the cultural, economic, social, civil and political 
life of the societal community in which they live.94  
Moreover, the UN Human Right Committee, while interpreting Article 27 of 
the Covenant under the light of the non-discrimination provisions of Article 2(1), the 
gender equality provision of Article 3 and the provision concerning equality before 
                                                 
91 Even when the CESCR Committee has emphasized “…it is the duty of States, regardless of their 
political, economic or cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”, has nevertheless reminded States that “…account must be taken of national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.” See, CESCR, General 
Comment No. 21. Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, cit., p. 5, para. 17-20. 
92 See, CEDAW Committee General Recommendation No. 14 (night session, 1990) on Female 
Circumcision. For a detailed analysis of different harmful cultural practices vis-à-vis women and 
children, see H. EMBAREK WARZAZI, Report of the Working Group on Traditional Practices 
Affecting the Health of Women and Children - Chairman-Rapporteur: Mrs. Halina, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1986/42, United Nations, 1986. 
93 Just as an example of harmful practises against the rights of the child, we can mention the 
customary practice in the south-eastern region, which consists in considering the birth of twins as a 
bad omen; as a consequence of this ethno-cultural understanding, only one of the new-borns is kept by 
the family, while the other is automatically abandoned. See, Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Committee: Madagascar, U.N. GAOR, HRComm., 89th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/MDG/CO/3, 2007, para. 17. 
94 See, among other publications, Report of the Secretary General. In-depth study on all forms of 
violence against women. UN Doc. A/61/122/Add.1, General Assembly, Sxty-first session, United 
Nations, 2006. See also, for a more general overview of the current women situation in the world, UN 
Women, In pursuit of Justice. 2011-2012 Progress of the World's Women, 2011. 
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the law of Article 26 of the same instrument, has arrived at the same conclusion. This 
is that the rights recognised to persons belonging to minority groups in Article 27 
ICCPR cannot be extended to the protection of harmful cultural practises or 
expressions. In this sense, this Committee has said, “[t]he rights which persons 
belonging to minorities enjoy under article 27 of the Covenant in respect of their 
language, culture and religion do not authorize any State, group or person to violate 
the right to the equal enjoyment by women of any Covenant rights, including the 
right to equal protection of the law.”95    
Therefore, we can do nothing but conclude that the exercise of cultural rights 
and the promotion of cultural diversity have to always go in line with the principles 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. In particular when it refers to the 
need of “including promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all and respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, peace, democracy, justice, equality, rule of law, pluralism, 
development, better standards of living and solidarity…”96  
In short, there can be no contradictions between the intangibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and cultural diversity; consequently all of those 
cultural practises that –in one way or another– clash against the above mentioned 
fundamental principles, must be considered outlawed and banned.97 In other words, 
human rights norms only admit and guarantee cultural practices that are compatible 
with the very same principles upon which human rights standards are based. These 
are –among others– human dignity, equality, non-discrimination, rule of law, etc.98 
We can perhaps even conclude that the limitation of cultural practises is not only a 
necessary requirement in order to guarantee the ‘general welfare’ within a pluralist 
                                                 
95 See, HRComm., General Comment No. 28: Equality of rights between men and women (article 3): 
29/03/2000, cit., para. 32. See also, among other resolutions, CCPR, Lovelace v. Canada, 
Communication No. 24/1977, adopted 30 July 1981, U.N. GAOR, HRComm., 13th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977, 1981. 
96 See the UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Preamble.  
97 As UNESCO has said, “[t]he statement that cultural diversity constitutes an asset for humanity as a 
whole and consequently should be safeguarded is not the same as saying that any cultural value, 
tradition and practice must be preserved as intangible heritage…” See, UNESCO, Investing in 
Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue – World Report, cit., p. 223. 
98 See, M. K. ADDO, Practice of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies in the Reconciliation of 
Cultural Diversity with Universal Respect for Human Rights, in Human Rights Quarterly, 32-3, 2010, 
p. 622. 
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and democratic society, but also it configures a sort of ‘individual societal duty’, in 
the terms of Article 29(1) of the UDHR.99  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have given a closer look at the question of cultural 
diversity and its legal implications and direct effects upon the enjoyment of 
fundamental human rights and freedoms. In addition, particular attention has been 
given to the right to take part in the cultural life of a given society. As a preliminary 
conclusion, this chapter has shown that cultural diversity is much more than a mere 
description of the factual cultural plurality that exists in modern societies.  
In fact, cultural diversity has become in our pluralist and democratic societies 
a pursuable societal value, whose defence –in the wording of the UNESCO 
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity– “is an ethical imperative, inseparable 
from respect for human dignity.”100 It is ontologically true that cultural diversity and 
human dignity are connected or even interconnected, but not to the point in which 
they have to be seen as “inseparable”, as reported in the Declaration. As it has been 
argued above, the diversity of cultures could provide the necessary substratum in 
which individual personalities can flourish and identities can be enriched by means 
of having different cultural meaningful choices. Nevertheless, these pluralities of 
cultural expressions are not directly linked to the essential equal dignity of human 
beings; the latter is directly connected with the enjoyment of fundamental human 
rights and freedoms, while cultural diversity is clearly not. This is quite clear if we 
take into consideration that cultures change and take diverse forms across time and 
space.101  
Hence, what individuals need is to have the possibility to freely express 
themselves and to freely engage in cultural creative activities within a given society. 
                                                 
99 Article 29(1) of the UDHR states that “[e]veryone has duties to the community in which alone the 
free and full development of his personality is possible.” Because societal communities, where 
individual personalities are developed, are in themselves culturally plural, the respect of all cultures 
impose on all members of the society a duty of cultural respect and self-restrain, that is the obligation 
not to develop, practises or exercise cultural practises that harm or prevent the enjoyment of someone 
else’s fundamental rights and freedoms.     
100 See, UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, Article 4. 
101 Ibid., Article 1. 
CULTURE DIVERSITY  
151 
 
It is the cultural potential of each human being, which is protected in an open, 
pluralist and democratic society. That is, the possibility for each of them to express 
themselves and to engage in cultural activities, individually or in community with 
others (members or not of the ethno-cultural groups in which they feel affiliated). 
The relevance of the human cultural potential is reflected on its protection as part of 
international human rights standards (e.g. by the right to take part in cultural life of 
Article 15(1.a.) ICSECR or the right to enjoy culture as a minority member in Article 
27 ICCPR), but also on its intimate connection with the notion of human dignity. In 
fact, it is through having creative cultural possibilities that human beings could find 
their dignity, and not in the unforeseeable cultural result of their cultural actions. To 
put it bluntly, without having the possibility to culturally express themselves as 
humans, they would become just mere instruments or tools subjected to the will of 
others.  
Therefore, we have to do nothing but conclude that the above mentioned 
intimate or inseparable connection indeed exists, but between human dignity and 
cultural freedom, because without the latter the former would not find its necessary 
and vital space. This conclusion does not have any intention to decrease the 
importance that cultural diversity has in increasing individuals’ cultural possibilities, 
that is, through presenting different cultural options that would obviously expand 
individuals’ cultural choices. But one thing is to say that cultural diversity generates 
better societal conditions for the exercise of cultural freedoms (and rights), and for 
that reason should be considered as a pursuable societal value, and another thing 
would be to say –as UNESCO did– that cultural diversity is “…an ethical 
imperative, inseparable from respect for human dignity.”  
Again, what is inseparable with regard to human dignity is the respect and 
defence of human (cultural) freedom, that is, the creative motion of human beings 
and not the perpetually changeable product of it. To put it in another way, the 
enjoyment of this product, namely culture, has to be indeed protected because it 
constitutes the channel through which individuals can expand their “selves” and 
perhaps reach their own fulfilment, regardless the particular cultural specificities 
pursued. Indeed, the diversity of this mutable product generates better societal 
conditions for further development of the individual “self”, and hence it could be 
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rightfully considered as a pursuable societal value.  But then again, the question 
would be why UNESCO fell into this sort of fallacy of confusion102, building on the 
illogical intimated connection between these two ontologically different notions, 
which are cultural diversity and human dignity. Perhaps the logic behind this 
misguided interpretation is –at this point– not strange to us, because it seems to me 
that it follows a kind of multiculturalist approach.     
In fact, when UNESCO underwent a process of identification of principles 
that would eventually rule the international cultural co-operation, arrived at the 
conclusion that because of the reciprocal influences that the rich variety and diversity 
of cultures exert on one another, they have to be considered as “…part of the 
common heritage belonging to all mankind.”103 This is nothing but acknowledging 
the value, that both past and present expressions of cultural diversity have for human 
societies, but not only. UNESCO also stated that “[e]very people has the right and 
the duty to develop its culture”104, which literally means that individuals, human 
beings, have obligations (duties) vis-à-vis their own cultural expressions, that is, a 
sort of separated cultural entity which would have rights vis-à-vis those that have 
created it.  
The above disconnection between cultural entities and individuals, in which 
the former have gained subjectivity and value on its own, without the “natural” 
intermediation of the latter, is confirmed when UNESCO indeed stated that “[e]ach 
culture has a dignity and value which must be respected and preserved.”105 In this 
sense, cultures would have values of their own, regardless of their instrumental 
function on the hands of individuals; it seems that they have gained their own dignity 
as societal entities that would have to be respected and preserved… but by whom? 
Certainly not by other cultures or artificial entities; they would have to be protected 
and perpetuated by individuals, human beings, who –under this new interpretative 
light– would not be any longer allocated at the centre of the legal protection, but –on 
the contrary– at its periphery, being displaced by the new ideological centrality of 
                                                 
102 See, J. BENTHAM, op. cit., Ch. 10, p. 314 et seq. 
103 See, UNESCO Declaration of Principles of International Cultural Co-operation, of 4 November 
1996, Article I(3). 
104 Ibid., Article I(2). 
105 Ibid., Article I(1). 
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societal cultural entities or… groups.106 In short, this new ideological understanding 
could be resumed as individuals at the services of cultures, instead of the opposite.107 
The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity 
of Cultural Expression (2005) has later reaffirmed these new ideological waves. In 
fact, this Convention has introduced the so-called ‘Principle of equal dignity of and 
respect for all cultures’, by stating –in its Article 2(3)– that “[t]he protection and 
promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions presuppose the recognition of 
equal dignity of and respect for all cultures…” Unfortunately, as we have had the 
possibility to explain above, there is no such logical and ontological connection 
between these two concepts, because what the protection or promotion of cultural 
diversity presupposes is the equal dignity of the cultural maker, namely humans, and 
not of their created societal entities.108  
Furthermore, as it has already been said in the previous chapter109, it would 
be important to bear in mind that the UNESCO’s proposed “equal dignity of 
cultures” 110 is deprived of ontological meaning, simply because we lack the external 
comparator. In fact, the affirmation that all cultures have equal value, ontologically 
presupposes the possibility of a comparative exercise among them, but the lack of an 
external comparator –which would also be cultural– make the entire exercise 
impossible. To put it simply, we cannot compare two objects that are identical; we 
necessarily need an external element that would provide the external comparative 
standards.  
Therefore, in order to escape from this dialectical trap, we have to do nothing 
but conclude that cultures deserve to be respected not because of their intrinsic equal 
dignity –as postulated by UNESCO– but because they equally provide cultural 
                                                 
106 See, Chapter 1, Section 4.2. 
107 We have to always bear in mind the wording of Article 1 of  the UDHR, which says that “[a]ll 
human beings are born equal in dignity and rights”; humans not ethno-cultural entities. 
108 As Prof. Kelsen has said, “[t]he lack of moral order may be very undesirable, but from the fact 
that a certain state of affairs is undesirable does not follow that the conditions of the desirable state of 
affairs exist.” Multiculturalist strives indeed for the incorporation into international legal standards of 
this sort of ethno-cultural reinterpretation of the concept of dignity, with the consequential relegation 
of individuals to a second level; but this is just their “desirable” aspirations, and fortunately not the 
real “state of affairs”. See, H. KELSEN, What is Justice? Justice, Law, and Politics in the mirror of 
science, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1971, p. 179.        
109 See, Chapter 1, Section 5, and 6. 
110 See Article 2(3) of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expression. 
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meaning to people’s life, broadening their cultural choices and possibilities. To put it 
bluntly, cultures’ equality lies in their function, not in their substance; the contrary 
would be nothing but cultural essentialism.  
 
 
6.1. Human rights as a cultural parameter and restrictor 
 
Someone might perhaps argue that the above socio-political or even 
ontological analysis does not fully embrace the complexity of the impact of the 
notion of culture diversity within a given society because it lacks its human rights 
based component. This would be a most appropriate observation, but –I must say– 
the incorporation of the latter element into this picture will only change its colours 
(leaving nevertheless unchanged its substance).  
As we have already concluded, culture diversity cannot be considered in itself 
as a right, and much less as a fundamental human right. But, of course, this does not 
mean that there are no interconnections between all these notions. In fact, a human 
rights based analysis would certainly reinforce the protection of those aspects of 
cultural diversity that could be considered enshrined within the scope of certain 
cultural rights. This could be the case of the right to take part in cultural life (Article 
15(1.a.) ICSECR), or the right to enjoy culture in community with the other members 
of a given ethno-cultural group (Article 27 ICCPR), but not only. The incorporation 
of this human rights based approach also provides an intrinsic limitation for the 
protection of cultural diversity, because fundamental rights provide the external 
cultural comparator that we lacked before.  
Indeed, internationally recognised human rights and freedoms have become 
the external comparative factor that can and should be used for the scanned analysis 
of all cultures in the world, even when they themselves are also cultural entities. 
They draw the bottom line over which cultural practises cannot cross, and if they do, 
then they would lose their moral (cultural) justification under the view of 
“humanity”, which is represented by the so-called international community. One 
could argue that human rights, as any other right, are cultural creations and therefore 
not superior to other cultural expressions. True, but the difference here is not 
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ontological in nature but consensual. Indeed, the difference between the international 
human rights standards (as a cultural product) and all other cultural expressions or 
understandings of “the good” (with moral regulatory pretensions) that exist in the 
world consist in the fact that the former has received the universal consensus from 
the international community. This means that international human rights standards 
can be used as a universal common moral parameter, and therefore as a cultural 
restrictor too.  
Human rights have gotten the consensual primacy of the “ought” over the 
cultural “is”, they represent the ultimate cultural valuative system that operates as a 
cultural comparator vis-à-vis the multifaceted and diversified cultural reality.111 
Culture make us specifically human, rational beings, endowed with a critical 
judgement and a sense of moral commitment112, but what makes us equal in dignity 
and rights is just one specific cultural valuative system, namely the universally 
accepted human rights system. In fact, international human rights minimum 
standards legitimately operate as both a cultural comparator and cultural restrictor 
at the same time. This affirmation is firmly anchored in the fact that no State in the 
world negates the legal value of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights¸ as 
a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, and each and all 
of them have also ratified one or more of the nine core human rights treaties. 113  
Consequentially, these minimum cultural standards have gained international 
consensual legitimacy in order to operate as a moral and legal universally common 
yardstick for the evaluation of cultural practises and understandings around the 
world. This also means that they cannot be diminished, restrained or otherwise 
affected by the allegation of cultural particularities, duties to communities or by 
references to different societal values. Indeed, no societal values could have a 
primacy over what has been adopted as a “universally consented value”, because the 
latter is intimately connected with the equal dignity of all members of the human 
                                                 
111 See, H. KELSEN, op. cit., p. 84. 
112 See, UNESCO Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, Preamble. 
113 As it has been said, “[t]he rights set forth in the UDHR may not have been realized in all countries 
of the world, but today people everywhere are increasingly demanding and gaining respect for their 
rights and freedoms. The performance of governments, and even their legitimacy, is being measured 
against the standards, and all governments are bound to feel their impact at home and in external 
relations.” See, A. EIDE, G. ALFREDSSON, Introduction, in G. ALFREDSSON, A. EIDE (eds.), 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A Common Standard of Achievement, The 
Hague/Boston/London, 1999, p. xxv. 
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family, but not only. It is also –and perhaps most importantly– because all people in 
the world, organised within the framework of the United Nations, have decided to 
establish these rights “as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all 
nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society […] shall strive 
[…] to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance…”114 Moral 
principles and values (including legal ones) are consensual, and –among them– 
international human rights standards are the most accepted ones.115        
Therefore, the respect for pluralism and the different cultural manifestations 
does not mean that it is extended to those practises that are harmful or disrespectful 
of international human rights law and standards. Those practices are no longer 
protected, neither are they guaranteed by international human rights law simply 
because they breach human rights, and therefore they violate –in most cases– the 
common universal understanding of human dignity. This line is straightforwardly 
embraced by the UNESCO Declaration which states that “[n]o one may invoke 
cultural diversity to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor 
to limit their scope”.116 
In the same line, and even closely related to the topic of the incoming 
chapters, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Convention No. C 169 of 
27th of June 1989 (here in after ILO Convention), affirms in its article 8(2) that 
indigenous and tribal peoples “...shall have the right to retain their own customs and 
institutions...” In addition, it establishes the sine qua non condition for the 
recognition of this right, in a sense that this recognition would be possible only in 
those cases “... where these [customs and institutions] are not incompatible with 
fundamental rights defined by the national legal system and with internationally 
recognised human rights.” The limitation is clear; cultural diversity and all cultural 
                                                 
114 See, UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble. 
115 As Ross has said, “[g]oodness is always a consequential attribute; that which is good is good by 
virtue of something else in its nature, by being of a certain kind”. Therefore, cultural practices would 
be considered culturally (or even morally) “good” or “bad” according to whether they fully respect or 
not internationally recognized human rights standards. To put it in the very same Ross words, 
‘morally good’ means “…good in one of certain definite ways to a certain sort of character. [Indeed,] 
only what is a certain sort of character or is related to a certain sort of character in one of certain 
ways, can be good in virtue of being a certain sort of character or of being so related to it.” See, D. 
ROSS, The Right and the Good, Oxford, 2002, p. 155.   
116 See, UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble. 
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practices, traditions, customs enshrined in it must respect international (and national) 
human rights law and standards. Therefore, only if the latter condition is fulfilled, 
these practices and customs would be protected under the umbrella of the 
fundamental rights’ guarantee. So far, so good.  
But then, how do we interpret and explain the understanding of cultural 
diversity, made by UNESCO, built upon what has already been considered as an 
ontologically and logically unsustainable affirmation of the ‘equal dignity of 
cultures’? The answer to this question largely exceeds the length and scope of this 
work and, for its complexity and importance, it would certainly require a study of its 
own. However, we can try to build, certainly not a proper answer, but –at least– a 
grounded presumption.    
We have already stressed that cultures are not unchangeable and essentialised 
entities; on the contrary, they are under permanent change simply because they 
reflect the creative actions of all human beings. And creation precisely means 
modification and change. However, when UNESCO affirmed that “[e]very culture 
represents a unique and irreplaceable body of values”117 it has unfortunately 
essentialised the notion of culture, considering it not as a changeable expression of 
the human creativity, but as an unalterable ‘body of values’ whose uniqueness would 
rather consist in its unchangeableness. But if those values are subjected to change, 
taking diverse forms across time and space118, as the same UNESCO has properly 
recognised119, then it would be quite difficult to make essentialist comparisons 
among them, even in terms of “dignity”.  Culture is nothing but a tool, a self-created 
tool that provides humans (its creators) with the possibility not only to ‘reflect upon 
themselves’, but also to make valuative and meaningful choices, regardless of their 
substantial contents. In fact, several societal institutions and practises that were 
considered culturally valuative in past societies and civilizations, today infringe our 
much based moral and legal concerns, which are indeed cultural too.120  
                                                 
117 See, UNESCO Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, cit., para. 1. 
118 Cultures are always suffering change or flux, “…like a river ever passing way, and never for two 
successive moments preserving the same numerical or aggregate identity…” See, PLATO, Contra 
Atheos: Plato Against the Atheists; or, The Tenth Book of the Dialogue on Laws, T. LEWIS, New 
York, 1845, Ch. XXIV, p. 170. 
119 See, UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, Article 1.  
120 As we have already said, slavery is perhaps one of the clearest examples of the change of cultural 
values in human history.  See, in connection with the historical different societal (including legal) 
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The reason for this contradictory UNESCO’s approach to culture and cultural 
diversity could –perhaps– be found in its own mandate.121 In fact, this organisation 
has as a mission –among others– the protection and promotion of culture and it is 
within that framework that –for instance– UNESCO has identified in the respect of 
cultural diversity “the best guarantee of peace in our world.”122 Of course, we can 
agree with the latter statement, but perhaps not in the way that it has been interpreted. 
Respect for cultural diversity, that is, the different forms that human expressions take 
across time and space and –even most importantly– for the possibility of each 
individual to freely and culturally express himself or herself, is quite different from 
essentializing those diverse cultural manifestations. The latter situation would 
happen through considering them as defined, unique and unchangeable products that 
claim their substantial space within the institutional (and therefore cultural) structure 
of a given State. In fact, the same UNESCO has unveiled its agenda by affirming that 
“[t]he goal may be not just a multicultural society, but a multiculturally constituted 
state; a state that can recognize plurality without forfeiting its integrity”; but not 
only. UNESCO has also suggested that “[l]ocal forms of autonomy, formerly swept 
aside by nation states, should perhaps be reinstated today and offered certain 
guarantees…” 123 
I have nothing against UNESCO having its own multiculturalist agenda, but 
it has to be called what it is, without euphemisms. The agenda could be good, and 
certainty there are clear advantages in starting decentralisation or devolutionary 
processes at the national level, giving more institutional space and visibility to those 
cultural entities with clear concentrated and homogenised geographical presence. 
However, these processes are political in nature, and therefore have to be dealt with 
at the national level, in an open, constructive and –above all– democratic dialogical 
process. The essential element of this democratic method (which has also been called 
                                                                                                                                          
appreciation of slavery within human societies, H. GROTIUS, The Rights of War and Peace (De Jure 
Belli et Pacis), 1st. ed. 1625, London, 1853, Chap. V., p. 105, para. XXVII et seq. See also, J.-J. 
ROUSSEAU, op. cit., L. I, Chap. IV, p. 32 et seq. 
121 I would like to emphasise here the world “perhaps” because in order to have certainty on this 
affirmation, further studies are required, in particular in connection with the different historical steps 
that UNESCO has taken in dealing with culture and, in particular, with cultural diversity. For an 
overview on this issue, see UNESCO, UNESCO and the question of Cultural Diversity - 1946-2007 
Review and Strategies, Paris, 2007. 
122 Ibid., p 67. 
123 See, UNESCO, Our Creative Diversity: Report of the World Commission on Culture and 
Development, Paris, 1996, p. 72.  
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as “the democratic game”) is its participatory aspect, in a sense that political 
participation should be open to all individuals in each society, regardless of their 
ethno-cultural appurtenances. Hence, in a democratic society, the stress is given to 
the participative method rather than to its outcome, and surely not to the outcome of 
the institutional partition of the society among the existing ethno-cultural entities or 
groups.  
Moreover, and perhaps even most importantly, we have to always keep in 
mind that UNESCO “…is prohibited from intervening in matters which are 
essentially within [States Parties] domestic jurisdiction.”124 Therefore, when 
promoting the diversity of cultures, their interaction and exchange, UNESCO cannot 
and must not intervene in the internal national democratic game of States members, 
which also prevents it from making devolutionary or autonomist pleading on behalf 
or in benefit of specific ethno-cultural entities present within the territory of those 
States. As it has been said before, those constitutional processes that involve transfer 
of competences and powers are political in nature and therefore must be reserved to 
the internal democratic decision making processes within each society.  
UNESCO, as any other international institution or –in more general terms– as 
any other entity that exist within a given society, can have its own political agenda, 
which can –of course– include multiculturalist goals and aims; this is nothing but 
absolutely legitimate.125 However, this agenda has to be called by its proper name 
and must show its real purpose. That is, political aspirations for a multiculturalist 
change of the existing society. Change that –I am afraid– would put at stake the very 
subject of our internationally recognised human rights system of protection, namely, 
the individuals, in a sense that the latter would be replaced –as ultimate beneficiaries 
and as a raison d’être of the system– by an inhomogeneous constellation of ethno-
cultural entities. We can agree or not with this new ideological postulate that 
pretends to introduce a fundamental shift in our current international human rights 
standards (I certainly do not agree with it), but what we cannot accept is the use of 
                                                 
124 See, UNESCO, Constitution, Article I(3). 
125 In fact, UNESCO sees its own political institutional mission as “to remain the place where 
frameworks for thought and action concerning culture can be endlessly reinvented, so as to ensure 
that culture retains its unique and rightful place on the international political scene.” See, UNESCO, 
UNESCO and the question of Cultural Diversity - 1946-2007 Review and Strategies, cit., p. 138. 
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euphuisms or misguiding classifications just in order to make the new politico-
ideological message more appealing to the general public.  
Last, but not least, respect for cultural diversity and protection of the cultural 
human creativity and expression has ontologically nothing to do with the pretended 
political aspiration of some ethno-cultural entities or groups in having more 
institutional visibility and structural societal participation, including even 
constitutional transference of political and law making powers. To put it in a 
different way, the ‘ought’ or ‘should be’ level of the socio-politico-ideological 
discourse must not be confused or misguidedly vested in the neutral and ascetic level 
of the ‘is’ discourse. The latter just refers to the present socio-political-cultural 
reality (including internationally recognised human rights standards) existing in our 
modern and democratic societies, and not –as in the case of the former– in those 
‘pretended’ or ‘inspired’ ones.126  
The multiculturalist proposal is one ideological way to deal with multi-ethnic 
or multicultural societies, but the harmonious and respectful coexistence of all 
individuals in the society could also be achieved under the guarantee of equal 
opportunities and equal respect for all, regardless their ethno-cultural appurtenances. 
And this is what I believe is the best way to accommodate cultural differences in the 
society, that is, through the reinforcement of what all of us have in common as 
members of the very same human family, which is our ontologically common dignity 
as humans. In other words, making the enjoyment of fundamental human rights and 
freedoms available for all, without discrimination and distinction of any kind, and 
not through the institutional enhancement of what circumstantially or contextually 
make us different, that is, our cultural preferences or ethno-cultural appurtenances.  
 
 
                                                 
126 See, H. KELSEN, op. cit., p. 84. 
  
CHAPTER FOUR 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THEIR “INTRINSIC” DIVERSITY  
 
“[I]ndigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples, 
while recognizing the right of all peoples to be different, to 
consider themselves different and to be respected as such.”1  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), indigenous and 
tribal peoples constitute at least 5,000 distinct societal aggregations with a population 
of more than 370 million, living in 70 different countries.2 This quantitative 
information shows –at least– the numerical relevance of this societal segment. 
However, in connection with the scope of this work, it would be perhaps more 
important to ask certain theoretical questions connected with their ontological 
character as distinguishable segments of human population. In other words, it would 
be useful to enquire under which criteria a person can be identified as “indigenous”, 
and –even most importantly– why human beings have to be dichotomously identified 
as either “indigenous” or “non-indigenous” persons, and what are the consequences 
of such identification.  
From a more practical point of view, someone can say that he or she knows 
who is an indigenous person when he or she sees this person. However, when this 
ideal observer does it, actually he or she cognitively refers to conceptual notions that 
he or she has previously acquired within a certain specific societal framework, 
namely notions referring –at least– to what an indigenous person should resemble.3 
Of course, this is just a simple example, which –without having scientific 
                                                          
1 See, UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Preamble. 
2 See, ILO, Indigenous & Tribal Peoples' Rights in Practice. A Guide to ILO Convention No. 169, 
International Labour Standards Department, 2009, p. 9. 
3 It has been said, in connection with the identification of minority groups, that “[m]uch of the time, 
after all, it is self-evident which groups qualify for protection. The former Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) High commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der S   
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pretensions– nevertheless help us to see the need for a more accurate and 
systematically based study of this notion and its legally attached consequences. 
The term “indigenous people”, like those other terms that have been analysed 
within the precedent chapters, is elusive and difficult to be conceptualised. This is 
not only because it is a composed notion that incorporates the noun “people”, which 
would almost immediately lead our thoughts to the notion of “peoples” in 
international law that we have already addressed in the first chapter. This is also 
because the notion incorporates the adjective “indigenous” which operates as a 
qualifier of the above mentioned noun.  
Therefore, within the following paragraphs we will attempt to approach this 
composed and multi-faceted notion, exploring the composition of “people”, as a 
societal aggregation, and its qualifying notion of “indigenous”, in order to identify its 
boundaries and limitations, if possible. Why? Because, as we already saw in the case 
of minorities4, the notion of “indigenous people” is not legally and societally neutral. 
In fact, if a social aggregation of individuals is able to frame its own legal claims or 
political demands/aspirations within the particular legal framework that regulates this 
specific type of human aggregation, then they would be able to enjoy and rightfully 
claim the protection of a specific set of tailored rights, which are not available to 
members of other societal aggregations.  
Hence, if the above referred tailored rights are recognised to these “people” 
on the bases of their “indigenousness”, then it becomes imperative to understand 
which characteristics make special these kinds of societal aggregations, not only with 
regard to the rest of the society but also vis-à-vis other societal aggregations with the 
same pretension of distinguishability. Indeed, as it has been already maintained in the 
case of minority groups, their existence within a specific societal milieu could be 
established through the positive identification of the factual presence of certain 
objective and subjective elements that factually objectivise or make them socially 
visible. In other words, the objective presence of these elements gives visibility and 
contextualises their existence as a differentiated societal entity, within the bosom of a 
larger societal setting, but not only. The positive identification of those factual 
elements (such as numerical minority, non-dominant position, ethno-cultural 
                                                          
4 See, Chapter II, Section 4.4. 
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differential traditions, sense of solidarity, etc.) would also make it possible –for the 
members of those minoritarian groups– the enjoyment of a specific set of rights. In 
fact, those rights are addressed to overcome the disadvantageous factual situation in 
which they are placed by the minoritarian unfriendly societal structural 
configurations of the mainstream society.5  
But, what does this mean in the case of indigenous people? Is this minority 
related reasoning directly or mutatis mutandis applicable to the case of indigenous 
people? In other words, it would be necessary to elucidate whether there is an 
ontological differentiation between indigenous people and other ethno-cultural 
societal aggregations, such as minorities, that would eventually allow a justifiable 
legal differential treatment between the former and all other eventual societal 
aggregations. In addition, it would be important to address –at least briefly– the 
question of whether indigenous people could be considered as “peoples” in the 
understanding of international law, and therefore whether they are entitled to 
rightfully claim and exercise the internationally recognised right of self-
determination, and perhaps even to have the possibility to build their own ethno-
cultural national State.  
In answering these crucial questions, I will make specific reference to the 
theoretical and conceptual conclusions that have been achieved within the three 
precedent chapters, in particular to those connected with the notion of 
multiculturalism, cultural diversity and cultural identity, but not only. After this first 
theoretical approach, the current internationally recognised standards applicable to 
the case of indigenous people will be reviewed and critically analysed under the light 
of the above mentioned theoretical framework. 
Therefore, within the following paragraphs, we will start discussing the 
conceptual notion of the term “indigenous people”, together with its societal 
dimension. 
 
 
2. Indigenous peoples: General understanding and Conceptualisations  
 
                                                          
5 See, Chapter II, Section 4.2.1. 
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As I said before, the conceptual distinction between indigenous people and 
minorities in general has not always been clear and –allow me to even say– that even 
today it is quite ontologically unclear. Perhaps this unclearness is not absolutely 
casual, in a sense that conceptual confusion or vagueness could always be considered 
a good escamotage or –at least– functional to either States’ interests in avoiding the 
empowerment of certain ethno-cultural societal entities or indigenous people’s socio-
political aspirations for a differential societal institutional setting.6 In fact, as it has 
been already maintained with regard to the notion of “minority”, there is no adopted 
legal definition of “indigenous people” in international law, perhaps in order to avoid 
those legal implications that are connected with the notion of “peoples” and the 
potential exercise of the right of self-determination.7  Nevertheless, as we will see 
below, during the last decades the international community has been quite active in 
drafting and adopting specific standards in connection with indigenous people; 
standards which have ultimately generated differentiated international legal regimes 
applicable to these two societal aggregations, without clarifying –however– certain 
ontological aspects, which would also be addressed.  
From a linguistic perspective, the term “indigenous” is frequently used 
interchangeably with other terms, such as “aboriginal”, “native”, “first nations”, 
“indios”, “pueblos originarios”, “original population”, etc. In this work we will use 
the generic term “indigenous people” (without the “s”) to refer to these kinds of 
societal aggregations, not only in view of ‘escaping the self-determination trap’8, but 
                                                          
6 In fact, indigenous representatives have manifested in several occasions, before the UN Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) that a definition of the concept of “indigenous people” was 
not necessary or desirable. In fact, it seems that ‘indigenous organizations did not want the term to be 
defined for fear some indigenous persons would not be covered by the scope of the definition.” See, 
E.-I. A. DAES, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of 
Indigenous People. Working paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the 
concept of “Indigenous people”, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2, United Nations, 1996, p. 12, 
para. 35, and p. 14, para. 40.  
7 As Prof. Alfredsson pointed out in a very clear manner, “…definitions are incomplete largely 
because States are reluctant to deal with rights of groups and peoples. In part, as far as group rights 
are concerned, ignorance, lack of tolerance and undoubtedly racism play a role in the lack of codified 
definitions. This reluctance has to do with the unfortunate but frequent (mis)conception that such 
rights may lead to separatist claims which would threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
States. (…) Peoples’ rights may indeed constitute a threat as far as the right of self-determination is 
concerned, but minority and indigenous and tribal rights do not.” See, G. ALFREDSSON, 
Minorities, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, and Peoples: Definitions of Terms as a Matter of 
International Law, in N. GHANEA, A. XANTHAKI (eds.), Minorities, Peoples and Self-
Determination, Leiden – Boston, 2005, p. 163-164.  
8 See, M. WELLER, Escaping the Self-Determination Trap, Leiden/Boston, 2008. 
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also because this is the most common dominant use in international law and by the 
international community. 
In fact, if we draw out attention toward one of the first attempts –in modern 
times– to define the notion of “indigenous people”, we will be able to see that, the 
‘Bureau international du Travail’ (hereinafter “B.I.T.”) used, in 1953, the 
denomination “aborigines” (aborigènes in French) instead of the denomination 
“indigenous” (indigènes in French). In any case, the definition attempted by the 
B.I.T. stated that « [s]ont aborigènes les descendants de la population autochtone 
qui habitait un pays déterminé à l’époque de la colonisation ou de la conquête (ou de 
plusieurs vagues successives de conquêtes) réalisée par certains des ancêtres des 
groupes non autochtones détenant actuellement le pouvoir politique et 
économique »9 
In this preliminary conceptual attempt, the international community 
constructed the notion of indigenous people around two main factors, namely descent 
and societal power. The first element referred to the factual opposition between the 
descendants of the original population in a given territory, and those from a non-
original population that came in a subsequent period of time, but not only. In fact, the 
second element of this notion refers to the relation of power that has been established 
between these two different societal aggregations, in a sense that the latter 
descendants currently keep the economic, political and even societal power vis-à-vis 
the former. This relationship could be considered –in a broad sense– as dynamics of 
power domination. In this sense, asymmetries with regard to power and relationship 
of dominations has been attributed by certain authors to the existing  knowledge and 
technological gap between the two above mentioned societal aggregations, at the 
time when they ancestors had met.10  
                                                          
9 See, B.I.T., 1953, p. 27; cited by F.V. LANGENHOVE, Le Problème de la Protection des 
Populations Aborigènes aux Nations Unies, in Académie de Droit International (ed.), in Recueil des 
Cours, Leyde, 1956-I, p. 327. Almost the same wording was used by the Eighth International 
Conference of American States, which declared in its Resolution XI of 21 December 1938, that “…the 
indigenous populations, as descendants of the first inhabitants of the lands which today form America, 
and in order to offset the deficency in their physical and intellectual development, have a preferential 
right to the protection of the pulic authorities.” Cited by, E.-I. A. DAES, op. cit., p. 7, para. 16. Here 
we find even an additional element, namelly the need of protection with regard to these populations, 
by means of adoption of positive measures by the States.  
10 According to Langenhove, « [d]eux éléments forment donc la définition de l’aborigène : le premier 
est l’antériorité de l’occupation du territoire ; le second est celui de l’infériorité et de la 
subordination à l’égard des descendants des nouveaux arrivants colonisateurs ou conquérants. Ceux-
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Moreover, it is important to highlight that this early definition already 
stressed the so-called ‘temporal factor’, which refers to the fact that indigenous 
people (aborigènes) would be those populations whish ancestors were established  
‘prior in time’ in a given territory (descendancy factor). This means, temporal 
presence vis-à-vis another population that currently inhabit the same territory but 
which ancestors arrived, occupied or conquered it later in time.11 In fact, “priority in 
time” has been considered as the common element that the different denominations 
used in connection with these populations.12  
The latter characteristic, namely the fact of descendant from “original” 
inhabitants of a given territory has led different authors toward the conclusion that 
what really differentiated indigenous people from other societal entities is “the race 
element”13, using the term “race” from a biological sense to describe “…groups of 
individuals who have a specific combination of physical characteristics of genetic 
origin.”14 In fact, as we will see within the following paragraphs, this idea of 
ancestry or descendancy could lead toward the construction of the indigenous 
people’s notion, as a distinguishable societal entity. Thus, a notion based on a 
biological factor, which is not far from the notion of “race”15, which is indeed a very 
problematic concept, not only because it is scientifically false16, but also because it 
cannot be used –under the light of our current internationally recognised human right 
                                                                                                                                                                    
ci disposent à l’égard des aborigènes d’un pouvoir supérieur qui résulte de connaissances plus 
étendues et des moyens matériels plus efficaces. » See, F.V. LANGENHOVE, op. cit., p. 329-330.    
11 This temporal factor, or being ‘prior in time’ is intimately connected with the factor of ‘ancestry’, 
because those that were ‘prior in time’ went the ancestors of certain parts of the current population of 
a given society constituted under the organisational structure of a national State. In this sense, 
‘ancestry’ has been defined as “[t]he biological factor or the fact of descent from members of the 
native population of a country…”, and –according to the UN Special Rapporteur Mr. Martínez Cobo, 
this factor “…is always present when persons or groups are described as “indigenous”, 
“autochthonous”, “aboriginal”, “Indian”, etc.” See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, Study of the Probelm 
of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.6, United 
Nations, 1982, p. 6, para. 15. 
12 In fact, according to Daes, “Ehglish and Spanish share a common root in the Latin term indigenae, 
which was used to distinguish between persons who were born in a particular place and those who 
arrived from elsewhere (advenae). The French term autochtone has, by comparison, Greek roots and, 
like the German term Ursprung, suggests that the group to which it refers was the first to exist in the 
particular location.” See, E.-I. A. DAES, op. cit., p. 5, para. 10. 
13 See, F. ERMACORA, The Protection of Minorities before the United Nations, in Académie de 
Droit International (ed.), Recueil des Cours, The Hague/Boston/London, 1983-IV, 293-294.  
14 See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, op. cit., p. 7, para. 19. 
15 See, K. A. APPIAH, The Ethics of Identity, Princeton, 2005, p. 136-137. 
16 See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, op. cit., p. 7, para. 17-18. 
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standards– as a factor of attribution of specific rights.17 I will come back later to this 
question, at the time of analysing in detail the different elements that compose this 
notion.   
 
 
2.1. Martínez Cobo’s definition of indigenous populations  
 
Facing the above mentioned conceptual difficulties, the former UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
commissioned its Special Rapporteur, Jose R. Martínez Cobo, to conduct a profound 
and wide-ranged study of the problem of discrimination against indigenous 
populations. The report was finalised and published in 1984 under the title of “Study 
of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations” (hereinafter 
“Martínez Cobo’s Study”)18. This study is rightfully considered –until today– one of 
the most accurate studies ever conducted in connection with indigenous people, but 
not only. In this study, Martínez Cobo proposed one definition of these populations, 
which has been widely used and quoted, and which is –in fact– known within the 
international community as ‘Martínez Cobo’s definition’. The definition states as 
follow: 
“Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on 
their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
                                                          
17 In fact, all international human rights instruments have incorporated the non-discrimination clause, 
starting with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states in its Article 2 that 
“[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other statues.”   
18 The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities commissioned 
this study to the appointed Special Rapporteur, Mr. José R. Martínez Cobo, by resolution 8 (XXIV) of 
18 August 1971, in order to make “…a complete and comprehensive study of the problem of 
discrimination against indigenous populations and to suggest the necessary national and 
international measures for eliminating such discrimination, in co-operation with the other organs and 
bodies of the United nations and with the competent international organizations.” The study lasted for 
a decade, and in 1984 the sub-Commission had before it the full report. See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ 
COBO, Study of the Problem of discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, Volume V, 
Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, New York, 
1987, p. 1 et seq. For an entire overview of this Study, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 and 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.1-3, which include the other remaining volumes I to IV. 
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sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, 
social institutions and legal systems.”19  
This proposed definition, as in the case of minorities, contains both objective 
and subjective elements. Within the following paragraph, we will proceed to their 
conceptual analysis, but not only. In fact, in this analysis we will go beyond the 
limits of the definition, which nevertheless has a highest degree of conceptual 
completeness, and hence extending our scrutiny to other criteria not mentioned or not 
fully present in it. 
 
 
2.2. Objective elements 
 
The Martínez Cobo’s definition can be deconstructed into different 
conceptual elements, both objective and subjective, which epistemologically 
integrate the notion of indigenous people as a distinctive societal aggregation. 
Among its objective elements, it is possible to individualise not only those two 
elements already mentioned, namely being first in time and non-dominant position, 
but also other interconnected and perhaps even implicit criteria.  
In fact, as we will see within the following sections, this proposed definition 
refers also to additional implicit or explicit elements, such as the cultural 
distinctiveness of these populations; the conceptual importance of their traditional 
lands (‘ancestral territories’ in the wording of the definition); and their ethnic 
identity, which also introduces a biological factor into the notion of indigenousness. 
Last but not least, it is worth to mention that all these objective criteria also have 
conceptual interconnections and perhaps potential epistemological elusiveness. Thus, 
in this chapter we will critically attempt a comprehensive exploration of all these 
                                                          
19 This definition was constructed after reviewing and comparing 37 different definition used by 37 
different countries covered by the study, and it was meant to be used as “…a guide when seeking to 
develop concrete rules defining the specific rights and indispensable freedoms of indigenous 
populations…” See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, Study of the Problem of discrimination Against 
Indigenous Populations, Volume V, Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, cit., p. 28-29, in 
particular, para. 367 and 379. 
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conceptual shadows, in order to assess or –at least– rationally understand the 
conceptual (and legal) societal segmentation of the human population.   
 
 
2.2.1. Being first in time 
 
 The first objective criterion proposed by the Martínez Cobo’s definition that 
have to be present in a societal aggregation, in order to be identified as an indigenous 
population, is the so-called “being first or having priority or precedence in time” 
criterion. This element is reflected in the text of the definition when it mentions the 
“historical continuity” of these populations with the “pre-invasion and pre-colonial 
societies” that inhabited their current territories (therefore, indigenous people would 
be connected –in principle– with those pre-dated societies by biological ties of 
“ancestry”).20 The historical continuity is envisaged in connection with “pre-
invasion” and “pre-colonial” societies.21 In this sense, the latter qualifier does not 
present many complications, because it is quite clear that it refers to the historical 
phenomenon of colonialism22, but the former is quite vague, especially because in 
                                                          
20 It is interesting to see that, for the Special Rapporteur, the factor of historical continuity is not only 
constituted by the ‘common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands’, but also by the 
continuative presence ‘for an extended period reaching into the present’, of one or more different 
factors, such as the total or partial occupation of ancestral lands, the residency in certain parts of the 
country or region and even the maintenance of culture, cultural manifestations and language. As we 
can see, his approach to the requirement of “historical continuity” is quite broad and not exclusively 
connected with ancestry. See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, Study of the Problem of discrimination 
Against Indigenous Populations, Volume V, Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, cit., p. 29, 
para. 379. 
21 It has been stressed that the term indigenous people has denoted from its very beginning a 
“…opposition between ‘racially’ or ‘culturally’ differing ‘new comers’ and ‘original inhabitants’. 
The term nevertheless did not, at least not in the League of Nations era, refer to distinct ‘ethnic’ 
groups, but to ‘original’ populations of a colony or a mandate as a whole.” See, T. MAKKONEN, 
Identity, Difference and Otherness. The Concepts of 'People', 'Indigenous People' and 'Minority' in 
International Law. Helsinki, 2000, p. 110-111. 
22 According to Prof. Scelle, « [l]e phénomène colonial est une des forme générales et constantes des 
rapports humains. […] La colonisation a existé de tout temps, si l’on admet qu’elle se confonde 
originairement avec le système de conquête et d’expansion des grands Empires de l’Antiquité. 
[…][L]a colonisation, au sens étroit, suppose une occupation territoriale et l’établissement sur une 
collectivité arriérée d’une administration directe. » See, G. SCELLE, Précis de Droit des Gens. 
Principes et Systématique I et II, Paris, 1984, p. 142-143. In connection with colonialism, the 
Declaration adopted at the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Intolerance, held in Durban, 31 August to 8 September 2001, states that “…colonialism has 
led to racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, and that Africans and 
people of African descent, and people of Asian descent and indigenous peoples were victims of 
colonialism and continue to be victims of its consequences.” See, Report of the World Conference 
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human history, almost all societal entities suffered from one or another kind of 
invasion, conquest or external violent attacks.23  In fact, one might argue that, if the 
requirement to “being first in time”, as a settler in connection with a given territory, 
would be applied seriously, it would be quite difficult to establish who really is 
indigenous to that given territory. If we look back in time, peaceful migratory flows 
or –on the contrary– violent invasions have indeed been a normal state of affairs in 
human history. In fact, almost in all cases, civilisations came from somewhere else… 
if one goes back in time far enough.24  
Therefore, it would be quite difficult to clearly establish a specific period of 
time, besides the case of colonialism which made references to the political control 
exercised by European powers outside of their continent25, from which point it would 
be possible to start counting and applying the “previous in time” criterion, but not 
only. Also identification of the territory over which we will apply this criterion could 
be problematic, in a sense that even descendants of different migratory flaws could 
claim to be native of the soil of the country as those groups that claim to be 
“indigenous” to that territory. Therefore, it seems that if temporal and territorial 
references would be constructed through referring just to those current settlers who 
constitute the predominant sectors of the society (as a reference parameter), within 
the specific borders of an existing national State, then this historical and geographical 
analysis would be much easier. That is, making references to those regarded as the 
historical successors of those who had invaded or otherwise besieged the territory of 
indigenous ancestors and who –as it has been said– “eventually prevailed over them 
and imposed on them colonial or other forms of subjugation.”26  
                                                                                                                                                                    
against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.189/12, 2001, p. 12, para. 14. 
23 According to Martínez Cobo, indigenous people “…consider themselves to be the historical 
successors of the peoples and nations that existed on their territories before the coming of the 
invaders of these territories, who eventually prevailed over them and imposed on them colonial or 
other form of subjugation, and whose historical successors now form the predominant sectors of 
society.” See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, Study of the Problem of discrimination Against Indigenous 
Populations, Volume V, Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, cit., p. 29, para. 376. 
24 See, H. HANNUM, Indigenous Rights, in G. M. LYONS, J. MAYALL (eds.), International Human 
Rights in the 21st Century. Protecting the Rights of Groups, Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford, 
2003, p. 72-73. 
25 See, G. SCELLE, cit., p. 145. 
26 See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, Study of the Problem of discrimination Against Indigenous 
Populations, Volume V, Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, cit., p. 29, para. 376; see also, 
E.-I. A. DAES, op. cit., p. 20, para. 64. 
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In addition, there is perhaps a more substantial question that we can ask in 
connection with this criterion, that is whether the factual element of “being first in 
time” really matters from a socio-political and legal perspective. In today’s world, 
national boundaries are already established, and all individuals count for their 
inherent worth and dignity, regardless of their ethno-cultural origin, race, religion, 
colour, culture, gender, age, or national origin. Moreover, it would be quite logical to 
add to this list of non-relevant legal matters (from the point of view of the equal 
enjoyment of rights and freedom), the biological factor of being descendant of the 
historical dwellers that, at a certain point in history, first inhabited a given territory 
vis-à-vis all other current inhabitants. That is, with regard to those that are not 
considered as biologically connected with the same historical indigenous 
aggregation. In today’s world, under the harmonious light of the golden rule 
enshrined within the UDHR, which states that “[a]ll human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights”27, it would be quite difficult to admit that certain 
segments of the population of the world are entitled to have a different set of 
exclusive rights. This is the case, especially because those differential rights would 
just be grounded on the sole factual element of being descendants of those that first 
inhabited a given territory, at certain point in history. All humans equally descend 
from historical societal aggregations, which, according to the wording of the 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, have to be considered as equal in worth.28            
As we have seen, the objective element of “being first in time” is considered 
as intimately and conceptually connected with the historical arrival of a pervasive 
external societal force, which has historically dominated the invaded territory and 
whose descendants are still in control of the main current societal structures and 
institutions. However, one could perhaps ask what would happen if those dynamics 
of domination and socio-political, economic and cultural subjugations lose their 
conceptual, practical or even legal interconnections and relevance. In other words, 
one can ask if it would still be possible to construct the notion of indigenousness in 
terms of which group was in a given location first, when all members of that given 
                                                          
27 See, Article 1 of the UN Unversal Declaration of Human Rights. 
28 See, Article 2(3) of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions. In connection with the principle of “equal dignity and respect for all cultures”, 
see our considerations in Chapter I, Section 3.4.1. 
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society are conceptually and practically equally treated.29 The answer to this question 
leads us to the analysis of the second objective element contained within the 
Hernández Cobo’s definition, which is the conceptual relevance of indigenous 
people’s non-dominant position in current societies.      
 
 
2.2.2. Non-dominant position 
 
The second mentioned objective element refers to the dynamics of power and 
domination, and is included within the definition which requires that indigenous 
people “form at the present non-dominant sectors” within a given society. The 
question in this case would be if, as result of measures taken for the full realisation of 
its rights, a given indigenous population would no longer be “non-dominant.” Would 
that population lose its legal status as “indigenous”? According the interpretation 
made by another former UN Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, they 
would not.30 However, one could argue that perhaps it would be important to make a 
distinction between the “legal status”, which is ascribed to indigenous populations 
by international law (or even by national laws), from their “indigenousness”. The 
former refers to their possibility to enjoy separate sets of rights, particularly tailored 
in order to overcome their “vulnerability”. The latter –on the contrary– denotes their 
particular cultural characteristics that make them culturally different from the rest of 
the society, which would not necessarily need a separate set of rights in order to be 
protected.31  
In fact, from a sociological or societal point of view, it would be possible to 
identify specific ethno-cultural characteristics that would represent a given societal 
aggregation, even if we would not take into account the dynamics of power and 
domination that could exist. Power dynamics are politically relational by nature and 
even when they can influence the construction of groups’ identities, they are not 
identitarian in themselves, in a sense that a cultural identity cannot be exclusively 
constructed in connection with an experience of exclusion and non-domination, as 
                                                          
29 See, H. HANNUM, op. cit., p. 72-73. 
30 See, E.-I. A. DAES, op. cit., p. 10, para. 26.  
31 Because of its importance in connection with the present discussion, I will come back later to this 
crucial point. 
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we have already seen in the precedent chapter.32 Therefore, because in a given 
society power dynamics change, it could happen that the involved indigenous 
societal entities would no longer be under domination, or would no longer be in ‘lack 
of political control’, and would not be otherwise structurally discriminated against –
in the enjoyment of their fundamental rights and freedoms– by other sectors of that 
society. However, this would not affect the cultural “indigenousness” of those 
groups.33  In other words, what I am arguing here is the fact that when indigenous 
people would not be in a vulnerable, non-dominant or otherwise powerless position, 
they would not be affected in their “indigenousness”, that is, in their cultural 
identity.34  
However, as we will see in the conclusive part of this chapter, the loss of the 
vulnerable or non-dominant societal position by indigenous people’s societal entities, 
and therefore the achievement of a situation of factual equality and non-
discrimination vis-à-vis- the other members of the society in which they live, cannot 
be considered deprived of legal effects. In fact, because the entire construction of 
special measures in connection with indigenous people is grounded (or would be 
grounded) not in the fact of their cultural specificity or “indigenousness”, but rather 
on their overwhelming situation of vulnerability, exclusion, and disenfranchisement, 
the overthrow or subversion of this structural situation would deprive the legal 
justification for this special treatment. In other words, without a situation of 
“domination” or structural discrimination, a differential treatment between 
individuals (indigenous and non-indigenous people alike) that would be in the same 
factual position in terms of “non-vulnerability”, would not be justified. The contrary 
would be against the principle of equality and non-discrimination.  
To put it in another way, losing the “legal status” as indigenous people under 
the light of common international standards, due the fact of not being in a vulnerable 
position any longer, does not absolutely mean that they lose their cultural 
“indigenousness”. In this sense, the latter feature would be culturally enjoyed and 
freely developed through the enjoyment of the very same fundamental rights that all 
the other members of the population have. In fact, the enjoyment of culture and 
                                                          
32 See, Chapter III, Section 4. 
33 See, M. SCHEININ, What are Indigenous Peoples?, in N. GHANEA, A. XANTHAKI (eds.), 
Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination, Leiden/Boston, 2005, 3-4. 
34 See, T. MAKKONEN, op. cit., p. 131-132. 
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cultural rights intrinsically presupposes the possibility of the enjoyment of cultural 
diversity.  
In short, one thing is to be able to fully enjoy our cultural differences, and 
another –quite different– is to claim a differentiated (and hence exclusive) set of 
rights based on the ethno-political argumentation of protection of ontologically 
irreconcilable cultural differences. If culture would matter up to the point in which 
cultural differences would be irreconcilable, in a sense that societal organisations 
would have to be constructed around differential sets of rights, ideally indispensables 
in order to meet the cultural “uniqueness” of each ethno-cultural group, then no 
societal enterprise would be even possible. At least, not a society based on the 
axiological equality and dignity between all its individual members.35  
 
 
2.2.3. Cultural distinctiveness or “indigenousness” 
 
Beside the relevance of the above preliminary conceptual appreciation, the 
precedent discussion has introduced us to the analysis of an additional elements that 
could be considered as part of those objective elements identified by the Special 
Rapporteur that theoretically characterise indigenous populations, namely the 
cultural indigenous “distinctiveness” that culturally differentiate them from all the 
other societal aggregations.  
                                                          
35 Notwithstanding the rationale behind this argumentation, indigenous activists and scholars, have 
exactly the opposite view. In fact, in connection with this crucial topic, Prof. Anaya has said that 
“[t]he nondiscrimination norm, viewed in light of broader self-determination values, goes beyond 
ensuring for indigenous individuals either the same civil and political freedoms accorded others 
within an existing state structure or the same access to the state’s social welfare programs.” See, S. J. 
ANAYA, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, New York, 2004, p. 131 et seq. Therefore, for 
him, recognising equal rights to all members of the society –including indigenous people– would be 
discriminatory because the law would not allow to treat differently those who are culturally different. 
However, the relevant question is not whether indigenous people are culturally different, which they 
obviously are as any other societal aggregation, but whether that difference should be relevant from a 
legal point of view, in a sense to allow the recognition of a different (and hence exclusive) set of 
rights. The answer to this question is hiding perhaps in the same wording of Prof. Anaya when he 
emphasised that his interpretation is constructed ‘in light of broader self-determination values’; 
“values” not “rights”. As we will see later in this chapter, his views –and other similar discourses– are 
based on indeed legitimate but political societal aspirations of indigenous groups; political aspirations 
that include their plea for the legal recognition of their societal institutions, their inclusion within the 
legal structure of the concerned States. As we can see, this plea does not substantially differ from the 
multiculturalist claims analysed in the precedent chapters. As I said, because the theoretical 
importance for this work that this question has, I will come back to it later. 
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Just for the sake of the argumentation, it is important to clarify that this 
criterion has not been expressly incorporated into the wording of the proposed 
definition. Nevertheless, we can consider it obliquely included in it under different 
wording, most precisely when it mentions the indigenous people’s “continued 
existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal systems.” Therefore, according to this, their ‘distinctiveness’ 
basically refers to the fact that indigenous people have their “own cultural patterns, 
social institutions and legal systems.” In summary, it would refer to the fact that they 
have… a different culture and cultural institutions, which not only lead us to a rather 
circular argumentation, but also toward the unavoidable question of “different from 
whom”?  
A second and holistic reading of the proposed definition could provide us –at 
least– with an answer to our second question, in a sense that it seems that it refers to 
those cultural differences that they have vis-à-vis the mainstream society, or its 
dominant sectors.36 If this interpretative reading is correct, and it seems that it is, 
then the “cultural distinctiveness” would be placed not at a substantial level but at a 
different comparative level, regardless the entity of the cultural comparative 
substance. In other words, if the “distinctiveness” element would consist in the fact 
of being “different” from the mainstream society, then the distinction is not 
ontological but relative. Relative because it would depend on the substance, on the 
cultural contents and entity of the comparator, which seems to be –in this case– the 
mainstream society. Whatever cultural entity or substance mainstream society would 
have, indigenous people would be those that just have a different one, regardless of 
the cultural entity of the difference.  
Indeed, because cultures change across time and space, the dialogical and 
mirror construction of indigenous people’s cultural distinctiveness would take as 
well different forms, following exactly the opposite or –at least– a different cultural 
development with regard to those taken by the mainstream society. As it would be 
possible to imagine, this approach does not really help in order to provide substantive 
elements neither for a general conceptual definition nor for a more specific 
                                                          
36 This is what we can literally and logically conclude from the wording “…consider themselves 
distinct from other sectors of the society now prevailing in those territories, or part of them.” See, J. 
R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, Study of the Problem of discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, 
Volume V, Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, cit., p. 29, para. 379. 
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individualisation of the cultural content that would substantiate their 
“distinctiveness”, beyond the obvious cultural contrast that they might have, as any 
other differential societal aggregation has.   
But then, the question is still open. One could still ask what it means to have a 
distinguishable culture, in the particular case of indigenous people. As it has been 
mentioned in precedent chapters, cultures and cultural manifestations assume diverse 
forms across time and space37, but not only. Cultures, and cultural manifestations are 
changeable and mutable, they are under permanent chance because they reflect the 
creative actions of all human beings based on the cultural human adaptability.38 
Therefore, the intrinsically changeable character of cultures has to be born in mind at 
the time to approach the “distinguishable” cultural specificities of indigenous people, 
in order to avoid the “essentialist trap”, that is to freeze cultures out of time, without 
acknowledging their unavoidable changes and mutable substances.39 
Having in mind the precedent observation, we can perhaps say –from a 
holistic cultural perspective– that indigenous people’s distinguishable culture 
includes all aspects of indigenous life. That is, inter alia, their different 
understandings of the world, the holy and admirable, languages, religion and culture, 
their own social structures and institutional organisations (including their legal 
systems, if they have retained them) and their own traditions and histories. However, 
these cultural characteristics40, which can be summarised in the wording of the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action as “…their distinct identities, cultures 
and social organizations”41, do not appear to differ very much from the general 
characteristics of all other ethno-cultural societal entities present in a given society.42 
                                                          
37 See, Article 1 of UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, adopted by the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, on 2 November 2001. 
38 See, Chapter I, Section 5. 
39 See, K. A. APPIAH, op. cit., p. 130 et seq. 
40 It is important to bear in mind that culture, in a wide sense, refers to “...the whole complex of 
distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social 
group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the 
human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs.” See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on 
Cultural Policies, adopted by the World Conference on Cultural Policies, Mexico, 6 August 1982, 
preamble. 
41 See, the UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted at the World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993, Paragraph 20 of Part I.  
42 In fact, for Prof. Ermacora considered that “[t]he problem of aborigines falls into the category of 
the protection of minorities. However [he added], aborigines are not considered and not legally 
treated as minorities.” See, F. ERMACORA, op. cit., p. 279. In the same line, the UN Special 
Rapporteur, Mr. Asbjørn Eide, has stated, when discussing constructive solutions for the problems 
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In fact, because the changeable, dialogical and hence mutually influential 
character of cultures43, the cultural expressions, manifestations, and characteristics of 
all societal entities –including indigenous people’s culture– are “unique”.44 But then 
again, if all cultures are “unique” –as they are from a sociological point of view– 
then it is pointless to still try to identify the most salient cultural characteristics 
enshrined within indigenous people’s distinctiveness. This is nothing but logical. 
Indeed, if we explore a little bit further this logical angle, we can even arrive at the 
conclusion of the inadequacy of the said quality, because if all cultures are “unique” 
then no one would be “unique”. Again, another fallacy trap.45  
Perhaps, as it happens in other cases of theoretical constructions, it could be 
that the case of indigenous people escapes this logical conceptual constrain, in a 
sense that their cultural “uniqueness” is… or “should be” considered more culturally 
“unique” than other “unique” cultural expressions and manifestations. In order to 
attempt to resolve this conceptual galimatias, and before commenting on its 
prescriptive dimension (the “should be” aspect), I will focus on its descriptive 
dimension (its “is” aspect).46 Hence, we will make an extra effort in this conceptual 
enquiry, trying to identify those cultural aspects that would be able to show the 
“uniqueness” of indigenous culture that –consequentially– make it more “unique” 
vis-à-vis the cultural “uniqueness” as well presented in all other cultural 
manifestations and entities (majorities and minorities alike).47 This is –of course– 
                                                                                                                                                                    
involving minorities, that the chosen definition of minorities “also includes indigenous peoples”, but 
–he nevertheless clarified– “it being recognized that they may have stronger rights than other 
minorities in areas where they live compactly together.” See, A. EIDE, Possible ways and means of 
facilitating the peaceful and constructive solution of problems involving minorities, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34, United Nations, 1993, p. 9, para. 40. As we can see, both authors put more 
emphasis on the recognised legal differences (different legal status) between indigenous people and 
minorities in general, rather than on the cultural ones. Because of its importance within the framework 
of this work, I will come back to it later in this chapter to discuss the differences between these two 
societal aggregations. 
43 See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, cit., para. 4. 
44 In the wording of UNESCO, “[e]very culture represents a unique and irreplaceable body of 
values…” See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, cit., para. 1. 
45 This kind of fallacy has been named as a fallacy of false classification, within the general fallacies 
ad judicium. See, J. BENTHAM, The Book of Fallacies, London, 1824, Ch. 10, p. 316 et seq. 
46 In connection with these two discursive dimensions, see, H. KELSEN, What is Justice? Justice, 
Law, and Politics in the mirror of science, Berkeley/Los Angeles/ London, 1971, p. 84. 
47 See, in this regard, our comments and conclusions in connection with the topic of cultural diversity, 
in Chapter III, Section 2. 
CHAPTER IV 
178 
 
without prejudice the observation that –in themselves– indigenous cultures are quite 
far from being homogeneous.48  
In order to address this new theoretical challenge, it would be perhaps a good 
departing point to come back to Martínez Cobo’s Study and see which extra 
conceptual elements we can find in it. According the Special Rapporteur, indigenous 
people have “…a deeply spiritual special relationship between indigenous peoples 
and their land as basic to their existence as such and to all their beliefs, customs, 
traditions and culture.”49 Here we can find a new focal point, which is the special 
relationship that indigenous people have with their lands, especially because is 
considered as “deeply spiritual”. The centrality of the land tenure systems in their 
cultures, and the special relationship that indigenous people have with them, has 
been acknowledge not only by Mr. Martínez Cobo, but also by other UN Special 
Rapporteurs50, the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) of the former 
UN Sub-Commission51, and other international mechanisms.52  
Just as an example of the UN focus on this matter, among UN Special 
Rapporteurs, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, issued in 2001 a working paper related 
                                                          
48 These conceptual complications have been acknowledged by the UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. 
Martínez Cobo, when he concluded that “…the culture criterion, although it is very useful, is not 
enough to classify a person as indigenous or non-indigenous.” See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, Study 
of the Probelm of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, cit., p. 18, para. 79. 
49 See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, Study of the Problem of discrimination Against Indigenous 
Populations, Volume V, Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, cit., p. 16, para. 196. 
50 According to another UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, “[f]rom time immemorial 
indigenous peoples have maintained a special relationship with the land, their source of livelihood 
and sustenance and the basis of their very existence as identifiable territorial communities. The right 
to own, occupy and use the land is inherent in the self-conception of indigenous peoples and in 
generally it is in the local community, the tribe, the indigenous nation or group that this right is 
vested.” See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Indigenous Issues. Human rights and indigenous issues. Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous 
people, Mr. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, subitted pursuant to Commission resolution 2001/57, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2002/97, United Nations, 2002, p. 14, para. 39. See also, E.-I. A. DAES, op. cit., p. 10, para. 
27. 
51 The Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which was established pursuant to Economic and 
Social Council resolution 1982/34 is a subsidiary organ of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, and has a two-fold mandate, which consist in, first, to review 
developments pertaining to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of indigenous peoples, and second, to give attention to the evolution of international standards 
concerning indigenous rights.  
52 Among those mechanisms, the Human Rights Committee has stated, for example, that “…culture 
manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life associated with the use of land 
resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples.” See, Human Rights Committee (HRComm.), 
General Comment No. 23: The rights of minorities (Art. 27), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21Rev.1/Add.5, 
United Nations, 1994, para. 7; see also, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD). General Recommendation No. 23: Indigenous Peoples. United Nations, 1987, para. 3 and 5. 
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specifically to this question.53 In that opportunity, she expressly stressed the fact that, 
for indigenous people themselves, “…it is difficult to separate the concept of 
indigenous peoples’ relationship with their lands, territories and resources from that 
of their cultural differences and values. The relationship with the land and all living 
things is at the core of indigenous societies.”54   
Because the importance of this “special relationship” within the framework 
of this work, it will be analysed in a separate section, even when thematically it is 
indeed connected with, and is part of the present issue of cultural distinctiveness. 
 
 
2.2.4. Special relationship with traditional lands 
 
As we will see bellow, the so-called ‘special relationship’ element has also 
been acknowledged within the currently recognised international human rights 
related instruments. These are –for instance– the ILO Convention concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries No. 169 of 1989 
(hereinafter “ILO Convention No. 169”), or even the most recent UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the UN General Assembly on the 13th 
September 2007 (hereinafter “UN Declaration”). In fact, within the former, we find –
as a sort of interpretative principle– the clear recognition of the “…special 
importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their 
relationship with the lands or territories.”55 The Declaration, makes even a more 
verbal and vivid exposition of the axiological centrality that lands play in indigenous 
people culture, when it states that “[i]indigenous peoples have the right to maintain 
and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditional owned or 
                                                          
53 See, E.-I. A. DAES, Indigenous peoples and their relationship to land. Final working paper 
prepared by the Special Rapporteur Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21, 
United Nation, 2001. 
54 Ibid., p. 7, para. 13. The Special Rapporteur also highlighted the words of Prof. Robert A. Williams, 
whom stated, within the discussion hold with the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, that 
“…indigenous peoples have emphasized that the spiritual and material foundations of their cultural 
identities are sustained by their unique relationships to their traditional territories.” Ibid. See also, R. 
A. WILLIAMS, Encounters on the frontiers of international human rights law: redefining the terms 
of indigenous peoples, in Duke Law Journal, 1990, p. 981et seq. 
55 See, Article 13(1) of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, C 169 of 27th of June 1989. 
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otherwise occupied and used lands…”56 In another words, or –to be more precise– in 
the words of Martínez Cobo, for indigenous people, “…the land is not merely a 
possession and a means of production. The entire relationship between the spiritual 
life of indigenous peoples and Mother Earth, and their land, has a great many deep-
seated implications.”57 
In the same line, another UN Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Daes, has stressed 
certain elements that –according to her inquiry– delineate this special relationship. In 
particular, she highlighted the fact that “…this relationship has various social, 
cultural, spiritual, economic and political dimensions and responsibilities; [that] the 
collective dimension of this relationship is significant; and […] the intergenerational 
aspect of such a relationship is also crucial to indigenous peoples’ identity, survival 
and cultural viability.”58 As we can see, the accent is put on the holistic and 
comprehensive impact that traditional lands have in the way that these populations 
culturally understand their own lives. According to this view, it seems that their 
philosophical understanding of life is constructed around this special relationship, 
which remains at the very centre of their cultural existence, and –as I will argue 
bellow in this chapter– assuming a kind of metaphysical if not a dogmatist 
character.59    
Furthermore, because the centrality of the lands in indigenous life, during the 
past decades till today, indigenous people started to be involved in numerous 
conflicts involving indigenous communities claiming for the rights that they believe 
                                                          
56 See, Article 25 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted at 
the 107th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, on 13th September 2007. 
57 See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, Study of the Problem of discrimination Against Indigenous 
Populations, Volume V, Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, cit., p. 16, para. 197. As 
Phillip Wearne said, “[t]he land is identity – past, present and future. The earth is literally and 
figuratively the home of the ancestors, the people who gave the current generations life and who 
demand veneration in traditional rituals and custom.” See, P. WEARNE, Return of the Indian, 1996, 
p. 23-24, cited by L. RAY, Language of the land. The Mapuche in Argentina and Chile, Copenhagen, 
2007, p. 11. The importance of land for indigenous people can also be seen in their groups’ 
denominations; for example we find among the indigenous people living in the southern region of 
South America, within the Argentinean and Chilean Patagonian regions, that they have designated 
themselves by the comprehensive name of “Alapu-ché”, which literally means “Children of the 
Land”. See, E. R. SMITH, The Araucanians; or, Notes of a tour among the Indians Tribes of 
Southern Chili, New York, 1855, p. 129. 
58 See, E.-I. A. DAES, Indigenous peoples and their relationship to land. Final working paper 
prepared by the Special Rapporteur Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, cit., p. 9, para. 20. 
59 Ibid., p. 7, para. 14. 
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they have over what they still consider their traditional lands and territories.60 
Consequently, judicial and quasi-judicial international bodies, under the legal label 
of human rights violations, have dealt with cases connected with these conflicts. In 
this sense, I would just like to quote one of the various cases in which the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (I-ACtHR) has dealt with the question of 
indigenous people’s land claims. This, of course, is without resting the importance of 
the jurisprudence of those quasi-judicial instances, and in particular, the UN Human 
Rights Committee (HRComm.), which has indeed recognised the indigenous 
people’s interaction with their lands as part of their culture and therefore as included 
within the scope of Article 27 ICCPR.61 However, the focus on the Inter-American 
Court is not only because of the fact that in the following chapters I will precisely 
deal with the jurisprudence of this Court, but also –and perhaps even most 
importantly within the framework of this work– due the fact that it has paid 
unusually deep attention to the above said relationship.  
In effect, the I-ACtHR, in its first case dealing with indigenous people’s land 
claims, made consistent efforts on the conceptualisation and identification of the 
elements enshrined by the notion of “property” as interpreted by indigenous 
communities. In this sense, the Court stated that “[i]ndigenous groups, by the fact of 
their very existence, have the right to live freely in their own territory [as any other 
human being, I would rather say]; the close ties of indigenous people with the land 
must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their 
spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival.” Additionally, and in order 
to clarify what the Court intended with regard to “fundamental basis of their 
cultures”, it has stressed that “[f]or indigenous communities, relations to the land 
are not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual 
                                                          
60 See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Indigenous Peoples in Comparative Perspective - Problems and 
Policies, in UNDP Occasional Paper, 2004/14, 2004, p. 3 et seq. 
61 See, among other resolutions from the UN Human rights Committee (HRComm.), Communications 
No. 24/1977, Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, 30 July 1981(UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977), para. 15-
16; No. 197/1985, Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, 10 August 1988 (UN Doc. CCPR/C/33/D197/1985), para. 
9(2); No. 549/1993, Francis Hopu and Tepoaitu Bessert v. France, 29 December 1997 
(CCPR/C/60/D/549), para. 10(3); No. 511/1992, Ilmari Länsman et al. v. Finland, 26 October 1994 
(CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992), para. 9(2); No. 1023/2001, Jouni Länsman et al. v. Finland, 15 April 2005 
(CCPR/C/83/D/1023/2001), para. 10(1-2). 
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element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and 
transmit it to future generations.”62   
For this Court, beyond the material element of economic use and production, 
the indigenous relationship with their lands seems to be characterised by the presence 
of a “spiritual element” connected with their cultural traditions and world’s views, 
which would make this ethno-cultural aggregation more… culturally “unique” than 
all the others. This “spiritual element”, according to the opinion of three out of the 
seven members of the Court’s bench, have to be understood in a sense that “without 
the effective use and enjoyment of [their lands], [indigenous people] would be 
deprived of practicing, conserving and revitalizing their cultural habits, which give a 
meaning to their own existence, both individual and communitarian.”63 As we can 
see, under this interpretative light, we have arrived at a sort of “essentialist point”, in 
a sense that if we go beyond this cultural element then we would not be conceptually 
able to properly refer to the members of a given societal aggregation that has lost its 
“spiritual” connection with their traditional lands, as indigenous people.64  
In short, it seems that for this Court, without the possibility of having a direct 
relationship with the lands in which their forebears used to live, in accordance with 
their special traditions and cultural understandings, these people would lose their 
own “indigenousness”. That is, the essential cultural element that makes them 
                                                          
62 See, I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, I-ACtHR, 
Series C No. 79. Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs of August 31, 2001, para. 149. 
63 Ibid. See, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges A.A. Cançado Trindade, M. Pacheco Gómez and A. 
Abreu Burelli, para. 8. These Judges have also introduced an additional cultural component to the 
above mentioned “spiritual element”, which is the so-called “intertemporal dimension.” This 
dimension is connected with the self-cultural understanding that indigenous people have that “…the 
land they occupy belongs to them, they in turn belong to their land”; in a sense that they have to 
“…not only […] preserve the legacy of past generations [which is supposed to be culturally connected 
with the same lands], but also to undertake the responsibilities that they have assumed in respect of 
future generations [which will necessarily be connected with those very same lands too].”   For this 
reason, these people have –according to the said Judges– “…the right to preserve their past and 
current cultural manifestations, and the power to develop them in the future.” (Ibid., para. 8-9). As we 
can see, it seems that it would be possible to find also in this interpretation a very powerful essentialist 
element, which is connected with the idea of intemporalité or timelessness unchangeability of 
indigenous people’s culture. For its importance in the framework of this work, I will come back later 
to this in the following chapters.      
64 The spiritual aspect of the relationship that indigenous people have with their lands, has been also 
acknowledged by the UN Durban Declaration, which stated that “We also recognize the special 
relationship that indigenous peoples have with the land as the basis for their spiritual, physical and 
cultural existence and encourage States, wherever possible, to ensure that indigenous peoples are 
able to retain ownership of their lands and of those natural resources to which they are entitled under 
domestic law.” See, Report of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, cit., p. 16, para. 43. 
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distinctive from the rest of the society.65 If this is true, then one cannot possibly be 
considered as indigenous if living outside of those areas regarded as “traditional 
lands”, which I believe is just another essentialization.66 Because the relevance of the 
above jurisprudence in this work, I will come back to it later in this and in the 
following chapters.  
 Therefore, as a consequential preliminary conclusion of the above 
considerations, it would be that the relationship that indigenous people have with 
their “traditional lands” plays a central or very important role in their culture, and for 
this reason is –or has been considered as– reflected in their ‘cultural 
distinctiveness’.67 But, on the other hand, it could also lead toward a sort of cultural 
“essentialist” understanding of these populations, which would potentially force 
them into historically frozen cultural conceptions. 
Coming back to our conceptual effort, and bearing in mind the holistic impact 
that lands have (or could have) on indigenous cultural practices, we can even say that 
the integral conceptual apprehension of the “traditional land” element is (or could be) 
also considered as inter-connected with one of the already mentioned objective 
requirements of the definition, namely the “priority in time” factor. In fact, as we 
have already seen, the “primogeniture” or the characteristic of “being first in time” 
                                                          
65 See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Indigenous Peoples in Comparative Perspective - Problems and 
Policies, cit., p. 3 et seq. 
66 Talking about “urban mapuches”, that is, individuals that identify themselves as Mapuche (one of 
the indigenous cultural aggregation present in the southern cone of South America, in Argentina and 
Chile), it has been said that “…leading academics have affirmed that a Mapuche culture as such does 
not exist today [, …] this is not the case, thanks principally to the role of the machi, who has taken on 
the burden of keeping the “ancient” knowledge alive in the city.” See, L. RAY, op. cit., p. 20 et seq. 
From this anthropologic perspective, the indigenous culture does not necessarily depend on the daily 
contact (or just contact) with those lands in which their forebears were established; culture is more 
flexible than that, it is rather reflected –in this case– on the oral transmission of their traditions and 
history as a distinguishable societal entity. Again, it seems to me that the problem of the different 
understandings lies in the conceptual confusion of indigenous people as a “legal category” and the 
cultural identification of certain societal aggregation of individuals as “indigenous”. The former refers 
to a group or societal entity that should fulfil certain requirements in order to be protected with certain 
specific (and exclusive) set of rights. The latter, on the contrary, refers to a socio-cultural notion of 
how individuals (or societal aggregation of them) are culturally self-perceived (self-identification), or 
externally perceived by others (external attribution of group membership), by the externalisation of 
certain cultural practices (e.g. language, religion, philosophy, etc.), regardless whether they would be 
entitled or not to an exclusive and differentiated “legal” status. See also, R. STAVENHAGEN, 
Indigenous Peoples in Comparative Perspective - Problems and Policies, cit., p. 25-26. 
67 In the views of UN Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, “…the cultural distinctiveness of 
indigenous peoples, which is central to the concept of “indigenous” in contemporary international 
law, is inseparable from “territory”. See, E.-I. A. DAES, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of 
Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous People. Working paper by the Chairperson-
Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the concept of “Indigenous people”, cit., p. 16, para. 43. 
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refers to a specific period in history (e.g. at the time of conquest or colonisation), but 
not only. It is also related to a specific territory that has been colonised, occupied or 
otherwise besieged by an external societal aggregation; “external” at that precise 
moment in history, and with regard to those that “originally” inhabited or occupied 
that given territory. Therefore, the two elements are –from a conceptual point of 
view– intrinsically connected, because it would be impossible to identify which 
societal aggregation was “first in time”, without first identifying the lands and 
territories over which that temporal analysis have to be conducted, and vice versa.68   
Moreover, traditional lands could be considered “traditional”  precisely 
because their cultural-economical interconnection with the traditional activities 
developed by these groups (e.g. hunting, fishing, forest dweller, etc.),  which –in 
most cases– highly depend on the exploitation and use of the natural resources 
specific to the area in question.69 Additionally, and perhaps even most importantly, 
when we refer to “traditional” lands, we are making reference to a specific 
geographical area. That is, to those lands historically occupied by a certain societal 
aggregation (indigenous group) at the time in which a specific historical situation 
took place, namely, at the time of their invasion, colonisation or dispossession by an 
external ethno-cultural or societal entity.  
Furthermore, the importance of the specific relationship with traditional 
lands, as a central cultural aspect of the indigenous people’s notion, it could be 
considered also evidenced in the so-called societal power dynamics of domination 
and exclusion which –in most cases– are connected with them. In this sense, as it has 
been already mentioned above, the same proposed definition denotes these dynamics, 
which refer to indigenous people as those having “historical continuity with pre-
invasion and pre-colonial societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of 
them.” Because those territories are nothing but the said traditional lands, then the 
act of invasion or colonisation has necessarily taken form precisely against those 
lands. It is in this sense that some authors refer to this historical-factual situation as 
                                                          
68 The relevance of “being the first people” and the strong ties to the land have also been identified, by 
indigenous people themselves, as constituted important elements of a possible definition, together 
with the principle of self-identification, which will be discussed latter, in connection with the 
subjective elements of the notion. See, E.-I. A. DAES, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of 
Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous People. Working paper by the Chairperson-
Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the concept of “Indigenous people”, cit., p. 14-15, para. 41. 
69 See, M. SCHEININ, op. cit., p. 3-4. 
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an autonomous or independent criterion, the so-called “dispossession of lands” 
element.70  
We have to keep in mind that this new potential objective criterion has to be 
epistemologically considered as an integrative part of the notion of “traditional 
lands” and the special relationship that indigenous people culturally have with them; 
however, because of its diverse conceptual ramification I would rather prefer to 
critically analyse it in the following self-standing section.  
 
 
2.2.5. Dispossession of lands and its axiological interpretation 
 
Under this new conceptual angle, indigenous people would be those that have 
suffered dispossession of their land, territories and resources, by means of 
colonisation or other comparable societal events in the past. These grievances are 
still today at the very centre of indigenous people’s overall situation of 
disenfranchisement, and socio-political, economic and cultural exclusion from the 
dominant societal structures and institutions in a given current society. To put it in 
another way, according to this interpretative line, indigenous people’s cultural 
“differentness” would be also grounded in the fact that they have suffered from 
“historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of 
their lands…”71  
Recognising the appealing force of this new interpretative angle, it is 
nevertheless not deprived of certain conceptual problems. Let me explain this more 
in detail. The element of historical dispossession of lands by colonialism, invasion or 
other historical events involves –at least– two different aspects, which are (a) the 
historical act of dispossession and (b) its perception of historical injustice.72 The first 
                                                          
70 See, M. SCHEININ, op. cit., p. 3-4. 
71 This line of interpretation has been adopted by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, which states –in its preamble– that the General Assembly is “concerned that indigenous 
peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and 
dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus prevailing them from exercising, in 
particular, their right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests.”  
72 See, among other authors, in connection with a sociological account of the “processes of 
dispossession”, R. J. EPSTEIN, The Role of Extinguishment in the Cosmology of Dispossession, in G. 
ALFREDSSON, M. STAVROPOULOU (eds.), Justice Pending: Indigenous Peoples and Other Good 
Causes. Essay in Honour of Erica-Irene A. Daes, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, p. 45 et seq. 
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aspect, that is, the historical act of dispossession of their ancestral lands, by means of 
colonisation, invasion or other historical events that have involved the unwilled (or 
even unwarranted) relinquishment of their traditional lands in favour of the cultural 
newcomers73, has already been analysed above. Thus, we will concentrate our 
considerations on the second involved aspect, namely the perception of historical 
injustice. 
Just in order to have a firm and well-founded base as a starting point in this 
complex matter74, I will draw our attention to the wording of the Declaration of the 
World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance (hereinafter “Durban Declaration”), held in Durban in 2001. This 
Declaration clearly states that “…colonialism has led to racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, and that Africans and people of 
                                                          
73 Just as an historical viewpoint, we can reproduce here just one of the observations made by one 
worldwide recognised eye-witness of the South American societal dynamics, in the first half of the 
nineteenth century.  Charles Darwin, in his account of his voyage in the southern cone of South 
America, he has remarked the “immense territory over which the Indians roam; [but he also added 
that] yet, great as it is, I think there will not, in another half century, be a wild Indian north of the Rio 
Negro [he refers to a river in a the southern Argentinean’s Province of Rio Negro]. The warfare is too 
bloody to last; the Christians killing every Indian, and the Indians doing the same by the Christians.” 
See, Ch. DARWIN, Journal of Researchers into the Natural History and Geology of the countries 
visited during the voyage of H. M. S. Beagle Round the World, New York, 1846, p. 133. Darwin wrote 
this notes in 1833, almost 50 years after, in 1884, one of the latest Mapuche cacique, Namunkurá, 
surrendered to the Argentinean army, putting almost an end to more than half a century war, which 
has been called “la conquista del desierto” (the conquest of the desert). See also, L. RAY, op. cit., p. 
64 et seq. These past wars, were indeed wars in the classical sense of the notion; the motivation of the 
belligerent counterparts were most likely different, for indigenous populations, it was perhaps the 
need to defend what they considered their sovereignty, as internationally independent and sovereign 
societal entity. For the non-indigenous “invaders”, it was perhaps a war motivated to secure their 
territorial integrity and effective occupation of what they consider their rightful territory, and even 
perhaps on reasons imposed on them by “civilization and modernity” (at least under their cultural 
world-views), but not only. In fact, these wars were also “unequal”, from a pure and classical military 
point of view. The belligerent counterparts did not have equal military power; the technological gap 
was enormous. In the words of Langenhove, « [u]ne grande supériorité d’armement fournit au peuple 
qui en dispose un pouvoir à peu près sans limite sur celui qui en est privé : il peut le refouler, lui 
enlever ses terres, le soumettre à sa domination, l’asservir, voire même l’exterminer. » See, F.V. 
LANGENHOVE, op. cit., p. 340 et seq. More in general, and especially in connection with the legal 
justifications behind the Spanish conquest of America, see L. HANKE, The Spanish Struggle for 
Justice in the Conquest of America, Philadelphia, 1949, p. 23 et seq. For a sociological perspective, 
see R. STAVENHAGEN, Cultural Diversity in the Development of the Americas. Indigenous Peoples 
and States in Spanish America, Organization of American States (OAS), 2002, p. 3 et seq. Finally, for 
a graphical description of the cultural opposite views or even clashes between the encountered 
cultures, see D. F. SARMIENTO, Life in the Argentine Republic in the Days of the Tyrants; or, 
Civilization and Barbarism, New York, 1868.    
74 In order to clarify to the reader the scope of addressing this indeed complex topic, I would like to 
just say that my intension here is neither to build a theoretical framework of a general theory of justice 
nor to analyses the involved phenomenon or societal events from a “legal history” viewpoint. The 
scope of the consideration that will follow is purely connected with the conceptual impact that this 
new element has or could have on the notion of indigenous people.  
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African descent, and people of Asian descent and indigenous peoples were victims of 
colonialism and continue to be victims of its consequences”75, but not only. In this 
document the international community has also acknowledged “…the suffering 
caused by colonialism and [therefore affirmed] that, wherever and whenever it 
occurred, it must be condemned and its reoccurrence prevented.  We further regret 
that the effects and persistence of these structures and practices have been among 
the factors contributing to lasting social and economic inequalities in many parts of 
the world today.”76 Additionally, the Durban Declaration not only acknowledged the 
effects of colonialist practices, but also equated these practises to other events that 
have generated “…massive human suffering and the tragic plight of millions of men, 
women and children”, such as ‘slavery’, ‘the slave trade’, ‘the transatlantic slave 
trade’, ‘apartheid’, and ‘genocide’.77 As a consequence of this acknowledgment, the 
Declaration ended by not only inviting “the international community and its 
members to honour the memory of the victims of these tragedies”, but also, due to the 
moral obligations connected with them, called upon the concerned States “to take 
appropriate and effective measures to halt and reverse the lasting consequences of 
those practices.”78      
Before we continue with our considerations, it would be important to clarify 
that the equation between colonialism and the others practices mentioned above, has 
generated quite a controversial debate at the bosom of the Conference, especially in 
connection with those countries that could be considered as “concerned” in past 
colonialist practices. In fact, Australia79, New Zealand80, and to a certain extent 
                                                          
75 See, Report of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Intolerance, cit., p. 12, para. 14. 
76 Ibid. 
77 In fact, the Durban Declaration, specifically “…acknowledge[s] and profoundly regret[s] the untold 
suffering and evils inflicted on millions of men, women and children as a result of slavery, the slave 
trade, the transatlantic slave trade, apartheid, genocide and past tragedies.” Ibid., p. 23, para. 99-
100.  
78 Ibid., p. 23-24, para. 101-102. 
79 The representative of Australia made at the Conference the following statement: “Australia is a 
country whose good governance and strong democratic traditions and institutions derive directly from 
its colonial history.  In relation to the text on the past, we therefore express serious concerns at the 
use of the same language in paragraphs 11 and 116 to condemn colonialism as is used in paragraph 
12 to condemn apartheid and genocide.” See, Report of the World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, cit., p. 118. 
80 The representative of New Zealand expressed at the Conference clearly that “…the concern of the 
New Zealand delegation at the unqualified references, at some points in the texts to colonialism, 
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Belgium, on behalf of the European Union81, expressly manifest their discomfort to 
this plain conceptual equation, basically because they considered that these practices 
have to be kept differentiated from an axiological (moral) point of view. In this 
sense, the statement of the representative of New Zealand is quite clear in making the 
point; he stated that “…New Zealand recognizes that injustices occurred under 
colonialism in many countries that would be abhorrent by today’s standards. Where 
those injustices were founded on racist attitudes and practices, colonialism can be 
viewed as having been a source of racism.”82  
  As we can see, the perception of historical injustice cannot be considered as 
a specific qualifying element that exclusively refers to indigenous people.83 The 
same can be said in connection with colonialism, which –as a system of governance– 
was applied in larger geographical scales, far beyond the potential ethno-cultural 
distinctions between those populations that could be considered indigenous and those 
that could not.84 In fact, the same declaration recognises that “…colonialism has led 
to racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, and that 
Africans and people of African descent, and people of Asian descent and indigenous 
peoples were victims of colonialism and continue to be victims of its 
consequences.”85 Hence, the factual perception of having been subjected to historical 
injustices has to be considered as a common societal feature that indigenous people 
                                                                                                                                                                    
placing it on a par with scourges such as slavery, apartheid and genocide.” See, Report of the World 
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, cit., p. 130. 
81 The representative of Belgium, on behalf of the European Union, manifested that “The European 
Union acknowledges and deplores the immense suffering caused by past and contemporary forms of 
slavery and the slave trade wherever they have occurred and the most reprehensible aspects of 
colonialism.” See, Report of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, cit., p. 144. 
82 See, footnote no. 80. As we can see, the expressed concern could be summarised in the following 
two elements. First, “today’s standards”, moral standards, cannot be considered as the very same 
standards that were applied during the past colonist era; and second, according to those historically 
applied standards, the effects of colonialism could be considered as regrettable “only” when they were 
generated by “racist attitudes and practices”. Hence, to this representative, colonialism was not an 
ontologically racist phenomenon. The same conclusion can be deducted from the statement of the 
representative of European Union, who has only acknowledged and deplored “…the most 
reprehensible aspects of colonialism.” See, footnote no. 81. 
83 With regard to this kind of perception, it has been said that, [t]he dispossession of indigenous 
peoples of their lands is the morally repugnant historical fact that underlies the creation of several 
modern democratic States, the United States of America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, to 
mention only a few.” See, R. J. EPSTEIN, op. cit., p. 45. 
84 In connection with the manner in which colonialism, as a system of governance, was organised and 
implemented, see, G. SCELLE, op. cit., p. 142 et seq. 
85 See, Report of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Intolerance, cit., p. 12, para. 14. 
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share with other ethno-cultural aggregations; consequentially, it cannot be considered 
as a distinctive character of their cultural “uniqueness” or, as it has been called, their 
“indigenousness”. As it has already been said, “there are few ethnic groups in the 
world with no experiences of historic or present-day injustices…”86    
Furthermore, and perhaps even most importantly, the conceptual equation of 
indigenous people with past experiences of domination, exploitation, structural 
exclusion, discrimination and disenfranchisement, can lead –and it seems to me that 
it has led– toward a kind of “victimisation” trend87, which could be considered also 
as another aspect of the “essentialization” of their group identity. The logic behind 
this interpretative trend could be summarised as follows: (a) indigenous people’s 
identity is essentially based and constructed in connection with their special 
relationship with their lands; (b) they have suffered and are still suffering the loss of 
their traditional lands and resources on the hands of non-indigenous people 
(colonists, commercial companies, State enterprises, etc.); and (c) as a consequence 
of this land deprivation, their cultural identity and their survival as a distinguishable 
cultural societal aggregation has been and still is jeopardized88, but not only. An 
extra element could be incorporated into this logical chain.  
In fact, as a result of the above mentioned logical steps, it would be possible 
to add a subsequent element. That is to recognise and grant indigenous people with a 
special legal regime, as a matter of compensation of the land loses and as special 
measures tending to guarantee and protect indigenous people’s cultural identity. This 
means, a regime containing exclusive rights regarding the use and enjoyment of 
those remaining traditional lands.89 To put it bluntly, if identity essentially depends 
                                                          
86 See, T. MAKKONEN, op. cit., p. 131. 
87 Ibid., p. 131et seq. According to Epstein, it is clear that “…the indigenous peoples consider 
themselves to be victims of dispossession of their lands, their very status, and the right to enjoy the 
fruits of their status and rights.” See, R. J. EPSTEIN, op. cit., p. 47. 
88 This type of reasoning can be found in many policy documents and recommendations of a variety of 
international bodies. Just as an example, we can mention –for instance– the General Recommendation 
No. 23: Indigenous Peoples of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), of 
18 August 1997, in particular its third paragraph.   
89 It has stressed that, “[s]ince indigenous lands were commandeered through territorial expansion, 
an ideal starting point for mechanisms of forgiveness and reconciliation should be the return of these 
lands. […]Modern norms on this issue […], express the view that peoples should not be dispossessed 
of their lands […] The question that remains is the extent to which these contemporary developments 
reinforce the notion that ancient acquisition of territory by expansionist colonisers is beyond the 
realm of critique since it is covered by the protection of the intertemporal rule.” See, J. 
CASTELLINO, Conceptual Difficulties and the Right to Indigenous Self-Determination, in N. 
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on the special relationship with traditional lands, and because those lands have been 
taken or otherwise affected, then the better (or the only) way to protect the former 
(the said cultural identity) would necessarily be through the protection of the latter 
(the traditional lands).90 This argumentation could be considered as based on a theory 
of historical distributive justice, in a sense of providing redress to those that have 
suffered from past wrongdoings, but, as a substantive ground for the conceptual 
construction of a distinguishable societal entity, it seems not to be enough.91  
Furthermore, it has to be said that the above mentioned logical chain could 
not be considered as exclusively applicable to the case of indigenous people. To be 
considered as a victim of past wrongdoings, such as the injustices mentioned above, 
could open the door for the enjoyment of specific set of rights for other ethno-
cultural entities seeking cultural recognition and societal redress. In fact, taken into 
consideration the legal possibilities connected with the exercise of the right of self-
determination that indigenous populations claim to have, it could happen that more 
and more ethno-cultural societal entities would plead to be considered as 
“indigenous” too, in order to receive the same equal “differential” legal treatment 
that the latter claims to be entitle to have.92 In other words, “[i]ndigenousness is seen 
in terms of victimization, as well as subsequent claims to justice, to sovereignty and 
land rights that once were taken from them.”93  
Hence, for an ethno-cultural societal entity, which has suffered the past 
institutional or structural injustices and which find itself in a current non-dominant 
political position vis-à-vis the ethno-cultural majority of a given national State, it 
would be a “winning choice” to frame its ethno-cultural and socio-political claims 
under the label of “indigenousness”, rather than just a minoritarian one. The reason 
seems to be quite clear: the better and far reaching international legal framework 
                                                                                                                                                                    
GHANEA, A. XANTHAKI (eds.), Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination, Leiden/Boston, 2005, 
p. 71-72.  
90 Ibid., para. 5. 
91 In fact, the establishment of special measures, addressing to compensate the damages generated by 
historical wrongdoings, that not necessarily means the specific recognition of a differential societal 
identity character, as a separate societal entity, and even less, the possibility to have as such, a 
differential, distinguishable and exclusive legal status.  
92 In this sense, it has been stressed that “[t]he emergence of ‘wannabe’ indigenous peoples and 
individuals seems to be an universally inevitable by –product of the growing recognition of the special 
protection measures attached to indigenousness.” See, T. MAKKONEN, op. cit., p. 127. 
93 Ibid., p. 133. 
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applicable to the former, especially in connection with the hypothetical and potential 
exercise of the claimed right of self-determination and autonomy.94       
  Finally, for concluding with the exploration of the conceptual 
interconnections that the objective element of “cultural distinctiveness” has (or 
could have) with other elements that potentially compose (or could compose) the 
notion of “indigenous people”, as a distinctive societal aggregation, we still have to 
address one additional interlink. In fact, so far we have explored these 
interconnections between the elements that compose the objective criterion of the 
notion, but not with regard to the subjective one. Therefore, in order to avoid 
undesirable discursive interruptions, I would rather prefer to anticipate the 
consideration of this potentially remaining conceptual interlink, before entering into 
the full evaluation of the subjective criterion that conceptually integrate (or could 
integrate) the notion of indigenous people. 
As we will see in the following paragraphs, the main subjective element that 
integrates the notion of “indigenous people” as a distinctive identifiable societal 
community is the so-called “self-identification” requirement. Without entering into 
the full analysis of this element, we can say that it refers to the recognition or 
appreciation that each “self” has of being different, of being “indigenous”, as 
individual and as a member of a given community. Self-identification of being 
different, as a part of a distinguishable societal aggregation, and of wanting to be 
different, that is to not be considered as part of a different (or even opposed) societal 
entity, which in most cases would be the mainstream society.95 Therefore, self-
identification has to be considered as intimately connected with “cultural 
distinctiveness”, in a sense that it is the latter that gives cultural content to the 
former, and vice versa.96 
Therefore, if none of the enumerated objective elements would be effectively 
able to show the uniqueness, or cultural distinctiveness of indigenous people’s 
                                                          
94 More detailed considerations will be made in connection with this relevant argument, later in this 
chapter, when we will address the potential conceptual differences between the notions of “indigenous 
people” and “minority”. Additional comments will be made also within the following chapters, when 
dealing with the cases of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in connection with tribal people.  
95 See, M. SCHEININ, op. cit., p. 3-4.  
96 We have already discussed in the precedent chapter the inter-relation between culture and cultural 
identity, and the way in which culture shapes humans’ identity and the manner that the latter 
constructs culture. See, Chapter III, Section 4. 
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societal aggregations, this subjective aspect will certainly do it. In fact, from a 
cultural point of view, it would be more than enough to claim to be different, as a 
collective aggregation, in order to build a differential group identity. In other words, 
if all members of a given group, seeing themselves as culturally different from other 
members of the society, and if they would also be dialectically able to convince all of 
those non-members to see them as culturally different, then it would be quite clear 
that they would “become” culturally different. This is, regardless of the potential 
ontological or relevant cultural differences that could exist (or not) between two 
given  societal entities. To put it bluntly, if I perceive myself as different, and others 
see me as different, then I “am” different. Culture and cultural identities are 
dialogically constructed97; they are subjected to a circular and permanent process of 
cultural exchange, in which the self is shaped in the mirrored view of external eyes, 
as we already saw in the precedent chapter.98 Consequentially, “cultural differences” 
cannot escape from this dialogical construction too. 
In conclusion, beside the existence of potential objective elements that would 
be able to empirically support and visualise the claim to “cultural distinctiveness”, 
indigenous people’s culture would have to be considered differentiated and culturally 
unique, vis-à-vis all other members of a given society (including other potential 
minority groups). This is not only because these people perceive themselves as 
culturally different, but also –and perhaps even most relevantly– due to the fact that 
they want to be perceived (and treated) by others members of the society as such.99   
                                                          
97 See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, cit., para. 4. 
98 See, Chapter III, Section 4. 
99 In fact, for the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission certain definitions, and in 
particular the meaning of “indigenous peoples”, “are matters which should be determined by the 
world’s indigenous peoples themselves.”  In fact, according to them, the elements that have to be 
considered in defining “indigenous people” have to be “[t]he right of indigenous peoples to self-
identify as such; [t]he meaning implicit in the terms “indigenous” and “aboriginal peoples”; [t]he 
consequent rights of primogeniture as “first peoples”; [t]he rights which this implies in relation to 
land, self-determination and culture; [t]he right to accept others into groups classed as indigenous or 
aboriginal; and [t]the right to determine finally the indicia and definition for “indigenous peoples.” 
As we can see, all the alleged rights that ideally in their view have to be included into the notion of 
“indigenousness”, basically refer to the right to consider themselves as “culturally different”, and to 
claim external respect for the differential legal status that should be –in their opinion– consequentially 
attached to that specific difference. See, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Standard-
Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards concerning the rights of Indigenous People: The concept of 
"Indigenous Peoples", UN Doc.  E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2/Add.1, United Nations, 1996, para. 1 
and 13. See also, E.-I. A. DAES, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the 
Rights of Indigenous People, cit., p. 14-15, para. 41. 
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Therefore, after having analysed the different objective elements that could be 
enshrined in the notion of indigenous people, we will proceed with the full 
consideration of the subjective elements, and in particular of the self-identity 
requirement, slightly introduced in the precedent paragraphs.    
  
 
2.3. Subjective elements  
 
 As it has been maintained above, cultural distinctiveness has not only 
objective implications within this conceptual effort, as an external visible cultural 
characteristic, but is also intimately connected with the subjective element that 
composes this notion of indigenous people. This is –of course– the will of indigenous 
people to be –and to be seen and considered– culturally different from the rest of the 
society.  
If we come back to the Martínez Cobo’s proposed definition, we will find 
that, in fact, it refers to those indigenous people that “consider themselves distinct 
from other sectors of the societies.” This introduces us to the subjective requirement 
of ‘self-identification’ as indigenous people, as the historical successor of their 
“indigenous” ancestors, as “peoples” with a distinctive culture that differentiate them 
from the rest of the society. As in the case of any other societal group, from an 
individual perspective, the self-identification criterion can be seen as composed of 
two main factors. First, the self-identification of the individual as a member of a 
given indigenous group, which can be called “group consciousness”; and second, the 
recognition made by the group that that given individual (which recognise himself or 
herself as a member of that specific ethno-cultural aggregation) is indeed its member, 
that is the “group’s acceptance”.100  
Moreover, Martínez Cobo has stressed –in his study– the importance of the 
self-identification element in the construction of the notion of indigenous people. In 
this sense, he stated that “…indigenous populations must be recognized according to 
their own perception and conception of themselves in relation to other groups”, and 
for that reason, he has also concluded that even “…the question of the definition is 
                                                          
100 See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, Study of the Problem of discrimination Against Indigenous 
Populations, Volume V, Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, cit., p. 29, para. 375. 
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one that must be left to the indigenous communities themselves.”101 In fact, the self-
consciousness of being different is not only applicable vis-à-vis the mainstream 
society but also with regard to “other” groups that seek the recognition of differential 
societal status in the society, as it would be –for instance– the case of minority 
groups.102  
In fact, the self-identification element not only refers to the internal individual 
and collective process of cultural identity construction, as we already saw in the 
previous chapter103, but also involves an external element, which is intrinsically 
dialogical and dynamic, and refers to the recognition of that societal entity as 
differential. Cultural identities are interactively and dialogically constructed, they are 
“…renewed and enriched through contact with the traditions and values of 
others.”104 Thus, cultural identities are mutable, changeable –the same as culture105– 
and, for this reason, collective cultural identity depends, in order to be considered 
distinguishable, on the recognition of “distinguishability” by external members of the 
collective entity that seek the said cultural differentiation, and –of course– 
indigenous people’s cultural identity does not escape from this general societal rule.  
As we have said in the previous chapter, the mere idea of a social group –as a 
differentiated societal entity– ontologically requires the existence of ‘other’ 
groups.106 In this sense, those sociological remarks, that were opportunely made in 
connection with “groups” in general, are indeed applicable to the case of indigenous 
societal aggregations. In fact, without having a dialogical exchange or contact with 
“other” external societal groups, with those that are not considered by indigenous 
people as ‘indigenous’, it would not be logically possible to place the discussion in a 
“group” dimension, just because we would not have –in this theoretical situation– 
any other “group” to be used as a comparator. In this hypothetical case, we would be 
only able to talk in terms of… ‘people’, but not in terms of ‘indigenous’ people. In 
other words, and in order to be graphically clear, we can again say that “without 
                                                          
101 Ibid., p. 28, para. 368. 
102 Ibid., p. 29, para. 376. 
103 See, Chapter III, Section 4. 
104 See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, cit., para. 4. 
105 See, Article 1 of the UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, cit.   
106 See, Chapter II, Section 3(1); and more in general in connection with the empirical implications of 
this affirmation, see –among classic authors– G. BERKELEY, Of the Principles of Human 
Knowledge. , in G. N. WRIGHT (ed.), The Works of George Berkeley, D.D., Bishop of Cloyne, 
London, 1843, para. XXIII, p. 95. 
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having the image of ‘difference’ mirrored in the eyes of those that look upon us as 
‘others’, our ‘otherness’ could not possibly exist.”107  
Therefore, the notion of indigenous people, as a separate and distinguishable 
cultural entity, in order to produce factual cultural effects (including legal ones) in a 
given societal milieu, needs the existence of a clear internal self-consciousness, that 
is from the indigenous communities themselves, but not only. In addition, it needs a 
mirrored societal reaction, in a sense of acknowledgement and acceptance, by all the 
other groups or populations –including of course the mainstream society– that forms 
part of the same societal setting.108 In fact, in an open, pluralist, and democratic 
society, it would not be enough for a group (indigenous and non-indigenous alike) to 
just have an internal self-consciousness in order ‘to be’ a distinctive cultural entity, 
separate and distinguishable from the rest of the population and other existing 
cultural groups.  
The alleged cultural distinctiveness has to be culturally acknowledged by the 
other members of the society, in a dialogical and dynamic process of cultural 
exchange, in order to culturally exist. That is, in order ‘to be considered’ as 
culturally relevant by all members of the society and not just by those societal 
aggregations that put forward their cultural pretentions of –in this case– 
‘indigenousness’. When referring to “culturally relevant”, I intend to highlight the 
fact that the acknowledgement of the cultural ‘uniqueness’ of the indigenous group, 
by group’s outsiders, would give cultural visibility –and in this sense objective 
existence– to the hypothetical cultural boundaries. In addition, would eventually 
generate certain societal effects –in particular– in connection with eventual changes 
on the socio-political, economic and legal, common societal institutions and 
structures. To put it bluntly, it would not be enough to claim cultural distinctiveness 
                                                          
107 See, Chapter II, Section 3(1), p. 17 et seq. 
108 In this sense, it has been stressed that “…people define themselves by what makes them different 
from others in a particular context: “one perceives oneself in terms of characteristics that distinguish 
oneself from other humans, especially from people in one’s usual social milieu…” See, S. P. 
HUNTINGTON, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, 1997, p. 
67. For a different, but not opposed view, see I. M. YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 
Princeton, 1990, p. 46. 
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or –in this case– ‘indigenousness’, in order to be considered as “indigenous”; what 
would be required, is also to be acknowledged as such.109  
In fact, conscious of the need for this external recognition, indigenous 
organisations and indigenous lobby groups have put their efforts in building the 
understanding by non-indigenous societies of the spiritual, social, cultural, economic 
and political significance of their lands, territories and resources for their continued 
cultural survival and vitality.110 Of course, this preliminary conclusion has to be 
taken for what it is, namely, a pretended description of societal dynamics that, within 
a given society, lies at the bottom of the perception of ethno-cultural groups’ cultural 
differences. Hence, the level of the discourse is allocated to what “is” (the descriptive 
level) and not in what “ought to be” (the prescriptive level)111, according to the 
political and cultural aspirations of one or more potential differentiated societal 
entities, such as –for instance– could be the case of indigenous groups struggling for 
the societal recognition of their cultural uniqueness.112 
However, the discourse could also be allocated at a prescriptive level. In this 
sense, all individuals that perceive themselves as members of an indigenous societal 
aggregation, and hence self-identified with it, should have the possibility to fully 
exercise, individually or collectively in association with all others that also consider 
themselves as members of the same indigenous entity, all his or her internationally 
recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms. This, of course, without 
suffering any discrimination or unequal treatment based on his or her cultural self-
identification and constructed identity. No discriminatory or unequal treatment 
                                                          
109 In order to be clear, I will give you a plain but graphical example that will eventually clarify 
potential remaining doubts. If I claim to be “blue”, and I perceive myself as blue, but nobody seems to 
notice that I am blue, and, as a consequence of that lack of external acknowledgement, nobody treats 
me according to what it should be –according to my own understanding– the special treatment 
deserved as “blue”; then, it would perhaps be the case to start reviewing this self-perception and, in 
particular, the  “unique” –in a sense of “unshared”– conceptual self-understanding of my “blueness”. 
110 See, E.-I. A. DAES, Indigenous peoples and their relationship to land. Final working paper 
prepared by the Special Rapporteur Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, cit., p. 7, para. 12; and E.-I. A. DAES, 
Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous People, cit., 
p. 14-15, para. 41. 
111 See, H. KELSEN, op. cit., p. 84. 
112 It has been said, in connection with migrants’ societal aggregations, “[t]he main reason for the 
people who are considered “different” by the wider society, and because of their alleged difference 
they are defined as potential victims of ethnic or cultural discrimination, to be engaged in, for 
example, anti-discrimination programmes, is not to receive socio-economic support, in the first place. 
They are aspiring to recognition of their identity.” See, R. TOIVANEN, Contextualising Struggles 
over Culture and Equality: An Anthropological Perspective, in M. SCHEININ, R. TOIVANEN (eds.), 
Rethinking Non-Discrimination and Minority Rights, Turku/Åbo/Berlin, 2004, p. 200.    
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should be allowed based on ethno-cultural appurtenance, self-identification or 
individual and/or collective cultural perception (internal and/or external), as a 
member of an indigenous societal aggregation. In other words, all persons, without 
consideration of their ethno-cultural or otherwise culturally constructed distinctions, 
should have the possibility (and indeed have it, under the current internationally 
recognised human rights standards113) to enjoy his or her self-perceived or otherwise 
acknowledged cultural diversity and identity, either individually or in association 
with others.114 And, of course, indigenous people are not and should not be an 
exception to this general rule.115     
However, if we approach this prescriptive level from a collective or even 
group’s perspective, then it seems that the answer is not so clear. The ‘ought to be’ 
collective or group dimension refers to the indigenous group’s aspirations for 
political and institutional recognition (including –for instance– the incorporation into 
publicly enforceable legal systems of their own traditional legal institutions), and, it 
has to be said, it is –at least– less pacific than the former (the “is” dimension). This 
group prescriptive dimension leads us toward the broad question of the relevance of 
cultural differences and cultural self-identifications, within a given societal 
framework. In short, this issue could be summarised under the question of whether 
the cultural freedom to consider ourselves different (self-identification), and our 
individual right to be acknowledged and respected in our cultural choices (external 
recognition), have to necessarily be translated into a distinguishable legal framework. 
That is, a framework that would ideally grant us with a differential and hence 
exclusive set of rights (the “ought to be” dimension).  
                                                          
113 See, among other international instruments, Article 2 of the UDHR; Article 27 of the ICCPR; 
Article 15(1)(a) reading jointly with Article 2(2) of the ICESCR; etc.   
114 As is stated in Article 5 of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, “[c]ultural 
rights are an integral part of human rights, which are universal, indivisible and interdependent. […] 
All persons have therefore the right to express themselves and to create and disseminate their work in 
language of their choice, and particularly in their mother tongue; […]and all persons have the right 
to participate in the cultural life of their choice and conduct their own cultural practices, subject to 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”  
115 In this sense, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, expressly affirms that 
“…indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples, while recognizing the right of all peoples to be 
different, to consider themselves different and to be respected as such”; and, as a direct consequence 
of the ontological equality among people, its reaffirms that “indigenous people, in the exercise of their 
rights, should be free from discrimination of any kind.” (Preamble).  
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As we saw in the previous chapters116, the recognition of different legal status 
based on the ethno-cultural group’s appurtenance, with differential and exclusive set 
of rights, could lead (and I am positively persuade that it does) toward a divided 
society where the only real equal entities would no longer be the individuals but the 
groups. Individuals would have differential and hence unequal rights, based on their 
equal possibility to be considered as equal members of equal –but distinguishable– 
cultural societal entities. Therefore, if we take seriously this multiculturalist 
prospective of society, we will ideally find within the national territory of each State, 
different societal aggregations (including –of course– indigenous ones in those 
countries in which they exist), equally treated in their possibility to grant 
differentiated set of rights to their members. These members would perhaps be 
treated equally and would not be discriminated against, vis-à-vis their fellows group 
members; but they would indeed receive a completely different structural, 
institutional and legal treatment vis-à-vis the members of other societal aggregations. 
In this sense, cultural differences between groups would be indeed relevant, in a 
sense that they would constitute not just an imaginary cultural boundary between 
ontologically equal humans, but also structural, institutional and legal borders that 
would distinguish and separate individuals according to their ethno-cultural group 
appurtenances. Consequently, individuals would be divided in institutional cultural 
slots and –therefore– they would start to be less equal, from an ontological point of 
view. 
Beside these ontological considerations, which are mostly connected with 
legal philosophy than socio-political understandings, would nevertheless be 
important to stress a final aspect with regard to the relevance of the cultural 
distinctiveness of indigenous people’s claims. In their case, as in the case of other 
minoritarian groups that do not perceive their own cultural views, societal practices 
and institutional organisation as included or otherwise taken into consideration by the 
common public societal structures and existing institutions of a given State, they 
could always take effective and direct part in the so-called “democratic game”. 
However, this possibility would necessarily require that the effective enjoyment of 
their fundamental individual rights would be fully guaranteed.  
                                                          
116 See, Chapter II, Section 4.3. 
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As it has been already maintained117, in an open and plural democratic 
setting, cultural ideas, world’s views and even differential understandings of how to 
institutionally organise and social structure the society at large (totally or partially), 
have to be dialogical discussed in an open and inclusive debate. In this sense, 
“peoples” that are all members of a given society, without making ethno-cultural 
distinctions between them (even if based in socio-anthropological primogeniture, 
such as in the alleged case of indigenous communities), would have to 
democratically decide which societal setting they would like to apply. Their decision 
would be logically shaped and influenced by the cultural views and understandings 
of potential majorities, which in most cases would be a non-indigenous majority.  
However, as in any system that would be properly recognised as democratic, 
the ideas, understandings and cultural interpretations of life and world’s views of the 
eventual minorities would still be fully protected and guaranteed, including –of 
course– those of indigenous aggregations. In fact, those minoritarian or indigenous 
views would be fully protected by individual human rights, which are and should be 
available in every democratic liberal society. Indeed, it is through the enhancement 
of human rights that the full development of the personality and identity of each 
member of the society (majorities and minorities alike) would be guaranteed; 
especially when their substantive views have not gained major cultural support 
within the common societal milieu.  
 
 
2.4. Conceptual conclusive remarks  
 
Therefore, after having conducted a conceptual exploration of the meaning 
and potential characteristics involved under the notion of “indigenous people”, 
which perhaps has not been fully exhausted but yet extended and accurately 
analysed, it would be possible to say –at least– that this notion is still logically and 
epistemologically problematic. 
From a cultural point of view, all cultures (including of course indigenous’ 
cultures) cannot be compared –as a matter of principle– in valuative or even moral 
                                                          
117 See, Chapter II, Section 3.4. 
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terms.118 However, because all cultures provide equal functional substantive content 
or mining of life and a sense of fullness to all those that recognise themselves in 
them119, then we have to do nothing but admit the cultural uniqueness of all cultural 
manifestations and expressions. Hence, from this point of view, indigenous cultures 
are not “more unique” than non-indigenous cultures. All of them are equally unique, 
because all of them provide an equally functional and essential content to human 
beings.120  
Moreover, even without taking into consideration this general observation, 
and entering into the cultural features of indigenous cultures, and taken for granted 
that they indeed show –as one of its most relevant characteristics of their 
distinguishable culture– a special relationship with their traditional lands, then we 
would arrive at a sort of dogmatic “essentialization” of their identity, but not only. 
In fact, this is an essentialist view of indigenous identity, in a sense that without 
having the possibility to enjoy their special relationship with their traditional lands, 
indigenous people would not be “indigenous” any longer, due the fracture of the 
ontological and dogmatic equation (indigenousness = special relationship with 
traditional lands).121 Consequently, those large majorities of self-identified 
indigenous people living in urban areas for generations would not be rightfully able 
to neither consider themselves as indigenous nor to claim their consequential external 
recognition.122  
                                                          
118 The incomparability of cultures, and therefore the impossibility to express a valuative judgement in 
their regard, actually has one sole exception, which allows us to compare all of them with an 
internationally accepted comparator, which is nothing but the internationally recognised human rights 
standards. See, Chapter II, Section 3.4.  
119 We have called this societal function as “the equal functional value of cultures”. See, Chapter II, 
Section 3.4.1.  
120 See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, cit., para. 1. 
121 I say dogmatic equation because is constructed upon indigenous cultural believes. One can 
legitimately believe, for instance, that “…al products of the human mind and heart as interrelated, 
and as flowing from the same source: the relationships between the people and their land, their 
kinship with the other living creatures that share the land, and with the spirit world”, as indigenous 
people have (See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Indigenous Peoples in Comparative Perspective - Problems 
and Policies, cit., p. 26). This beliefs is as legitimate and deserving respect as any other, such as for 
instance religious beliefs that the existence of metaphysic entities that rule the universe;  all these 
beliefs fulfil the essential function in human life, that is the need of meaningful life. But these beliefs 
cannot be neither impose to others nor incorporated into common societal structures, because they are 
dogmatically constructed and hence beyond any potential dialogical democratic negotiation. This way, 
in modern democratic societies, common public domain remains secular, and beliefs are left to the 
private but fully protected sphere of individuals.         
122 In this sense, a former UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, when analysing the 
relationship of indigenous people with their lands, has stressed that a question frequently asked of 
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In addition, this essentialist view of indigenous culture presupposes not only 
its unchangeable character, but also its uncontaminated existence across time and 
space, which is ontologically inadequate, in a sense that culture is in essence a 
“dialogical process”, which necessarily presupposes the existence of cultural 
exchange of values and traditions. Without and open exchange, cultures wither and 
die in isolation.123 Therefore, the notion of the intertemporal dimension that has been 
claimed as characterising the relationship of indigenous communities with their 
traditional lands124, has –at least– certain epistemological problems, and perhaps 
cannot escape from the so-called essentialist trap.  
Then, if the cultural distinctiveness loses its conceptual relevance, then what 
remains, in order to attempt a generic conceptualisation able to embrace the 
distinguishable elements of these populations are the objective factor of descendancy 
and the subjective element. In this sense, the conceptual notion of indigenous people 
would ideally be connected with those populations that identify themselves as 
descendants of the historical inhabitants of a given territory. These were the 
inhabitants that, as a consequence of an invasion, colonisation or otherwise unwilling 
domination by external (and even extra-continental) forces, and by their 
consequentially generated non-dominant positions within the society, have suffered 
and still suffer from a general disenfranchisement (including the loss or 
dispossession of their traditional lands and territories), discrimination and socio-
political exclusion from the mainstream societal structures and institutions.125 
                                                                                                                                                                    
indigenous people is “…whether cultural identities can survive in a deterritorialized environment, 
that is, in dispersed settlements and urban centers where indigenous migrants live interspersed with 
non-indigenous populations.” His answer is quite clear but not definitive. He said that the answer 
“…depends on particular circumstances and is contingent on the specific definition of indigenous 
identity in each case.” If the answer has to be identified case by case, which I think is very reasonable, 
and then it would not be logically possible to refer to indigenous people as one generic societal 
aggregation, but as a different entity with different cultural characteristics. See, R. STAVENHAGEN, 
Indigenous Peoples in Comparative Perspective - Problems and Policies, cit., p. 25-26. 
123 See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, cit., para. 4. 
124 See, I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, cit., Joint 
Separate Opinion of Judges A.A. Cançado Trindade, M. Pacheco Gómez and A. Abreu Burelli, para. 
8. 
125 According to Prof. Anaya, in general terms, indigenous people refers to those segments of 
humanity that “…have suffered histories of colonization, that retain continuity with their pre-colonial 
cultural identities, and that now find themselves engulfed by social and political constructions 
dominated by others and built upon colonial settlement.” See, S. J. ANAYA, The Contours of Self-
Determination and its Implementation: Implications of Developments Concerning Indigenous 
Peoples, in G. ALFREDSSON, M. STAVROPOULOU (eds.), Justice Pending: Indigenous Peoples 
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However, because victimisation cannot be used as an exclusive characteristic 
of indigenous groups (almost every single societal aggregation in the world has 
suffered and/or generated an historical injustice or wrongdoing), then what remains 
is the factual element of ancestry from those primus historical inhabitants, and the 
self-identification with their traditional culture. But again, self-identification cannot 
be considered either as an exclusive characteristic of this kind of societal aggregation 
because, as we already saw, this subjective element is consubstantial with every 
single societal aggregation. In an open, pluralist and democratic society, group 
membership cannot be forced; it always requires and always depends of self-
recognition.126      
Therefore, if this logical conceptual deconstruction127 is correct, then the only 
element that remains, as potentially able to show the distinguishable features of 
indigenous people’s societal uniqueness, would be ‘descendancy’. In other words, if 
all other elements, including the dimension of dispossession or subordination in 
relation to other ethno-cultural societal aggregations, are common or shared with all 
societal aggregations, then the only factor that would truly characterise indigenous 
people as a differential and distinguishable societal aggregation is their ethno-
cultural descendancy from a specific group. A group that used to inhabit a defined 
territory at certain precise time in history, or –at least– from a precedent time than 
the ancestors of the societal ethno-cultural dominant group.128  
As we can see, the notion of indigenous people if based just on the fact of 
descendancy, is nothing but an ethno-cultural biological notion129; and –as we have 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and Other Good Causes. Essay in Honour of Erica-Irene A. Daes, The Hague/London/New York, 
2002, p. 6. 
126 See, Chapter II, Section 4.4. 
127 This could be considered another paradoxical scholarly situation; in previous chapters, when 
dealing with cultural diversity, I quite strongly disagreed with deconstructivist scholars, especially in 
connection with interpretation of power dynamics between majorities and minorities in society; and 
now, it seems that I am becoming a deconstructivist too… at least from a conceptual point of view.  
128 In this sense, it has been said that “[a]s to the meaning of ‘indigenous’, I believe this is a ‘political’ 
term with no clear scientific meaning today. It appears to signify ‘original’ inhabitants when western 
colonial powers arrive to colonize/conquer/rule some other area. […] I have rarely seen the term 
applied to the ‘subject’ peoples of non-western nations, e.g. Tibetans, Mongolians, Druze, Kurds, the 
various ‘tribal’ peoples recognized for special treatment in India, Tomorians, the Ainu, Taiwanese, 
Okinawans, ‘pygmies’ etc.” See, T. MAKKONEN, op. cit., p. 133-134. 
129 According to Prof. Scheinin, however, this biological notion cannot fully embrace the idea of 
indigenousness, precisely because it“…does not include the dimension of a relationship of 
dispossession or subordination in relation to another group that arrived latter.” See, M. SCHEININ, 
op. cit., p. 4-5.  
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already mentioned– the idea of a society divided among groups based on ancestry or 
descendancy, or biological factors, it is not far from the notion of “race” and racially 
divided societies.130 We have to always keep in mind the courageous fights 
conducted in the last century against racial purity laws, racial segregation and 
apartheid, in a sense of not forgetting their lasting and durable lessons, especially in 
order to avoid the reoccurrence of these social tragedies.131 Hence, if the essential 
factor that conceptually composes the nuclear element of indigenousness or 
indigenous people’s cultural distinctiveness is the descendancy factor, then the 
division of societies between indigenous and non-indigenous societal aggregations 
would be just based on and constructed over a given biological factor, and on the 
consequential political aspiration to maintain the political relevance of the ethno-
cultural difference. This process would ideally consist of the unchangeable 
perpetuation of indigenous cultural distinctiveness and the protection of the 
essentialised “indigenous purity” vis-à-vis the mainstream societal cultural 
aggregation.132  
Therefore, seeing the epistemological complications that the 
conceptualisation of the notion of indigenous people involves, especially in 
connection with the above mentioned biological aspects, it would be better perhaps 
to discontinue these epistemological efforts, and just open the floor for the most 
flexible political evolution of this notion, within the inclusive and dialogical 
dynamics of the so-called democratic game. When legal epistemology cannot resolve 
                                                          
130 See, K. A. APPIAH, op. cit., p. 136-137. In the opinion of Prof. Ermacora, “…a predominat 
character or aborigines is the race element. This whit the understanding that the expression race 
should be understood in a biological sense of the word to describe groups of individuals who have a 
pecific combination of physical characteristics of genetic origin. […] Indeed it seems that the racial 
element as to aborigines is the different specifics which make them different from other minorities.” 
However, he has also logically concluded that “[i]n any case the self-consciousness of the group as 
“indigenous” is necessary.” See, F. ERMACORA, op. cit., p. 294.  
131 Fortunately, the current international community is united in its strong condemnation of all of these 
practises, as it has been reaffirmed in the UN Durban Declaration, when recalling that “…persecution 
against any identifiable group, collectivity or community on racial, national ethnic or other grounds 
that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, as well as the crime of 
apartheid, constitute serious violations of human rights and, in some cases, qualify as crimes against 
humanity.”  See, Report of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia 
and Related Intolerance, cit., p. 13, para. 28. 
132 See, T. MAKKONEN, op. cit., p. 133-134; K. A. APPIAH, op. cit., p. 136 et seq., and R. H. 
THOMPSON, Ethnic Minorities and the Case for Collective Rights, in American Anthropologist, 
99(4),  1997, p. 793. 
CHAPTER IV 
204 
 
a certain conceptual galimatias, perhaps politics can.133 In fact, as Mr. J. Bengoa, 
alternate member of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations of the former 
UN Sub-Commission, said that “…the discussion clearly had two side: a theoretical 
one and a political one”134; but not only. Another member of the Working Group, 
Mr. R. Hatano, has bluntly exposed one of the reasons that lie at the bottom of this 
conceptual problem, namely the fact that “…indigenous organizations did not want 
the term to be defined for fear some indigenous persons would not be covered by the 
scope of the definition.”135 
From the above argumentations, it seems quite clear that indigenous people, 
as a matter of self-determination and recognition, have generally manifested their 
political choices, desires or aspirations to remain distinct, in a sense to maintain and 
perpetuate those cultural features that make them a distinguishable societal entity, 
but not only. They also have consistently advocated for the perpetuation of their 
societal and economical structures and –perhaps even most importantly– their 
institutional organisations, including legal systems, judicial bodies and traditional 
political authorities.  
For these reasons, and in order to achieve their political goals, and ultimately 
regain the institutional and territorial autonomy lost during centuries of domination 
and exclusion136, indigenous people insist on their right to define themselves, and 
hence to apply the subjective approach in the construction of this notion. This means, 
that an indigenous person would be that one that not only recognises himself or 
herself as such, but is also accepted as such by the other members of his or her own 
indigenous community.137 In short, the self-construction of the societal notion of 
                                                          
133 Perhaps politics it is not only the art of the possible, as it has been said, but also, the art to make 
possible the impossible… 
134 See, E.-I. A. DAES, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of 
Indigenous People. Working paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the 
concept of “Indigenous people”, cit., p. 14, para. 41. 
135 Ibid., p. 14, para. 40. 
136 See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Indigenous Peoples in Comparative Perspective - Problems and 
Policies, cit., p. 28-30. 
137 See, E.-I. A. DAES, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of 
Indigenous People. Working paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the 
concept of “Indigenous people”, cit., p. 13-15, para. 35 et seq. However, this kind of thought 
constitutes, as it has been stressed, a sort of circular thinking, because a given group cannot determine 
its membership criteria, before the group itself is assigned with members; in other words, what is 
needed first is to identify the group and group’s specific cultural distinguishable features. See, T. 
MAKKONEN, op. cit., p. 137. 
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indigenousness, as the essential characteristic over which to build a perfectly 
distinguishable societal group, could be considered as one of the best political tools 
on the hands of auto-defined indigenous groups in order to achieve their political 
aspiration for economic, social and cultural autonomy. Moreover, it could even be a 
vehicle for self-government and –in ultimate terms– for regaining the lost auto-
determination as a sovereign and fully independent societal entity. 
However, it seems that we are facing again the permanent dichotomy of the 
descriptive and prescriptive discursive levels. In fact, in the precedent paragraph, I 
described indigenous people’s aspirations and ultimate political goals, and this of 
course is nothing but an approximate description of them; but this is not necessarily 
what has been prescribed as legitimate or accepted in modern, open, pluralist and 
democratic societies, under the light of the current internationally recognised human 
rights standards. As it has been expressed, it could happen that the meaning given to 
the term indigenous people in those international human rights instruments differs 
from the general usage of the term.138 Again, the factual and cultural self-
identification as “indigenous”, will not necessarily lead (or have to lead) to the 
enjoyment of a specific legal status or exclusive rights attached to the “legal” notion 
of the term. These new potential conceptual angles will be examined more in detail 
in the following sections; and, as we will see, under the current international 
standards, not all political claims could be considered legally protected within a 
modern democratic setting, even when backed by historical societal legitimation.139 
 
   
3. Indigenous peoples and international law 
 
                                                          
138 See, T. MAKKONEN, op. cit., p. 132-133. According to Prof. Scheinin, for the use of the term 
indigenous in human rights law, “…it is insufficient that an ethnic group is constituted of the 
descendants of the first known inhabitants of the area in question. There must be another ethnic group 
and a power relationship involved before the descendants of the original inhabitants are understood 
as indigenous in the legal meaning of the term.” See, M. SCHEININ, The Right to Enjoy a Distinct 
Culture: Indigenous and Competing Uses of Land, in T. ORLIN, A. ROSAS, M. SCHEININ (eds.), 
The Jurisprudence of Human Rights Law: A Comparative Interpretative Approach, Turku/Åbo, 2000, 
p. 161.  
139 In fact, we have to take into account that legal systems do not always reflect or consider historical 
events under the same interpretative light as those proposed by different ethno-cultural and political 
parties. For instance, if we have two opposed interpretations, it would be quite logical to think that a 
common legal system will either construct an intermediate and balanced possession or just embrace 
one of the two opposed visions; what it cannot logically do is to incorporate both.   
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First of all, it would be important to clarify –since from the beginning– that 
this section has not have the intention to fully examine and systematically study all 
recognised international legal standards concerning indigenous issues that have been 
developed for their specific legal protection. This kind of study will certainly require 
–for its extension and complexity– a work on its own. Thus, in order to not lose our 
theoretical path, the focus would rather be allocated –within the following 
paragraphs– on the conceptual incorporation that the notion “indigenous people” has 
received within those international instruments specifically dedicated to the question 
of indigenous people. Among them, especial attention will be given to the UN 
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the ILO Conventions No. 107 & 
169 on indigenous and tribal peoples.  
In addition, we will briefly examine the legal implications that the UN 
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
conceptually have in connection with indigenous people notion and –most in 
particular– with regard to their political aspiration for autonomy and self-
determination. In order to contextualise our legal analysis, and to properly see the 
conceptual evolution of this notion, we will follow the historical process of adoption, 
at least in connection with the three instruments mentioned in the precedent 
paragraph that specifically address the situation of indigenous populations.  
  
 
3.1. The ILO Convention No. 107: indigenous and tribal populations  
 
The first international legal instruments exclusively dealing with indigenous 
people issues was the ILO Convention No. 107 concerning the Protection of 
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, 
adopted in 1957 and entering into force two years later in 1959. Even when this 
Convention was revised in 1989 by the Convention No. 169, as we will see bellow, it 
is still in force in connection with those countries that have not ratified the latter 
instrument.140   
                                                          
140 This Convention, which is now closed for ratification, has received 27 ratifications, but only 
remains in force in connection with 17 States Parties; all the other States Parties (with the exception of 
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Beside the legal relevance that this Convention has in connection with its 
current States Parties, and taken into account that it has been considered as a 
“reflection of the paternalistic and assimilation-oriented assumption of the time”141, 
it has, however, a historical importance for being the first attempt that broadly 
embraced indigenous people’s complex issues. Thus, the Convention contained 
important provisions on non-discrimination in connection with the regulation of the 
labour market142, such as recruitment and conditions for employment, social security 
and measures of assistance, but also introduced positive actions for the equal 
enjoyment of rights and opportunities, in particular in connection with their 
traditional lands143, education144, health145, languages146, customs and institutions147. 
In addition, and perhaps even most importantly for the scope of this chapter, this 
Convention also engaged in the conceptual exercise of defining indigenous and tribal 
populations.  
In fact, Article 1 of the ILO Convention No. 107, when defining the scope of 
application of the Convention, made a conceptual distinction between three different 
societal aggregations, namely “tribal”, “semi-tribal” and “indigenous” populations. 
In connection with the first two notions, the Convention stated that it applies to 
“members of tribal or semi-tribal populations in independent countries whose social 
and economic conditions are at a less advanced stage than the stage reached by the 
other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or 
partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations.”148 In 
addition, it clarifies that “…the term semi-tribal includes groups and persons who, 
although they are in the process of losing their tribal characteristics, are not yet 
integrated into the national community.”149 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Portugal) had denounced it when they ratified the ILO Convention No. 169. (Source: ILOLEX: 
18.1.2012). 
141 See, S. J. ANAYA, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development. Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, UN Doc. A/HRC/9/9, 
Human Rights Council, 2008, p. 11, para. 31. 
142 See, Articles 15-18 of the ILO Convention No. 107. 
143 Ibid., Articles 11-14. 
144 Ibid., Articles 21-26. 
145 Ibid., Articles 19-20. 
146 Ibid., Article 23. 
147 Ibid., Articles 2-10. 
148 Ibid., Article 1(1)(a). 
149 Ibid., Article 1(2). 
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As we can see, tribal and semi-tribal populations were characterised in 
connection with two main elements: (a) their degree or –in the words of the text– 
their ‘less advanced stage’ of development, taken as an external comparator the 
mainstream society of the national territory in which these populations live and are 
part of. And (b) their cultural and institutional distinctiveness, in a sense that these 
population are regulated or governed (totally or partially) by a different normative 
setting, constituted either by their own customs and traditions, recognised as legally 
enforceable and binding by the given national legal system (including –of course– 
judicial bodies), or by special national norms.  
Within the reasoning of the Convention, the fact that those populations were 
still regulated and living under their own traditional societal organisation and cultural 
practises, it was seen as one of the potential causes or factors “…which have hitherto 
prevented them from sharing fully in the progress of the national community of which 
they form part”.150 Thus, positive actions or special measures would eventually 
enable “…the said populations to benefit on an equal footing from the rights and 
opportunities which national laws or regulations grant to the other members of the 
population.”151 In other words, in order to allow their “development”, special 
measures of protections should be taken for “…their progressive integration into the 
life of their respective countries”152, but excluding measures “…tending towards the 
artificial assimilation of these populations.”153 To put it bluntly, under the light of 
the Convention, these populations were “…prevented by their backwardness from 
‘sharing fully in the progress of the national community of which they form part’.”154  
Therefore, within the conceptual scheme of the ILO Convention No. 107, 
‘tribalness’ represents “…the lower stage on the scale of human evolution, and also 
the extreme of the process leading to a final state of ‘integration’.”155 In fact, semi-
                                                          
150 Ibid., Preamble.  
151 Ibid., Article 2(2)(a). 
152 Ibid., Article 2(1). 
153 Ibid., Article 2(2)(c). 
154 See, P. THORNBERRY, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights, Manchester, 2002, p. 327. 
155 See, L. RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO, Indigenous Peoples, Postcolonialism, and International Law. The 
ILO Regime (1919-1989), Oxford, 2005, p. 167. Aditionally, this author has stressed that “[t]he idea 
of ‘tribe’ was articulated as a relational concept vis-à-vis so-called ‘modern’ societies, denoting a 
stage of political evolution. In this intellectual milieu, the very use of the term ‘tribal’ in the ILO 1957 
standards referred automatically to one end of the bipolar representation of change in human 
societies characteristic of anthropological theory, occupying the same conceptual space as notions 
such as ‘primitive’, ‘traditional’, ‘pre-modern’, ‘pre-industrial’, and ‘folk’.” Ibid., p. 168. 
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tribal populations are those that are already engaged in the process of ‘losing their 
tribal characteristics’, but which have not arrived yet to the final stage of the said 
process, in a sense that they “…are not yet integrated into the national 
community.”156 And… what about indigenous people? Within the following 
paragraph, we will address the conceptual approach of this Convention to the notion 
of indigenous populations, and the potential difference with the above mentioned 
notions.   
The Convention refers to the notion of indigenous people as “…members of 
tribal or semi-tribal populations in independent countries which are regarded as 
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the 
country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of 
conquest or colonisation and which, irrespective of their legal status, live more in 
conformity with the social, economic and cultural institutions of that time than with 
the institutions of the nation to which they belong.”157  
In this Conventional approach to the notion, we find some elements that have 
already been analysed within our previous theoretical section. But we also find a new 
element. This new element is refers to (a) the fact that indigenous populations are 
also tribal or semi-tribal populations. In fact these populations, according to the text 
of the Convention, ‘can be regarded as indigenous’ if they additionally fulfil other 
requirements. This means that all the considerations already made in connection with 
tribal and semi-tribal populations are applicable to the case of indigenous 
populations. Hence, indigenous people are also characterised by their (b) cultural and 
institutional distinctiveness, and by their (c) ‘under-developed’ position vis-à-vis the 
mainstream national society, which is quite similar to the criterion of ‘non-dominant 
position’, but –nevertheless– is not exactly the same. In fact, under this conventional 
criterion, there is no reference to the situation of exploitation, exclusion, or land 
dispossession due to historical processes such as colonialism or conquest. The 
disadvantaged situation in which these populations live is potentially adjudicated to 
their own cultural practices, and the solution is their integration to the mainstream 
culture. However, colonialism and conquest are mentioned within the notion, but not 
                                                          
156 See, Article 1(2) of the ILO Convention No. 107. 
157 Ibid., Article 1(1)(b). 
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as an autonomous element or criterion, but just as a historical and temporal 
contextualisation of the additional criterion which is (d) ‘being first in time’.  
Consequently, this Convention considers that indigenous populations 
distinguish themselves from tribal and semi-tribal societal aggregations by the fact of 
being descendant ‘from the populations which inhabited the country’ at the time of –
for instance– their colonisation or external invasion. Finally, the conventional 
enshrined notion also includes an indirect mention of the (e) subjective criteria of 
self-identification, which states that indigenous populations are those that also live 
“in conformity with [their] social, economic and cultural institutions.”   
Therefore, according to this Convention, all indigenous peoples are tribal or 
semi-tribal (in accordance with their stage of development), but not all tribal and 
semi-tribal people are indigenous. What matters here is not being a descendant of 
historical victims of process of conquest or colonisation, but just the fact of being 
descendant from the historical inhabitants of a given territory.  
As we can see, here again the conceptual notion of indigenous people, their 
essential distinguishable character that makes them different from other societal 
organisations, such as tribal or semi-tribal populations, is reduced to an ethno-
cultural or even biological factor, which is the factual descendancy of the historical 
inhabitants of a given territory. 
As a conclusion, we can say that the intention of this early legislative attempt 
by the ILO was very positive, in a sense that its main objective was to enhance the 
protection of vast sectors of the human populations that were living in vulnerable 
conditions. For historic reasons, the balance between cultural distinguishable 
development and the enhancement of the living conditions of these populations was 
resolved through an “integration” formula, and not by granting more societal 
institutional autonomy.158   
 
 
3.2. The ILO Convention No. 169: indigenous and tribal peoples 
 
                                                          
158 See, A. XANTHAKI, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards, Cambridge, 2007, p. 66-
67. 
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As it has already been said, the ILO Convention No. 107 was replaced thirty 
years later, under the pressures from indigenous peoples groups, associations and 
lobbyists, thus producing an up-to-dated version that shifted the approach to a 
‘nonassimilationist and nonintegrationist text.’159 The new ILO Convention No. 169, 
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, was adopted on 
27 June 1989, by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation, 
and came into force on 5 September 1991. Moreover, as states in its preamble, has 
introduced a “…new international standards on the subject with a view to removing 
the assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards”160, but not only. This new 
Convention also aims at “…recognising the aspiration of these peoples to exercise 
control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to 
maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions, within the framework 
of the States in which they live.”161    
As we can see, the Convention is quite far reaching in its goals, and perhaps 
for this reason has received nothing but just a few ratifications from ILO States 
members162, which to great length waters down its legally binding effects. However, 
this Convention has also generated great reluctance on States, especially in 
connection with those provisions that recognise degrees of autonomy to indigenous 
groups and –in particular– the fact that that recognition implies the acknowledgment 
of groups within States’ territory.163 But also this instrument has generated large 
dissatisfaction on the side of advocates for indigenous people rights. In fact, they 
viewed the Convention’s provisions as not sufficiently constraining government’s 
conduct in relation to their own indigenous concerns. This is particularly applicable 
to the case of indigenous people’s aspirations for the recognition of full decision-
making powers with regard to all matters connected with them, but not only. In 
addition, and perhaps most importantly, this concerns the lack of recognition of the 
                                                          
159 See, H. HANNUM, op. cit., p. 87-88. See also, See, S. J. ANAYA, Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law, cit., p. 58 et seq. 
160 See, ILO Convention No. 169, Preamble. 
161 Ibid. 
162 This Convention has received –until now– 22 ratifications, from which 15 refer to Latin American 
States Parties. (Source: ILOLEX: 18.1.2012). 
163 See, L. SWEPSTON, G. ALFREDSSON, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Contribution 
by Erica Daes, in G. ALFREDSSON, M. STAVROPOULOU (eds.), Justice Pending: Indigenous 
Peoples and Other Good Causes. Essay in Honour of Erica-Irene A. Daes, The Hague/London/New 
York, 2002, p. 75-76. 
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right of self-determination and their full international acknowledgement as a full self-
standing and autonomous subjects within the international community, and not just 
subjected to the authority of national States, as the Convention assumed.164  
In general terms, and beside its specific provisions connected with the 
applicable labour rights and working conditions165, this Convention refers to the 
principle of respect and recognition of the cultural diversity of these populations. The 
said principle is incorporated through a co-ordinated and systematic action for the 
protection of their rights and to guarantee respect for their integrity166, including the 
respect for their customs, traditions, institutions and social and cultural identity, 
when they are not incompatible with national legal systems and with internationally 
recognised human rights.167 Also through the incorporation of the general principle 
of consultation in all matters that directly affect these populations168; and the 
recognition of their right to decide their own priorities for the process of 
development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions, spiritual well-being and 
traditional lands.169 In connection with the latter, the Convention has not only 
acknowledged the special relationship that these populations have with their 
traditional lands170, but also it has extensively regulated the right of ownership and 
possession of the people concerned over those lands171 and natural resources 
traditionally used172, including their right to return and compensation in case of 
forced relocation.173  
Within the second part of this work, when the jurisprudential analysis of the 
indigenous people’s lands claims before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
will be undertaken, we will address more in detail the legal scope and practical 
implications of the above mentioned land rights. In particular, we will focus on their 
                                                          
164 In fact, according to Prof. Anaya, the indigenous people“…overriding reason for disappointment 
appeared to be a grounded simply in frustration over the inability to dictate a convention in terms 
more sweeping than those included in the final text.” See, S. J. ANAYA, Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law, cit., p. 59. 
165 See, Articles 20-25 of the ILO Convention No. 169. 
166 Ibid., Article 2(1). 
167 Ibid., Articles 2(3), 5 and 8. 
168 Ibid., Article 6. 
169 Ibid., Article 7. 
170 Ibid., Article 13. 
171 Ibid., Articles 14 and 17. 
172 Ibid., Article 15. 
173 Ibid., Article 16. 
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interconnection with indigenous people’s cultural diversity, which is and remains one 
of the main topics of this dissertation.       
Coming back to our conceptual inquiry, the first sign that capture our 
attention is the terminological shift between these two Conventions, starting with 
their proper denominations. That is, the Convention No. 169 changed the term 
‘populations’ to ‘peoples’. In fact, using the term “peoples” was strongly insisted 
upon by some advocates, scholars and representatives of indigenous people 
participating in the drafting process. For them this change implied a greater and more 
visible recognition of their group identity, as separate distinguishable and identifiable 
societal aggregations, and –even perhaps most importantly– as a semantic 
legitimation and support for their claims for self-determination and aspirations for 
the construction of an independent statehood.174  
In fact, within the drafting process of the Convention, representatives of 
States strongly reacted vis-à-vis this political pretension, and finally managed to 
avoid any connection between the use of the term “peoples” in this Convention and 
legal understanding of the term “peoples” in international law.175 This conceptual 
tension was resolved by the drafters by means of reaching a quite balanced position, 
which led to the incorporation of the term “peoples” within the title and throughout 
of the text of the Convention. Though, with the reassuring clause that clearly states 
that “[t]he use of the term peoples in this Convention shall not be constructed as 
having any implications as regards which may attach to the term under international 
law.”176 As we can see, indigenous people were terminologically recognised as such, 
but this recognition has not bestowed on them any legal benefit to their original legal 
claims and aspirations. In other words, this acknowledgment as “peoples” can just 
only be interpreted as what it is, the reaffirmation that indigenous “peoples” are 
entitled to the same equal treatment, without discrimination of any kind and –in 
particular– without discrimination based on ethno cultural appurtenance, exactly as 
and together with all other “peoples” living in the world.177  
                                                          
174 See, S. J. ANAYA, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, cit., p. 60. 
175 See, Chapter II, Section 4.1., 4.2, and 4.3.  
176 See, Article 1(3) of the ILO Convention No. 169. 
177 In fact, as it has been said, the collective dimension involved in the term “peoples” “…does not, 
however, take the form of substantive rights adjudged to indigenous peoples as such, but instead 
reflects States obligation towards those peoples.” See, I. M. DONDERS, Towards a Right to Cultural 
Identity?, Antwerpen/Oxford/New York, 2002, p. 210 et seq. 
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In short, “peoples” here, is just the plural version of “people”, that is an 
aggregation of human beings.178 Why? Because terms in international law should be 
interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in which they are included.179 And, in this case, the text of the Convention is 
absolutely clear in a sense that the term “peoples” has not the same specific meaning 
that it has in international law; therefore, within this Convention can only have the 
general meaning attached to it.  
Consequentially, for this convention, indigenous “peoples” are not, as such, 
the “peoples” mentioned in Article 1(2) and 55 of the UN Charter, which are entitled 
by international law to the right of self-determination. Mere semantic engineering 
does not establish rights, however.180 This does not absolutely mean –of course– that 
indigenous people will never qualify for the exercise of these rights. It just means 
that under the application of this Convention, indigenous peoples are not “peoples” 
in the technical sense of international law.181 But, of course, this Convention does 
not have either negative implications of denying the status of “peoples” to any 
human societal aggregation that fulfil the legal requirement to be “peoples” under 
international law. Therefore, it could happen indeed that a societal entity that is 
regarded as “indigenous” also qualifies as “peoples” under international law, not 
because of its cultural distinctiveness or distinguishability as “indigenous”, but 
because it could be seen as an aggregation of (individuals) human beings that qualify 
as such, and –hence– able to gain international recognition under the legal status of 
“peoples”.182  
                                                          
178 From Oxford Dictionary of English in English Dictionaries & Thesauruses. 
179 See, Article 31(1) of the UN Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (1969). 
180 For a contrary position, see S. J. ANAYA, The Contours of Self-Determination and its 
Implementation: Implications of Developments Concerning Indigenous Peoples, cit., p. 9 et seq. 
181 In connection with the meaning of the term “people” in international law, see Chapter II, Section 
4.1. In Addition, see, among other authors, A. CASSESE, Self-Determination of Peoples. A legal 
Reappraisal, Cambridge, 1996, in particular p. 141 et seq.; J. CRAWFORD, The Right of Self-
Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future, in P. ALSTON (ed.), Peoples' 
Rights, Oxford, 2002, p. 7 et seq.; A. XANTHAKI, The Right to Self-Determination: Meaning and 
Scope in N. GHANEA, A. XANTHAKI (eds.), Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination, Leiden – 
Boston, 2005, p. 15 et seq.; and J. SUMMERS, Peoples and International Law. How Nationalism and 
Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations, Leiden/Boston, 2007, p. 1 et seq. 
182 See, M. SCHEININ, What are Indigenous Peoples?, cit., p. 7. Moreover, it would be important to 
add that, if an indigenous people’s societal aggregation finds itself in a minoritarian position, within 
the territory of a given national State, then the same specific criteria, in order to be considered as 
“peoples” under international law, would be applicable to the case. In this sense, see –in particular– 
our considerations in Chapter II, Section 4.3. 
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Coming back to our definitional track, this Convention from the beginning 
stressed the fundamental importance of the subjective criterion, that is (a) the self-
identification element.183 In fact, its Article 1(2) clearly states that “[s]elf-
identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as fundamental criterion for 
determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply.” Hence, in 
case of doubts, with regard to whether a group is classified or not as indigenous or 
tribal, the interpreter should pay special consideration to how members of the group 
perceive themself. However, this does not mean that –under the wording of the 
Convention– self-identification is the sole definitional applicable criterion. As we 
will see in the following paragraphs, objective criterions are also required.  
Moreover, the incorporation of the above mentioned subjective element is not 
the only substantial conceptual modification introduced by the text of the new 
Convention. This Convention also abandoned the distinction between “tribal” and 
“semi-tribal” populations (or “peoples” under the new terminological denomination), 
but maintained the distinction between the former and “indigenous peoples”. It refers 
to “tribal peoples” as those whose “…social, cultural and economic conditions 
distinguish them from other sections of the national community”184, that is those that 
are culturally distinguishable from the mainstream society. This is nothing but the 
objective criterion that has already been mentioned under the letter (b), namely, 
cultural distinctiveness. In addition, a societal aggregation is considered as “tribal” if 
its “…status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by 
special laws or regulations.”185  
As in the case of the previous Convention No. 107, “tribal people” are 
objectively identified by (c) the maintenance of a different “status”, that is a legal 
status, than the rest of the national community. This additional objective criterion has 
actually been considered as complementary to the previous one, because it basically 
refers to the existence of an institutional legal setting (“status”) which –if you allow 
me the redundancy– institutionalises their cultural distinctiveness. This differential 
status or regulatory framework refers, as in the previous Convention, to the 
recognition –within the legal system– of the legal force of their traditions and 
                                                          
183 In fact, the self-identification element has been rightfully called as “a major novelty in ILO No. 
169.” See, A. XANTHAKI, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards, cit., p. 73. 
184 See, Article 1(a) of the ILO Convention No. 169. 
185 Ibid. 
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customs (consuetudinary norms) or through their specific incorporation into “special 
laws or regulations.”186 As you can see, the main change introduced in connection 
with the previous conceptualisation of the notion of “tribes” refers to the elimination 
from the text of any reference to their “less advanced stage” vis-à-vis the 
mainstream society. In this sense, it has been said that the axiological approach of the 
Convention changed from an assimilationist orientation to a new stage of 
acknowledgement and respect of their cultural diversity.  
In connection with “indigenous peoples”, this Convention introduced the 
same objective criterion of (c) ‘being first in time’. That is, being “descent from the 
populations which inhabited the country […] at the time of conquest or colonisation 
or the establishment of present state boundaries…”187  The sole modification that 
this criterion introduces, refers to the fact that has broadened the referential historical 
period in which this requirement has to be measured. In fact, the referred ancestors 
should be those not only present at the time of conquest, external invasion or 
colonisation, but also those present –within the current territory of a given national 
State– at the time when its present boundaries were fixed. The latter reference has to 
be considered as a truly conceptual novelty, not only because it differs from the text 
of the previous Convention, but also –and even most importantly– because it 
completely diminishes the importance of the ‘being first in time’ element. Let me 
explain this more in detail. 
Therefore, it would be possible to regard as “indigenous” the descendants of 
those inhabitants present within the territory of a national State, at the time of the 
‘establishment of the present state boundaries’. However, and as a consequence of 
this new interpretative light, the primus inter pares element (being first in time) 
cannot be used any longer as an ontological argument for the justification of the 
                                                          
186 The UN former Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Daes, interpreted this latter objective criterion in a sense 
that societal aggregations could be considered as “tribal” “…either by its own choice (that is, by 
maintaining its own laws and customs), or without its consent (as a result of special legal status 
imposed by the State).” I rather disagree with this interpretation, because the imposition of a different 
status or regulatory framework to a given group, based on ethno-cultural characteristics (what we 
have called cultural distinctiveness) would be against the very principle of equality and non-
discrimination. All individuals should indeed enjoy the same legal status; exceptional special 
treatments –as a matter of principle– should be consented. See, E.-I. A. DAES, Standard-Setting 
Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous People. Working paper by the 
Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the concept of “Indigenous people”, cit., p. 
11, para. 29.      
187 See, Article 1(b) of the ILO Convention No. 169. 
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establishment of a differential set of rights, vis-à-vis the descendants of those other 
settlers that have arrived later in time (a sort of ultimus inter pares).188  
Moreover, this Conventional modification also affects two additional 
elements that have been considered as integrative parts of the objective criteria for 
the conceptual definition of the notion of indigenousness; I am referring to the 
historical act of dispossession of their traditional lands, and its current perception of 
historical injustice.189 In fact, if the primogeniture element is not any longer 
considered as constitutive or as essential in the configuration of the indigenous 
people’s ‘indigenousness’, then the reference to a certain temporal incident in 
history, e.g. act of colonisation, external invasion or otherwise dispossession of their 
historical traditional lands, would consequentially lose its discursive relevance, but 
not only. In addition, without that temporal reference, we would also lack a 
reasonable legitimation to legally (and perhaps even morally) condemn those passed 
incidences as historical injustices.  
To put it differently, the act of dispossession of traditional lands has been 
considered as a historical injustice precisely because those same lands were 
possessed –before the act of dispossession– by those historical ancestors whom 
inhabited the said territories first. But again, without having a concrete biological 
link with those ancestors who have suffered historical wrongs, the current inhabitants 
of the present national territory would not be able to either claim the legacies of those 
historical wrongs nor the remediation of the continuing effects of those historical 
injustices.190 Furthermore, even the very notion of “traditional lands” would lose its 
historical contextual meaning. In short, without the ‘being first in time’ connection, 
indigenousness, seen in terms of victimisation, cannot be sustained any longer.191  
As we can see, without the ontological temporal connection with those that 
were the first inhabitants of the national territory, the entire epistemological 
                                                          
188 Just in order to give you an example, with the application of this criterion to a country like 
Argentina, my home country, in which its present boundaries were –in general terms– fixed at the end 
of the XIX Century. In this case, almost all inhabitants would be regarded as “indigenous” in a sense 
that they would more certainly have an ancestor that inhabited the said national territory at that time. 
Even the descendants of the ‘criollos’ elites that were in charge of the governance of the country since 
its independence, at the beginning of the above mentioned century (1816), would be able to 
legitimately claim their indigenousness… 
189 See above, Section 2.2.5. 
190 See, in a contrario sensu interpretation, S. J. ANAYA, The Contours of Self-Determination and its 
Implementation: Implications of Developments Concerning Indigenous Peoples, cit., p. 7. 
191 See, T. MAKKONEN, op. cit., p. 133. 
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construction of the notion tumbles. In fact, without the presence of this objective 
element, it becomes quite difficult to see the ontological differences between 
indigenous and non-indigenous people, and therefore the need for a distinguishable 
and exclusive legal status. The reason for this epistemological confusion lies perhaps 
in the fact that this Convention focuses on cover a social situation, rather than to 
establish a priority based on whose ancestors had arrived in a particular area first.192 
In other words, it would be possible to say that, in order to take a more inclusive 
approach that would allow the extension of the special protection delivered by the 
Convention to largest possible number of societal aggregations, this instrument not 
only goes beyond the distinction between tribal people and indigenous people, but 
even further.193 It seems that, paradoxically, this Convention in its ambitious 
protective project has conceptually diminished the ontological importance of being 
“indigenous”.  
Last but not least, the remaining objective criterion incorporated within the 
ILO Convention No. 169 for the conceptual identification of “indigenous peoples” is 
–of course– the already mentioned element of (d) ‘cultural distinctiveness’. The 
Convention refers to those peoples who have managed to “...retain some or all of 
their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.”194 The wording has 
certain (but not conceptual) variations from its predecessor instrument. Indigenous 
peoples are those that maintain their traditional practises and societal institutions, 
regardless their legal ‘status’. The latter observation is important because it 
establishes a particular difference with regard to “tribal people”. In fact, in order to 
be considered as such, it has to have a recognised legal status integrated by 
consuetudinary or special laws or regulations; indigenous peoples do not. For the 
Convention, the latter is considered to be a pre-existing factual entity, regardless its 
legal recognition or status.195  
                                                          
192 See, A. XANTHAKI, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards, cit., p. 72-73; see also, J. 
WALDRON, Indigeneity?: First peoples and Last Occupancy?, in New Zealand Journal of Public 
and International Law, 1, 2003, p. 56-77.  
193 See, ILO, Indigenous & Tribal Peoples' Rights in Practice. A Guide to ILO convention No. 169, 
cit. p. 10. 
194 See, Article 1(b) of the ILO Convention No. 169. 
195 According to the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (Committee of Experts), “…the legal personality of indigenous groups is a pre-
existing fact of reality and requires unconditional and unqualified recognition by the State; what 
already exists is thus declare, namely the pre-existence of the personality of indigenous communities 
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In addition, some authors considered that the cultural distinctiveness element 
in the case of indigenous people differs from that of tribal peoples, in a sense that in 
connection with the latter, political institutions are not mentioned. Thus, for them, 
the distinction between indigenous and tribal peoples lies in the fact that indigenous 
peoples have retained their cultural institutions rather than just on their “customs or 
traditions”.196 Although the wording differences, I would rather not put much 
emphasis on this, because if the status of tribal people is regulated by their customs 
and traditions, logically speaking, it has to involve a traditional institutional 
framework too.  
Finally, as a concluding remark in connection with the revised conceptual 
elements, we can say that this new Convention does not resolve our epistemological 
doubts in connection with the notion of “indigenousness”, on the contrary, it 
increases them. In the words of the former UN Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Daes, 
“…the ILO did not achieve greater semantic precision, but on the contrary 
succeeded only in merging the definition of “indigenous” and “tribal into a single 
broad test of distinctiveness.”197 In fact, according to her, this Convention has 
reduced the indemnificatory criteria in two main elements, one objective and one 
subjective. The objective criterion refers to their extrinsic cultural distinctiveness; 
and the subjective one to their choice to be and to remain distinct, which is nothing 
but their self-identification as such.198  
We cannot but agree with Mrs. Daes, adding that if this is the case, then we 
have to forcibly conclude that what really and ontologically constitutes the notion of 
“indigenousness” is just the subjective element of self-identification as such. That is 
the voluntary choice of the members of a given societal aggregation to be seen as a 
differentiated societal unit, with distinguishable cultural practises and institutions. 
You can rightly ask why the above mentioned objective element is excluded from 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and organizations.” What this Committee omitted to refer to is the need for the logical previous steps, 
namely the identification, through the verification of the presence of objective and subjective criterion 
and indicia, of the concrete existence of that pre-existing reality. See, Committee of Experts, 77th 
Session, 2006, Individual Direct Request, Argentina, Submitted 2007, in ILO, Indigenous & Tribal 
Peoples' Rights in Practice. A Guide to ILO convention No. 169, cit. p. 11-12.   
196 See, A. XANTHAKI, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards, cit., p. 72. 
197 See, E.-I. A. DAES, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of 
Indigenous People. Working paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the 
concept of “Indigenous people”, cit., p. 11, para. 32. 
198 Ibid., para. 30. 
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this conclusive remark. The answer to this question is enshrined in the intrinsic equal 
uniqueness of all cultural manifestations, including –of course– the indigenous 
people’s distinctiveness. From a cultural diversity perspective, they are as distinctive 
as all the other distinctive cultural manifestations and traditions in the world. 
However, one question still remains unanswered. This is whether the fact that 
one cultural entity among other entities in a given society, which sees itself as 
different and even chooses to be culturally different from the rest of the society, 
would justify the recognition of a distinguishable and exclusive set of rights and 
status, vis-à-vis all the other members of the society. In other words, the question 
could be framed as to whether in an open, pluralist and democratic society an 
exception to the principle of equality and non-discrimination between individuals –
based on their ethno-cultural self-identifications and appurtenances– would be first 
necessary and second justified. Until now, the answer seems to be negative… but, 
before arriving at final conclusions, let us explore first the epistemological notions 
contained within the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.      
  
 
3.3. The UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples 
 
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (hereinafter “the 
UN Declaration” or “the Declaration”) was adopted on 13 September 2007, by the 
UN General Assembly Resolution No. 61/295, and is the most recent international 
instrument entirely dedicated to indigenous people issues.  
Following a universal vocation, the Declaration started not only by 
reaffirming the principle of equal dignity and equality between all human beings, but 
also by recognizing the right of all people to be different, to consider themselves 
different and to be respected as such.199  In other words, the Declaration strongly 
reaffirmed the principle of cultural freedom and cultural auto-determination of all 
human beings, together with the principle of equality and non-discrimination.200  
                                                          
199 See, UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Preamble.  
200 In fact, the Declaration in its Article 2 states that “[i]ndigenous peoples and individuals are free 
and equal to all other peoples and individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of 
discrimination, in the exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or 
identity.” 
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However, almost immediately after, the Declaration engaged itself in the 
acknowledgement of the link between indigenous identity and the suffering from 
historic injustices, which implies a complete change in the approach to 
indigenousness, especially with regard to the ILO Conventions. In fact, the 
Declaration expressly states that “[i]ndigenous peoples have suffered from historic 
injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their 
lands, territories and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, 
their right to development in accordance with their own needs and interest.”201  
As we can see, the Declaration has retroactively recognised –as an historical 
injustice– the suffering of those inhabitants present in a given national territory at the 
time when the colonisation or dispossession of lands occurred, but not only. It has 
also accepted the genealogical linkage between those historical inhabitants and their 
current descendants, and the consequential connection between their current living 
conditions and the said historical injustices. Thus, the Declaration consequentially 
stresses the ‘urgent need’ to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous 
peoples “…which derive from their political, economic and social structures and 
from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, especially their 
rights to their lands, territories and resources.”202 This latter paragraph has been 
interpreted as giving to the Declaration an essential ‘remedial purpose’, in a sense 
that the current recognition of these rights is intended as a compensation for the 
historical suffering of their ancestors and for their current living conditions of 
exclusion and disenfranchisement.203   
Therefore, even when the Declaration has not incorporated any definition of 
the notion “indigenous peoples”, it has nevertheless reaffirmed –stating in the 
wording of its preamble– almost all above mentioned objective criteria for the 
identification of these segments of the population as a distinguishable part of it. In 
this sense, it would be possible to identify as enshrined in its text the following 
                                                          
201 See, UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Preamble. 
202 Ibid. 
203 In fact, the UN Special Rapporteur, S. James Anaya, has stressed that the Declaration “…aims at 
repairing the ongoing consequences of the historical denial of the right to self-determination and 
other basic human rights affirmed in international instruments of general applicability.” See, S. J. 
ANAYA, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, cit., p. 12, para. 36. 
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criteria: (a) the ‘being first in time’ factor, that is the ethno-cultural or biological 
element of being descendant of the historical inhabitants of the present national 
territory; (b) the temporal element that historically contextualise the societal 
aggregation indicated by the previous element, which is the said act of colonisation 
or dispossession of lands, territories and resources; (c) the cultural relevance of those 
lands, as part of their cultural distinctiveness204; (d) the current situation of 
prevention in the full exercise and enjoyment of their rights, which is nothing but a 
reference to their factual societal non-dominant position vis-à-vis other societal 
aggregations present in the territory in which they live; and (e) the perception of 
historical injustice of the act of dispossession of their lands; and hence their 
axiological allocation as current victims of those past wrongdoings (the so-called 
element of victimization).  
Therefore, it seems that all explicit and implicit objective elements included 
in Martínez Cobo’s proposed definition are present within the conceptual 
understanding of the indigenous people’s notion as enshrined in this Declaration. 
But, what about its subjective element? The subjective element is included too, but 
implicitly. In fact, if we come back to the preamble of the Declaration, is affirmed 
and recognised the right of all peoples –including of course indigenous people– “to 
be different, to consider themselves different, and to be respected as such.” In other 
word, an indigenous person has, as any other individual, the right to build his or her 
own identity, to self-identify with it, and to be recognised by it, in a sense of his or 
her self-identification. In addition, the Declaration also recognises to each individual, 
in association with his or her fellow group members, the “…collective right to live in 
freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples…”205, but not only. She or he also 
has the right to be protected in “…their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their 
cultural values or ethnic identities”206; the right to “…belong to an indigenous 
community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the 
                                                          
204 The preamble of the Declaration does not refer to the so-called special relationship that these 
people have with their traditional lands. However, its Article 25 expressly states that they have the 
right to maintain and strengthen “…their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally 
owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources 
and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this regards.” 
205 See, Article 7(2) of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
206 Ibid., Article 8(2)(a). 
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community or nation concerned.”207 Last but not least, she or he has the right to 
“…determine their own identity or membership in accordance with their customs 
and traditions.”208 
As we can appreciate, through the incorporation of a variety of rights 
connected with indigenous identity, the Declaration has fully recognised their right to 
self-identification as members of an indigenous group, and therefore the protection of 
the individual self-perception as such. Additionally, it has also incorporated the 
collective perception of cultural distinctiveness, that is, to live as distinct peoples as 
is worded in the Declaration.209 The latter, refers to what Martínez Cobo has 
mentioned as ‘group consciousness’.210 Moreover, this group dimension is perhaps 
the most innovative element introduced by the Declaration in comparison with the 
previous two analysed ILO Conventions. In fact, in those Conventions, indigenous 
people were addressed as individuals, as human beings with specific and distinctive 
ethno-cultural identities, which justified the recognition of tailored rights in order to 
facilitate the full enjoyment of their rights and freedoms. Though, in case of the 
Declaration, we do not only find the incorporation of this individual dimension but 
also a group dimension, which seems to attribute rights to indigenous groups 
themselves, as a societal cultural entity with its own subjectivity and not just as an 
aggregation of individuals that share the same cultural identities and distinctiveness.  
One may argue that one indicia of the recognition of indigenous peoples as a 
societal entity or group lies on the fact that they are addressed under the 
denomination of “peoples” and not as mere “populations”, as in the case of the ILO 
Convention No. 107. This observation, however, does not –in itself– make a decisive 
contribution in order to answer the question, as we have already discussed when 
reviewing its terminological incorporation within the text of the ILO Convention No. 
169. However, the answer could be different if we add to this semantic observation 
the fact that the Declaration refers to itself as “a standard of achievement to be 
pursued in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect…”211 Why? Because when we 
                                                          
207 Ibid., Article 9. 
208 Ibid., Article 33(1). 
209 Ibid., Article 7(2). 
210 See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, Study of the Problem of discrimination Against Indigenous 
Populations, Volume V, Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, cit., p. 29, in particular, para. 
381. 
211 See, UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Preamble. 
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talk about partnership and mutual respect, then the question is between… whom? 
The answer now seems to be quite clear, between the Indigenous peoples and –of 
course– the States.212  
It would be quite difficult to admit, from the point of view of international 
law and even public law in general, that the relationship between a national State and 
its citizens is based on standards of “partnership and mutual respect.” If not for 
other reasons, this is just because the very same individuals or citizens intrinsically 
represent one of the ontologically constitutive elements of every national State, 
which is its population. Hence, the State cannot –by a matter of logical principles– 
have a relationship of partnership, which is a relationship between two or more 
separate entities that associatively interact at the same level, with… itself. Then, if 
this is correct, it seems that we will have to acknowledge that the Declaration 
addresses indigenous peoples not only as an aggregation of individuals, with 
individual and collective cultural interests, but also as a group, with its own 
subjective personality and even rights.213  
The same conclusion has to be drawn from the different obligations that, 
according to the Declaration, States have to perform “in consultation and 
cooperation with indigenous peoples”, such as –for instance– “…take the 
appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this 
Declaration”214, but not only.215 It seems to be clear that, in modern democracies, 
legislative bodies have the representation of the will of the people, and therefore –as 
a matter of principle– they do not need to act “in consultation and cooperation” with 
their citizens any time that they pass a piece of legislation. The mere act of 
                                                          
212 In fact, the same preamble states that “…treaties, agreements and other constructive 
arrangements, and the relationship they represent, are the basis for a strengthened partnership 
between indigenous peoples and States.” Constructive arrangements, like –for instance– it could be 
even considered the same Declaration.  
213 According to Prof. Anaya, in his vest of UN Special Rapporteur, the declaration however “…does 
not affirm or create special rights separate from the fundamental human rights that are deemed of 
universal application, but rather elaborates upon these fundamental rights in the specific cultural, 
historical, social and economic circumstances of indigenous peoples.” As we will see within the 
following section, this does not seem to be the case. See, S. J. ANAYA, Promotion and Protection of 
All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to 
Development. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous people, cit., p. 13, para. 40. 
214 See, Article 38 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
215 Other provisions of the Declaration that incorporate the above mentioned wording, are Articles 
15(2), 17(2),  36(2), 37, and last, but not least, the Preamble itself.  
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legislating presumes –in itself– the said consultation and cooperation. Hence, if in 
the case of indigenous people States have to act in consultation and cooperation with 
them, then it is because they do not constitute an integrative part of the population 
but just as a different societal entity, a group, with which States have to engage in 
‘partnership’.216     
Last but definitely not the least, the Declaration clearly affirms that 
indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination, in a sense that by virtue of 
this right, they “…freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.”217 The only semantic difference 
between Article 3 of the Declaration and the common Article 1(1) of the two 1966 
International Covenants consists in the use of the term “indigenous peoples” at the 
place of “all peoples”. Vis-à-vis this clear terminological connection, it would be 
quite difficult to argue that indigenous people are not “peoples” in the sense of 
holders of the right to self-determination, but… someone could rightfully ask which 
version of the right to self-determination. A plain version of it, including the right of 
secession from the territory of the current State in which they live, or just a 
diminished version of it, consisted on what has been called ‘internal self-
determination’?218     
As we know, the right to self-determination should be understood –in its 
widest or general sense– as the right to all people to choose their own political, 
economic and social systems and their own international status.219 Indigenous people 
                                                          
216 This relationship between States and indigenous people, has been framed, by the former UN 
Special Rapporteur Mrs. Daes, as a process of “belated State-building”, that is a process “through 
which indigenous peoples are able to join with all the other peoples that make up the State on 
mutually-agreed upon and just terms, after many years of isolation and exclusion.” It seems that for 
the author, indigenous people did not participate and are not part of the “peoples” that currently 
constitute the population of a given State. Rather than controversial, this position seems to be an 
essentialization of the existing societal dynamics in open, pluralist and modern democracies. See, E.-I. 
A. DAES, Some Considerations on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination, in Transn’ 
L. & Contemp. Probs., 3(1), 1993, p. 9, cited by S. J. ANAYA, Promotion and Protection of All 
Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to 
Development. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous people, cit., p. 14, para. 46.     
217 See, Article 3 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
218 For a brief account on the distinction between internal and external self-determination, see M. 
NOWAK, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. CCPR Commentary, 2005, p. 22 et seq. For a 
more detailed explanation, see, A. CASSESE, op. cit., p. 67 et seq. For our own account of this 
distintion, see Chapter II, Section 4.1 to 4.3.    
219 See, A. CRISTESCU, The Right to Self-Determination. Historical and current development on the 
basis of United Nations instruments, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1, Special Rapporteur of the 
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are indeed “peoples” in a sense of being an undifferentiated part of “all peoples”, 
considered without ethno cultural discriminations. In fact, according to the former 
UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Aureliu Cristescu, the term “people” denotes a social 
entity possessing a clear identity and its own characteristics, which implies a 
relationship with a territory, and until now indigenous people fulfil those criteria; but 
–he clarified– that they should not be confused with ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities.220 And in this latter case, indigenous people also match the criterion of 
being an “ethnic” minority (when indigenous peoples find themselves in a 
minoritarian situations vis-à-vis the dominant majority, which happens in most 
cases).221 According to Mr. Cristescu, the reason for this exception lies on the fact 
that the rights of minorities are regulated by a different disposition, that is by Article 
27 of the ICCPR222, but not only. In fact, he also found grounds for this exception on 
the content and meaning of the ‘principle of territorial integrity and political unity of 
sovereign and independent States’, developed in the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (GA res. 2625 XXV).223  
For the above mentioned reasons, indigenous populations living in the 
territory of sovereign and independent States, and –therefore– being an integrative 
part of its independent and sovereign political unity, would not have the possibility –
as a matter of principle– to exercise the right of self-determination. That is, in a sense 
of “…authorizing dismemberment or amputation of sovereign States exercising their 
sovereignty by virtue of the principle of self-determination of peoples.”224 In fact, 
this general limitation, which lies at the bottom of the international community’s 
structure (Articles 1(2) and 55 of the UN Charter)225, has also been rightfully 
incorporated into the text of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In 
effect, the Declaration clearly states that, nothing in it “…may be interpreted as 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, United Nations, 1981, 
p. 39, para. 268. 
220 Ibid., p. 41, para. 279. 
221 See, M. SCHEININ, What are Indigenous Peoples?, cit., p. 9 et seq. 
222 According to Prof. Ermacora this argumentation was not acceptable. For this eminent professor, 
“[a] minority can well be considered a people if a given minority has the elements of a people.” See, 
F. ERMACORA, op. cit., p. 327-328. 
223 See, A. CRISTESCU, op cit., p. 41, para. 279. In connection with this declaration and its 
application to the case of minorities, see also our considerations in Chapter II, Section 4.2. 
224 Ibid. 
225 See, A. CASSESE, op. cit., p. 73-74. 
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implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or 
to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nation or construed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or 
in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent 
States.”226          
Therefore, it seems to me that the Declaration does not authorise by any 
means the full exercise of the right to self-determination, or what has been called the 
right to external self-determination, and therefore, the possibility for indigenous 
societal aggregation to secede from the national territory of the State of which they 
form part.227 However, this does not absolutely mean that they would not be able to 
exercise –under any circumstance– this full version of the right to self-determination. 
Indigenous people are indeed peoples.228 In fact, we have to bear in mind that 
nothing in the Declaration may be used to “…deny any peoples [including –of 
course– indigenous people] their right to self-determination, exercised in conformity 
with international law.”229  
As it has been already maintained230, ethno-cultural groups which find 
themselves in a minority situation living within the territory of an independent and 
sovereign State –such as the case of indigenous people– could indeed have the 
possibility to exercise the right of external self-determination, and therefore 
legitimately secede ‘in conformity with international law’.231 And, this could happen 
                                                          
226 See, Article 46(1) of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
227 The extension of this full version of the right of self-determination has been clearly configured by 
the above mentioned UN Declaration on Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, which 
states that “[t]he establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or 
integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely 
determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by the 
people.”  
228 See, S. J. ANAYA, The Contours of Self-Determination and its Implementation: Implications of 
Developments Concerning Indigenous Peoples, cit., p. 10. According to Mrs. Daes, the only potential 
distinction between “indigenous” peoples, and “peoples” generally, would be no other than “…the 
fact that groups typically identified as “indigenous” have been unable to exercise the right of self-
determination by participating in the construction of a contemporary nation-state.” See, E.-I. A. 
DAES, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous 
People. Working paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the concept of 
“Indigenous people”, cit., p. 22-23, para. 72. See also, A. XANTHAKI, Indigenous Rights and United 
Nations Standards, cit., p. 140 et seq. 
229 See, UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Preamble. 
230 See, Chapter II, Section 4.3. 
231 This argumentation introduces us to the topic of the legitimacy of self-determination. For its 
extension and complication it is not possible to develop it within the framework of this work, but we 
can just briefly say that the main aspect of legitimation lies on the recognition and support that the 
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in those cases of absolutely exceptional circumstances in which the group itself and 
its members would be subjected to a situation of extreme violence, just because of 
their ethno-cultural appurtenances (e.g. genocide or ethnic cleansing). Situations, 
which –for their extreme characteristics– do not give any room for any other action 
other than revolt against their own imminent and certain physical destruction.232 
Again, the exercise of this sort of “remedial secession”233 could be exceptionally 
authorised by international law234 not because of their character as indigenous 
people, but because of their nature as just “peoples”, without consideration of their 
cultural distinctiveness or indigenousness.  
But then, how do we interpret the scope and legal extension of the right to 
self-determination enshrined in the Declaration? As in most cases, the answer is 
provided by the text of the Declaration itself. In fact, Article 4 clearly states that 
“[i]indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right 
to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local 
affairs…” Hence, the right to self-determination, in a sense to “freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”, 
as recognised in Article 3 of the Declaration, actually means that these populations 
can channel their exercise by means of seeking autonomy and self-government. 
However, the recognition of this right does not absolutely mean that they are free and 
not obliged by the limitation contained in Article 46 of the Declaration, that is, the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
pretended exercise of the right to self-determination (in its secession form) can gain from the relevant 
international organisation and community. In words of Prof. Ermacora, “[l]egitimacy of self-
determination must take into consideration whether by the claim of self-determination international 
harmony would be favoured; whether the international community is confronted with an already 
accepted form of new entity (such as a condominion, a small State, a protectorate) and whether the 
entity can prove its future viability.”  See, F. ERMACORA, op. cit., p. 330. The case of Kosovo is 
perhaps a good concrete example on this matter. In this sense, see, I.C.J., Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory 
Opinion, Report 2010, No. 141, p. 29, para. 78 et seq.  
232 Nevertheless, even in those absolute extreme cases, the proposed solution is not pacific among 
members of the international community. In fact, the ICJ, in its advisory opinion regarding the case of 
Kosovo, has recognised that “…differences existed regarding whether international law provides for 
a right of “remedial secession” and, if so, in what circumstances”, and preferred to not take a clear 
stand in the matter. See, I.C.J., Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, Report 2010, No. 141, p. 31, para. 82. 
233 See, M. WELLER, Escaping the Self-Determination Trap, Leiden/Boston, 2008, p. 59 et seq. 
234 We have to always remember that the general principle of international law applicable to the case 
of cession is that ‘[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the 
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations’. See, UN Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and 
peoples, No. 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, Article 6. 
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prohibition to engage in any acts that could disrupt the territorial integrity and 
political unity of the national State of which they form an integrative part. And this is 
nothing but the recognition of the right to internal self-determination.235  
Furthermore, in case of potential interpretative problems, as could be the case 
in connection with the scope and extension of the recognised right of self-
determination, the Declaration clearly states –in its last but not least paragraph– that 
all its provisions “…shall be interpreted in accordance with the principles of justice, 
democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, good governance 
and good faith.”236 To state the obvious, this means that even the right to self-
determination has to be interpreted and applied under the light of these legal 
principles; which also mean that it has to be exercised within the framework of the 
democratic national institutions that guarantee the good governance and political 
unity of a territorially integrated State. Indeed, in modern, open, and pluralist 
democratic societies, the claims for autonomy and self-government have to follow 
the political channels of good governance in full respect of the principles of rule of 
law and democratic decision making procedures.  
As it has been already maintained, democracy is in essence a method. In fact, 
it is a procedural methodology in which all societal claims and political aspirations 
find room for an open and constructive dialogical negotiation. It implies that 
decisions are taken by majorities but with due protection of potential minorities –as 
in the case of indigenous people– under the safeguarding lights of the principles of 
equality, non-discrimination and full respect for recognised human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.  
Therefore, the right to autonomy or self-government recognised to indigenous 
peoples, in order to be institutionally implemented, has to be necessarily subjected to 
the democratic procedures of good governance, which in essence refers to the 
democratic dynamics of the national decision-making bodies. It is in this political 
dimension that indigenous people’s claims for autonomy and self-government in 
economic, social and cultural spheres have to be deal with. Professor Anaya, in his 
vest of UN Special Rapporteur, has considered that the implementation of the 
Declaration requires the ‘transformation of broader legal structures in key areas’, 
                                                          
235 See, A. CASSESE, op. cit., p. 101 et seq. 
236 See, Article 46(3) of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
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carrying in this sense ‘a number of implications for broader State governance’, 
which realization implies ‘a whole package of legal and administrative 
transformations, particularly regarding property and natural resources law and 
administration.”237  
If the above interpretation is correct, then the legitimate channel in a 
democratic society for pursuing those changes necessarily consist in introducing 
them into the hands of the decision-making legislative bodies, in an open, pluralist 
and inclusive manner. Moreover, in order to be inclusive, that democratic process 
should grant participation to indigenous people’s representatives, not necessarily 
through their incorporation into the very corps of the legislative body (which is 
necessarily subjected to the societal political dynamics of each society), but –at 
least– through fair and effective mechanism of consultations.238 But this also means 
that indigenous peoples would have to accept in good faith the democratic outcome 
of that democratic participation, even when they find themselves in disagreement 
with the said democratic result.  
Furthermore, it is under the above democratic light that we have to interpret 
the introduced requirement of consultation. This is particularly the case of the 
provision of the Declaration that states that, before adopting and implementing 
legislative or administrative measures that may affect indigenous people’s rights, 
“States shall consult and cooperate in good faith […] in order to obtain their free, 
prior and informed consent.”239 This means that States’ authorities and indigenous 
people’s representatives have to engage in an open and constructive dialogical 
process, with the objective to reach in good faith, an acceptable agreement for all 
interests involved.240 Act ‘in order to obtain’ means just that. It means to establish an 
open, inclusive and dialogical democratic process, methodologically able to reach 
                                                          
237 See, S. J. ANAYA, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development. Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, cit., p. 15-16, paras. 50-
51. 
238 In fact, Article 18 of the Declaration introduces the principle of consultation, when states that 
“[i]indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect 
their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, 
as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.” 
239 See, Article 19 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
240 For up-dated information in connection of the participation of indigenous peoples in decision-
making processes, see the Report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(EMRIP), Progress report on the study on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-
making, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/35, Human Rights Council, 2010, in particular, p. 17 et seq. 
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balanced positions between the different interests at stake.241 The contrary would be 
nothing but the “democratic tyranny” of a given ethno-cultural group. 
Finally, and as a conclusive remark with regard to this Declaration, we can 
say that this instrument, under the influences of indigenous activist, scholars and 
lobbyists, has not engaged in the conceptual exercise of defining the notion of 
indigenous people, perhaps conscious of the epistemological and conceptual 
difficulties that this notion enshrines.242 Instead, the drafters focussed on the creation 
of a differentiated set of rights that will ideally match the cultural differentness of its 
beneficiaries. It seems to me that indigenous movements have succeeded in 
achieving –at least under a declaratory form– their political claims for a separate and 
distinguishable society, in which its members would enjoy a differential set of 
culturally tailored rights based on their ethno-cultural appurtenances. Indeed, this 
would be an exclusive society with exclusive members, in a sense that all other 
fellow humans would be excluded.  
Within the new philosophical standing of the Declaration, the full 
participation of indigenous people within the political, economic, social and cultural 
life of the State, in full equality and non-discriminatory guaranties, is regarded as a 
second option. Meanwhile, the strength and further development of their distinct 
political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, as a societal framework for 
a concrete separate and differentiated society, is considered as a the main and 
purported goal.243 
In this sense, it seems that the multiculturalist option for equally divided 
societies, composed of equal and distinguishable ethno-cultural societal entities or 
                                                          
241 This interpretation has been endorsed by UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Anaya. In fact, he has 
concluded that Article 19 of the Declaration “…should not be regarded as according indigenous 
peoples a general “veto power” over decisions that may affect them, but rather as establishing 
consent as the objective of consultations with indigenous peoples.” See, S. J. ANAYA, Promotion 
and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including 
the Right to Development. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, Human Right 
Council, 2009, p. 16, para. 46. 
242 According to UN Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Daes, “[i]ndigenous representatives on several 
occasions have expressed the view, before the working Group that a definition of the concept of 
“indigenous people” is not necessary or desirable.” See, E.-I. A. DAES, Standard-Setting Activities: 
Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous People. Working paper by the 
Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the concept of “Indigenous people”, cit., p. 
12, para. 35. 
243 See, Article 5 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
CHAPTER IV 
232 
 
groups, but with equally unequal individual members, has won this particular 
declaratory battle under the new indigenous people’s cultural clothes.244 However, 
the future fate of this Declaration is still unclear; we will have to wait for a new 
ideological battle, the battle for its implementation.245 Hopefully, this battle would be 
conducted within the dialogical argumentative arena of democratic institutions, 
giving to all parties the possibility to participate, but also with civic respect for the 
democratic outcome of the so-called ‘democratic game’. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Coming back to our initial question, namely, whether or not indigenous 
people should enjoy special and tailored rights, as a distinctive segment of human 
society, after analysing the two ILO Conventions and in particular the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the answer seems to be quite clear. 
In fact, the international community has –at least– declared that they are entitled to 
be considered as a separate and distinguishable societal aggregation. Especially, 
within the Declaration, the recognition of the right to self-determination goes in that 
direction. In effect, this right –even in its reduced version of internal self-
determination– involves a collective dimension that is not escapable.246 As the same 
Declaration has recognised, “…indigenous peoples possess collective rights which 
are indispensable for their existence, well-being and integral development as 
                                                          
244 In connection with our considerations with regard to multiculturalism and its societal concerns, see 
Chapter I, Section 3 and 4.  
245 If we stay with the words of Mrs. Daes, the idea of having separate societies divided by the ethno-
cultural notion of indigenousness would continuously make its path. In fact, at the very end of her 
explorative conceptual exercise, she stressed that “…we must ensure that the eventual implementation 
of a declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples is entrusted to a body which is fair-minded and 
open to the views of indigenous peoples and Governments, so that there is room for the reasonable 
evolution and regional specificity of the concept of “indigenous” in practise.” E.-I. A. DAES, 
Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous People. 
Working paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the concept of 
“Indigenous people”, cit., p. 23, para. 74. 
246 Even if the right to self-determination has been incorporated within human rights instruments, that 
is, the two 1966 International Covenants, it goes beyond the individual dimension of each person, and 
incorporates a collective dimension that is enshrined within the notion of “all peoples”, in the case of 
the Covenants, or “indigenous peoples”, in case of the Declaration. This collective dimension, as we 
already saw in this and previous Chapters necessarily conducts to the notion of group or societal 
aggregation, in a sense that is the collectivity, the group rather than each individual, who can claim 
and exercise this right. See, M. NOWAK, op. cit., p. 14 et seq.     
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peoples.”247 Thus, their claim for being considered as a separate and distinguishable 
societal entity, as a specific group of peoples with specific rights248, seems to have 
been fulfilled. 
In this sense, the chosen path for the protection of their cultural diversity and 
their specific cultural manifestations, traditions, knowledge, values and world views, 
has not been the practical reinforcement and full implementation of the 
internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms. In fact, the latter 
can be deemed to have universal implications. This means that fundamental rights 
have to be recognised “…without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status”, as was clearly stated in what has been considered as the most 
enlightened and inspirational page of modern international societal regulation, 
namely, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).249 After the 
proclamation of this “common standard of achievement for all peoples and all 
nations”250, the Universal Declaration has put words that could frame the demands 
of all peoples in the world, for an equal respect of their inner dignity as members of 
the human family; asking for an equal recognition and respect for equally recognised 
rights.251  
Nevertheless, as we already saw in the first chapter of this work252, having the 
same human rights and fundamental freedoms for all human beings seems not to be 
satisfactory enough for all humans. Some humans, aggregated within societal 
distinguishable cultural entities, have claimed and still claim for a differential and 
exclusive set of rights that would ideally match their cultural distinctiveness. And we 
can possibly say that, in the case of indigenous peoples, they have successfully done 
so… at least under the light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.  
                                                          
247 See, UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Preamble. 
248 See, Report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP), Progress 
report on the study on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making, cit., p. 17, 
para. 67 et seq. 
249 See, Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
250 Ibid., Preamble.  
251 See, A. EIDE, G. ALFREDSSON, Introduction, in G. ALFREDSSON, A. EIDE (eds.), The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A Common Standard of Achievement, The 
Hague/Boston/London, 1999, p. xxxii. 
252 See, Chapter I, Section 3 et seq. 
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As I said before, this is nothing but the multiculturalist recognition of equally 
culturally divided societies, composed by equal and distinguishable ethno-cultural 
groups, but with equally unequal individual members. In fact, the multiculturalist 
logic, behind the recognition of a differential and exclusive set of rights to a societal 
aggregation exclusively composed of indigenous people, lies on the cultural fact of 
their cultural distinctiveness. That is, on the need to preserve their uniqueness 
through a unique (and exclusive) set of rights. But, on the other hand, this also means 
that those excluded from the enjoyment of these culturally tailored rights, are 
considered less culturally “unique” than those in possession of the said cultural 
distinctiveness, who have been identified under the term ‘indigenousness’. 
However, even when the conclusion reached in the previous paragraphs 
seems to satisfy one element of the inquiry developed in this chapter, that is, the 
determination of the legal dimension and reception of the notion of indigenous 
people in international law, this finding is just connected with one of the two 
dimensions presented in this notion. The remaining dimension refers –of course– to 
the ontological implications of this notion; that is its axiological legitimation as a 
societal concept that enshrines and reflects the unique and distinguishable societal 
nature of indigenous groups that also gives justification to its differential (and 
exclusive) normative treatment. 
In this sense, our enquiry in connection with the different objective and 
subjective criteria used for the identification of indigenous people as a 
distinguishable people, and therefore as culturally “unique” vis-à-vis the rest of 
human cultural societies, was quite unsuccessful. First of all, indigenous people’s 
culture cannot be considered as more “unique” than other cultural manifestations. 
All cultures are equally unique, because all of them provide an equally functional 
essential content to human beings.253 From the perspective of the individual, the 
cultural bearer, his or her own culture is as unique as all the others; it is in his or her 
cultural construction where the individual finds his or her meaning of life, his or her 
understanding of the world, his or her articulated sense of the good, the holy, the 
admirable.254 In fact, as it has been already stated, all cultures have equal functional 
                                                          
253 See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, cit., para. 1. 
254 See, Ch. TAYLOR, The Politics of Recognition, in A. GUTMANN (ed.), Multiculturalism. 
Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton, 1994, p. 72-73. 
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value, indigenous or non-indigenous cultures alike. 255 Hence, from an ontological 
point of view, the alleged intrinsic cultural distinctiveness of indigenous cultures 
does not make them different or more distinctive than non-indigenous cultures; both 
are equally distinctive.  
Furthermore, if we just focus on what has been identified as the most relevant 
distinguishable cultural feature of these populations, which is their special 
relationship with their traditional lands, as we saw in the previous sections, the final 
result does not change. In fact, this conceptual understanding involves what we have 
called a sort of dogmatic “essentialization” of their identity. This is because, it 
enshrines the dogmatic equation of indigenousness = special relationship with 
traditional lands256, which deprives of indigenous identity those large majorities of 
self-identified indigenous people living in urban areas for generations257, but not 
only. It is also based on an additional essentialization, which is the assumption of the 
unchangeable, timeless and even culturally uncontaminated character of indigenous 
cultures. Culture is in essence a dynamic dialogical process; thus, even indigenous 
cultures change and adapt under the societal influences of external cultures and –
even most importantly– under the effect of time and space circumstances. 258  
For the above mentioned reasons, we would have to perhaps understand as a 
dogmatic essentialization those views that consider that, without having a current 
and permanent relationship with their traditional lands, an indigenous person would 
lose his or her indigenousness, and therefore would be deprived of his or her cultural 
identity. As culture, cultural identities are complex, dialogical and relational by 
nature. And, as culture, identities are subjected to change, and reach their potential 
through a dialogical perpetual exchange.259 In other words, the idea of deprivation of 
cultural identity, by means of the essentialization of its objective components, is 
quite contrary to the same ontological understanding of culture and identity.260 
                                                          
255 See, Chapter II, Section 3.4.1.  
256 For further explanation of why we have chosen the sematic construction “dogmatic equation”, see 
in this Chapter, Section 2.4.         
257 See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Indigenous Peoples in Comparative Perspective - Problems and 
Policies, cit., p. 25-26. 
258 See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, cit., para. 4. 
259 For more detailed explanation of the notion of “cultural identity”, see our considerations in Chapter 
III, Section 4 et seq. 
260 Perhaps one exception to this general understanding could be found in those few indigenous 
communities living in isolation or which do not maintain regular contact with external societal 
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Furthermore, even the construction of indigenous identity over the objective criterion 
of being descendants of those first inhabitants that populated the current national 
territory at the time of the colonisation, invasion or otherwise unjust dispossession of 
their traditional lands, has been retained as ontologically problematic, for its 
biological and hence racially related connotations. 261 
Therefore, as we have concluded above, without having any grounded 
objective elements that can ontologically sustain the cultural claim of distinctiveness, 
what rests is the subjective element of self-understanding as being different. 
Indigenous people’s culture is (more) different and unique than other cultures 
because indigenous people perceive it as more different and unique (descriptive 
dimension), and then all the other members of the society should perceive it as such 
(prescriptive dimension). In fact, the same Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples seams to subscribe to this position when in its forefront affirms the 
recognition of the right “…of all peoples to be different, to consider themselves 
different, and to be respected as such.”262 As you can see, the Declaration 
semantically refers to “all peoples”, but actually, if we read this passage under the 
light of its object and purpose263, we will promptly realise that it refers rather to the 
right of “indigenous” peoples to be culturally different, to be seen as different, and to 
be treated as such. Indeed, the right of indigenous peoples “as peoples”, was already 
recognised and guaranteed because they form part of the undistinguishable and 
integrative societal notion of “all peoples”, regardless their ethnicity, race, colour, or 
cultural appurtenance. 
The right to every single person to enjoy his or her cultural identity, as he or 
she defines it, and to take part in the cultural life of both, his or her group of 
appurtenance (if it is the case) and with regard to the mainstream society, is beyond 
any question.264 However, the enjoyment of this individual right is not the same as a 
potential claim of a given group to be seen as different, and to constrain all the other 
                                                                                                                                                                    
aggregations. In connection with them, see the Human Rights Council Expert Mechanism on the 
Rights of Indigenous People’s Report called “Draft Guidelines on the Protection of Indigenous 
Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and in Initial contact of the Amazon Basin and El Chaco, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/EMRIP/2009/6, of 30 June 2009. 
261 For a more detailed explanation, see in this Chapter, section 2.4. See also, K. A. APPIAH, op. cit., 
p. 136-137; and F. ERMACORA, op. cit., p. 294.  
262 See, UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Preamble. 
263 See, Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties.  
264 See our considerations in connection with these rights in Chapter III, section 4.1. et seq. 
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members of the society to treat it as being different. That is, through granting to it a 
special and exclusive set of rights, for the –allow me the redundancy– exclusive 
enjoyment of its exclusive culturally defined members.  
In other words, from an individual perspective, an indigenous person, who is 
indigenous because he or she sees himself or herself as such (self-identification), can 
fully enjoy his or her life and therefore his or her indigenousness in association with 
all other persons that identify themselves in the same manner, almost without any 
restriction. Nevertheless, from a group perspective, the answer does not seem to be 
the same. In fact, if an indigenous group, because it considers itself as ontologically 
different from the rest of the society –and therefore culturally distinguishable as a 
different societal entity– requests to be granted with a differential set of rights for the 
exclusive enjoyment of its indigenous members, then the very idea of all human 
beings being equal in rights and dignity seems to start suffering.265  
Then, what can be done about this? Just continue in this axiological 
multiculturalist path of segmentation of human society in equal societal ethno-
cultural entities or groups, biologically divided according to the criterion of 
descendancy (as we saw is the case of indigenous people) and therefore –even when 
we would not like to admit it– racially divided under the new conceptual clothes of 
ethnicity (as Appiah warned us266)? A multiculturalist society is the one in which 
human beings –individuals– would have the possibility to enjoy and share the same 
equal rights of their fellow group members, but not the same equal and 
undistinguishable status in rights and fundamental freedoms than the rest of the 
human family. In short, the multiculturalist proposal, in which, it seems that the 
indigenous people’s claim for culturally and institutionally divided societies finds its 
axiological contents, would conduct us to a society of equal groups and cultural 
entities, but not necessarily to a society composed of equal human beings, in rights 
and dignity.267  
Moreover, we can still ask ourselves whether the ethno-cultural segmentation 
of the society is the beginning of the realisation of a more effective equality among 
ontologically equal human beings, or if it is –on the contrary– the beginning of its 
                                                          
265 See, Article 1 of the Unversal Declaration of Human Righs. 
266 See, K. A. APPIAH, op. cit., p. 136-137. 
267 For further consideration in connection with this axiological analysis, see Chapter I, Section 6. 
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end. In fact, it seems that the materialisation of this ‘end’ starts through the 
construction and recognition of differential legal status, with differential and 
exclusive rights and freedoms, for each ethno-cultural group. Indeed, the latter 
situation would consequentially generate nothing but the allocation of humans in 
distinguishable unequal positions, according to their ethno-cultural appurtenances, 
that is, according to their cultural distinctiveness.  
At least for now, the political direction taken by the international community 
it is quite clear, and the success of the increasingly effective lobby carried out by 
indigenous organisations, within the different international and regional fora, too.268 
What still remains doubtful is whether these developments take us toward a better 
and full realisation of the inspirational values enshrined within our axiological 
international cornerstone, that is, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or not. 
Personally, I remain sceptical and unconvinced of the ontological goodness of human 
divisiveness.      
The question is still the same, and it is about how we can ontologically 
interpret human rights. In effect, they could be seen as equal minimum standards for 
all, based on our equal dignity, regardless of potential different ethno-cultural 
appurtenances, but which nevertheless guarantee the full realisation of our cultural 
self. Alternatively, they could also be seen as equal rights for equal human societal 
aggregations or groups, culturally distinguishable and composed by individuals who 
would enjoy a differential set of rights and legal status, based on their ethno-cultural 
memberships. The former interpretation ideally leads toward a society of culturally 
diverse but equal humans; the latter, toward a society of equally culturally diverse 
humans, but not necessarily equals. To say it straightforwardly, diversity in equality 
or equality in diversity, this is the question. 
But again, what can we do? What is the answer to this axiological galimatias? 
Because the problem is indeed axiological, then the answer should be necessarily 
axiological too. This valuative answer will certainly depend on which axiological 
understanding of equality we would like to embrace. Equality for groups, or equality 
for individuals, again, this is the question.   
                                                          
268 See, H. HANNUM, op. cit., p. 90 et seq. 
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In attempting to provide –at least– a potential answer to this question, we will 
–within the following chapters– critically examine the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (I-ACtHR) in connection with indigenous people’s 
land claims. Why? Because this regional court, as a culturally neutral judicial body 
(at least from the theoretical point of view of its conventional mandate), has legally 
dealt with the objective element that has been identified as constitutive of the 
indigenous people’s cultural distinctiveness, namely, their special relationship with 
their traditional lands, but not only. Also –and even most importantly– because it has 
done it from a perspective of a regional instrument that recognises equal human 
rights for all individuals, regardless their ethno-cultural affiliations, that is, the 
American Convention on Human Rights also known as “Pact of San Jose, Costa 
Rica.”269  
In other words, the analysis of this regional jurisprudence will provide us with 
the possibility to see if the claim for justice and redress advanced by indigenous 
people can be fulfilled without falling into the axiological multiculturalist trap.270 
That is, without the need to segment our common societies into culturally 
distinguishable societal aggregations, in which their human members would enjoy 
equally distinguishable but unequal rights. 
 
  
                                                          
269 The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) was adopted by the delegates of the member 
States of the Organization of the American States (OAS) in the Inter-American Specialized 
Conference on Human, which was held in San José, Costa Rica, on the 22nd of November 1969, and 
entered into force on July 18, 1978. The ACHR has received 25 ratifications from the 35 OAS’s 
member States, but today has only 24 States Parties (Trinidad and Tobago denounced it in 1998). 
Source: OAS’s Department of International Law, 23/01/12. 
270 See, Chapter I, Section 4.2. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
 
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ LAND CLAIMS 
 
“In the present domain of protection, International law 
has indeed been made use of, in order to improve and strengthen, 
and never to weaken or undermine, the protection of the 
recognised rights inherent to all human beings.” Judge Antônio 
Augusto Cançado Trindade, ICJ.1  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As it has been maintained within the precedent chapters, at the theoretical 
level, indigenous people’s claims for justice and redress for the suffering caused by 
past injustices, such as colonialism2, and for modification and amelioration of their 
current general living conditions of disempowerment and societal exclusion3, have 
assumed –in most cases– the form of claims for their legal recognition as a specific 
group of peoples with specific, exclusive and tailored rights.4  
                                                 
1 See, A. A. CANÇADO TRINDADE, The Developing Case Law of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, in Human Rights Law Review, 3-1, 2003. p. 25. 
2 As an example of the current acknowledgement by the international community of these past 
tragedies, and their present consequences, we can always quote the UN Durban Declaration, 
especially when it states that “[w]e acknowledge the suffering caused by colonialism and affirm that, 
wherever and whenever it occurred, it must be condemned and its reoccurrence prevented.  We 
further regret that the effects and persistence of these structures and practices have been among the 
factors contributing to lasting social and economic inequalities in many parts of the world today” 
See, Report of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance, UN Doc. A/CONF.189/12, 2001, p. 12, para. 14 
3 As the UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Martínez Cobo, has concluded –in his famous study of the 
problem of discrimination against indigenous people populations– “…the social conditions in which 
the majority of indigenous populations lived were favourable to the specific types of discrimination, 
oppression and exploitation in various fields […]. In many countries they were at the bottom of the 
socio-economic scale.” See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, Study of the Problem of discrimination 
Against Indigenous Populations, Volume V, Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, New York, 1987, p. 1. 
4 See, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP), Progress report on the study 
on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/35, 
Human Rights Council, 2010, in particular, p. 17, para. 67. 
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In fact, as we saw in our previous chapter, indigenous people’s struggles were 
and are still focused on their recognition as “peoples”, in a sense given to this term 
by international law. That is, as a societal aggregation, fully entitled to their own 
self-determination in order to ‘freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development’, ‘freely dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources’, and in order to ‘not be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence’, as the common Article 1 of the two 1966 International Covenants 
recognise to “all peoples”.5  
As it has been maintained, indigenous people are indeed “peoples”, in a sense 
that they are indistinguishably included as integrative part of the notion “all 
peoples”, considered without any ethno-cultural distinction.6 However, indigenous 
people’s self-perception as being “peoples” does not mean to be an undistinguishable 
part of “all peoples”. On the contrary, it means to be a differential segment of 
peoples, with clear ethno-cultural differential boundaries, constructed as a reflection 
of their cultural differentness, which places them in a culturally separate but equal 
position –as a distinguishable societal aggregation– vis-à-vis the mainstream or non-
indigenous society.7 As members of the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples stressed, for these populations “[s]elf-determination is an 
ongoing process which ensures that indigenous peoples continue to participate in 
                                                 
5 See, S. J. ANAYA, The Contours of Self-Determination and its Implementation: Implications of 
Developments Concerning Indigenous Peoples, in G. ALFREDSSON, M. STAVROPOULOU (eds.), 
Justice Pending: Indigenous Peoples and Other Good Causes. Essay in Honour of Erica-Irene A. 
Daes, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, p, 6 et seq. See also, G. ALFREDSSON, Different Forms 
of and Claims to the Right of Self-Determination, in D. CLARK, R. WILLIAMSON (eds.), Self-
Determination. International Perspectives, London, 1996, p. 71 et seq. 
6 In connection with the understanding in international law of indigenous people as “peoples”, see our 
consideration in Chapter IV, Section 3. See also –among other authors– J. CASTELLINO, Conceptual 
Difficulties and the Right to Indigenous Self-Determination, in N. GHANEA, A. XANTHAKI (eds.), 
Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination, Leiden/Boston, 2005, p. 55 et seq.; A. XANTHAKI, The 
Right to Self-Determination: Meaning and Scope, in N. GHANEA, A. XANTHAKI (eds.), Minorities, 
Peoples and Self-Determination, Leiden/Boston, 2005, p. 15 et seq.  
7 See, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of 
Standards concerning the rights of Indigenous People: The concept of "Indigenous Peoples", UN 
Doc.  E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2/Add.1, United Nations, 1996, para. 5 and 13; see also, E.-I. A. 
DAES, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous 
People. Working paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the concept of 
“Indigenous people”, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2, United Nations, 1996, p. 14-15, para. 40-
41. 
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decision-making and control over their own destinies”, as –I will add– 
distinguishable ethno-cultural entities.8  
Furthermore, if we stay to the conclusions reached in the precedent chapter, it 
seems that the trend of international law is going in the direction of greater 
affirmation of indigenous people’s rights of self-determination, in particular in a 
sense of socio-political, economical and institutional autonomy and self-
government.9 However, the ultimate goal of the self-determination political 
campaign, which refers to the achievement of ethno-cultural indigenous statehood, 
seems to be –from a perspective of international law– quite unreachable, at least in 
the foreseeable future.10  
As we can see, after a few decades11, the political battles fought by 
indigenous movements, activists, lobbyists and even scholars within the international 
area, have been quite successful.12 They have conditioned international discourses 
and the way that international community dealt with indigenous people’s issues in a 
quite decisive manner. Examples of this political path can be found reflected in 
international law, passing from the early patronising but protective approach of the 
ILO Convention No. 107, to the tepid autonomic approach of the ILO Convention 
No. 169, and to the final recognition of the right to internal self-determination of the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  
However, the political approach is not the only possible one. In fact, the 
above mentioned political actions have resulted in the affirmation of, within 
internationally recognised human rights standards, a concrete number of rights –that 
have been constructed in a tailored fashion– in order to better protect indigenous 
                                                 
8 See, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP), Progress report on the study 
on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making, cit., p. 9, para. 31. 
9 See, Article 3, 5, 18, 36 and 37 of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted on 
13 September 2007, by the UN General Assembly Res. No. 61/295. In connection with this 
Declaration, see our considerations in Chapter IV, Section 3.3. 
10 In connection with the possibility to exercise the right to remedial self-determination, see -among 
other authors- M. WELLER, Escaping the Self-Determination Trap, Leiden/Boston, 2008, p. 59 et 
seq. 
11 United Nation has declared, following its standing tradition to promote specific rights, two 
International Decades of the World's Indigenous People. The first one covered the period 1995-2004 
(General Assembly Res. No. 48/163 of 21/12/1993), and the second one for the on-going period 2005-
2014 (General Assembly Res. No. 59/174 of 20/12/2004). In addition, and with the same purpose, UN 
has also declared in 1993 the International Year of the World’s Indigenous People, 1993 (General 
Assembly Res. No. 48/133, of 18/02/1994). 
12 See, S. J. ANAYA, op. cit., p. 7. 
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people’s enjoyment of their traditional way of life and dignity. Even when it seems 
that indigenous people have got a differential set of rights, culturally made in order 
to match their cultural distinctiveness or indigenousness, some authors 
authoritatively argue that they have not.13 They affirm that this new indigenous 
standards, in particular those enshrined in the Declaration, have been elaborated upon 
the existing fundamental human rights and freedoms, but taking into account the 
specific cultural, historical, social and economic circumstances of indigenous 
peoples.14  
In other words, indigenous people’s distinguishable norms would be nothing 
but a re-interpretation of the very same catalogue of fundamental rights available to 
all humans, just under a culturally friendly and inclusive light. A light under which 
indigenous people’s culture would ideally regain its distinctive dimension. If this is 
the case, then it would be possible to overtake one of the main and central weakness 
of indigenous people legal regime, namely the lack of specific judicial or even quasi-
judicial mechanism with concrete jurisdiction to supervise the full respect, 
applicability and enforcement of these rights, in concrete and specific cases.15   
It would be far away from the scope of this work to review and analyse –even 
briefly– all international bodies that, with greater or lesser degree, have judicial, 
quasi-judicial or just political monitoring functions or competences in connection 
with indigenous people’s rights and claims. Therefore, instead of engaging in a sort 
of enumerative action vis-à-vis these bodies, which have been already undertaken16, I 
                                                 
13 For detailed explanation of these two expressions, see Chapter IV, Section 2.2.3.  
14 See, S. J. ANAYA, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development. Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, UN Doc. A/HRC/9/9, 
Human Rights Council, 2008, p. 13, para. 40. 
15 As it has been said, the problem of a “protection gap” between existing human rights legislation and 
specific situations facing indigenous people “…is indeed of major significance and presents a 
challenge to international mechanism for the effective protection of human rights.” See, R. 
STAVENHAGEN, Indigenous Issues. Human rights and indigenous issues. Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, Mr. 
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, subitted pursuant to Commission resolution 2001/57, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2002/97, United Nations, 2002, p. 28, para. 102.  
16 See, among other authors, A. XANTHAKI, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards, 
Cambridge, 2007, p. 47 et seq.; P. THORNBERRY, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights, 
Manchester, 2002, p. 116 et seq.; S. J. ANAYA, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, New York, 
2004, p. 217 et seq.; E. STAMATOPOULOU, Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations: Human 
Rights as a Developing Dynamic, in Human Rights Quarterly, 16, 1994, p. 58 et seq.; E. 
STAMATOPOULOU, United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues: A Multifaceted 
Approach to Human Rights Monitoring, in G. ALFREDSSON, J. GRIMHEDEN (eds), International 
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would rather prefer to focus on one specific international body with the specific 
competence to adjudicate in human rights cases, through binding resolutions whose 
observance is mandatory for States.17 The reference is made in connection with the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Court” or “I-ACtHR”). I 
will explain within the following paragraphs the rationale behind this substantive 
and methodological choice.  
First of all, being an Argentinean Lawyer, I am naturally interested in the 
Inter-American System of human rights protection which is in force in the Americas, 
and in particular in the jurisprudence of its highest judicial organ, that is the above 
mentioned Inter-American Court. Of course, this argument would not be enough to 
persuade an attentive reader of the methodological and substantive connection 
between the jurisprudence of this judicial body and the conceptual framework that 
has been developed within the former chapters. Quite right, the geographical 
contexts do not lie at the bottom of this choice or –at least– not essentially. 
What has been the decisive factor is the landmark jurisprudence that the Inter-
American Court has developed in the recent years with regard to indigenous peoples’ 
rights, especially in connection with their right to communal property over their 
traditional lands and –fundamentally– their right to enjoy their own culture and 
traditions as different peoples. This remarkable jurisprudence, created by a regional 
judicial body, could be perhaps considered the result of the continuous battles by 
indigenous peoples recognised as such, as culturally diverse societal aggregation, 
with a distinguishable and differential cultural practices, understandings and 
worldviews vis-à-vis the rest of the human component of national societies.  
In fact, within the jurisprudence of this Court, we will be able to find almost 
all conceptual notions that we have critically analysed within our previous theoretical 
chapters. However, those notions will gain –in this case– a different interpretative 
light through their practical application within specific human rights cases, 
                                                                                                                                          
Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms. Essay in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller, 2nd revised Edition, 
Leiden/Boston, 2009, p. 355 et seq.; R. STAVENHAGEN, op. cit., p. 7 et seq.; J. M. 
PASQUALUCCI, The Evolution of International Indigenous Rights in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System, in Human Rights Law Review, 6, 2006, p. 281 et seq. 
17 According to Article 62 (1) of the American Convention, “[a] State Party may, upon depositing its 
instrument of ratification or adherence to this Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that it 
recognizes as binding, ipso facto, and not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court 
on all matters relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention.” 
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introduced into the Inter-American System of human rights protection, by the 
offended indigenous communities. Therefore, it would be possible also to see –as 
reflected or mirrored in these judicial cases– their own aspirations and claims for 
justice, which also echoed their political battles for the recognition of a differential 
set of exclusive rights, as a different and separate cultural entity. However, instead of 
giving support to the cultural partition of the society, these judicial cases will show 
us that it is possible to gain redress and justice –in cases of cultural wrongdoings– 
through innovative and perhaps even indigenous-oriented interpretation of common 
human rights standards. And this is not minor. 
Until now, the theoretical discussion was organised around the 
multiculturalist argument for divided societies between equally positioned ethno-
cultural aggregations, in a sense of each societal entity having the possibility to be 
regulated by a differentiated set of culturally tailored rights, and leading toward a 
society of unequal individuals, affiliated to equal groups.18 But again, here we could 
find a completely different approach that consists of granting culturally tailored 
judicial protection not through a differential set of culturally constructed rights, but 
through a culturally friendly interpretation of universally constructed rights; and 
hence –in principle– culturally neutral.  
Indeed, the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence and competence is based on 
an instrument with universal character, rather than a group oriented one. In fact, the 
rights and freedoms included within the American Convention on Human Rights or 
“Pact of San José, Costa Rica” (hereinafter, “the Convention”; “American 
Convention or “ACHR”) 19 are recognised “without any discrimination for reasons 
of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.”20 In short, 
fundamental human rights and freedoms are recognised without any discrimination, 
and in particular, without making any distinction in connection with the ethno-
                                                 
18 For further reading in connection with this topic, see our considerations in Chapter I, Section 4. 
19 The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) was adopted by the delegates of the member 
States of the Organization of the American States (OAS) in the Inter-American Specialized 
Conference on Human, which was held in San José, Costa Rica, on the 22nd of November 1969, and 
entered into force on July 18, 1978. The ACHR has received 25 ratifications from the 35 OAS’s 
member States, but today has only 24 States Parties (Trinidad and Tobago denounced it in 1998). 
Source: OAS’s Department of International Law, 23/01/12. 
20 See, Article 1(1) ACHR.  
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cultural appurtenances of the individuals subjected to the jurisdiction of the Court. 
As we can see, the approach, the semantic, and the philosophy behind this instrument 
is quite different from what we have called the multiculturalist proposal.21  
It would be possible to say that, an individual who identifies himself or 
herself as –for instance– an indigenous person would consider that an important part 
–perhaps the very essential one– of his or her identity is based on the special 
relationship that this person has with those lands that he or she regards as 
traditional.22 Therefore, for that individual, the semantic construction of both Article 
13 of the ILO Convention No. 169 and Article 25 of the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, it would perhaps be more culturally appealing and axiologically 
persuasive than Article 21 of the American Convention. In fact, Article 25 of the 
Declaration states that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to maintain and 
strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or 
otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other 
resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this 
regards.”23 On the contrary, if we focus on Article 21(1) ACHR, we find that it only 
states that “[e]veryone has the right to the use and enjoyment of this property. The 
law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society.”  
The different semantics of the above mentioned articles is quite obvious. The 
former has a clear-cut ethno-cultural inspiration, with a spelt-out recognition of what 
is perceived as the main objective element of the indigenous people’s cultural 
distinctiveness, which is their dual (material and spiritual) special relationship with 
traditional lands.24 The latter, on the contrary, only recognises –as a general universal 
right– the right to property of ‘everyone’. Everyone, of course, includes ‘everyone’ 
(if you allow me the redundancy), that is all individuals without ethno-cultural 
distinctions; indigenous people included. However, the “right to property”, as such, 
                                                 
21 See above, Chapter I, Section 6. 
22 See above, in Chapter IV, Section 2.2.4. 
23 Article 13(1) of the ILO Convention No. 169 reads as follow: “In applying the provisions of this 
Part of the convention governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual 
values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both as 
applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this 
relationship.” 
24 See, E.-I. A. DAES, Indigenous peoples and their relationship to land. Final working paper 
prepared by the Special Rapporteur Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21, 
United Nation, 2001, p. 7, para. 12 et seq. 
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does not necessarily include the above mentioned special relationship with lands or 
territories… neither exclude it! 
Therefore, for the above mentioned self-identified indigenous person, if the 
latter instrument does not exclude the possibility to receive institutional safeguards 
with regard to his or her claim for land protection, especially if he or she takes into 
account the binding character of the resolutions emitted by this Court, then this 
option becomes quite more attractive. But, before taking the strategic decision to 
frame his or her claim as “just” as another human rights claim, and not as a claim 
based on his or her differential status as a member of a distinguishable societal 
aggregation with rights to a culturally tailored and exclusive legal treatment, he or 
she would like to be sure of the feasibility of this “human rights” avenue. In other 
words, he or she would need to know if it would be possible to read within the phrase 
“the use and enjoyment of his property” of Article 21(1) ACHR, the socio-cultural 
and axiological concept of “distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally 
owned or otherwise occupied and used lands.”  
Within this and the following chapter we will attempt to answer that question, 
using as a pivotal working material the judgments that the Inter-American Court has 
delivered in connection with indigenous people’s land cases, but not only. In 
addition, special attention will be given to the innovative interpretative method used 
by the Court in its jurisprudential construction referring to the traditional or 
communal property rights.  
Hence, in order to have a more systematic and better methodological 
approach to the substance of this jurisprudence, that is in connection with the 
jurisprudential understanding of the right to communal property over traditional 
lands, we will focus –first– on the interpretative methods applied by the Court and –
in the subsequent chapter– on the proper analysis of the above mentioned right. But, 
before doing so, and even before sketchily introducing the Inter-American Human 
Rights System, and taking into consideration that every juridical instrument, and 
regional system, are products of its own temporal and spatial circumstances, in a 
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sense that law does not operate in a vacuum25, let me very briefly refer to the 
indigenous people’s general situation in the Americas.  
 
 
2. Indigenous Peoples and their cultural struggle in the Americas 
 
The Americas is a vast region in which live together different cultural 
traditions in everyday interaction. According to a report issued by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Inter-American Commission”; “the 
Commission” or “I-ACHR”), around 400 aboriginal ethnic groups exist in America, 
distinguished by different cultural practices (including languages, world views and 
lifestyle), which encompass a population surpassing 30 million people, according to 
approximate estimations. This figure could be considered as representative of 10% of 
the total population of Latin America.26  Additionally, this report highlights the fact 
that, in particular in Latin America, indigenous people are “…the poorest of the 
poor, and the most excluded of the excluded”27, hence those who find themselves 
within the most vulnerable, excluded and disempowered societal position. 
The encounter between European settlers and autochthone populations 
happened more than 500 years ago (1492). However, inequalities still exist between 
those that perceive themselves (or are identified) as descendants of those populations 
that were present within the Americas territory with precedence to that encounter, 
and those descendants of those who had arrived with the process of colonisation, or 
even after as later settlers.28        
                                                 
25 See, A. A. CANÇADO TRINDADE, The Right to Cultural Identity in the Evolving Jurisprudential 
Construction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in S. YEE, J.-Y. MORIN, 
Multiculturalism and International Law, Leiden/Boston, 2009, p. 497. 
26 See, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (I-ACHR), The Human Rights Situation of the 
Indigenous People in the Americas, OEA Doc. 62 OEA/Ser.L/V/II.108, 2000, Ch. II.   
27 Ibid., Introduction.  
28 In this sense, it has been said that “[t]he profound economic inequalities between indigenous and 
non-indigenous peoples, as well as the social exclusion of the former, their political 
disenfranchisement and cultural subordination, are part of a history of ongoing discrimination that 
can be described as structural racism; in other words, rooted in the power and control structures that 
have defined Latin American societies for centuries.” See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Cultural Diversity in 
the Development of the Americas. Indigenous Peoples and States in Spanish America, Organization of 
American States (OAS), 2002, p. 23, para. 79. 
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However, before the colonisation process began, important civilizations29 
were present in the Americas territory, especially in Mesoamerica (Maya and Aztec) 
and in the Andes (Inca). Their knowledge, understanding, practises (including 
religious practices) and traditions remained lively throughout the entire process of 
colonisation until the present. However, not only did the greatest civilisations present 
in the Americas manage to survive until present days, according to their own 
practices and beliefs, but also many other indigenous peoples have managed to 
continuously live within their own traditions during all of these centuries. In fact, this 
is the case of many indigenous populations, from the far south as Tierra del Fuego 
until the far north as Canada, from the Pacific till the Atlantic coasts, passing over 
the pampas, deserts and estuaries, the steppes and tropical jungles of the Amazon 
basin.30 
What is in common, among all indigenous people in the region, is that all of 
them were involved in the same struggle for the recognition and respect of their 
traditions, customs and culture, for the acceptance of their diversity and the worth 
and value of their traditional knowledge and understandings. In other words, 
indigenous people in the Americas region have been implicated in the same socio-
political battles, struggling for the same aims, fighting for the recognition and 
respect of what they consider to be their separate and cultural distinguishable societal 
structures, socio-political and institutional organizations, and –last but not least– 
distinctive cultural identities. As Stavenhagen pointed out, “...the majority of 
indigenous peoples have not managed to identify with the dominant model of the 
nation and its symbolic, but very real, attempts to occupy the cultural and social 
space of the national territory. In contrast, contemporary indigenous movement (a 
social and political phenomenon of the last twenty-five years at most) dispute the 
                                                 
29 See, with regard to civilisations dynamics, S. P. HUNTINGTON, The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World Order, New York, 1997, in particular, p. 40 et seq. 
30 It has been pointed out that “Mexico´s indigenous population (around 15 million) is larger than that 
of Latin America and accounts for 15 % of the population. In contrast, the Indians of Guatemala and 
Bolivia comprise the majority of the national population, while in Peru and Ecuador they number 
almost half. In Brazil, Indians represent less than 0,5 % of the total population, but as the original 
inhabitants of the Amazon basin they have been pivotal in the resistance to the plundering of their 
lands, demanding respect for their territorial rights and political representations…” See, R. 
STAVENHAGEN, Cultural Diversity in the Development of the Americas. Indigenous Peoples and 
States in Spanish America, cit., p. 17, para. 61. 
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hegemonic intentions of the national state and have proposed alternative discourses 
as part of their social and political struggles.”31  
In addition, the survival of indigenous people as distinctive people, with their 
own traditions and cultural identity, was inextricably bound up with their struggle for 
their land rights because of the perceived intimate connection between their 
traditional territories, in which they live and manage to conserve their traditions, 
customs, and practices (even religious one), and their constructed cultural identity. 
These three factors (territory, culture and identity), as we saw in our previous 
chapter, are regarded as intimately interconnected in the current understanding of the 
complex and epistemological controversial notion of indigenousness32, in a sense 
that it would be theoretically impossible to understand one of them without the said 
conceptual interconnections. As it has been already stated, the logic behind this 
argumentation is the following: without access to their traditional lands, these 
populations would not be able to practise their own traditions and beliefs. This is 
because their culture was and still is built upon and developed in close connection 
with those territories; in a certain sense, their culture is a product of their lands, grew 
up in them as part of that specific cultural biosphere, under the influences of those 
specific temporal and spatial conditions.33 Therefore, the logical conclusion of this 
reasoning would be that, without having access to those traditional lands, their 
culture would become meaningless; and without the possibility to freely enjoy and 
practise their cultural traditions, their own identity –as different people– would peril 
or –at least– would be under a serious threat.   
However appealing this conceptual construction could be, as we already saw, 
involves a sort of dogmatic “essentialization” of their identity. In fact the dogmatic 
equation (indigenousness = special relationship with traditional lands)34 not only 
deprives of indigenous identity those large majorities who have been living in urban 
areas for generations, besides their self-identified indigenousness35, but is also based 
                                                 
31 Ibid., p. 23, para. 77. 
32 See, Chapter IV, Section 2, and in particular, 2.2.3. 
33 See, Article 1 of UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, adopted by the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, on 2 November 2001. 
34 For further explanation of why we have chosen the sematic construction “dogmatic equation”, see 
Chapter IV, Section 2.4. and 4.          
35 See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Indigenous Peoples in Comparative Perspective - Problems and 
Policies, in UNDP Occasional Paper, 2004/14, 2004, p. 25-26. 
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on an additional essentialization, which is the assumption of the unchangeable, 
timelessness  and even culturally uncontaminated character of indigenous cultures. In 
short, the very idea of deprivation of cultural identity, by means of the 
essentialization of one of its regarded objective components, that is the special 
relationship with traditional lands, is quite contrary to the same ontological 
understanding of culture and identity. 36  
Nevertheless, it would be important at this point to incorporate, to our 
ontological interpretation of what we have called ‘essentialist trap’, an additional 
interpretative angle, nonetheless because the former has been successfully 
incorporated into the legal and –as we will see in this and the upcoming chapter– 
jurisprudential discourses in the Americas. In fact, if we would rather address our 
attention to the ontological and interpretative channels that the above mentioned 
threefold relationship has went through, then it would be possible to realise that 
indigenous people have been focused on the Inter-American System as an effective 
vehicle for their land’s claims. In particular, it seems that they have found, within 
this regional system of human rights protection, judicial and quasi-judicial bodies 
with an increasingly sensitive attitude toward their ethno-culturally based petitions.  
Indeed, this receptive institutional approach has produced not only tailored 
responses in connection with those specifically introduced petitions aiming at the 
recognition of indigenous people land’s rights, but also has generated very high 
expectations among the indigenous communities (and not only) alongside the 
Americas region.37 These positive prospects have been raised, not only because of 
the innovative and culturally friendly language used in them, but also due the binding 
legal character of the Inter-American Court’s resolutions. In fact, it is important to 
bear in mind the fact that the I-ACtHR is the unique judicial body that has 
competence in human rights matters all over the Americas; therefore the potentiality 
of its jurisprudence for the legal harmonisation across the region, must not be 
disregard.  
                                                 
36 See, See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, adopted by the World 
Conference on Cultural Policies, Mexico, 6 August 1982, para. 4; in addition, see our own 
understandings in Chapter IV, Section 2.4. and 4.  
37 See, L. HENNEBEL, La Protection de l'"Intégrité Spirituelle" des Indigènes. Rèflexions sur l'arrêt 
de la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l'homme dans l'affaire Comunidad Moiwana c. Suriname du 
15 juin 2005, in Rev. trim dr. h., 66, 2002, p. 253 et seq. 
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Last but not least, because of the increasing regional awareness among 
indigenous populations in connection with these regional mechanisms, together with 
the influential “political” authority that the Court has gained since its establishment 
in 1979,  vis-à-vis national authorities38, we can conclude that its jurisprudence could 
be regarded as a powerful tool for change. In fact, it could be used to overturn 
centuries of abandonment and degradation of indigenous communities all over the 
Americas. And –at the very end– perhaps it could even make a contribution in order 
to match and fulfil indigenous peoples’ aspirations for reversing the historical 
processes of cultural integration in the Americas and to reinvigorate their cultural 
distinctiveness, as socio-politically distinguishable and separate ethno-cultural 
aggregations.39 
For these reasons, within this and the following chapter we will attempt to 
critically and systematically analyse the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, or –at least– its most relevant part, in order to identify how the Court 
has incorporated into its own judicial reasoning the above described threefold 
relationship (traditional lands → culture → identity). In fact, what will be under our 
scrutiny will be the reasoning provided by the Court when it has been called to 
resolve contentions cases in which indigenous peoples’ traditional lands –and the 
right to property over them– was at stake. In other words, the focus will be put on the 
legal argumentation of the Court and –last but not least– on whether and how the 
Court has dealt with those multiculturalist challenges mentioned in the precedent 
chapters, and in particular, with the above mentioned ‘essentialist trap’.   
However, before starting to focus on the Court’s argumentative reasoning and 
interpretative methods, let me very briefly introduce the Inter-American System, 
together with its main bodies and legal instruments.   
 
                                                 
38 See, L. R. TANNER, Interview with Judge Antônio A. Cançado Trindade, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, in Human Rights Quarterly, 31-4, 2009, p. 989 et seq. 
39 As it has been said, “[w]ith the rise of 20th-century liberalism, Latin American states opted, at least 
formally, for policies to assimilate and integrate the indigenous peoples. In the name of national 
unification and development, another form of discrimination was in fact put in practice, based on the 
proposition that the only way for indigenous peoples to “progress” was through enculturation, which 
is to say, the abandonment of their own identities.” See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Cultural Diversity in 
the Development of the Americas. Indigenous Peoples and States in Spanish America, cit., p. 32, para. 
109. See also, L. ABAD GONZÁLEZ, Etnocidio y rsistencia en la Amazonía Peruana, Cuenca, 2003, 
p. 105 et seq; and A. BELLO, Etnicidad y ciudadanía en América Latina. La acción colectiva de los 
pueblos indígenas, Santiago de Chile, 2004, p. 75 et seq. 
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3. Human Rights instruments and Procedures in the Americas 
 
It has been said that, “…if the saving of lives and the securing of broad 
reparations to victims are appropriate measurements of the effectiveness of any such 
supervisory goodies, then arguably no other system has been more successful than 
the Inter-American System.”40 We can agree or disagree with the views of one of the 
former members of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, but before to 
do so, it would be necessary to understand what we mean when we refer to the Inter-
American System of human rights protection. Thus, and for the sake of better 
discursive flow, we will sketch its main elements in this section.41  
Conceptually speaking, the Human Rights System for the promotion and 
protection of human rights refers to the numerous regional instruments and 
institutional mechanisms that have been adopted and put in place by the American 
States, with the scope to promote and protect human rights in the Americas region. In 
other words, we can say that the Inter-American system is a combination of human 
rights norms and supervisory institutions within the Americas; a system that provides 
recourses to people (all people, including –of course– indigenous people) in the 
Americas who have suffered violations or arbitrary interferences in the enjoyment of 
their rights, by States members of the OAS. 
In fact, within the very same constitutive instrument of the Organization of 
the American States (OAS)42, that is the Charter of the OAS43, the members of this 
                                                 
40 See, R. K. GOLDMAN, History and Action: The Inter-American Human Rights System and the 
Role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in Human Rights Quarterly, 31, 2009, p. 
857. 
41 In connection with a general overview of the Inter-American System of human rights protection, see 
among other authors, L. HENNEBEL, La convention Américaine des Droits de L'Homme. 
Mécanismes de Protection et Étendue des Droits et Libertés, Bruxelles, 2007, in particular p. 22 et 
seq. ; H. TIGROUDJA, I. K. PANOUSSIS, La Cour interaméricaine des drois de l'homme. Analyse 
de la jurisprudence consultative et contentieuse, Bruxelles, 2003, p. 21 et seq. 
42 The Organization of the American States (OAS) is the oldest and most important intergovernmental 
regional organisation within the western hemisphere, dating back to the First International Conference 
Held in Washington D.C., in 1889-1890. The official institutional departure of the OAS happened in 
1951, when its Charter entered into force. OAS was established in order to achieve among its 
members, according to Article 1 of the Charter, “an order of peace and justice, to promote their 
solidarity to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, 
and their independence.” Currently, all 35 independent States of the hemisphere are members of the 
Organization, which are represented within the General Assembly, supreme organ of the OAS. Other 
important organs are the Permanent Council, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
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regional organisation proclaimed “the fundamental rights of the individual without 
distinction as to race, nationality, creed and sex”44, as one of the basic principles of 
the OAS. In addition, they has also recognised –as a guiding principle for the 
realisation of the aspirations of the Organisation– that “[a]ll human beings, without 
distinction as to race, sex, nationality, creed, or social condition, have a right to 
material well-being and to their spiritual development, under circumstances of 
liberty, dignity, equality of opportunity, and economic security.”45 The Inter-
American System of human rights protection was already in place, although in an 
embryonic form, since the beginning of this regional common enterprise.    
However, even when the OAS’s Chapter has to be considered the cornerstone 
of the system, it was with the adoption of the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man (hereinafter “the American Declaration”), in Bogotá, Colombia, in 
April of 1948, that the system truly emerged.46 With the Declaration, the Americas’ 
States established a set of standards or ideals to strive for47, considered as being 
suited for the social and juridical conditions of the region which –together with the 
guarantees given by the internal regimes of the States– have to be considered as the 
initial system of protection and affirmation of essential human rights.48  
Even when this Declaration does not particularly address any specific issue 
concerning indigenous people, due to its undistinguishable universal character, in its 
Preamble we can already track the importance that the system has given, and still 
gives to culture and cultural expressions. In fact, it states that “[a]ll men are born 
free and equal, in dignity and in rights […]; [i]nasmuch as spiritual development is 
                                                                                                                                          
Affairs and the Councils; but its most visible organ is its General Secretariat, impersonated by the 
Secretary General, and which is the central and permanent OAS’s organ, with its headquarters in 
Washington, D.C. For more information about the Organisation, visit: www.oas.org.    
43 The Charter of the OAS was adopted at the Ninth International Conference of American States, the 
meeting in Bogotá, Colombia, in 1948, with the participation of 21 American States. The Chapter, was 
subsequently ammended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires (1967); the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias 
(1988); the Protocol of Managua (1993); and the Protocol of Washington (1992).  
44 See, Article 3(l) of the OAS Charter. 
45 Ibid., Article 45(a). 
46 The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, was adopted in the same Ninth 
International Conference of American States in which was adopted the OAS’s Charter, by Res. XXX. 
At the time of its adoption (April 1948), it was the first proper international human rights instrument, 
even preceding the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 with just a few months.  
47 See, C. MEDINA QUIROGA, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, in 
C. KRAUSE, M. SCHEININ (eds.), International Protection of Human Rights: A Texbook, 
Turku/Åbo, 2009, p. 475 et seq. 
48 See, American Declaration, preliminary considerations. 
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the supreme end of human existence and the highest expression thereof, it is the duty 
of man to serve that end with all his strength and resources; [and] ][s]ince culture is 
the highest social and historical expression of that spiritual development, it is the 
duty of man to preserve, practice, and foster culture by very means within its 
power.” The latter phrase does not only constitute a eulogy to culture and cultural 
human capacity49, but also a guiding statement, a roadmap for the interpretative 
action of the national and regional institutions responsible for the application of these 
core instruments, such –for instance–has been the case of the Inter-American Court.  
Someone could –of course– argue that a declaration is always a declaration, 
in a sense that could have just certain relative legal value, as a merely a non-binding 
statement of moral obligations50 or –at least– as an interpretative guiding parameter, 
and –in general terms– this person would be right. Nevertheless, the American 
Declaration has superseded its own declarative status, gaining legal force among the 
States members, although it was originally adopted as a declaration and not as a 
legally binding treaty.51 Moreover, according to the Inter-American Court, in order to 
“…determine the legal status of the American Declaration it is appropriate to look to 
the inter-American system of today in the light of the evolution it has undergone 
since the adoption of the Declaration, rather than to examine the normative value 
and significance which that instrument was believed to have had in 1948.”52 
Therefore, in interpreting the legal binding value of this instrument, the Court has 
made use of one of the interpretative techniques that allowed to build its innovative 
jurisprudence, that is the evolutive interpretation of international human rights law.    
Finally, it would be important to stress that, in addition to its preamble, the 
American Declaration consists of 38 articles containing the recognised protected 
rights, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and also the 
corresponding duties.  
                                                 
49 See our consideration with regard to the notion of culture and cultural identity in Chapter I, Section 
2 et seq. 
50 See, R. K. GOLDMAN, op. cit., p. 863. 
51 See, C. MEDINA QUIROGA, op. cit., p. 477. 
52 See, I-ACtHR, Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within 
the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-
10/89 of July 14,1989, Series A No. 10, para. 37. See also, Article 20 of the Statute of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, OAS General Assembly Res. No. 447, 1979. 
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Yet, as you can imagine, the Inter-American System has not only been built 
over the text of the Declaration. In fact, after the adoption of this instrument, the next 
important step was the creation in 1959 of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (hereinafter “the Commission” or “IACHR”)53, which stated its 
operative function in 1960.54 The Commission is a principal and autonomous organ 
of the OAS, whose mission is to promote and protect human rights in the Americas 
region, and to serve as a consultative organ in these matters.55 The mandate of the 
Commission initially consisted of monitoring and observing, including on-site visits, 
the general situation of human rights in the region; but in 1965, it was authorised to 
examine complaints or petitions regarding specific cases of human rights 
violations.56 According to official data, by 2010 the Commission had received 
thousands of complains with regard to alleged violations, bringing the total number 
of cases and petitions to over 14,000.57     
Hence, the Commission became the monitoring body of the observance and 
implementation –by Members States– of the rights enshrined within the American 
Declaration, which provided the necessary materialisation and corporeity –through a 
specific list of fundamental human rights– to the obligation assumed by OAS’s 
States members at the time of the adoption of its Charter. In other words, the Charter 
authorises the Commission to protect human rights, but it does not list or define 
them; hence, according to the Inter-American Court, those rights are none others than 
those enunciated and defined in the Declaration.58        
   After the amendment of the IACHR’s competences, in 1969 the American 
Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the American Convention”, “the 
                                                 
53 The Inter-American Commission is composed of seven persons, elected in their personal capacity 
by the OAS’s General Assembly, who shall be persons of high moral character and recognised 
competence in the field of human rights (Article 34-36 ACHR). They are elected for a four year term 
and may be reelected only once. No two nationals of the same state may be members of the 
Commission (Article 37 ACHR).  
54 The Inter-American Commission was created by Resolution VIII, of the Fifth Meeting of 
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Santiago de Chile, in 1959. 
55 See, Article 106 of the OAS Charter. 
56 The competence of the IACHR was broadened by the Second Special Inter-American Conference, 
held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in November 1965. 
57 See, IACHR, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2010, OAS Doc. 
No. 5, rev. 1 OEA/Ser.L/V/II, 2011, p. 5, para. 5. 
58 See, I-ACtHR, Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within 
the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, cit., p. 11, para. 41. 
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Convention”, or “ACHR”) was adopted, and came into force in 1978.59 This new 
instrument, which has become the second instrumental pillar of the system (together 
with the Declaration), having the legal nature as a proper binding international 
treaty60, introduced concrete and defined human rights that States Members have the 
obligation to respect and to ensure61 within their own national jurisdictions.62 The 
recognised rights are –therefore– directly enforceable within the territory of the 
members States, in a sense that their enjoyment can be directly claimed by all the 
beneficiaries of the Convention, that is by all persons subject to their jurisdictions.63 
In addition, and in order to guarantee the full enjoyment of these conventional rights, 
States Parties are obliged to adopt “…such legislative or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.”64  
The Convention broadened the scope and content of the American 
Declaration by means of the incorporation of more detailed and elaborated catalogue 
of civil and political rights, which resemble the text of the ICCPR and the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR).65 However, the Convention also presents certain differences vis-à-vis those 
                                                 
59 The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), also denominated “Pact of San José, Costa 
Rica”, was adopted by the delegates of the member States of the Organization of the American States 
(OAS) in the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human, which was held in San José, Costa 
Rica, on the 22nd of November 1969, and entered into force on July 18, 1978. The ACHR has received 
to this date 25 ratifications from the 35 OAS’s member States, but today has only 24 States Parties 
(Trinidad and Tobago denounced it in 1998). Source: OAS’s Department of International Law, 
23/01/12. The 25 current States parties of the Convention are: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Granada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
60 In connection with the minimum legal requirements that an international treaty should fulfil, in 
order to be considered as such, see –among other authors– J. KLABBERS, The Concept of Treaty in 
Internatinal Law, The Hague/London/Boston, 1996, p. 15 et seq. 
61 According to the Court, the obligation to ensure “…implies the duty of States Parties to organize 
the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public power is 
exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human 
rights.” See, I-ACtHR, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment of July 29, 1988. 
Series C No. 4, p. 30, para. 166. 
62 In this sense, Article 1(1) of the American Convention clearly states that “…States Parties to this 
Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all 
persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without 
any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.”  
63 Ibid. 
64 See, Article 2 of the American Convention. 
65 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) was 
opened for signature by the States Parties of the Council of Europe (CofE) in Rome on 4 November 
1950, and entered into force on 3 September 1953. 
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instruments, such as the incorporation of new rights (e.g. the right to asylum)66, the 
inclusion of a generic article refereeing to economic, social and cultural rights67, or 
the incorporation of –together with these rights and guarantees– their means of 
protection.68 
In fact, In addition to these substantive provisions, the Convention also 
created the inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Inter-American 
Court”, “the Court”, or “I-ACtHR”)69 and established the functions and procedures 
of the Court and the Inter-American Commission in order to receive individual 
complains refereeing to violations of the human rights and freedoms contained 
within the Convention. In this sense, the Commission added to its previous 
competence of monitoring the respect and implementation of the human rights as 
recognised within the American Declaration –including the consideration of 
individual petitions in connection with their alleged violations (in accordance with 
the OAS Charter and its own Statute)–, a new competence exclusively based on the 
Convention.70 This new competence consists precisely on the examination of 
complaints regarding alleged violations of the rights enshrined within the American 
Convention, committed by States Parties.   
Therefore, with the entry into force of the Convention, it would be correct to 
say that the Inter-American System of human rights protection is composed of a 
twofold or dual system, vis-à-vis OAS’s State Members. On one hand, with regard to 
the States Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights, the American 
Convention has to be considered the primary source of the human rights obligations 
                                                 
66 See, Article 22 of the American Convention. 
67 Article 26 of the American Convention states as follow: “The States Parties undertake to adopt 
measures, both internally and through international cooperation, especially those of an economic and 
technical nature, with a view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate means, 
the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural 
standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol 
of Buenos Aires.” 
68 See, R. K. GOLDMAN, op. cit., p. 866. 
69 The Inter-American Court consists of seven judges, elected in their own capacity by the OAS’s 
General Assembly, from among jurist of the highest moral authority and of recognised competence in 
the field of human rights, and who possess the qualifications required for the exercise of the highest 
judicial functions in conformity with the law of the state of which they are nationals or of the state that 
proposes them as candidates (Article 52(1) ACHR). They are elected for a term of six years and may 
be reelected once (Article 52(2) ACHR), and no two judges may be national of the same state (Article 
51(2) ACHR). The Court elects from among its members a President and Vice-President who shall 
serve for a period of two years, and who may be reelected (Article 12(1) of the Statute of the Court).  
70 See, Articles 34-51 of the American Convention. 
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of those State Parties. In connection with them, the Commission is competent to 
receive individual petitions regarding alleged violations of the human rights as 
enshrined in the Convention71 and other applicable instruments72; and to report on 
the merit of the case, declaring or not the existence of a violation of the said rights in 
a given case.73 In addition, the Commission has the power to refer the case to the 
Court if the State involved has not complied with the recommendations made by the 
same Commission in its resolution on the merit of the case, but only if the State in 
question has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 62 of the Convention.74 Finally, in connection with those States that are 
not Parties of the American Convention, the Commission has retained its competence 
to examine communications (petitions) concerning allegations of human rights 
violations, as defined by the American Declaration and the OAS Charter.75 With 
regard to these OAS’s States members, the Commission cannot –of course– refer the 
cases to the Court, just because the Court is an organ of the Convention, but not of 
the OAS Charter.76   
To summarise, the Inter-American System of human rights protection is 
substantially based on both the American Convention and the American Declaration 
(read together with the OAS Charter). It has as its main institutional pillars, for the 
substantial implementation of these instruments –together with its quasi-judicial and 
judicial monitoring– two main bodies, namely, the Inter-American Commission and 
                                                 
71 See, Article 41 of the American Convention; Article 19 of the Statute of the Inter-American 
Commission; and Article 23 of the Rule of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission. 
72 According to Article 23 of the Rule of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission, “[a]ny person 
or group of persons or nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more of the Member 
States of the OAS may submit petitions to the Commission, on their behalf or on behalf of third 
persons, concerning alleged violations of a human right recognized in, as the case may be, the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the American Convention on Human Rights 
“Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “Protocol of San Salvador”, the Protocol 
to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, the Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance 
of Persons, and/or the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of 
Violence Against Women “Convention of Belém do Pará”, in accordance with their respective 
provisions, the Statute of the Commission, and these Rules of Procedure.”  
73 See, Article 50 of the American Convention; and Articles 43-44 of the Rule of Procedure of the 
Inter-American Commission. 
74 See, Article 51(1) of the American Convention; and Articles 45 of the Rule of Procedure of the 
Inter-American Commission. 
75 See, Article 20 of the Statute of the Inter-American Commission; and Article 51-52 of the Rule of 
Procedure of the Inter-American Commission 
76 See, R. K. GOLDMAN, op. cit., p. 866. 
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the Inter-American Court. At this regional dimension, we have to add the national 
judicial one. In fact, because the main responsibility of the implementation of the 
rights enshrined within the above mentioned regional instruments lies at the national 
level, then national judicial systems have to be also considered as integrative part of 
the Inter-American System. The latter authorities are those that have to deal first with 
petitions alleging human rights violations, and have also the obligation, as State 
organs, of deliver justice and redress in order to overcome the effects of such 
fundamental breaches. In fact, the regional bodies represent a subsidiary mechanism 
of protection vis-à-vis the national judicial systems, in a sense that national judges 
are and have to be considered the first guarantors of the observance of the regional 
norms.77       
In connection with the individual complains, the system allows any person, or 
group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognised in one or more 
member States, to submit to the Commission –on their behalf or on behalf of third 
persons– complaints alleging violations by Members States of the American 
Convention and the American Declaration.78 Those petitions would be subjected to 
one of those two parallel complain systems that have briefly been described above. 
Though, let me make an additional remark in connection with this significant issue. 
First, it is important to notice that, within the Inter-American System not only 
the victim is authorised to personally summit his or her complaint to the 
Commission79, but also any person or association on his or her behalf. This latter 
remark is quite important in connection with the cases submitted by indigenous 
people to the system. The victim has to be an individual, and identify or identifiable 
individual80, not a group.81 In fact, according to the text of the Convention, the States 
                                                 
77 See, L. HENNEBEL, La convention Américaine des Droits de L'Homme. Mécanismes de 
Protection et Étendue des Droits et Libertés, cit., p. 167 et seq. See also, among the jurisprudence of 
the Court in connection with the requirement of subsidiarity and the exhaustion of domestic remedies 
admissibility requirement (Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention), I-ACtHR, Case of 
Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 
1, para. 87; Case of Godínez-Cruz v. Honduras, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. 
Series C No. 3, para. 89; Case of Fairén-Garbi and Solís-Corrales v. Honduras, Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 2, para. 86;  
78 See, Article 45(1) ACHR and 23 of the Rule of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission. 
79 Individual complains can only be submitted to the Commission (Article 44 ACHR); victims cannot 
submit directly their complaints to the Court, only the Commission and the State concerned can 
submit cases to the Court (Article 51(1) ACHR).  
80 According to the Court, “the victim must be properly identified and named in the 
application…”See, I-ACtHR, Case of the "Juvenile Reeducation Institute" v. Paraguay, Preliminary 
CHAPTER V 
262 
 
Parties undertake to respect the rights and freedom recognised in it and to ensure “to 
all persons” subjected to its jurisdiction the enjoyment of those rights and freedoms. 
It is clear that, for “person”, the Convention means “every human being.”82 As we 
can see, the commitment is toward “all persons”, in their individual character, not 
with regard to societal entities or groups.83  
Therefore, and indigenous group, as a distinguishable societal entity, as a 
group, cannot vest the cloths of a victim before the complaint mechanism of the 
Inter-American System. However, this does not mean that a group, even the very 
same indigenous group, regarded as a collective entity or association, if “legally 
recognized in one or more member states of the Organization” (Article 44 ACHR), 
would not be able to submit a complain on behalf of its identified or identifiable 
individual members, whose rights have been concretely violated.84  
This distinction is not minor, especially in the case of indigenous 
communities, where geographical and societal conditions (including cultural barriers 
such as language or a different traditional judicial system) could diminish their 
possibilities to successfully reach a judicial or quasi-judicial regional body. These 
difficulties would be even more constringed in the case, inter alia, of those 
communities living in complete isolation or just in a phase of initial external societal 
contact.85 In fact, in most cases litigated within the Inter-American System, it has 
been the active and engaged support of local and international NGOs, together with 
Academia and even in same cases with the assistance of National Human Rights 
                                                                                                                                          
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of September 2, 2004. Series C No. 112, para. 
109. 
81 See, L. HENNEBEL, La convention Américaine des Droits de L'Homme. Mécanismes de 
Protection et Étendue des Droits et Libertés, cit., p. 130 et seq. 
82 See, Article 1(2) ACHR. 
83 In the words of the Court, “…in order for the Court to hear a case […], it is essential that the 
Commission receive a communication or petition alleging a concrete violation of the human rights of 
a specific individual.” See, I-ACtHR, International Responsibility for the Promulgation and 
Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-14/94 of December 9, 1994. Series A No. 14, para. 45. 
84 It has been stressed that, Article 44 ACHR « organise un double droit d’action: le premier est le 
droit d’action de’une victime de la violation de la Convention, et le second est une action en 
dénonciation qui peut être opérée par toute personne. » See, L. HENNEBEL, La convention 
Américaine des Droits de L'Homme. Mécanismes de Protection et Étendue des Droits et Libertés, cit., 
p. 142. 
85 In connection with this communities, see the report elaborated by the UN Human Rights Council 
Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous People’s Report called “Draft Guidelines on the 
Protection of Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and in Initial contact of the Amazon Basin 
and El Chaco, UN Doc. A/HRC/EMRIP/2009/6, of 30 June 2009. 
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Institutions (NHRIs), which have facilitated first the legal theoretical construction of 
the cases, and second their successful regional litigation.86 In fact, not only thousands 
of miles separate the Paraguayan forests, where –for instance– the Yakye Axa87 and 
Sawhoyamaxa88 indigenous communities live, from Washington D.C., where the 
Inter-American Commission is located, or San José de Costa Rica, where the Court is 
based.    
As we can see, the Inter-American System, even when it is not ontologically 
constructed for the protection of “groups” –including indigenous communities as 
differentiated societal aggregations– counts nevertheless with the necessary 
mechanism for effective protection and redress of human rights violations. In fact, it 
has a system of individually and universally constructed human rights, recognised to 
‘every human being’ present within the territory of the States Parties, including –of 
course– indigenous people… individually regarded. As we will see in this and the 
following chapter, when the Court has declared the violation of the right to property 
enshrined in Article 21 of the Convention, it has nevertheless clarified that that 
violation has been “to the detriment of the members” of the involved indigenous 
communities, and not with respect of the community itself.89 In short, there rights 
bearers –within the axiological configuration of the convention– remains the 
individuals, which in the case of indigenous communities –for instance– could 
indeed enjoy those rights in communal association with the other members of the 
very same ethno-cultural group.    
For these reasons, it has became indispensable to try to understand the 
interpretative mechanism through which this system, ontologically anchored around 
                                                 
86 Just as an example of the role of all these actors within a litigation process of a concrete case, see S. 
J. ANAYA, C. GROSSMAN, The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A new step in the International 
Law of Indigenous Peoples, in Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, 19, 2002, p. 1 
et seq. 
87 See, I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on Merits, 
Reparations and Costs of June 17, 2005. Serie C No. 125. 
88 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations 
and Costs. Judgment of March 29, 2006. Series C No. 146. 
89 See, among other resolutions, I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community 
v. Nicaragua, I-ACtHR, Series C No. 79. Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs of August 31, 
2001, para. 155, and operative para. 2; I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. 
Paraguay, cit., para. 156, and operative para. 2; and Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community 
v. Paraguay, cit., para. 144, and operative para. 2. 
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the centrality of the individual90, could nevertheless provide tailored legal answers to 
claims based –at last– on the socio-political and cultural aspirations of ethno-cultural 
societal entities for distinguishability and differentness.  
  
 
4. The Inter-American Court and its involvement in the adjudication of 
Indigenous Peoples’ cases 
 
As result of the indigenous people struggles for the recognition and protection 
of their human rights, the Inter-American Court has developed in recent years a 
landmark jurisprudence on indigenous peoples’ rights. This jurisprudence refers –in 
particular– to their right to communal property over their traditional lands and –most 
in particular– to their right to enjoy their own distinguishable culture and cultural 
traditions as differential societal aggregations.  
Moreover, this remarkable jurisprudence, inedited for a regional judicial 
body, could be considered as a result of the continuous political battles of indigenous 
peoples to be recognised as such, as a culturally diverse people with different cultural 
understandings and worldviews vis-à-vis the majoritarian parts of the national 
societies.91 Connected with this, it appears important to bear in mind that the Court 
has only subsidiary jurisdiction. Hence, as a requirement to lodge a petition before 
the Inter-American Commission (first step within the Inter-American system of 
human rights protection), alleged victims of human rights violation must exhaust the 
local remedies available to them under national laws and within domestic jurisdiction 
(Article 46.1 (a) of the Convention).92 Therefore, before arriving at the final 
                                                 
90 In the words of the Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, “…the Inter-American Court bears in mind the 
universality and unity of the human kind, which inspired, more than four and a half centuries ago, the 
historical process of formation of the droit des gens. […] [T]he Inter-American Court contributes to 
the construction of the new jus gentium of the XXIst century, oriented by the general principles of law 
(among which the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination), characterized by the 
intangibility of the due process of law in its wide scope, crystallized in the recognition of jus cogens 
and instrumentalized by the consequent obligations  erga omnes of protection, and erected, ultimately, 
on the full respect for, and guarantee of, the rights inherent to the human person.” See, I-ACtHR, 
Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion AC-18/03 of 
September 17, 2003. Series A No. 18, Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, para. 89. 
91 See, Chapter IV, in particular, Section 2.2.3. 
92 Article 46.1 of the Convention states that: “Admission by the Commission of a petition or 
communication lodged in accordance with Articles 44 or 45 shall be subject to the following 
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judgment of the Court, indigenous people –as all other alleged victims– must follow 
a very long path, alongside of several years of litigation at national and regional 
levels, affording unaffordable costs, and wishing that the Commission first, and the 
Inter-American Court later, would consider their pleadings and –ultimately– embrace 
their suffering providing a final release. That is, a solution that would ideally 
overcome the injustice committed to them.93  
A good departing point for the analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence is –of 
course– the Case of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 
decided on August 31, 200194 (here in after the Awas Tingni Case). Without any 
doubts, this is a landmark case in the Court’s history.95 In this case the Court 
recognised for the very first time in its history, as protected by article 21 of the 
Convention96, the right to a collective or communal property of indigenous peoples 
to their traditional lands, but not only. The IACtHR recognised at the same time that 
the members of the community of Awas Tingni have the right to have their traditional 
                                                                                                                                          
requirements: a) that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in 
accordance with generally recognized principles of international law…” 
93 According to Article 61.1 of the Convention, the only ones that have the right to lodge a complaint 
against a State Party is the Commission itself –in representation of the victims- and others Member 
States. Therefore, victims of human rights violation only have recognised, within the Inter-American 
system of human rights protection, jus standi before the Commission but not before the Court. 
Nevertheless, according to the established case law of the Court and the evolution of the Court Rules 
of Procedure, victims have gained locus standi in judicio throughout the proceedings before the Court. 
In fact, in its last version, the Court’s Rules of Procedure granted participation to the alleged victims, 
in its article 24.1 that states at following: “When the application has been admitted, the alleged 
victims or their duly accredited representatives may submit their pleadings, motions, and evidence 
autonomously throughout the proceedings.” (Rules of Procedure of the I-ACtHR, approved by the 
Court during its XLIX Ordinary Period of Sessions, held from November 16 to 25, 2000, and partially 
amended by the Court during its LXXXII Ordinary Period of Sessions, held from January 19 to 31, 
2009). In addition, and in connection with the legal capacity of the individual as subject of 
international law, and most in particular, with regard to their direct access (Jus Standi) to international 
human rights tribunals, see A. A. CANÇADO TRINDADE, International Law for Humankind: 
Towards a New Jus Gentium, in Académie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours, 216, 
Leiden/Boston, 2005, p. 285 et seq. 
94 See I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, I-ACtHR, 
Series C No. 79. Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs of August 31, 2001.  
95 Nevertheless, the importance of the Awas Tingni Case, as long as the very focus of this essay is the 
transversal reasoning of the Court, a resume of the fact is not provided, as it will not be provided in all 
the other cases that will pass under our scrutiny. I am sure that the reader will accept this little liberty. 
Therefore, not following a chronological approach, the relevant Court’s cases will be quoted alongside 
the evolving reasoning of the substantive discussion. 
96 Article 21 of the Convention read as follow: “Right to Property. 1. Everyone has the right to the use 
and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of 
society. 2. No one shall be deprived of this property except upon payment of just compensation, for 
reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by 
law. 3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by law.” 
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lands clearly demarcated and –in that regard– the State has the duty to provide them 
with a proper title for it, based upon their customary law and resource tenure 
patterns. 97   
This revolutionary interpretation of Article 21 of the Convention not only 
opened the door for similar cases from all over the region, but also fundamentally 
legitimised indigenous customary law as a source of law, as a valid source of law 
toward which Member States have to pay due respect and observance. In fact, when 
the Court afforded the problematic nature of the indigenous people’s diversity, it has 
done so manly in connection with the right to communal property over their 
traditional land and resources with the exception of just only one case. The latter was 
the Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua98 (hereinafter “the Yatama Case”), in which the 
Court had been called to decide with regard to the effective enjoyment of political 
rights by an indigenous group.  
Coming back to Article 21 of the Convention, its literal reading drives us 
toward a preliminary formal interpretation consisted on the clear recognition of the 
right to private property, as an individual protected right. In fact, in its first 
paragraph we only literally read, “[e]veryone has the right to the use and enjoyment 
of his property.” In addition, another conclusion that can be draw from its literal 
interpretation is that the right to property is recognised as a non-absolute right. This 
mean that this right can suffer limitations in its enjoyment, but only when those 
restrictions are imposed by law, pursued in the realisation of a pressing social need 
as “public utility” or “social interest” (in the wording of the article), and when exists 
a (reasonable) relation of proportionality between such aims and the established 
limitation. In fact, on the second part of the first paragraph, Article 21 literally states 
                                                 
97 See I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, cit., para. 
151-155, and operative para. 4. For the commentaries that this case has generated between scholars, 
see –among others– S. J. ANAYA, C. GROSSMAN, The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A new 
step in the International Law of Indigenous Peoples, cit., p. 1 et seq.; S. J. ANAYA, Divergent 
Discourses about International Law, Indigenous People, and rights over lands and natural resources: 
toward a realist trend, in Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’, 16, 2005, p. 237; L. J. ALVARADO, 
Prospects and Challenges in the implementation of Indigenous Peoples’ human rights in International 
Law: lessons from the Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, in Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L., 24, 2007, p. 
609; and J. A. AMIOTT, Environment, equality, and Indigenous Peoples’ land rights in the Inter-
American Human Rights System: Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community of Awas Tingni v. 
Nicaragua, in Envtl. L., 32, 2002, p. 873. 
98 See I-ACtHR, Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs of June 23, 2005. Series C No. 127. 
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that “[t]he law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society”. 
Additionally, in its second paragraph, declares that “[n]o one shall be deprived of his 
property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or 
social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law.”  
Therefore, it is beyond any doubts that private property is recognised and 
protected under the American Convention, thus there is no need to go further in its 
regard. The real question here is to determinate whether such recognition could be 
extended to different understandings of property, different from the civilist (private 
law) conception99, such as –for instance– the collective or communal understanding 
of property that indigenous peoples have in connection with their traditional lands.100 
At this stage, we know that that is possible indeed, because of the outcome of the 
Awas Tingni Case, but we can still ask which the reasoning of the Court behind this 
judgment was. Or, alternatively, which was the interpretation performed by the Court 
in its reading of Article 21 of the Convention? This question introduces our 
discussion within the general sphere of interpretation and –most in particular– to the 
interpretative rules applied by the Court on the indigenous people’s communal or 
traditional lands cases. 
 
 
5. Inter-American Court’s interpretational general rules  
 
As a matter of principle, the Court applies in its interpretation of the 
Convention what we can call the traditional international law method of 
interpretation. In this sense, it relies both on general and supplementary rules of 
interpretation, which find expression in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (here in after “the Vienna Convention” of “VCLT”)101, as the 
                                                 
99 See, I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, cit., Joint 
Separate Opinion of Judges A.A. Cançado Trindade, M. Pacheco Gómez and A. Abreu Burelli, para. 
9. 
100 In connection with the communal understanding of property, and special relationship that 
indigenous communities have with their lands, see our comments in Chapter IV, Section 2.2.4. 
101 The Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties was done at Vienna on 23 May 1969 and 
entered into force on 27 January 1980. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331.  
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Court itself recognised in its very first advisory opinion, during the early eighties.102 
As we know, Article 31 VCLT states –at its first paragraph– that “[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. In 
addition, and in case of need, Article 32 VCLT recognises the possibility to recourse 
to supplementary means of interpretation. The latter includes “the preparatory work 
of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; 
or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 
Accordingly, the first guide in the interpretation of the Convention is 
provided by its own object and purpose, which in the case of the American 
Convention on Human Rights is –as the Court clearly stated– is the “...effective 
protection of human rights.” As the Court said, this method of interpretation 
“...respects the principle of the primacy of the text, that is, the application of 
objective criteria of interpretation.”103 Moreover, the I-ACtHR has stressed the fact 
that, in the case of human rights treaties, objective criteria of interpretation is more 
appropriate that subjective criteria because the latter seeks to ascertain “only” the 
intent of the Parties.104 
Therefore, in the interpretation of the Convention, the Court must “...do it in 
such a way that the system for the protection of human rights has all its appropriate 
effects (effet utile)”.105 According to this, the Convention (article 21 included) must 
not be interpreted in a sense that would reduce, restrict or limit the recognition and 
                                                 
102 See I-ACtHR, “Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of September 24, 1982. Series 
A No. 1, para. 33. 
103 See I-ACtHR, The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on 
Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75). Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of September 24, 1982. Series A No. 2, 
para. 29. 
104 The Court justified its position on the very nature of the human rights treaties, on the fact that these 
treaties “...are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal 
exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting States;” rather “their object and purpose 
is the protection of the basic rights of individual human beings, irrespective of their nationality, both 
against the State of their nationality and all other contracting States.” See, I-ACtHR, Restrictions to 
the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion 
OC-3/83 of September 8, 1983. Series A No. 3, para. 50. 
105 See I-ACtHR, The right to information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the 
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of October 1, 1999. Series A No. 
16, para. 58.  
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effective protection of the fundamental rights included on it.106 In other words, the 
Convention has to be interpreted in its most effective manner.107 
The principle of effectiveness requires, for its positive application, unlimited 
or unrestricted application of the rights recognised in the Convention. In other word, 
its effective application would not be possible if the interpretation of the Convention 
is done in a restrictive manner. A perfect complement for this principle is found in 
Article 29 of the Convention, which incorporates another sine qua non requirement, 
merely the principle of non-restrictive interpretation of human rights instruments. In 
fact, this article precludes any restrictive interpretation of the rights and freedoms 
recognised in the Convention108, at domestic level or even within any other 
convention subscribed by the States parties.109 
Consequently, the interpretation of the rights and freedoms included within 
the Convention must be done in a good faith110 and in a non-restrictive manner, in a 
                                                 
106 In the wording of Judge García Ramírez, “…the principle of interpretation that requires that the 
object and purpose of the treaties be considered (Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention), referenced 
below, and the principle pro homine of the international law of human rights –frequently cited in this 
Court’s case-law- which requires the interpretation that is conducive to the fullest protection of 
persons, all for the ultimate purpose of preserving human dignity, ensuring fundamental rights and 
encouraging their advancement.” See I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
Community v. Nicaragua, cit., Concurring Opinion of the Judge Sergio García Ramírez, para. 2. 
107 According to the Court, “…States Parties to the Convention must guarantee compliance with its 
provisions and its effects (effet utile) within their own domestic laws. This principle applies not only to 
the substantive provisions of human rights treaties (in other words, the clauses on the protected 
rights), but also to the procedural provisions […] That clause, essential to the efficacy of the 
mechanism of international protection, must be interpreted and applied in such a way that the 
guarantee that it establishes is truly practical and effective, given the special nature of human rights 
treaties...” See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. Competence. Judgment of 
September 24, 1999. Series C No. 55, para. 36. 
108 In this sense, the Court has stressed, in connection with the application of Article 29(a) of the 
Convention, that “[a]ny interpretation of the Convention that […] would imply suppression of the 
exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in the Convention, would be contrary to its object and 
purpose as a human rights treaty, and would deprive all the Convention’s beneficiaries of the 
additional guarantee of protection of their human rights that the Convention’s jurisdictional body 
affords.” See, I-ACtHR, Case of Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru. Competence. Judgment of September 24, 
1999. Series C No. 54, para. 41. 
109 Article 29 of the American Convention (Restrictions Regarding Interpretation) read as follow: “No 
provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: a. permitting any State Party, group, or person to 
suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to 
restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of 
any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another 
convention to which one of the said states is a party; c. precluding other rights or guarantees that are 
inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; 
or d. excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
and other international acts of the same nature may have.” 
110 The central importance of ‘good faith’ in international law has been notice since its beginnings, and 
even before. In fact, Grotius in his famous De Jure Belli et Pacis recalled the importance of it within 
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sense to allow an effective and plain application (and enjoyment) of the given rights. 
However, a full guarantee of fundamental rights requires an additional element. 
Effective and unrestrictive protection of a given right would not be possible if this 
protection would not take into account all circumstances of the case, all relevant 
elements that shape the situations that have to be analysed by the Court. To put it 
differently, when the interpretation does not take into account the evolution of the 
social institutions (including the evolution of legal systems) and the general and 
permanent societal transformations, especially with regard to its social-cultural 
evolution or our societies, that interpretation would simply not be able to generate an 
effective protection of the fundamental rights at stake. In other words, the 
interpretation of the fundamental rights recognised on the Convention must be 
contextual and evolutive.  
In the wording of the Court, “... evolutive interpretation is consistent with the 
general rules of treaty interpretation established in the 1969 Vienna Convention”, 
adding –for even more clarification- that “... human rights treaties are living 
instruments whose interpretation must consider the changes over time and present-
day conditions.”111 Moreover, the Court stated that the dynamic evolution of the 
corpus juris of international human rights law has had a positive impact on 
international law. Therefore, the Court “…must adopt the proper approach to 
consider [the interpretation of a given right] in the context of the evolution of the 
fundamental rights of the human person in contemporary international law.”112  
Coming back to Article 29 of the Convention, it is important to clarify that 
the principle of non-restrictive interpretation refers not only to the right or freedom 
at stake (the right to property in this case), but also to all other rights recognised and 
guaranteed by the Convention. As all fundamental rights are inter-connected and 
interdependent, the restriction over one of them can possibly generate limitations 
over the others. This means that, in a given case, the less restrictive interpretation of 
                                                                                                                                          
Roman law, when he referred that “Cicero, in his Office, gives so much weight to promises, that he 
calls Good Faith the foundation of Justice. So Horace: and the Platonists often call Justice, Truth, or 
Truthfulness, which Apuleius translates Fidelitas.” (p. 147-148) Moreover, quoting again Cicero, 
Grotius stressed the fact that “[i]n good faith, what you thought, not what your said, is to be 
considered” (p. 192). See, H. GROTIUS, The Rights of War and Peace (De Jure Belli et Pacis), 1st. 
ed. 1625, London, 1853, p. 147-148. 
111 See I-ACtHR, The right to information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the 
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, cit., para. 114. 
112 Ibid, para. 115. 
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the right at stake has to take into account not only the full enjoyment of that right but 
also the complete enjoyment of all other fundamental rights connected with.113 
Finally, the last element that has to be accounted for the interpretation of the 
conventional rights is that the interpretation must take into account the legal system 
of which it is a part, merely the system built by and for the international human right 
law.114 In the wording of the International Court of Justice “...an international 
instrument has to be interpretated and applied within the framework of the entire 
legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.”115  
Therefore, on the interpretation of the rights enshrined in the Convention, the 
Court does not limit itself to the text of the Convention, but would rather scrutinise 
all other regional or universal human rights instruments that, for different 
circumstances (as e.g. because the States Parties in the controversy have ratified it), 
would become applicable to a case at stake. Of course, this does not mean that the 
Court would resolve a given case through the direct and exclusive application of a 
different instrument than the Convention (which would be clearly in violation of its 
own mandate and competence). On the contrary, this only means that the Court 
would use other relevant instruments, part of the corpus juris of international human 
rights law, that would provide a better understanding of the rights recognised within 
the same American Convention.116  
                                                 
113 For the Inter-American Court, “…when there be conflicting interests it must assess in each case 
the legality, necessity, proportionality and fulfilment of a lawful purpose in a democratic society”, and 
adding that, for proportionality, she means a “…restriction being closely adjusted to the attainment of 
a legitimate objective, interfering as little as possible with the effective exercise of the restricted 
right.” See, first, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 138; and 
second, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 145. 
114 See, The right to information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the 
Due Process of Law, cit., para. 113. 
115 See. ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa), Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16 ad 31. 
116 As the Court said, “[t]he corpus juris of international human rights law comprises a set of 
international instruments of varied content and juridical effects (treaties, conventions, resolutions and 
declarations). Its dynamic evolution has had a positive impact on international law in affirming and 
building up the latter´s faculty for regulating relations between States and the human beings within 
their respective jurisdictions. This Court, therefore, must adopt the proper approach to consider this 
question in the context of the evolution of the fundamental rights of the human person in 
contemporary international law.” See, I-ACtHR, Juridical Condition and Rights of the 
Undocumented Migrants, cit., para. 120; and see, I-ACtHR, The right to information on Consular 
Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, cit., para. 115. 
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In the following paragraphs, we will see how the Court applies this systemic 
interpretation of the corpus juris of international human rights law to those cases in 
which indigenous people claimed the protection of the right to collective property.  
 
 
5.1. Indigenous peoples’ land claims: specific interpretative rules 
 
As we said above, the interpretation of the conventional rights must be done 
in good faith, taking into account the interdependence and interconnection with other 
fundamental rights; it must be non-restrictive and respectful of the social context and 
cultural evolution of a given society in which the enjoyment of the right at stake is 
under question. But, of course, if we take into account that in our modern and 
globalised societies we can find a plurality of cultural expressions, practices, 
religions, different understandings of the “good”, the “evil” and diverse world views, 
our interpretative task becomes more difficult.117  
Why? Because the contextual and evolutive interpretation of the conventional 
rights has to be done precisely in context, that is not with regard to an abstract and 
idealised societal landscape, but –on the contrary– in consideration of a specific 
societal temporal and spatial environment that is permeated by a given and concrete 
cultural expressions and traditions. In short, due regard has to be paid to the existing 
cultural expressions, according to their cultural stage at the time in which the 
interpreter is performing his or her task. But also, special attention has to be operated 
in order not to fall into what we have called the ‘essentialist trap’, that is to 
essentialize the understanding of a given cultural expression or entity, through the 
dogmatic construction of its ontological cultural elements or characteristics.118   
Therefore, the interpretation of the rights embodied within the Convention 
must take into consideration the society as a whole, paying due account to the 
complex plurality of cultural understandings that are present in it, especially in the 
recognition of the right pleaded before the Court. In fact, in the case of divergent 
cultural views, which are reflected in the different understandings of the rights 
                                                 
117 See, in connection with the plurality of cultures, our considerations in Chapter I, Section 3; with 
regard to cultural diversity, Chapter III, Section 1 et seq.  
118 See, with regard to this notion, our consideration in Chapter IV, Section 2.4. and 4. 
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protected by the Convention (such as the case of indigenous peoples), the principle 
of pluralism in a democratic society requires –from public authorities– to take 
positive measures that would guarantee a fair protection for those different 
understandings.119 In addition, it demands to implement the less possible restrictive 
interpretation toward the enjoyment of those rights that are regarded as incompatible 
with the enjoyment and protection of another conventionally recognised right, 
according to the circumstances of a concrete and specific case. Indeed, the same 
approach has to be applied in connection with the need to secure an acceptable 
degree of tolerance among the antagonist cultural manifestations.120 In fact, this 
interpretative approach has been applied by the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter “European Court” or “ECtHR”) in different occasions, especially in all 
of those cases in which religious minorities were involved.121  
Consequently, as a matter of principle, the strict and sole reference to only 
one cultural manifestation among the plurality of cultural traditions, expressions and 
understandings present in a given society (even when they refer to the majoritarian 
societal entity), would not necessarily satisfy the requirements of the principle of 
equality and non-discrimination. This would be the case when that sole culture 
reference would be used as a contextual cultural standard for the determination of 
the socio-cultural evolution the society as a whole. Indeed, this would be the case if –
for example– through that restrictive interpretation no different treatment would be 
provided, without a reasonable justification, to those situations that are substantially 
and culturally different. 122  
                                                 
119 In connection with positive or affirmative actions, see Chapter II, Section 3.   
120 See, Chapter II, Section 1. 
121 On this sense, the ECtHR has stated that “...the court recognises that it is possible that tension is 
created in situations where a religious or any other community becomes divided, it considers that this 
is one of the unavoidable consequences of pluralism. The role of the authorities in such circumstances 
is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing 
groups tolerate each other.” See, among others, ECtHR, Case of Serif v. Greece (Application no. 
38178/97), Judgment of 14 December 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-IX, para. 53; 
and ECtHR, Case of platform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria (Application no. 10126/82), 
Judgement of 21 june 1998, Series A no. 139, p. 12, para. 32. 
122 As the I-ACtHR said, “[i]t is a well-established principle of international law that unequal 
treatment towards persons in unequal situations does not necessarily amount to impermissible 
discrimination. Legislation that recognizes said differences is therefore not necessarily 
discriminatory.” See I-ACtHR, the Case of Saramaka People v. Suriname; Judgment on Preliminary 
Objections, merits, Reparations, and Costs of November 28, 2007. Series C No. 172, para. 103. In the 
same line, but in a more clear fashion, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has stated that 
“[t]he right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the 
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As an example of the above mentioned case, we can perhaps refer to the case 
of certain indigenous cultural expressions and practises (e.g. language, religion, or 
communal method of productions), that would require specific measures of 
protection in order to be equally developed and practised.123 Otherwise, it would be 
possible that they would not be able to enjoy the same level of protection that the 
other members of the society have. In short, without the application of positive 
actions when required, indigenous people would be discriminated against. 
Notwithstanding, the need for positive measures and culturally tailored 
actions does not absolutely mean that cultures, in themselves, as complex and 
integrative manifestations of the human spirit, or “highest social and historical 
expression of that spiritual development” –in the wording of the American 
Declaration124–, have to receive –as such– a special or favourable treatment. All 
cultures have equal functional value vis-à-vis the individual that build his or her 
identity (cultural identity) on them125; and hence, all of them are placed or should be 
placed in a non-differential legal position –at least– in an open, pluralistic and 
democratic society. Cultures cannot be regarded as an edict of fate; and indigenous 
cultures, as such, as an integrative cultural expression, should not be considered in 
this sense as a cultural exception.126  
It is important to bear in mind, especially when we talk about indigenous 
people, that the American Convention does indeed recognise the right of everybody 
to equal protection before the law, without discrimination of any kind (Article 24)127, 
but not only. Additionally, it also puts over the Member States’ shoulders the duty to 
respect and ensure –under equal basis– the full exercise and enjoyment of the rights 
of all individuals who are subject to their jurisdiction (Article 1.1.).128  
                                                                                                                                          
Convention is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat 
differently persons whose situations are significantly different”. See, ECtHR, Case of Thlimmenos v. 
Greece (Application no. 34369/97), Judgment of 6 April 2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
2000-IV, p. 11 § 44. 
123 See our consideration in Chapter II, Section 3 and 3.1. 
124 See, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of the Man, Preamble. 
125 See our consideration in Chapter I, Section 5. 
126 See, UNESCO, Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue – World Report, Paris, 
2009, p. 3. 
127 Article 24 of the American Convention read as follow: “All persons are equal before the law. 
Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law.” 
128 Article 1.1. of the American Convention read as follow: “The States Parties to this Convention 
undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to 
their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination 
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The above mentioned duty generates for the Member States the obligation to 
take positive measures to not only protect and guarantee those rights, but as well to 
generate the conditions that would make it possible the full enjoyment of those 
recognised rights. In addition, in the particular case of the members of indigenous 
communities (and not with regard to the communities themselves, as differential 
societal entities), the States –according to the understanding of the Court– “...must 
take into account the specific characteristics that differentiate the members of the 
indigenous peoples from the general population and that constitute their cultural 
identity.”129  
Accordingly, the obligation to treat differently a member of an indigenous 
community, who finds himself or herself in a concrete and circumstantiated 
differential position –generated by the structural difficulties that he or she faces in 
order to be able to equally enjoy his or her traditional culture and cultural identity– 
vis-à-vis the other members of the society (or even with regard to the members of his 
or her own cultural group), could not be considered as an option at the hands of the 
States. In fact, they have the conventional obligation to ensure the enjoyment of the 
recognized rights, and therefore to enact all those affirmative actions that are 
required by the contextual circumstances. Moreover, because this is a positive 
obligation, the failure in its achievement would amount to a violation of fundamental 
rights guarantee by the Convention.  
However, in the formulation and application of these measures, I would argue 
that States enjoy a margin of appreciation, or –at least– a certain margin of 
manoeuvre. Nevertheless, regarding to the detailed level of specification in 
connection with the reparation measures ordered by the Court –in cases involving 
indigenous people’s land claims– in order to eliminate the effects of the breaches 
perpetrated (especially in connection with the redress of non-pecuniary damages), 
seems quite the opposite.130  
                                                                                                                                          
for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
economic status, birth, or any other social condition.” 
129 See I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on Merits, 
Reparations and Costs of June 17, 2005. Serie C No. 125, para. 51.  
130 See, among other judgments, I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
cit., para. 211-232, and operative paragraphs 6-13. See also, G. CITRONI, K. I. QUINTANA 
OSUNA, Reparations for Indigenous Peoples in the Case Law of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, in F. LENZERINI (ed.), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples. International & Comparative 
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6. Indigenous peoples and the right to land: Article 21 of the American 
Convention under a new interpretative light  
 
Coming back to article 21 of the American Convention, the Inter-American 
Court did not make an exception in connection with the application of the 
interpretative rules that were described within the precedent section. Indigenous 
communities have claimed before the Court the recognition of the right to collective 
property over their traditional lands. As we already pointed out, Article 21 ACHR 
does not make any literal mention to this kind of property but –at the same time– 
does not literal exclude it.  
For this reason, and in view of the impossibility to resolve this interpretative 
quiz through the –if you may allow me the redundancy– literal interpretation of the 
text of the Convention (Article 31(1) VCLT)131, and bearing in mind its object and 
purpose (the effective protection of human rights), the Court has recurred –as a 
supplementary means of interpretation (Article 32 VCLT)132– to the preparatory 
work of the American Convention on Human Rights. In fact, when the literal 
interpretation of text of a treaty leaves an ambiguous or obscure meaning, or even 
absurd or unreasonable, it would be possible to make recourse to supplementary 
means of interpretation, such as “the preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion”.  
                                                                                                                                          
Perspectives, Oxford, 2008, p. 317 et seq. More in general, see also, S. J. ANAYA, Reparations for 
Neglect of Indigenous Land Rights at the Intersection of Domestic and International Law - The Maya 
Cases in the Supreme Court of Belize, in F. LENZERINI (ed.), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples. 
International & Comparative Perspectives, Oxford, 2008, p. 567 et seq.; F. FRANCIONI, Reparation 
for Indigenous Peoples: Is International Law Ready to ensure Redress for Historical Injustices, in F. 
LENZERINI (ed.), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples. International & Comparative Perspectives, 
Oxford, 2008, p. 27 et seq.; and D. SHELTON, Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: The Present 
Value of Past Wrongs, in F. LENZERINI (ed.), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples. International & 
Comparative Perspectives, Oxford, 2008, p. 47 et seq. 
131 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) reads as follows: “A treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 
132 Article 32 VCLT reads as follows: “Supplementary means of interpretation. Recourse may be had 
to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of 
article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
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In fact, at the time of the elaboration of the Convention, it has been decided to 
refer to Article 21 only to “use and enjoyment of his property” instead to “private 
property”. Therefore, the phrase “[e]veryone has the right to the use and enjoyment 
of private property, but the law may subordinate its use and enjoyment to public 
interest” was replaced by “[e]veryone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his 
property”, according to the quotation of the Court.133 Consequently, it was not 
possible for the Court to exclude, from the protection offered by Article 21 of the 
Convention, the exercise of the right to property in a communal manner, because –as 
it has been already said– the same article precludes, when read together with article 
29 of the Convention, a restrictive interpretation of rights.  
Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that the use of supplementary methods of 
interpretation remains always as a subsidiary and complementary means for 
interpretation. In fact, the Court has emphasized that “...the preparatory works are 
completely insufficient to provide solid grounds to reject [or to accept] the 
interpretation...”134 Hence, for the Court, the recourse to the ‘preparatory works’ is 
only the last resource of interpretation and, before making use of it, all principal 
elements of interpretation of the Vienna Convention should be applied.  
Moreover, even when the text of the Convention, or of the other treaties 
subject to the interpretation of the Court, could appear clear, that –in itself– does not 
authorise a straightforward, direct and literal interpretation of them, without 
previously exploring all the elements that are included within the rule of 
interpretation of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. In fact, the Court has said that 
the “usual meaning” of the terms “...cannot be a rule in itself, but should be 
examined in the context and, especially, from the perspective of the object and 
purpose of the treaty, so that the interpretation does not result in a deterioration in 
the protection system embodied in the Convention”.135 In short, the interpreter should 
proceed to apply, before reaching a final conclusion, a ‘systemic interpretation’ of 
the norm under scrutiny.  
 
                                                 
133 See, I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, cit., para. 
145. 
134 See, I-ACtHR, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 73. 
135 Ibid., para. 42. 
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6.1. Systemic interpretation of Article 21 of the Convention 
 
In its recent jurisprudence, the Inter-American Court has emphasised that, 
according to the systemic interpretation, “...norms should be interpreted as part of a 
whole, whose meaning and scope must be established in function of the juridical 
system to which they belong.”136 Accordingly, the second interpretative steps made 
by the Court was the application of Article 29(b) of the Convention137, which means 
to analyse the conventional right to property under the light of other conventions that 
are part of the same human rights international law system applicable to the case.  
In this regard, the Court found that, in most cases in which indigenous 
people’s property rights were at stake, the ILO Convention No. 169138 was –among 
other international treaties– the most suitable instrument for the interpretation of the 
rights enclosed within the American Convention. This is because a systemic 
interpretation of the Convention must be made in “...accordance with the evolution 
of the inter-American system, taking into account related developments in 
International Human Rights Law.”139 
However, before entering into the analysis of the reading that the Court has 
made of the American Convention, under the light of the specific provision 
contained within the mentioned ILO Convention, it would be very constructive to 
address one of those pregnant questions whose answer would most likely contribute 
to the better understanding of the entire system of human rights protection. The 
question in this case could be formulated as follows: which treaties should be taken 
into account for the interpretation of the rights included in the Convention? Could 
they only include treaties adopted within the framework of the Inter-American 
system or perhaps even also those that have been adopted outside of this regional 
framework?  
                                                 
136 Ibid., para. 43. 
137 Article 29(b) ACHR reads as follow: “No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: […] 
b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any 
State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party.” 
138 See the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries, C 169 of 27th of June 1989. 
139 See I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 127. 
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Since the beginning of its jurisprudence, the Court has clearly realised that 
the very nature of the above questions was intimately connected with the distinction 
between universalism and regionalism. In fact, the I-ACtHR, relying in the wording 
of the Preamble of the American Convention, which recognises that the essential 
rights of all human beings “...are based upon attributes of the human personality, 
and that they therefore justify international protection in the form of a 
convention...”140, stated that it would be improper “...to make distinctions based on 
the regional or non-regional character of the international obligations assumed by 
States, and thus deny the existence of the common core of basic human rights 
standards.”141  
For these reasons, the Court concluded that it was absolutely necessary to 
complement the regional system with the universal system, adding that that 
complementation was “...entirely consistent with the object and purpose of the 
Convention, the American Declaration and the Statute of the Commission.”142 In this 
sense, we can conclude that the inter-American judges have a truly universal 
understanding of Human Rights, beside the attention that they pay to the particular 
features of the region, as –for instance– the cultural diversity that strongly 
characterises this part of the world.143 
Moreover, the Court has also interpreted that it has the competence, within 
the exercise of its jurisdiction, to examine and interpret any treaty with the purpose 
of enlightening the reading of the Convention. In fact, the regional tribunal affirmed 
that “…provided that the protection of human rights in a member State of the Inter-
American system is directly involved, even though the said instrument does not 
belong the regional system of protection.”144 Even when this quotation has been 
                                                 
140 See, Preamble, 2nd para., ACHR. 
141 See I-ACtHR, "Other treaties” subject to the advisory jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American 
Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of September 24, 1982. Series A No. 1, 
para. 40. 
142 Ibid., para. 43. 
143 In this sense, international scholars have said, not without reasons, that “...le juge interaméricain 
indiquait la nécessité qu’il y a à rejeter une vision régionaliste des droits de l’homme, en rappelant 
que la Convention ne fait que reprendre et intégrer les principes de la Déclaration universelle des 
droits de l’homme et du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques.” See, H. 
TIGROUDJA, L'Autonomie du Droit Applicable par la Cour Interaméricaine des Droits de l'Homme: 
En Marge d'Arrêts et Avis Consultatifs Récents, in Rev. trim. dr. h., 69, 2002, p. 82 et seq..  
144 See I-ACtHR, Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion 
OC-18 of September 17, 2003. Series A No. 18, para. 54. 
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taken from one of the advisory opinions delivered by the Court145, it does not mean 
that it would not be applicable to the cases raised within its contentious 
jurisdiction146; this is precisely because of the application of the principle of systemic 
interpretation of the American Convention. For this reason, the said principle has to 
be considered as a mainstream principle of interpretation that permeates the entire 
adjudicatory activity of this international body. 
Based in its own jurisprudence147 and in the findings of other international 
and regional judicial bodies148, the Court has characterised human rights instruments 
as live instruments, whose interpretation must “...consider the changes over time and 
present-day conditions.”149 As it has been highlighted above, under the views of the 
Court, international human rights law conform an integrated corpus juris. In a sense 
that, all international instruments that are part of it does not live isolated one from 
each other, on the contrary, they interact and influence each other in a way that 
generate a critical mass capable to put pressure toward the enhancement of the 
protection of the existing human rights in the region.150  
To conclude, under the view of the Court, the dynamic evolution of the 
international human rights law should be considered as a main factor that “...has had 
a positive impact on international law in affirming and building up the latter’s 
                                                 
145 With regard to the advisory competence of the Court, see Article 64 ACHR. 
146 See, Articles 51(1) and 62 ACHR. 
147 See, among others, I-ACtHR, Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. 
Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63, para. 192 et seq..; Case of the 
Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 8, 2004. Series 
C No. 110, para. 165. 
148 In fact, in its 16th Advisory Opinion (see below), the Court made references to the jurisprudence of 
the International Court of Justice and of the European Court of Human Rights; more precisely, in the 
case of the former, references have been made to its Advisory Opinion delivered in “Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971; p. 
16 ad 31; and in the case of the ECtHR, to the following cases: Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgment of 
25 April 1978, Series A no. 26; pp. 15-16, para. 31; Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, 
Series A no. 31; p. 19, para. 41; and Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), judgment of 23 
March 1995, Series A no. 310; p. 26, para. 71. 
149 See I-ACtHR, The right to information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the 
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, cit., para. 114. 
150 In the opinion of two judges of the Inter-American Court, through the exercise of their judicial 
function, they “…must enhance the awareness of all inhabitants of our region so that facts such as 
those of the instant case do not happen again, to the detriment of those who most need protection, who 
have no one else to resort to in our societies, and of all those who are socially marginalized and 
excluded, who suffer in silence, but who in no way can be forgotten by the law.” See, I-ACtHR, Case 
of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit.; Separate Dissenting Opinion of Judges A.A. 
Cançado Trindade and M.E. Ventura Robles, para. 24. 
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faculty for regulation relations between States and the human beings within their 
respective jurisdictions.”151 
 
 
6.1.1. The application of the ILO Convention No. 169 
 
After scanning those international instruments that might provide a 
supportive light for a dynamic and evolutive reading of the Convention, and taking 
into account the related developments in international human rights law, the Court 
concluded that it would be appropriate for the analysis of the scope of Article 21 of 
the Convention to resort to the ILO Convention No. 169 (1989) concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (hereinafter “the ILO 
Convention”).152  
The reason for this interpretative decision lies on the fact that the ILO 
Convention has been considered by the Court as integrative part of the international 
human rights system.153 Moreover, because it is one of the few specific instruments 
that deals with the relationship between indigenous and tribal peoples and their 
traditional lands and territories through its numerous provisions, the I-ACtHR 
expressly recognised its pertinence and adequacy for the interpretation of the 
                                                 
151 See I-ACtHR The right to information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the 
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, cit., para. 115. 
152 Notwithstanding the importance of this Convention, it is important to recall that in the first case in 
which the Court was called to decide upon this matter, the ILO Convention was not even mentioned. I 
am referring to the The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua. This 
attitude of the Court is justified –under my point of view- because Nicaragua did not ratify the ILO 
Convention No. 169.  Nevertheless, one of expert witness, Mr. Rodolfo Stavenhagen Gruenbaum, 
mentioned this Convention in the Court´s room, in his capacity as anthropologist and sociologist. See, 
I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, cit., para. 83(d).       
153 As we saw in Chapter IV, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was one of the first 
international bodies that addressed the situation of indigenous people in the world, of course, from a 
labour perspective but with a broader far reaching effect. In fact, the ILO Convention No. 107 (1957) 
and its subsequent revision in the form of the ILO Convention No. 169 (1989), were the first 
international instruments specifically addressing the situation of ‘indigenous and tribal’ peoples within 
the broad frame of the international law. Nevertheless, this fact has been seen as a “historical 
anomaly”, as a “contemporary incongruity that can only be explained through history”. In fact, the 
ILO organisation is predominantly, but not exclusively, “...a factory of international legal standards 
aimed at creating ‘human conditions of labour’”; in other words, it has not as main purpose of the 
solution of the so called “indigenous problem”. For further exploration of this topic, see our 
consideration in Chapter IV, Section 3, and –among other authors– L. RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO, 
Indigenous Peoples, Postcolonialism, and International Law. The ILO Regime (1919-1989), Oxford, 
2005, p. 8 et seq..   
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American Convention in connection with the current stage of the International 
Human Rights Law.154 In the own wording of the Court, the ILO Convention “...can 
shed light on the content and scope of Article 21 of the American Convention.”155  
Consequently, under the systemic interpretation of the Article 21 ACHR, the 
Court preceded to analyse the meaning of its terms under the light provided by the 
regulations enshrined within the ILO Convention. In this sense, the Court has tried to 
reconstruct the norms enshrined in the mentioned article “...in accordance with the 
evolution of the Inter-American System considering the development that has taken 
place regarding these matters in international human rights law.”156  
As it has been already mentioned, the reference to instruments that could 
have been adopted even outside of the Inter-American System does not mean that the 
Court will directly apply their respective norms in a solution of a given case.157 If the 
latter would be the case, this hypothetical adjudicative action would be allocated 
outside of the material competence of the Court, according to the clear wording of 
Article 62(3) of the American Convention.158  In fact, only violations of the rights 
guaranteed in the Convention, or within other treaties that expressly or implicitly 
recognise its competence159, will open its adjudicatory jurisdiction. Hence, the 
                                                 
154 As the Committee of Experts observed in its 1999 Annual Report, “[the] Convention No. 169 is 
the most comprehensive instrument of international law for the protection in law and in practice of 
the right of indigenous and tribal peoples to preserve their own laws and customs within the national 
societies in which they live.” See General Report of the Committee of Expers on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations, 1999, 87th Session of the ILO Conference, Geneva (CEACR 
General Report – Ilolex No. 041999), para. 99.  
155 See I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 130. 
156 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of March 29, 2006. Series C No. 146, para. 117. 
157 In connection with the direct inapplicability of international instruments outside of the Inter-
American System, see –among other resolutions- the following cases: Case of the “Street Children” 
(Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63, 
paras. 192-195; Case of Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of November 25, 2000. 
Series C No. 70, paras. 208-210; and Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala. Merits. 
Judgment of April 29, 2004. Series C No. 105, Separate Concurring Opining of Judge Sergio Garcia-
Ramírez, para. 19. 
158 Article 62(3) of the American Convention reads as follow: “The jurisdiction of the Court shall 
comprise all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention 
that are submitted to it, provided that the States Parties to the case recognize or have recognized such 
jurisdiction, whether by special declaration pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, or by a special 
agreement.” 
159 In this sense, it is important to bear in mind that Article 23 of the Rule of Procedure of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights makes an enumeration of all of those treaties that, within the 
Inter-American System, have recognised the competence of the Commission, and the Court, for the 
reception of the individual petitions, if all the extra requirements are fulfilled. Article 23 reads as 
follow: “Any person or group of persons or nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more 
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material competence of the Court does not cover those cases in which what is at 
stake is an exclusive violation of a pure extra regional international instrument.160 In 
the words of the I-ACtHR, “...in adjudicatory matters it is only competent to find 
violations of the American Convention on Human Rights and of other instruments of 
the inter-American system for the protection of human rights that enable it to do 
so.”161  
Notwithstanding, the Court has reaffirmed that its material competence in 
contentious cases which were included the assessment of compatibility between 
different national or international laws applied by a State Party of the American 
Convention; in those cases the Court proceeded to the scrutiny of the former 
normative instruments under the light of the latter. It is within this interpretative 
framework that we have to interpret the affirmation of the Court that, in the exercise 
of its jurisdiction, “...has no normative limitation: any legal norm may be submitted 
to this examination of compatibility.” 162  
                                                                                                                                          
of the Member States of the OAS may submit petitions to the Commission, on their behalf or on behalf 
of third persons, concerning alleged violations of a human right recognized in, as the case may be, the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the American Convention on Human Rights 
“Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “Protocol of San Salvador”, the Protocol 
to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, the Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance 
of Persons, and/or the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of 
Violence Against Women “Convention of Belém do Pará”, in accordance with their respective 
provisions, the Statute of the Commission, and these Rules of Procedure.  The petitioner may 
designate an attorney or other person to represent him or her before the Commission, either in the 
petition itself or in a separate document.” (The underlined is added by the author). 
160 The I-ACtHR has said that “...[a]lthough the Inter-American Commission has broad faculties as 
an organ for the promotion and protection of human rights, it can clearly be inferred from the 
American Convention that the procedure initiated in contentious cases before the Commission, which 
culminates in an application before the Court, should refer specifically to rights protected by that 
Convention (cf. Articles 33, 44, 48.1 and 48). Cases in which another Convention, ratified by the 
State, confers competence on the Inter-American Court or Commission to hear violations of the rights 
protected by that Convention are excepted from this rule; these include, for example, the Inter-
American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons.” See Case of Las Palmeras v. 
Colombia. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of February 4, 2000. Series C No. 67, para. 34. (The 
underlined is added by the author). 
161 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of April 29, 
2004. Series C No. 105, para. 51. 
162 The whole citation read as follow: “[w]hen a State is a Party to the American Convention and has 
accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, the Court may examine the conduct of the State to 
determine whether it conforms to the provisions of the Convention, even when the issue may have 
been definitively resolved by the domestic legal system. The Court is also competent to determine 
whether any norm of domestic or international law applied by a State, in times of peace or armed 
conflict, is compatible or not with the American Convention. In this activity, the Court has no 
normative limitation: any legal norm may be submitted to this examination of compatibility. In order 
to carry out this examination, the Court interprets the norm in question and analyzes it in the light of 
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Therefore, in accordance with what has been said in the precedent 
paragraphs, the conclusion reached by the Court cannot generate any surprise, more 
so when assessing the scope of Article 21 of the American Convention under the 
light of principles and regulations enshrined in the ILO Convention No. 169. In fact, 
it is within this framework that the Court has recognised that “...the close 
relationship of the indigenous peoples with the land must be acknowledged and 
understood as the fundamental basis for their culture, spiritual life, wholeness, 
economical survival, and preservation and transmission to future generations.”163  
Moreover, it is through the reading of the ILO Convention that the Court 
drew an interconnected line between identity, culture and traditional land (right to 
property). The reference is made with regard to the Article 13, paragraph 1 of the 
ILO Convention. In this sense, this provision specifically states that governments 
“...shall respect the especial importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the 
peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both as 
applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective 
aspects of this relationship.”  
When the ILO Convention refers to “lands” it includes, according to what 
has been established in the second paragraph of the above mentioned Article 13, not 
only their traditional lands but as well their “territories” which “...covers the total 
environment of the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use.”164 
In addition, Article 14(1) of the ILO Convention expressly recognises “[t]he rights 
of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they 
traditionally occupy...” It is important to emphasise the fact that this Convention 
uses the term “shall” rather than any other weaker configuration, underlining the 
obligation of the State Parties in connection with the recognition of these rights and 
their incorporation within their national laws.165  
                                                                                                                                          
the provisions of the Convention. The result of this operation will always be an opinion in which the 
Court will say whether or not that norm or that fact is compatible with the American Convention.” 
See, I-ACtHR, Case of Las Palmeras v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of February 4, 
2000. Series C No. 67, para. 32 and 33 (The underlined is added by the author). 
163 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community, supra note 94, para. 149; 
and I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, supra note 129, para. 131. 
164 See ILO Convention No. 169, Article 13(2). 
165 On this regards, our consideration in Chapter IV, Section 3.2. et seq. See also, among others, A. 
XANTHAKI, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards, cit., p. 81 et seq.. 
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Furthermore, the same Article 14 of the ILO Convention clarifies the extent 
to which these rights have been recognised, adding that “... the right of the peoples 
concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have 
traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities.”166 
According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), when the Convention 
refers to lands, the concept “...embraces the whole territory they use, including 
forests, rivers, mountains and coastal sea, the surface as well as the sub-surface.” 
Additionally, when it alludes to those lands that they have “traditionally occupy”, 
the Convention indicates those lands as “...where indigenous peoples have lived over 
time, and which they want to pass on to future generation.” 167 Whether those 
traditional lands have to be presently occupied or not, or –in other words– whether it 
would be sufficient to exhibit a historical occupation or possession of them, as some 
scholars referred to them with the expression “lands whenever occupied”, will be 
addressed in the following chapter, together with the position adopted by the Inter-
American Court in this matter.168 
Therefore, bearing in mind these notions, the Court has understood that the 
referred close relationship between lands and culture could be considered as 
enshrined within the wide-ranged area of protection of Article 21 of the American 
Convention. In other words, this article covers not only “...those material things 
which can be possessed, [but] as well as any right which may be part of a person’s 
patrimony”, which also means that the protection of this norm can be extended to 
“...all movables and immovables, corporeal and incorporeal elements and any other 
intangible object capable of having value.”169  
                                                 
166 See ILO Convention No. 169, Article 14(1). In the same line, Article 26 of the United nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in its 1st paragraph establishes that “Indigenous 
peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, 
occupied or otherwise used or acquired”; adding in its 2nd paragraph that they have “...the right to 
own, use and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional 
ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise 
acquired.” 
167 See ILO, Indigenous & Tribal Peoples' Rights in Practice. A Guide to ILO convention No. 169, 
International Labour Standards Department, 2009 (here-in-after ‘The ILO Guide’), p. 91. 
168 On this matter, see –among others- P. THORNBERRY, op. cit., p. 353 et seq.  
169 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2001. Series C No. 79, para. 144; and Case of Ivcher-
Bronstein v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74, para. 
122. 
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Having as a pivotal notion of this broad understanding of “property”, the 
Court has constructed an evolutionary reading of Article 21 of the American 
Convention, under the light of the dispositions of the ILO Convention No. 169, as we 
said before. This evolutionary and systemic reading, led to the incorporation of the 
indigenous conceptual understanding of property, with the consequence of the 
extension of the conventional protection to the “communal form of collective 
property of the land.”170  
Moreover, the incorporation of the indigenous understanding of the right to 
property in the reading of Article 21 ACHR has conducted the Court to an even more 
innovative reading, merely, to the extension of the conventional protection to those 
regarded especial ties that spiritually connect these peoples with their traditional 
lands and territories. In fact, based on these considerations, and taken from the above 
quoted Article 13 of the ILO Convention almost as a blueprint model, the Court has 
stated that “...the close relationship of indigenous peoples with the land must be 
acknowledged and understood as the fundamental basis for their culture, spiritual 
life, wholeness, economic survival, and preservation and transmission to future 
generations.”171 In addition, and explaining even deeply this cultural connection, it 
has affirmed that “[t]he culture of the members of the indigenous communities 
directly relates to a specific way of being, seeing, and acting in the world, developed 
on the basis of their close relationship with their traditional territories and the 
resources therein, not only because they are their main means of subsistence, but 
also because they are part of their worldview, their religiosity, and therefore, of their 
cultural identity”.172  
Hence, for the Courts, the relationship between indigenous people and their 
traditional lands has to be considered as a twofold relationship. On one hand, it is 
composed of a material element in a sense that those lands provide to these people 
essential means of subsistence and, on the other hand, it is possible to even identify a 
spiritual element on it, because it is through this relationship that indigenous peoples 
                                                 
170 See I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, cit., para. 
149. 
171 See I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 131. 
172 See I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 135. 
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find their own identity.173 Without this relationship, their entire understanding of the 
world, life and death, would become meaningless.174   
As you can see, the Court has done nothing but fully incorporate one of the 
identified objective elements that conceptually composes the notion of indigenous 
people, namely their special relationship with their lands, with its particular 
characteristics, as described within the precedent chapter, but not only.175 Through 
the constructed conceptual interconnection between traditional lands and cultural 
identity, and the dogmatic understanding of the ontological dependency between the 
latter with the former, I will argue that the Court has also fallen into what we have 
called the ‘essentialist trap’.  
In fact, as it has been already anticipated in the previous chapter176, it seems 
that for the Court, without the direct enjoyment of the said special relationship with 
the lands in which indigenous forebears used to live, in accordance with their special 
traditions and cultural understandings (including the spiritual dimension), these 
people would lose their “indigenousness.” Indeed, without this special connection, 
they would lose their ‘cultural identity’ (in the wording of the Court), that is, the 
essential cultural element that would make them distinctive (or distinguishable) from 
the rest of the society.177 As I concluded before, if a person cannot possibly be 
considered as “indigenous” due the fact that is living outside of those areas regarded 
as “traditional lands”, then we must admit that the very notion of being indigenous 
has been essentialized, in a sense of being conceptually (and perhaps even 
dogmatically) reduced to one specific character or element.178 
Notwithstanding, if we stay with the interpretative rules contained in Article 
29 of the American Convention, then any possible restrictive interpretation of the 
                                                 
173 See infra note 203. 
174 In the words of the former UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Martínez Cobo, “…for indigenous 
populations, land does not represent simply a possession or means of production. It is not a 
commodity that can be appropriated, but a physical element that must be enjoyed freely. It is also 
essential to understand the special and profoundly spiritual relationship of indigenous peoples with 
Mother Earth as basic to their existence and to all their beliefs, customs, traditions and culture.” See 
J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, op. cit., para. 509. 
175 See, Chapter IV, Section 2.2.4. 
176 Ibid. 
177 See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Indigenous Peoples in Comparative Perspective - Problems and 
Policies, cit., p. 3 et seq. 
178 See, in connection of urban indigenous population, L. RAY, Language of the land. The Mapuche 
in Argentina and Chile, Copenhagen, 2007, p. 20 et seq.; and also R. STAVENHAGEN, Indigenous 
Peoples in Comparative Perspective - Problems and Policies, cit., p. 25-26. 
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conventional rights is precluded, but not only. A restrictive interpretation of those 
rights “...recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another 
convention to which one of the said states is a party”179, is also precluded. Therefore, 
it could be seen as quite logical that an evolutive interpretation of Article 21 of the 
American Convention, under the light of the dispositions enshrined at the ILO 
Convention No. 169, has led the Court to the interpretation of the right to property in 
a sense that includes –among others– the right to communal property of the members 
of the indigenous groups (and tribal communities).180 This without prejudice of the 
conceptual considerations mentioned above. 
 
 
6.1.2. References to common Article 1 of the 1966 International Covenants 
 
The ILO Convention No. 169 has not been the only international instrument 
that the Court used for its evolutive and systemic interpretation of Article 21 ACHR. 
In effect, in two cases regarding the State of Surinam181, whose domestic legislation 
does not recognise the right to communal property of members of tribal peoples182, 
and has not ratified any of the two ILO Conventions, the Court has made references 
to two additional international instruments. In fact, it has recurred to both the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (here in after ICCPR) and to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (here in after 
                                                 
179 See Article 29(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights. 
180 See, I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, cit., para. 
148. 
181 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 15, 2005. Series C No. 124; and I-ACtHR, the Case of 
Saramaka People v. Suriname, cit.  
182 In the Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, the Court has 
acknowledged the fact that the Constitution of Nicaragua also recognizes the right to communal 
property of indigenous people (Articles 5, 89 and 180 of the 1995 Constitution of Nicaragua), but it 
did not nevertheless subordinate the conventional protection of the right to communal property –and 
therefore its recognition– to the potential scope and meaning that the same rights could have within 
the national legislation of the said country. In fact, the Court has stated that “[t]he terms of an 
international human rights treaty have an autonomous meaning, for which reason they cannot be 
made equivalent to the meaning given to them in domestic law.” See, I-ACtHR, The Case of The 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, cit., para. 146.   
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ICESCR), in order to reach the same evolutive interpretative outcome in connection 
to Article 21 of the American Convention.183  
Indeed, being unable to highlight the importance of the ILO Conventions as 
an international standard that could be used for the interpretation of the conventional 
regulations applicable to those cases regarding Suriname, precisely because they 
have not been ratified by the said country, the Court has made references to both 
International Covenants, and in particular to their common Article 1.184 As it has 
been said before, in the case of the ILO Convention 169, the Court made reference to 
it not only because the especial pertinence of its norms, in connection with the 
substance of the case at stake, but also because of its ratification made by the 
respondent State in the case.185  
As we said, the first reference made by the Court, in connection with both 
International Covenants, has been to their common Article 1, and in particular to the 
right of self-determination enshrined on them. As we know, this common article 
recognises the right that “all peoples” have to “...freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development (Article 1(1)), to “...freely dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources...”, and to “...not be deprived of its own means of subsistence 
(Article 1(2)).186  
The Court took as granted, based on the interpretations made by one of the 
monitoring bodies of the Covenants, that indigenous people are also beneficiaries of 
this right that has been recognised to “all peoples”. In this sense, it seems that the 
Court has taken a very strong stance in this controversial matter.187 In fact, the Court 
                                                 
183 See, for instance, I-ACtHR, The Case of Saramaka People v. Suriname, cit., para. 92-95.    
184 Article 1 of the both International Covenant in Civil and Political Rights and in Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, reads as follow: “1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. 2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth 
and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-
operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people 
be deprived of its own means of subsistence. 3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including 
those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall 
promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity 
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”(The underlining is made by the author). 
185 See, I-ACtHR,  Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 130; Case of the 
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 117;  
186 See, as a general comment of this Article 1 ICCPR, M. NOWAK, U.N. Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. CCPR Commentary, 2005, p. 5 et seq. 
187 See, our comments in the previous chapters, in particular in Chapter IV, Section 3.3. and 3.4.; see 
also, among other authors, J. CASTELLINO, op. cit., p. 55 et seq.; A. XANTHAKI, The Right to Self-
CHAPTER V 
290 
 
quoted one of the Concluding Observations made by the Committee on economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in connection with the Russian Federation, in 
which the Committee showed its concern about “...the precarious situation of 
indigenous communities in the State party, affecting their right to self-determination 
under article 1 of the Covenant.”188 Beside the institutional prestige of this 
international body, this quotation seems to be a rather weak reference in order to 
ground the legal basis for the recognition of the right of communal property of 
indigenous or tribal people over their traditional lands.  
Nevertheless, if we read common Article 1 of the 1966 International 
Covenants under the light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, in which it is expressly recognised that indigenous people are beneficiaries 
of the right of self-determination, although not in its full version (as we saw within 
the precedent chapter), then perhaps the above conclusion would have been 
different.189 In fact, as it has been already mentioned, the Declaration has clearly 
recognised the right of indigenous people to internal self-determination, in a sense 
that these populations can channel their exercise by means of seeking autonomy and 
self-government, and to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.”190 Additionally, the said 
Declaration expressly recognises that indigenous people have the “the right to the 
lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or 
otherwise used or acquired”191; and even stressing that they have the right “to 
maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their 
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands…”192 
Hence, as long as the Declaration stresses the vital importance of indigenous 
peoples’ “distinctive spiritual relationship” with their traditional lands and 
territories (Article 25) and –based on that relationship– has recognised the right to 
                                                                                                                                          
Determination: Meaning and Scope, cit., p. 15 et seq.; and A. XANTHAKI, Indigenous Rights and 
United Nations Standards, cit., p. 131 et seq.. 
188 The Court referred to UNCESCR, consideration of Reports submitted by States Parties under 
Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations on Russian Federation (Thirty-first 
session), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.94, December 12, 2003, para. 11. See, I-ACtHR, The Case of 
Saramaka People v. Suriname, cit., para. 93. 
189 See our consideration in Chapter IV, Section 3.3. 
190 See, Article 3 and 4 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
191 Ibid., Article 26 (1). 
192 Ibid., Article 25. 
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the lands, territories and resources which they traditionally owned (Article 26(1)), it 
would be possible to argue that –under the rationale of the Declaration– this special 
right to property could be considered as a specific materialisation or concretisation of 
the right to internal self-determination enshrined in Article 3 of the said instrument. 
However, the Declaration is not a legally binding instrument, as it has been 
rightfully pointed out193, and therefore it could be said that it would not be possible 
to properly use it –as a supportive legal argumentation– within the Court case under 
analysis. In fact, the Declaration has not binding force but –nevertheless– it could be 
used as an interpretative tool. This means that it could be regarded as having 
elaborated upon the already existing human rights obligations of States, through the 
incorporation of the general existing principles of international law194, at least under 
the authoritative view of the UN General Assembly, which has adopted it.195 
 Therefore, it would be possible to consider the Declaration on the Right of 
Indigenous Peoples as integrative part of the corpus juris of international human 
rights law, in a sense of being part of that “…set of international instruments of 
varied content and juridical effect (treaties, conventions, resolutions, and 
declarations).”196 Then, a systemic, dynamic and evolutive interpretation of the right 
to property protected under Article 21 ACHR, interpreted in light of the right 
recognised under common Article 1 of the 1966 Covenants (until this point, the 
construction of the argumentation is semantically equal to the interpretation made by 
the Court in the case of Saramaka)197, but as read under the light of the dispositions 
enshrined within the said Declaration, would perhaps lead toward a stronger 
interpretative construction. Stronger, from the point of view of the protection that, 
this norm, would be able to deliver.  
Of course, at the time of the adoption of this judgment, the Declaration was 
still a draft; therefore, it would have been improper for the Court to incorporate it 
                                                 
193 See, S. J. ANAYA, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development. Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, UN Doc. A/HRC/9/9, 
Human Rights Council, 2008, para. 41. 
194 The Declaration was adopted by the UN General Assembly resolution 61/295 of 13 September 
2003, by the majority of the Member States: 143 voting in favour, 4 against and 11 abstaining.   
195 Ibid. 
196 See, I-ACtHR, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance. In the Framework of the 
Guarantees of the due Process of Law. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of October 1, 1999. Series A No. 
16, para. 115. 
197 See, I-ACtHR, The Case of Saramaka People v. Suriname, cit., para. 95. 
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into its own reasoning. Nevertheless, as an alternative theoretical construction, from 
the point of view of the systemic interpretation of the international human rights 
corpus juris, it has interesting applicative and perhaps innovative angles.   
 
 
6.1.3. References to Article 27 ICCPR 
 
In addition to common Article 1 of the 1966 International Covenants, the 
Court has made references to Article 27 of the ICCPR198 and, most in particular, to 
the interpretation that the UN Human Rights Committee has made of it, in its 
General Comment No. 23 on “The rights of Minorities”.199  In fact the Court has 
referred to the section in which the Committee has considered that “...minorities 
shall not be denied the rights, in community with the other members of their group, 
to enjoy their own culture [, which] may consist in a way of life which is closely 
associated with territory and use of its resources. This may particularly be true of 
members of indigenous communities constituting a minority.”200 
The above mentioned interpretation of the said Article 27 ICCPR, has also 
been considered by the Court as part of the dynamic evolution of the interpretation of 
human rights law, and hence integrative part of its corpus juris. In other words, an 
evolutive reading of international instruments for the protection of human rights 
imposes also a contextual, systemic and non-restrictive interpretation of Article 21 of 
the Convention. Hence, as a direct consequence of this interpretative approach, the 
right to property recognised in the said provision would have to be considered also as 
integrative part, in the case of minority groups, of their right to enjoy their own 
culture, individually or in community with the other members of their group. In 
addition, in the case of indigenous communities, the enjoyment of this right would be 
closely associated with their territories or lands (General Comment No. 23). 
                                                 
198 Article 27 of the ICCPR read as follow: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own 
religion, or to use their own language.” 
199 See, I-ACtHR, The Case of Saramaka People v. Suriname, cit., para. 94. 
200 Human Rights Committee (HRComm.), General Comment No. 23: The rights of minorities (Art. 
27), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21Rev.1/Add.5, United Nation, 1994, paras. 1 and 3.2. 
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Therefore, the obvious conclusion of a systemic and non-restrictive interpretation of 
Article 21 ACHR would necessarily be that the said right includes the right to 
communal property of the members of the indigenous communities –as minorities– 
to their traditional lands.201  
This kind of interpretation is based on the consideration that indigenous 
people’s customary law (as a source of law) recognises a communal form of 
collective property of the land202, in which the ownership of the said land is not 
centred on the individual but rather on the group and its community. In fact, it is in 
this sense that this traditional understanding of the right to property is regard as an 
essential element of the indigenous cultures, spiritual life, integrity and economic 
survival of these populations.203  
Following this line of thought, the Court has added that “[d]isregard for 
specific versions of use and enjoyment of property, springing from the culture, uses, 
customs, and beliefs of each people, would be tantamount to holding that there is 
only one way of using and disposing of property, which, in turn, would render 
protection under Article 21 of the Convention illusory for millions of persons.”204 
Indeed, this notion of ownership and possession of land does not necessarily conform 
to the classic concept of property205, but –nevertheless– deserves equal protection 
                                                 
201 In this sense, the term “property” under the new interpretative light of Article 21 ACHR, includes 
“...material things which can be possessed, as well as any right which may be part of a person´s 
patrimony; that concept includes all movable and immovable, corporeal and incorporeal elements 
and any other intangible object capable of having value.” See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 121.  
202 It is important to bear in mind that the ILO Convention No. 169 states, at the first paragraph of 
article 8 that “[i]n applying national laws and regulations (...) due regard shall be had to their 
customs or customary laws”, and at its second paragraph that “[t]hese peoples shall have the rights to 
retain their own customs and institutions, where these are not incompatible with fundamental rights 
defined by the national legal system and with internationally recognised human rights.”  
203 The I-ACtHR has stated that “[t]o guarantee the right of indigenous peoples to communal 
property, it is necessary to take into account that the land is closely linked to their oral expressions 
and traditions, their customs and languages, their arts and rituals, their knowledge and practices in 
connections with nature, culinary art, and customary law, dress, philosophy, and values. In 
connection with their milieu, their integration with nature and their history, the members of the 
indigenous communities transmit this non-material cultural heritage from one generation to the next, 
and it is constantly recreated by members of the indigenous groups and communities.” See I-ACtHR, 
Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 154.   
204 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 120.  
205 As Judge Sergio García-Ramírez pointed out in one of his separate opinions, “...the property rights 
[of indigenous peoples] are “qualified”, that is to say it has unique characteristic, which correspond 
in some aspect to ordinary ownership, but differ radically form it in others. The idea of putting the 
indigenous form of ownership (…) on the same footing as that of the civil law also preserved under 
Article 21 of the Convention my prove extremely disadvantageous to the legitimate interest and lawful 
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under the understanding of the Court. Consequentially, Article 21 of the American 
Convention protects –according to the Court– both the private property of 
individuals and communal property of the members of indigenous communities.206 
Furthermore, it would be important to clarify that this innovative 
interpretative line does not absolutely mean that the American Convention authorises 
the recognition of a collective property right as a “group right”. In fact, as we will 
see also within the following chapter, the right to collective property recognised by 
the Inter-American Court is indeed an individual right, whose right holders are the 
members of the regarded indigenous communities rather than the community as such 
(as a separate entity with autonomous personality).207 But, because this sui generis or 
special individual right to property is enjoyed in community or association with other 
members of the same indigenous community, then we can also conclude that it can 
be seen as an individual collective right to property.208 
In conclusion, Member States of the Convention have to respect the special 
relationship that indigenous peoples have with their territories, but not only. 
Additionally, the conjunction reading of Article 21 with Articles 1(1) and 2 of the 
Convention209, places upon the States “...a positive obligation to adopt special 
measures that guarantee members of indigenous and tribal peoples the full and equal 
                                                                                                                                          
rights of the indigenous people”. See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. 
Paraguay, cit., Separate Opinion of Judge Sergio García-Ramírez, para. 16. 
206 See, I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 143. 
207 As we have already said, the Court has declared the violation of the right to property enshrined in 
Article 21 of the Convention, has done so “to the detriment of the members” of the involved 
indigenous communities and not with respect of the community itself. See, among other resolutions, I-
ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, I-ACtHR, Series C 
No. 79. Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs of August 31, 2001, para. 155, and operative para. 
2; I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 156, and operative 
para. 2; and Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 144, and 
operative para. 2.  
208 Prof. Stavenhagen, former UN Special Rapporteur, referring to the special relationship that 
indigenous people have with their lands, has nevertheless said that “[t]he right to own, occupy and 
use land collectively is inherent in the self-conception of indigenous peoples and generally this right is 
vested in the local community, the tribe, the indigenous nation or group. For productive purposes it 
may be divided into plots and used individually or on a family basis, yet much of it is regularly 
restricted for community use only (forests, pastures, fisheries, etc.), and the social and moral 
ownership belongs to the community.” See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Indigenous Peoples in 
Comparative Perspective - Problems and Policies, in UNDP Occasional Paper, 2004/14, 2004, p. 3-4. 
209 Article 2 of the American Convention reads as follow: “Where the exercise of any of the rights or 
freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States 
Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of 
this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights 
or freedoms.” 
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exercise of their right to the territories they have traditionally used and 
occupied.”210 
Last but not least, and as a final general conceptual remark, allow me to say 
that it seems that we can identify here again the conceptual configuration of the 
above mentioned threefold relationship (traditional lands → culture → identity) but 
with the addition of an ulterior element, that is, the right to property. Under this new 
version, not only the relationship with traditional lands is interpreted as essential for 
the culture of indigenous people, and therefore essential for the maintenance of their 
identity, but also the protection of the right to property, as a guarantee for the 
preservation of the said especial relationship has become essential too. It seems that 
not only the threefold relationship211 has increased its components, becoming a 
fourfold one, but also the above mentioned essentialist trap has grown in trapped 
conceptualisations.  
 
 
6.2.  Other possible interpretations? 
 
As we have seen within the previous paragraphs, in the views of the Inter-
American Court, the close ties that indigenous peoples have with their traditional 
territories and natural resources constitute a central element of their culture. This is 
also regarded as integrative part of their own distinctive identity, and –as such– 
deserves to be guaranteed under the protection of Article 21 of the Convention, 
which –as we already know– protect the right to property.  
Therefore, if their traditional communal understanding of the right to property 
is protected because it constitutes an essential part of indigenous cultural identity, it 
seems that the very focus on the protection here is –at last– their cultural identity in 
itself. If this is true, as it seems to be, then the protection of the indigenous 
communal property –as guaranteed by Article 21 ACHR– would become a powerful 
vehicle, a useful tool in the hands of indigenous peoples for the protection of their 
                                                 
210 See, I-ACtHR, The Case of Saramaka People v. Suriname, cit., para. 91. 
211 See, in this Chapter, Section 2, and in Chapter IV, Section 2.4. and 4.  
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culture and identity as such. This –of course– despite the fact that it would be a 
vehicle ontologically trapped in an essentialised view of indigenousness.212 
If traditional lands constitute an essential part of indigenous peoples’ culture, 
as the Court has clearly interpreted, and if we add to that interpretation the 
conceptual assumption that that essential part of their culture also constitutes the 
central element of their cultural distinctiveness, as a differential societal aggregation, 
therefore, it would be possible to conclude that the cultural aspect of the ties between 
indigenous peoples and their lands represent a constituent factor of their identity. 
That is, a factor that allows them to self-identify as such, as different peoples, as 
indigenous peoples. This inter-relatedly regarded dependency was clearly pictured by 
Judges A.A. Cançado Trindade, M. Pacheco Gómez and A. Abreu Burelli when, in a 
joint separate opinion, stressed that “[w]ithout the effective use and enjoyment of 
these [traditional lands], they would be deprived of practicing, conserving and 
revitalizing their cultural habits, which give a meaning to their own existence, both 
individual and communitarian. The feeling which can be inferred is in the sense that, 
just as the land they occupy belongs to them, they in turn belong to their land. They 
thus have the right to preserve their past and current cultural manifestations, and the 
power to develop them in the future.”213 
Furthermore, under this new interpretative light, it would be possible to say 
that what was really at stake in these cases –at least under the understanding of the 
Court– was not only the right to indigenous people to communal property and its 
interpretative recognition, as enshrined by the scope of Article 21 of the Convention. 
Indeed, it would be possible to argue that what was really at stake in these cases was 
the right of indigenous people to enjoy their own identity, their own culture, and their 
right to live their lives according to their own cultural traditions, their own 
understandings, and their own spiritual conception of the world.  
In short, under this new interpretative light, the traditional right to communal 
property is protected, not just because fells into the scope of protection of Article 21 
ACHR as a mere right to property; but because it has to be considered as an essential 
                                                 
212 See, Chapter IV, Section 2.2.3. 
213 See I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, cit., Joint 
Separate Opinion of Judges A.A. Cançado Trindade, M. Pacheco Gómez and A. Abreu Burelli, para. 
8. 
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part of the indigenous peoples’ cultural identity. Hence, under this view, the non-
recognition of this right to collective property would generate a violation of the right 
to property, but not only. Under this logic, it would also amount to a deprivation of 
their culture, because it would put under threat their distinguishable identity as 
different people. Consequentially, it would amount to a violation of their human 
dignity, as indigenous.214 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We started the present chapter with the observation that perhaps one of the 
central weaknesses of indigenous people’s legal regime –as described within the 
precedent chapter215– is the lack of specific judicial or even quasi-judicial 
mechanisms with concrete jurisdiction to supervise the full respect, applicability and 
enforcement of those that are regarded as specific indigenous people’s rights.  
In this sense, our inquiry moved toward one of the main regional systems of 
human rights protection, namely, the Inter-American System and –more in 
particular– in connection with the jurisprudence that the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights has developed in the recent years. This decision was a quite obvious 
step, if we take into consideration that the jurisprudence of this Court, regarding 
indigenous people’s right to communal property over their traditional lands, have to 
be considered as absolutely innovational vis-à-vis other international judicial bodies. 
In fact, the Inter-American Court, through an innovative and integrative 
method of legal interpretation, namely through a dynamic, systemic, evolutive, non-
                                                 
214 It is interesting to see the conceptual parallels between the interpretative lines of the Court and the 
famous study elaborated by the former UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Martínez Cobo, with regard to the 
relationship between traditional lands and indigenous peoples’ identity. In fact, in his views, “[t]oday 
as yesterday, land is part of the existence, as indigenous persons, of these populations and serves as 
the basis for their entire physical and spiritual environment. It is land that defines the group (clan, 
tribe, people or nation), its culture, its way of life, its life style, its cultural and religious ceremonies, 
its problems of survival and its relationships of all kinds within the community and with other groups 
and, above all, its own identity. Land is synonymous with the very life of indigenous populations.” 
See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, Study of the Problem of discrimination Against Indigenous 
Populations - Final Report (last part) submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. José R. Martínez 
Cobo, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.4, United Nations, 1983, para. 73 (underline added). 
215 See, Chapter IV, Section 3. 
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restrictive and effective interpretation of the regional and universal human rights 
instruments –which are integrative part of the corpus juris of international human 
rights law216– has incorporated specific indigenous people rights into the text of the 
American Convention. Consequently, under the interpretative light of the said corpus 
juris, the Court has re-elaborated Article 21 of the American Convention in a sense 
to extend its scope of protection beyond the borders of a mere right to property; even 
far away from the mere recognition of the right of indigenous people to communal 
property over traditional lands. Indeed, the Court has extended the scope of 
protection of this article to the protection of indigenous people’s cultural identity.  
The reasoning applied by the Court started with the consideration that 
indigenous people have a special relationship with their traditional lands.217 Then, 
the Court understood that that special relationship was also the essential and 
determinative factor of the distinguishable cultural identity pertained to indigenous 
people. Moreover, it concluded that, without the enjoyment of that relationship, what 
was at stake was not only their identity, as distinguishable peoples, but also –and 
even most importantly– their possibility to enjoy a life in dignity, or a dignified life, 
according to their own cultural traditions, their own understandings and their own 
spiritual conception of the world.  
Therefore, for the Court, the scope of protection of Article 21 ACHR is 
extended far beyond the right to property, to the point of confusing its own limits 
with those of the right to life, as protected by Article 4(1) ACHR.218 In this sense, 
without the right to use and enjoy their traditional land, according to the indigenous 
people’s traditions and customary law, these people would not have access to a 
dignified life. In the views of Judge Cançado Trindade, “here the question of the 
ownership of ancestral land becomes one of the very essence, including the 
preservation of the right to life in a broad sense which encompasses the conditions of 
                                                 
216 See, I-ACtHR, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance. In the Framework of the 
Guarantees of the due Process of Law, cit. para. 115. 
217 See, Chapter IV, Section 2.2.4. et seq. 
218 Article 4(1) ACHR reads as follow: “Every person has the right to have his life respected. This 
right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life.” 
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a life with dignity and the necessary preservation of cultural identity.”219 If some 
doubts have remained in connection to what was his understanding with regard to 
these interconnections, he has clarified them when he bluntly stated that “[c]ultural 
identity is a component of, or an addition to, the fundamental right to life in its wider 
sense. As regard members of indigenous communities, cultural identity is closely 
linked to their ancestral lands. If they are deprived of them […], it seriously affects 
their cultural identity, and finally their very right to life latu sensu, that is, the right 
to life of each and every member of each community."220   
Accordingly, in the reasoning of the Court, when Article 21 of the 
Convention has to be interpreted –under this new interpretative light– in connection 
with indigenous peoples’ communal property cases, due attention would have to be 
paid to their right to life, as guaranteed under Article 4 of the same instrument. In 
addition, according to the principle of non-restrictive interpretation (Article 29 
ACHR), it would not be possible to interpret the right to property in any manner that 
could lead to an unjustified restriction with regard to the full enjoyment of the right 
to life (or to have a dignified life).  
Finally, and as a conclusive remark, I would like to address the above 
conclusion from a different point of view, which is from the standpoint of the 
theoretical framework that has been developed in the first part of this work. I have 
already maintained that with the incorporation of the right to property into the 
conceptual configuration of the notion of indigenousness, the latter has become a 
multifaceted concept that enshrines a fourfold relationship. In this sense, it does not 
only include the already mentioned trinomial configuration (traditional lands → 
culture → identity) but has also incorporated a fourth element that is constituted by 
the right of communal property over their traditional lands. In short, the fourfold 
relationship is configured as follows: traditional lands → culture → identity → right 
to communal property over traditional lands. Indeed, because the right to communal 
                                                 
219 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., Separate 
Opinion by Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, para. 15. See also, I-ACtHR, The Case of Saramaka 
People v. Suriname, cit., para. 122. 
220 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., Separate 
Opinion by Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, para. 28.; see also Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, cit., Separate Dissenting Opinion of Judges A.A. Cançado Trindade and 
M.E. Ventura Robles, para. 4, 18-20. 
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property is recognised over the very same traditional lands, the fourfold relationship 
has also become circular.  
Furthermore, there is still one conceptual element missing within this fourfold 
circular relationship. And, as you can imagine, this element is nothing but the right 
to have a dignified life, or a life in dignity. This right has been retained as configured 
–in the case of indigenous people– as a life conducted according to their own cultural 
traditions, to their own moral understandings of the good and the evil, and to their 
own spiritual conception of the world. Moreover, if we understood correctly the 
latest remark made by Judge Cançado Trindade, then we have to do nothing but 
surrender to the evidence that –in the views of the Court– the above relationship has 
become fivefold.  
In fact, under this new version, the special relationship with traditional lands 
is interpreted as essential for the culture of indigenous people, and –in that sense– 
indispensable for the maintenance of their distinguishable cultural identity as a 
differential societal aggregations, that is, their indigenousness. Moreover, the 
enjoyment of their cultural identity is regarded as essential in order to have the 
possibility to enjoy a life in dignity, which is in accordance with their cultural 
traditions, understandings and world views (right to life in lato sensu).221 Thus, in 
order to protect and ensure the indigenous people’s enjoyment of their right to life in 
dignity, the protection of their special relationship with their traditional lands has 
been regarded as indispensable, and it has been made effective by means of its 
inclusion within the scope of protection of the right to property (Article 21 ACHR). 
As we can see, the new fivefold relationship has not lost it circular configuration. 
Therefore, according to this new understanding, the current configuration of 
the fivefold circular relationship is the following:  traditional lands → culture → 
identity → right to dignified life → right to communal property over traditional 
lands. Indeed, because the right to communal property is recognised as a vehicle for 
protection of the said special relationship with traditional lands, this conceptual 
construction has to be understood as circular too. 
                                                 
221 For further reading in connection with the Court’s understanding of the right to life in lato sensu, 
see –among others judgments– I-ACtHR, The Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, 
Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, para. 120; and I-
ACtHR, The Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Judgment on 
Merits of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63, para. 144.   
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Last but not least, if the above conclusion is correct, then we can even redraft 
the conceptual dogmatic equation that has been previously introduced in this 
chapter222, in a sense to incorporate into it the latter element referring the right to a 
dignified life. Hence, the new equation would be configured as follows: 
indigenousness = special relationship with traditional lands = dignified life. 
Consequentially, as an ultimate stage of the Court’s reasoning path, we can even 
conclude that a disrespect of indigenous people’s special relationship with their lands 
would not only amount to a violation of their right to communal property, but also –
and most importantly– would amount to a deprivation or violation of their right to a 
dignified life. In other words, without having the possibility to fully enjoy the said 
special relationship, their cultural identity would be seriously affected223 and, 
because the latter is considered as a component of the fundamental right to life (in its 
wider sense)224, it would also affect their right to life. 
This conceptual construction could be regarded –at last– as a dogmatic 
“essentialization” of indigenous identity. In fact, the above mentioned dogmatic 
equation would have –as an epistemological effect– the deprivation of their self-
identified indigenousness to those large majorities living in urban areas for 
generations, who have continuously asserted their self-perceived indigenous 
identity.225 But also, from an ontological point of view, it has to be regarded as based 
on an ulterior or additional essentialization, which is the assumption of the 
unchangeable, timeless and even culturally uncontaminated character of indigenous 
cultures.  
Finally, as it has been already stated, the very idea of deprivation of 
indigenous cultural identity, by means of the essentialization of one of its regarded 
objective components, that is, the special relationship with traditional lands, it has to 
                                                 
222 See above, Section 2, and, for further explanation on why we have chosen the sematic construction 
of “dogmatic equation”, see Chapter IV, Section 2.4. and 4. 
223 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., Separate 
Opinion by Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, para. 28.  
224 Ibid. 
225 See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Indigenous Peoples in Comparative Perspective - Problems and 
Policies, cit., p. 25-26; and L. RAY, op. cit., p. 20 et seq. 
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be considered as quite contrary to the very same ontological understanding of culture 
and cultural identity. 226  
In short, it seems that not only the fourfold relationship has increased its 
components, becoming a fivefold one, but also the above mentioned essentialist trap 
has been growing in trapped conceptualisations… and we are still counting.   
 
 
                                                 
226 See, See, UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, cit. para. 4; in addition, see our 
own understandings in Chapter IV, Section 2.4. and 4.  
  
CHAPTER SIX 
JURISPRUDENTIAL DIMENSION OF THE RIGHT TO 
TRADITIONAL LANDS 
 
THE RIGHT TO COMMUNAL PROPERTY AS A ‘VEHICLE’ FOR A DIGNIFIED 
LIFE  
 
“Cultural identity has historical roots […], it is tied to 
ancestral lands. We must emphasize that cultural identity is a 
component or is attached to the right to life lato sensu; thus, if 
cultural identity suffers, the very right to life of the members of 
said indigenous community also inevitable suffers.” Judges A. A. 
Cançado Trindade and M. E. Ventura Robles, I-ACtHR.1  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As we saw in the precedent chapter, the Inter-American Court, through an 
innovative and integrative method of legal interpretation, has recognised as protected 
under the scope of Article 21 of the American Convention the right of indigenous 
people to communal property over traditional lands. This method can be 
characterised as a dynamic, systemic, evolutive, non-restrictive and effective 
interpretation of the regional and universal human rights instruments (corpus juris).2   
Moreover, the Court has extended the scope of protection of the above 
mentioned article to the protection of indigenous people’s cultural identity, under the 
understanding that the special relationship that they have with their traditional lands 
is also the essential and determinative factor of their distinguishable cultural identity. 
Furthermore, due to the essential role that the said relationship played in connection 
with their identity and life, the regional tribunal concluded that the maintenance of 
                                                 
1 See, I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on Merits, 
Reparations and Costs of June 17, 2005. Serie C No. 125, Separate Dissenting Opinion of Judges A.A. 
Cançado Trindade and M.E. Ventura Robles, para. 18. 
2 See, I-ACtHR, The right to information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees 
of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of October 1, 1999. Series A No. 16, para. 
115. 
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this special relationship is essential for their possibility to enjoy a life in dignity, or a 
dignified life. That is, a life in accordance with their own cultural traditions, their 
own understandings and their own spiritual conception of the world. 
Therefore, for the Court, the scope of protection of Article 21 ACHR is 
extended far beyond the mere tutelage of the right to property. In fact, in the case of 
indigenous community, this right confuses its own limits with those of the right to 
life, as protected by Article 4(1) ACHR. 
Moreover, under this interpretative light, the access to their traditional 
territories and natural resources has been considered as indispensable for the 
preservation of their culture identity and survival as different peoples, but also for the 
enjoyment of dignified standard of living. In this sense, it would be even possible to 
say –following this argumentative line– that what is truly at stake when indigenous 
people are deprived of their traditional lands is their own right to life (lato sensu), in 
a sense of being able of develop a life in dignity according to their own cultural 
parameters and understandings.  
In this chapter, we will analyse the implications that this new interpretative 
angle has in connection with the relevant jurisprudence of the Court, that is, the one 
related to the cases in which the right of indigenous people to their traditional lands 
was claimed. In this sense, the most logical starting point will be to address our 
enquiry in direction of the understanding that the regional tribunal has on the right to 
life and, in particular in connection with the right to have a dignified life.  
The methodological approach that we will use in this chapter will be slightly 
different from the method applied in the precedent chapters; in this case, because our 
focus will be on the substantive and analytical review of the jurisprudence of the 
Court, space will be given to the very same voice of the regional tribunal. This means 
that the reader will find in this chapter extensive quotations of the court’s rulings but 
also, and perhaps most importantly within the framework of this study, our own 
critical legal analysis on these matters. However, before starting with this substantive 
task, allow me to partially introduce ‘the voices’ that you will hear through this 
chapter.  
In effect, with regard to the above mentioned interrelations between cultural 
identity and the right to life, I would like to quote one of the several enlightening 
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dissenting opinions Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade formulated in this case together 
with Judge M.E. Ventura Robles in which they clearly pictured the essence of the 
regarded relationship. In fact, they have stressed that “the fundamental right to life 
takes on higher dimension when the right to personal and cultural identity is taken 
into consideration; the latter cannot be disassociated from the legal personality of 
the individual as an international subject.”3 
Moreover, and with the purpose to clarify the connection between cultural 
identity and the right to life, the above mentioned Justices also affirmed that 
“...cultural identity is a component or is attached to the right to life lato sensu; thus, 
if cultural identity suffers, the very right to life of the members of said indigenous 
community also inevitable suffers” 4, but not only. Additionally, they have concluded 
with the admonishing reminder that “...the right to life is a non-derogable right 
under the American Convention, while the right to property is not [...] the latter is 
especially significant because it is directly related to full enjoyment of the right to 
life including conditions for a decent life.”5  
Last but not least, it is important to stress the fact that, even if these 
quotations appertains to a separate opinion of two Judges (in a bench of seven), they 
are able to reflect an accurate synthesis of the understanding of the Court in this 
crucial matter.  
Therefore, in order to understand better the identified interconnection 
between the enjoyment of the right to property over traditional lands, indigenous 
cultural identity and the right to life, or to have a dignified life, within the following 
sections we will undertake a critical analysis of the legal understanding that the 
Court has in connection with the latter right. That is, the right to property as 
recognised in Article 4 of the American Convention.  
 
 
2. The right to (dignified) life and positive measures for its effective protection 
 
                                                 
3 See, I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., Separate Dissenting 
Opinion of Judges A.A. Cançado Trindade and M.E. Ventura Robles, para. 4. 
4 Ibid., para. 18. 
5 Ibid., para. 20. 
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According to the jurisprudence of the Court, the right to life –as guaranteed in 
Article 4 ACHR6– is not only a fundamental right; it is an essential right for the 
exercise of all other human rights. If this right is not respected, all other rights do not 
have sense. For instance, the Court rejects any restrictive approaches to it.7 In fact, 
by virtue of the fundamental role that this right has within the Convention, the Court 
has allocated under the responsibility of the States Parties “...the duty to guarantee 
the creation of the conditions that may be necessary in order to prevent violations of 
such inalienable right.”8 
Therefore, in the views of this regional tribunal, the recognised scope of the 
right to life is very broad, and includes “… not only the right of every human being 
not to be deprived of his life arbitrarily”, that is, the right to life understood in stricto 
sensu, but not only. It also includes “…the right that he will not be prevented from 
having access to the conditions that guarantee a decent existence”, which means the 
right to life lato sensu.9 Moreover, it would be possible to read this twofold 
understanding of the right to life together with the general obligation to respect and 
ensure the enjoyment of fundamental rights incorporated in Article 1(1) of the 
American Convention.  
Consequently, through the joint reading of the above mentioned articles, it 
would be possible to affirm that States Parties of the Convention have the negative 
conventional obligation to prevent and restrain arbitrary deprivations of the protected 
                                                 
6 Article 4 of the American Convention reads as follow: “(1) Every person has the right to have his 
life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. (2) In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, 
it may be imposed only for the most serious crimes and pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a 
competent court and in accordance with a law establishing such punishment, enacted prior to the 
commission of the crime. The application of such punishment shall not be extended to crimes to which 
it does not presently apply. (3) The death penalty shall not be reestablished in states that have 
abolished it. (4) In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political offenses or related 
common crimes. (5) Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the crime 
was committed, were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of age; nor shall it be applied to 
pregnant women. (6) Every person condemned to death shall have the right to apply for amnesty, 
pardon, or commutation of sentence, which may be granted in all cases. Capital punishment shall not 
be imposed while such a petition is pending decision by the competent authority.” 
7 See, among others, I-ACtHR, The Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment on 
Merits, Reparations and Costs of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, para. 120; I-ACtHR, The Case 
of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Judgment on Merits of November 
19, 1999. Series C No. 63, para. 144. 
8 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations 
and Costs. Judgment of March 29, 2006. Series C No. 146, para. 151. 
9 See I-ACtHR, The Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, cit., para. 
144. 
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rights. In addition, they also have the positive obligation to guarantee the existence of 
the necessary conditions that would permit –for instance– indigenous peoples (and 
all others persons protected by the Convention) to have a ‘decent life’. Accordingly, 
the Court has stressed the positive obligation of the Member States in the adoption of 
all appropriate measures, in the light of their obligation to secure the full and free 
enjoyment of human rights, in order to protect and preserve the right to life.10 
Additionally, we have to bear in mind that the obligation to take positive 
measures vis-à-vis the protection of the right to life increases its imperativeness in 
connection to “…the particular needs of protection of the legal persons, whether due 
to their personal conditions or because of the specific situation they have to face, 
such as extreme poverty, exclusion or childhood.”11 In this sense, the Inter-American 
Court has emphasised –as part of its ‘jurisprudence constant’– that in the case of the 
right to life, “…its observance appears in “special ways” in certain circumstances, 
particularly when the individuals in questions are found in a situation of serious 
vulnerability.”12 Therefore, in a case of persons or communities that live in 
situations of vulnerability or submerged in unacceptable conditions of degradation, 
States have to adopt all necessary measures that ‘reasonably’ and foreseeable could 
be taken in order to protect and guarantee –in a given concrete situation– the full 
enjoyment of the right to life and dignity of all people involved.13 This could be 
indeed the case of several indigenous communities within the Americas region.14 
                                                 
10 See, among others, I-ACtHR, The Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, cit., para. 120; 
and Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 
September 15, 2005. Series C No. 134, para. 232. 
11 See,  I-ACtHR, The Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, cit., para. 111 and 112. 
12 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., Separate 
Opinion by Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 29; and I-ACtHR, The Case of the Gómez-Paquiyauri 
Brothers v. Peru, Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs of July 8, 2004. Series C No. 110, para. 
124. 
13 As an example of concrete situation in which States have the obligation to take positive measures to 
protect and prevent possible restriction or deprivation on the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention, we can recall the living conditions of the members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community. 
They were not only deprived of their traditional land, but also and as a consequence of that, were 
characterised by “...unemployment, illiteracy, morbidity rates caused by evitable illness, malnutrition, 
precarious conditions in their dwelling places and environment, limitations to access and use health 
services and drinking water, as well as marginalization due to economic, geographic and cultural 
causes...” See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 
168. 
14 In connection with the situation of indigenous people in Latin America, see our considerations in 
Chapter V, Section II; and –among other authors– R. STAVENHAGEN, Cultural Diversity in the 
Development of the Americas. Indigenous Peoples and States in Spanish America, Organization of 
American States (OAS), 2002; L. RAY, Language of the land. The Mapuche in Argentina and Chile, 
CHAPTER VI 
308 
 
As we also saw in our previous chapters15, positive measures have to be 
concrete and determined, according to the particular needs for protection of the 
subject of law, either owing to his or her personal situation or to the specific situation 
in which a concrete individual finds himself or herself.16 Moreover, they also have to 
be reasonable in the sense that States have to be able to accomplish them. In fact, 
any positive measure that exceeds the available resources of the State, in a sense that 
generate an impossible or disproportionate burden that would impair the 
accomplishment of its current affairs, can no longer be considered as reasonable. 
Therefore, in case of the latter situation, it would most likely not generate States’ 
responsibility for the lack of preventive measures that –consequentially– could have 
led or contributed to a violation of one of the conventionally protected rights. In 
other words, States cannot be considered responsible for all situations in which the 
right to life it would be at risk.  
In this sense, the Inter-American Court has acknowledged that ‘budgetary’ 
restrictions could indeed affect the adoption of public policies and –hence– the 
operative choices that Member States have to take in order to combine the available 
resources with the priorities that have to be addressed and satisfied in a democratic 
society, but not only. The Court has also recognised that “...positive obligations of 
the state must be interpreted so that an impossible or disproportionate burden is not 
imposed upon the authorities.” 17 Moreover, the Court has added, as a pre-condition 
for the raising of these positive obligations, that in every given case “...it must be 
determined that at the moment of the occurrence of the events, the authorities knew 
or should have known about the existence of a situation posing an immediate and 
certain risk to the life of an individual or a group of individuals, and that the 
                                                                                                                                          
Copenhagen, 2007, and L. GIRAUDO, La Questione Indigena in America Latina, Roma, 2009, in 
particular p. 13-39. For a more general overview in connection with the situation of indigenous people 
in the world, see Chapter IV, Section 1 et seq.; see also, ILO, Indigenous & Tribal Peoples' Rights in 
Practice. A Guide to ILO convention No. 169, International Labour Standards Department, 2009; R. 
STAVENHAGEN, Indigenous Peoples in Comparative Perspective - Problems and Policies, in 
UNDP Occasional Paper, 2004/14, 2004; and R. STAVENHAGEN, Indigenous Issues. Human rights 
and indigenous issues. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, Mr. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, subitted pursuant to 
Commission resolution 2001/57, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/97, United Nations, 2002. 
15 See, Chapter II, Section 3. 
16 Particular needs could be grounded on personal conditions, such as illness, elderly, pregnancy, etc., 
or on specific situation that under which members of these populations could be subjected to, such us 
extreme poverty, exclusion, childhood or forced displacement.    
17 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 155. 
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necessary measures were not adopted within the scope of their authority which could 
be reasonably expected to prevent or avoid such risk.”18 
Therefore, according to the Court, in order to establish the international 
responsibility of the States, three elements must be present at the time in which the 
violation of the general obligations –embodied in Articles 1(1) and 2 of the 
American Convention– occurred. These three elements are the following: (a) the 
existence of an objective and concrete situation of risk for –in this case– the life of 
the individuals involved; (b) the acknowledgement by the State of that specific 
situation, in a sense that the State knew it or should have known it through the 
deployment of a due diligent conduct; and (c) the inactivity of the authorities in 
taking all of those measures that could be reasonably expected in a pluralist and 
democratic society –according to available resources– to prevent or avoid such risks. 
Moreover, in connection with the latter element, it would be necessary to establish its 
causal relation with the vulnerable situation in which the members of the affected 
groups live; in other words, a relationship of causality must exist between the State 
action, negligence or omission and the deplorable living conditions of the alleged 
victims.19 If these conditions are met in a given case, the international responsibility 
of the State would arise, as a consequence of the violation of the general obligations 
embodied in Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention.20  
This jurisprudence on positive measures is indeed applicable to those cases in 
which indigenous communities’ interests and claims are involved. In these cases, in 
order to establish the States’ responsibility for possible violations of their obligation 
to guarantee the full enjoyment of the conventional rights, the analysis has to be 
focused on what the Court has regarded as their distinctive characteristics. That is, 
                                                 
18 Ibid. See also, I-ACtHR, The Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, cit., paras. 123 and 
124, see also Kiliç v. Turkey (2000) III, EurCourt HR, 63, Öneryildiz v. Turkey, application no. 
48939/99, EurCourt HR [gc], Judgment 30 November 2004, 93, and Osman v. the United Kingdom 
(1998) VIII, 116. 
19 See on this point, J. M. PASQUALUCCI, The right to a dignified life (vida digna): The integration 
of economic and social rights with civil and political rights in the Inter-American Human Right 
System, in Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 31, 2008, p. 1 et seq.; and S. R. 
KEENER, J. VASQUEZ, A life worth living: Enforcement of the right to health through the right to 
life in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 40, 2009, 
p. 595 et seq.. 
20 See –among others– I-ACtHR, The Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, cit., para. 111; 
I- Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia., cit., para. 111; and Juridical Condition and Rights 
of the Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion OC-18 of September 17, 2003. Series A No. 18, 
para. 140. 
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with due regard to their different manner or way of life and of their life aspirations21 
–both individual and collective– and taking into account the existing international 
corpus juris regarding the especial protection deserved by its members.22 This means 
that –for the Court– positive measures, in order to be adequate and effective in the 
prevention and abolition of those concrete risks that affect or could affect the life of 
the members of the indigenous communities, have to take into account the factual 
vulnerability in which these communities live, but not only. In addition, they also –
and perhaps even most relevant for the purpose of our study– have to be adapted, 
accommodated to their different worldviews and valuative systems, which include –
as we saw in the precedent chapter– their special relationship with their traditional 
lands.23 To summarise, positive measures have to pay due regard to indigenous 
peoples’ cultural identity and diversity.24  
Relevant, in order to test this jurisprudential approach of the Court, are those 
cases in which the regional tribunal has dealt with displaced indigenous 
communities, especially because the said displacement has factually generated –for 
the members of those communities– situations of extreme vulnerability. Therefore, 
the Court has required a pro-active role of the public authorities in order to neutralise 
the risks against their lives. This has happen specifically in the cases of the Yakye 
Axa25 and Sawhoyamaxa26 Indigenous Communities in Paraguay. In fact, according 
to the Court, the lack of lands and access to natural resources has generated –for the 
members of these communities– extreme destitute conditions. Moreover, it has 
                                                 
21 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations 
and Costs. Judgment of March 29, 2006. Series C No. 146, para. 118, 146(a), and Separate Opinion of 
Judge Ventura-Robles, p. 13. See also, I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. 
Paraguay; Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs of June 17, 2005. Serie C No. 125, Separate 
Dissenting Opinion of Judges A.A. Cançado Trindade and M.E. Ventura Robles, para. 18 
22 In order to draw a clear legal framework in which the expected positive measures would be 
grounded vis-à-vis the protection of right to life of the members of these communities, the Court made 
reference to the connected articles of the Convention, merely Article 1(1) and 26 (duty of progressive 
development), but not only. It also referred to the pertinent provisions of the ILO Convention No. 169 
and to those enshrined on the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in 
the Area of Economic, Social and cultural Rights “Protocol of San Salvador” (El Salvador, November 
17, 1988), in particular to Article 10 (Right to Health); Article 11 (Right to Healthy Environment); 
Article 12 (Right to Food); Article 13 (Right to Education); and Article 14 (Right to The Benefits of 
Culture). For our considerations in connection with the ILO Convention, see Chapter V, Section 6.1.1. 
and 6.2.  
23 See, Chapter V, Section 6.2. and 7. See also, for a more theoretical approach, Chapter IV, Section 
2.2.4.  
24 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 163. 
25 Ibid. 
26 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit. 
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deprived them of appropriate housing with basic minimum services (clean water and 
toilets), and generated a general malnutrition among the population. In particular, the 
Court has emphasised the “...special and grave difficulties to obtain food, primarily 
because the area where their temporary settlement is located does not have 
appropriate conditions for cultivation or to practice their traditional subsistence 
activities, such as hunting, fishing and gathering.”27  
Therefore, in the case of these displaced communities, the Court has 
considered that the lack of access to traditional lands and the use and enjoyment of 
the natural resources (traditionally used by them), have prevented their members 
from the full exercise of the right to food and access to clean water28, but not only. It 
has also produced “...a major impact on the right to a decent existence and basic 
conditions to exercise other human rights, such to a right to education or the right to 
cultural identity.”29 Indeed, under the views of the Court, their displacement and the 
consequent deprivation of access to their traditional lands and resources have 
jeopardised the very enjoyment of their right to life in a broad sense30, which 
encompasses the conditions of a life with dignity and the necessary preservation their 
cultural identity.31  
Therefore, following the reasoning of the Court, it would be possible to say 
that the right to life (in a broad sense) has been affected by the displacement. This is 
                                                 
27 Ibid., para. 164-167. 
28 The Court made references in this regard to the jurisprudence of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). In particular, referred to those in which the special vulnerability 
of the indigenous peoples’ groups were highlighted by the Committee because of lack of access to 
means of obtaining food and clear water due the imposed threat on their access to their traditional 
lands. See U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5. The right to adequate food (Art. 11), (20th session, 1999), para. 
13, and U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 at 117, cited by the I-ACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 167. 
29 Ibid., para. 167. 
30 In the case of the Sawhoyamaxa Community, the Court emphasised the fact that they had suffered 
the deprivation of their lands, but not only. Additionally, it stressed the fact that the life of their 
members was characterised by “...unemployment, illiteracy, morbidity rates caused by evitable 
illnesses, malnutrition, precarious conditions in their dwelling places and environment, limitations to 
access and use health services and drinking water, as well as marginalization due to economic, 
geographic and cultural causes...” See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community 
v. Paraguay, cit., para. 168. 
31 Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade described the situation of the situation of the Sawhoyamaxa 
Community as follow: “Some of the members of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community died when 
they were only days, or weeks, or months, old. They died in total want, as they had lived, in the 
humiliation of total want (that is the deprivation of all human rights), along the roadside (…), most 
probably unable to develop a life project.” See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, cit., Separate Opinion by Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, para. 18. 
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because the intrinsical disruption that any displacement has in the life of those 
affected by it (indigenous or non-indigenous alike); but also because –according to 
the reasoning of the Court– for these communities, “[l]iving on their ancestral lands 
is essential to cultivate and preserve their values, including communication with 
their forebearers.”32  
In this sense, as Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade concluded in his separate 
opinion in the case of Sawhoyamaxa Community (views shared in this case with the 
majority of the Court33), “[a]n attack against cultural identity […] is an attack 
against the right of life lato sensu, the right to live, with the aggravating 
circumstances of those who actually died. A State cannot release itself from the due 
diligence duty to safeguard the right to live.”34 Consequently, the Court has 
considered that such deaths were attributable to the “...lack of adequate prevention 
and the failure by the State to adopt sufficient positive measures, considering that the 
State had knowledge of the situation of the Community and that action by the State 
could be reasonably expected.”35  
Therefore, from the reading of the Court’s jurisprudence –taken as a whole– 
related to those cases in which indigenous peoples’ right to communal property was 
involved, it would be possible to identify three main logical steps that tie together 
the legal protection of this right with the enjoyment of a dignified life. These three 
logical steps are the following: (a) first, the protection of the right to life includes not 
only the prohibition of its arbitrary deprivation (negative obligation) but as well the 
generation of all of those conditions that would permit and facilitate its full 
enjoyment, merely, those that would generate conditions for a decent life (positive 
                                                 
32 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., Separate 
Opinion by Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 30. 
33 In the Yakye Axa Case, the majority of the Court (five votes to three) decided that the evidence to 
prove the violation of the Right to life, vis-à-vis sixteen members of the Community, was not 
sufficient in order to consider such deaths as attributable to the States. See, I-ACtHR, Case of the 
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., operative para. No. 4.  
34 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., Separate 
Opinion by Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, para. 33. 
35 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 176 and –
additionally– Operative Paragraphs No. 3. As illustration of the inappropriate response gave by the 
State of Paraguay, the Court stressed the fact that a mere declaration of state of emergency cannot be 
considered sufficient and adequate, adding that “…for six years after the effective date of the order, 
the State only delivered food to the alleged victims on ten opportunities, and medicine and educational 
material in two opportunities, with long intervals between each delivery. […] These deliveries, as well 
of the amounts delivered, are obviously insufficient to revert the situation of vulnerability and risk of 
the members of this Community and to prevent violations to the right to life…” Idid., para. 170. 
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obligations)36; (b) secondly, positive obligations include the generation of those 
conditions that would permit an equal enjoyment for each member of the society of 
their own right to cultural identity; (c) and finally, in the case of indigenous peoples, 
as long as their cultural identity is seen as intimately connected with their traditional 
lands, positive measures must include adequate legal and material protection for this 
especial relationship. 
In other words, among those positive obligations that each State Party to the 
American Convention has to take, in order to guarantee the full enjoyment and 
access to ‘decent’ conditions of life for all members of the society (and especially for 
those that find themselves in a vulnerable situation)37, the Court has included the 
recognition and legal protection –within the national legal system– of the right of 
indigenous people to communal property over their traditional lands and resources. 
This would be nothing but a full observation of the general obligation of domestic 
implementation enshrined in Article 2 of the Convention.38  
Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that this particular and 
consequential reasoning of the Court is grounded on the specific vulnerable situation 
in which these people live in general. But also, and perhaps more relevant for the 
scope of this study, it could be considered as based on the intrinsic and constitutive 
nature that traditional lands have vis-à-vis their identity, and –hence– on the 
enjoyment of ‘decent’ conditions of life (dignified life); conditions that have to 
necessarily take into account their own culture, understandings, traditions and world 
                                                 
36 See I-ACtHR, Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras. Preliminary Objection, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 7, 2003. Series C No. 99, para. 110. 
37 Under the ‘jurisprudence constant’ of the I-ACtHR, the obligation to take positive measures vis-à-
vis the protection of the right to life increases its imperativeness according to “…the particular needs 
of protection of the legal persons, whether due to their personal conditions or because of the specific 
situation they have to face, such as extreme poverty, exclusion or childhood.” See, I-ACtHR, The 
Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, cit., para. 111-112. 
38 According to the Court, the adjustment of the domestic legislation to the parameters established in 
the Convention implies the adoption of two different measures: “i) the elimination of any norms and 
practices that in any way violate the guarantees provided under the Convention or disregard the 
rights therein enshrined or obstruct its exercise; and ii) the promulgation of norms and the 
development of practices conductive to the effective observance of those guarantees. The first kind of 
measures is satisfied with the amendment, the repealing or annulment, of the norms or practices that 
are within such scope, if applicable. The second one imposes an obligation on the States to prevent 
further violations of human rights and therefore, to adopt all legal, administrative and other measures 
necessary to prevent further occurrence of similar facts.” See, I-ACtHR, Case of Salvador-Chiriboga 
v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections and Merits. Judgment of May 6, 2008 Series C No. 179, para. 
122. 
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views.39 In short, under the views of the Court, positive actions have become an 
integrative part of what has been called in the precedent chapter a conceptual fivefold 
circular relationship, which –in this sense– it has become a sixfold relationship.40  
Furthermore, this intrinsic interconnection between the enjoyment of 
traditional lands and resources and the access to decent conditions of life, would lead 
to an additional conclusion. That is, without the recognition of the communal 
property over their traditional lands, in accordance with its regulation in their 
customary laws, the life of the members of indigenous communities (in its all-
inclusive understanding) would be under threat.41 Indeed, within the axiological 
construction made by the Court, it is in the intimate and close union with their land 
that indigenous peoples find the possibility to build and develop their life, according 
to their own understanding, worldviews and traditions. Furthermore, without that 
connection, their own ‘project of life’42 would become meaningless due the 
impossibility to live a ‘dignified life’, merely, according to their own understanding 
of dignity.43  
                                                 
39 The line of thought drawn in this paragraph was fully embraced in the Case Yakye Axa Community, 
especially when Judges Cançado Trindade and Ventura Robles emphasized the fact that even if the 
right to life “...is a non-derogable right under the American Convention, while the right to property is 
not [...] the latter is especially significant because it is directly related to full enjoyment of the right to 
life including conditions for a decent life.” See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, cit., Separate Dissenting Opinion of Judges A.A. Cançado trindade and M.E. 
Ventura Robles, para. 20. 
40 We have already defined as a fivefold circular relationship the conceptual notion integrated by the 
following notions: traditional lands → culture → identity → right to dignified life → right to 
communal property over traditional lands (see, Chapter V, Section 7). With its new configuration, the 
sixfold relationship it would be composed as follow: traditional lands → culture → identity → right 
to dignified life → positive actions → right to communal property over traditional lands. I will come 
back later in this chapter to the conceptual implication of this notion, in particular vis-à-vis the notion 
of indigenousness and its ontological implications. But for now, as it has been stated in the 
introductory section, let us to continuously listen to the voice of the Court. 
41 In fact, the Court expressly recognised that in the case of indigenous communities “...any denial of 
the enjoyment or exercise of their territorial rights is detrimental to value that are very representative 
for the members of said peoples, who are at risk or losing or suffering irreparable damage to their 
cultural identity and life and to the cultural heritage to be passed on to future generations.” See, I-
ACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 203. 
42 In connection with the understanding of the Court toward the concept of project of life, see I-
ACtHR, The  Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, cit., para. 144; 
and I-ACtHR, The Case of Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment on Reparations and Costs of November 
27, 1998. Series C No. 42, para. 147 and 148. 
43 This kind of legal reasoning has already been considered as a sort of essentialization of the 
indigenous people identity, in a sense that their identity is conceptually reduced to the existence of a 
single objective element, namely the special relationship with traditional lands. For more detailed 
explanations in connection with this dogmatic equation (indigenousness = relationship with traditional 
lands), se our considerations in Chapter IV, Sections 2.2.4., 2.4. and 4; and Chapter V, Section 2 and 
7.  
JURISPRUDENTIAL DIMENSION OF THE RIGHT TO TRADITIONAL LANDS 
315 
 
In conclusion, according to the jurisprudence of the Court, in the specific case 
of indigenous communities, the negation of the recognition of the right to property of 
their traditional lands, would amount to a violation of Article 21 of the American 
Convention, but not only. It would also comprise of an infringement of the right to 
life as protected by Article 4(1), read in accordance with the dispositions contained 
within Article 1(1) of the same instrument (Obligation to Respect and Protect)44. 
Obviously, this would always be dependent upon the specific and concrete 
circumstances of a given case.  
Finally, and as a colophon of this section, it would be important to clarify that 
the responsibility of the States Parties of the Convention to ‘positively’ guarantee the 
enjoyment of the recognised rights generates a consequential and equal responsibility 
on the assessment of the situation of vulnerability that could possible affect these 
populations, but not only. It would also generate the connected responsibility 
regarding the determination of the adequate and efficient positive measures that have 
to be taken in order to neutralise possible violations in connection with potential 
rights at stake. This means that the States have –or must have– a margin of 
appreciation on the determination of the factual situation of a given case, and with 
regard to the individualisation and implementation of tailored solutions.45 Indeed, 
States are those that have to assess the real situation of vulnerability that affect these 
populations, and have to establish the adequate remedies for the protection of their 
members, but –of course– with due consideration of the available budgetary 
possibilities. In fact, in balancing the operative choices among the different public 
policies that state authorities have to take, in order to satisfy the different social 
needs in a democratic society, they always have a certain margin of appreciation... as 
                                                 
44 In the case of the members of the  Yakye Axa Community, the Court established that the State of 
Paraguay not only did not guarantee their right to communal property, but as well the Court deemed 
that “...this fact has had a negative effect on the right of the members of the community to a decent 
life, because it has deprived them of the possibility of access to their traditional means of subsistence, 
as well as to use and enjoyment of the natural resources necessary to obtain clear water and to 
practice traditional medicine to prevent and cure illnesses.” See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 168. 
45 Without entering at this stage on the analysis of the doctrine of the national margin of appreciation 
or discretion, it is important to clarify that –generically speaking– it refers to “...the latitude of 
deference or error which the Strasbourg organs will allow to national legislative, executive, 
administrative and judicial bodies before it is prepared to declare a national derogation from the 
Convention, to constitute a violation of one of the Convention’s substantive guarantees.” See, H. Ch. 
YOUROW, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights 
Jurisprudence, The Hague/Boston/London, 1996, p. 13.   
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long as they do not infringe with their operative choices on the rights and freedoms 
conventionally guaranteed.46      
Without a certain degree or margin of appreciation States would have their 
hands tied and –hence– they would not be able to provide a rapid and adequate 
solution to those cases at stake. This –of course– does not mean that they would have 
absolutely free hands in their assessments and decisions; whenever conventionally 
protected rights are involved, the Inter-American Court has the competence to 
analyse whether the State ensured the human rights of the members of the involved 
communities.47 Notwithstanding, from the reading of the case law, it seems that 
would be possible to perceive a certain reluctant attitude on the side of the Court 
with regard to properly name and openly verbalise the use of the ‘margin of 
appreciation doctrine’. This without prejudice to say that, it seems to be quite clear 
what the Court has had in mind, when it has adjudicated the above mentioned 
indigenous lands’ claims... Because of the relevance of this topic, we will continue 
with its analysis within the incoming sections.  
 
 
3.  Jurisprudential regulation of the right to communal property over traditional 
lands and territories 
 
As it has been established in the precedent paragraphs, the right to communal 
property that indigenous peoples enjoy upon their traditional lands is recognised –by 
the Inter-American Court– as protected by Article 21 of the American Convention. 
Accordingly, and for imperium of the dispositions enshrined in Articles 1(1) and 2 of 
the same instrument, States Parties have the positive obligation to adopt special 
measures that will guarantee the full and equal exercise of their rights over the 
territories they have traditionally used and occupied, especially taking into account –
for that purpose– indigenous peoples’ customary law.48 In other words, for the Court, 
                                                 
46 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 155. 
47 Ibid., para. 136.  
48 See I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, I-ACtHR, 
Series C No. 79. Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs of August 31, 2001, para. 151; and I-
ACtHR, the Case of Saramaka People v. Suriname; Judgment on Preliminary Objections, merits, 
Reparations, and Costs of November 28, 2007. Series C No. 172, para. 91. 
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the recognition of the right to communal property should be done in accordance with 
indigenous people’s own traditions and land-tenure systems.49 
The States obligation to protect and guarantee indigenous land-tenure 
systems, when recognising the right to property over their traditional lands in 
accordance with the disposition of the Convention, has been explicitly held by the 
Court in the ´Saramaka Case´. In it, the regional tribunal has recognised that the 
right of the member of these communities to “...freely determine and enjoy their own 
social, cultural and economic development, which includes the right to enjoy their 
particular spiritual relationship with the territory they have traditionally used and 
occupied.”50 This recognition finds its ground not only in the ‘praetorian’ 
jurisprudence of the Court, but also in the wording of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples which states in its article 26(3) that “[s]uch 
recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land 
tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.”51 Similar references can be 
found within the dispositions of the ILO Convention No. 169. 52  
For the Court, the inclusion of the indigenous peoples’ understanding of 
communal property under the protective umbrella of Article 21 of the Convention 
responds to the general obligations that lie upon the States, according to Articles 1(1) 
and 2 of the same instrument, but not only. Additionally, also it is by virtue of the 
application of the principle of effectiveness and non-restrictive and dynamic 
interpretation of the right to property, which permits its expansive and inclusive 
interpretation.53 In other words, for the Court, the interpretation of the right to 
                                                 
49 According to the Court, “...indigenous communities might have collective understanding of the 
concepts of property and possession, in the sense that ownership of the land “is not centered on an 
individual but rather on the group and its community”. The notion of ownership and possession of 
land does not necessarily conform to the classic concept of property, but deserves equal protection 
under Article 21 of the American Convention.” See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 120. 
50 See I-ACtHR, the Case of Saramaka People v. Suriname, cit., para. 95-96. 
51 With regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, see our considerations in 
Chapter IV, Sections 3.3.; and Chapter V, Section 6.1.2. 
52 In fact, the ILO Convention not only recognises the right to ownership and possession over the 
lands traditionally occupy (Article 14(1)), but as well emphasises the fact that “[i]n applying national 
laws and regulations to the peoples concerned, due regard shall be had to their customs or customary 
laws”, adding also that “[t]hese peoples shall have the right to retain their own customs and 
institutions” (Article 8(1)(2)). Therefore, for the ILO Convention, the recognition of the right to 
communal property shall be done under the light of these two premises. In connection with this 
Convention, see our consideration in Chapter IV, Sections 3.2.; and Chapter V, Section 6.1.1.  
53 In connection with the general rules of interpretation applied by the Court, see Chapter V, Section 5. 
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property would have to necessarily take into account the culture, uses, customs, and 
beliefs of each ethno-cultural aggregation (or at least an accommodative synthesis of 
its main understandings or salient cultural characteristics). Otherwise, it “...would be 
tantamount to holding that there is only one way of using and disposing of property, 
which, in turn, would render protection under Article 21 of the Convention illusory 
for millions of persons.”54  
However, we have to bear in mind that the terms and notions incorporated 
and recognised within the Convention have autonomous and independent meanings 
and –hence– cannot and must not be considered as subordinated to the national legal 
systems. Therefore, it would be equally unavoidable to conclude that the same 
notions and terms enshrined within the Convention cannot and must not be 
subordinated to the indigenous peoples’ notions and traditional regulations. In other 
words, when the Court states that the regulation of the communal property has to be 
done taking into account the indigenous’ lands tenure-systems, means that the right 
to property conventionally recognised includes –in its autonomous meaning– the 
collective dimension of it. Hence, States have to incorporate this notion into their 
respective domestic legislations by virtue of the generic obligation enshrined within 
Article 2 of the Convention. Nevertheless, this does not absolutely mean that States 
have the conventional obligation of recognise general legal status to the traditional 
legal systems that could have remained in force among indigenous communities.55  
Notwithstanding, the legal recognition of the indigenous peoples’ communal 
property per se would be absolutely worthless or meaningless, if their traditional 
lands and territories are not physically individualised and delimited.  In fact, it would 
only consist in an abstract recognition of this right without any concrete and 
                                                 
54 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 120. 
55 In fact, another aspect of the recognition of the autonomous meaning of the right to communal 
property that could be stressed is that its jurisprudential acknowledgement does not mean that the 
Court directly or indirectly has recognised the existence of the plurality of legal orders in the 
Americas. In other words, it does not mean that the indigenous peoples’ legal systems have gained 
conventional enforceable authority within the territories of the Members States. The hypothetical 
conventional recognition of this plurality would not only be contrary to the very legal structure of the 
American Convention, that sees the States as the exclusive responsible actors (and therefore with the 
exclusion of parallel legal systems), but also it would exceed the proper material competence of the 
Court. From a broadest perspective, which is from a socio-political point of view, indigenous legal 
systems could indeed be incorporated within the national legal systems, but this incorporation would 
depend on the results of what we have called the democratic game. In connection with this latter 
remark, see our considerations in Chapter I, Section 4.2.; and Chapter II, Section 5. 
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protective effect. Indeed, according to the Court, as long as the special relationship 
that these populations maintain is related to their ‘traditional’ lands and territories, it 
seems that that particular spiritual/material connection would only exist if is related 
to those specific and particular lands, namely, their ‘traditional’ lands, and not 
others. In this sense, the Court has stated that “...a strictly juridical or abstract 
recognition of indigenous lands, territories or resources lacks true meaning where 
the property has not been physically established and delimited.”56  
Therefore, following the reasoning of the Court, among the positive measures 
that state authorities have to take, in order to ensure the enjoyment of the right to 
collective property of indigenous people, we have to include the obligation to 
identify, delimit, demarcate, grant title deed and formal transfer of these traditional 
lands. In fact, it is the State that has the technical and scientific means to carry out 
these tasks.57 In other words, it is not for the regional judicial body to define or 
identify the traditional territory that should be demarcated and titled; the obligation 
of identification and demarcation rebound over the Member States. However, it is 
important to bear in mind that the Court always retains the competence to analyse 
whether the State in question has ensured and guaranteed the right of the members of 
the indigenous communities to their traditional lands, as enshrined in Article 21 of 
the American Convention.58 
Because of its importance for the concretisation or materialisation of the right 
to property over traditional lands, within the incoming sections, we will try to 
identify, the jurisprudential requirements delineated by the Court, for the 
identification, demarcation and titling of those lands, for the benefit of the involved 
indigenous communities.  
 
 
4. Identification and delimitation of traditional lands: the role of ‘traditional’ 
possession 
                                                 
56 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment on Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, cit., para. 143. 
57 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Interpretation of the 
Judgment of Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 6, 2006. Series C No. 142, para. 
23. 
58 See I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, cit., para. 215. 
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Since the beginning of its jurisprudence in addressing indigenous people’s 
land claims, the Court stressed the responsibility of the States in the delimitation, 
demarcation and titling of the territories belonging to these communities.59 And –
consequently– their conventional obligation on the adoption of the national 
regulations and all other necessary measures for the creation of effective domestic 
mechanisms needed in order to fulfil these duties.60  
Furthermore, the Court has interpreted the above obligations as part of the 
compensations that States owe to the affected populations (due the international 
responsibility generated by an attributable violation of a right conventionally 
guaranteed)61; for this reason, it has even clarified that the State obligation to identify 
the traditional territories has to be honoured free of charge.62 This holding can be 
seen as in line with the standards enshrined within Article 14(2) of the ILO 
Convention No. 169, which states that “[g]overnments shall take steps as necessary 
                                                 
59 According to the UN Special Rapporteur Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes “[d]elimitation of the lands is 
the formal process of identifying the actual locations and boundaries of indigenous lands or 
territories and physically marking those boundaries on the ground. Purely abstract or legal 
recognition of indigenous lands, territories or resources can be practically meaningless unless the 
physical identity of the property is determined and marked.” In this last remark, we can find a great 
similarity with the reasoning showed by the Inter-American Court that lay at the very base of the 
recognition of these obligations lying on the head of the States. See E.-I. A. DAES, Indigenous 
peoples and their relationship to land. Final working paper prepared by the Special Rapporteur Mrs. 
Erica-Irene A. Daes, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21, United Nation, 2001, para, 50 et seq.; see also 
–from the same author– E.-I. A. DAES, Indigenous Peoples' Rights to Land and Natural Resources, in 
N. GHANEA, A. XANTHAKI (eds.), Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination, Leiden – Boston, 
2005, p. 82.  
60 See I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, cit., op. 
para. 4; see also, Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Interpretation of the Judgment of 
Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 8, 2006. Series C No. 145, para. 19. 
61 The restitution of the traditional lands as one of the reparation measures that the Court recognised in 
its jurisprudence will be addressed at the final stage of this chapter. Nevertheless, for introductory 
analysis of this topic, see –among others- G. CITRONI, K. I. QUINTANA OSUNA, Reparations for 
Indigenous Peoples in the Case Law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in F. LENZERINI 
(ed.), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples. International & Comparative Perspectives, Oxford, 2008, 
p. 317 et seq.; S. J. ANAYA, Reparations for Neglect of Indigenous Land Rights at the Intersection of 
Domestic and International Law - The Maya Cases in the Supreme Court of Belize, in F. LENZERINI 
(ed.), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples. International & Comparative Perspectives, Oxford, 2008, 
p. 567 et seq. For and oerview of the jurisprudence of the Court in this matter, see also C. 
GROSSMAN (ed.), Reparatinos in the Inter-American System: A Comparative Approach, in 
American University Law Review, 56, 2007, p. 1375-1433. 
62 See I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, cit., op. para. 6. 
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to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to 
guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession.”63 
Pursuant to the foregoing, the Court has provided pregnant and consistent 
guidelines in connection with the premises under which the State has to conduct and 
fulfil the above mentioned obligations. At the core of those guidelines we can 
identify –as an overarching principle– the obligation that the entire process 
connected with the traditional lands has to be conducted in consultation with the 
affected indigenous communities (the so-called “the duty to consult” or “principle of 
consultation”). The right to participate in this process is not only a very well 
established standard in international human rights law64, it has also been embraced 
and enforced by the Court in its jurisprudence.  
In fact, according to the Court, in the process of identification, demarcation 
and titling of the traditional lands, the States Parties have to give “...careful 
consideration to the values, uses, customs and customary laws of the members of the 
community, which bind them to an specific territory.”65 Moreover, in order to 
identify which is the land-tenure system connected with their traditions and 
customary laws, the responded State must conduct a “...previous, effective and fully 
informed consultations” with the communities involved.66 Furthermore, this process 
of consultation has to be –in itself– conducted with due respect for their customs and 
                                                 
63 Similar disposition can be found within the UN Declaration on the Rights of indigenous Peoples, in 
particular in Article 26(3), which states that “States shall give legal recognition and protection to 
these lands, territories and resources...”, and Article 27, which states –in its first part– that “States 
shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, 
impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws, 
traditions, customs and land tenure systems…”   
64 The ILO Convention No. 169 has taken a clear stand in this sense, by establishing –as a State 
responsibility– in its Article 6(1)(a), the obligation to “...consult the peoples concerned, through 
appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever 
consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them 
directly”;  the same principle can be found in Article 27 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. In connection with this obligation, see S. J. ANAYA, Promotion and Protection 
of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to 
Development. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, Human Right Council, 2009, 
p. 12 et seq. See also, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP), Progress 
report on the study on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/15/35, Human Rights Council, 2010, in particular, p. 17 et seq 
65 See I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, cit., para. 26. 
66 See I-ACtHR, the Case of Saramaka People v. Suriname; Judgment on Preliminary Objections, 
merits, Reparations, and Costs, cit., para. 194(a). 
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traditions, including the designation of the representatives of these communities with 
which States have to interact in good faith during the necessary consultations.67  
Therefore, after the establishment of the land-tenure system’s framework 
applicable to the case, the claimed traditional lands have to be physically identified 
and delimited. For this purpose, the Court has recognised the ‘traditional’ possession 
exercised by indigenous communities as a central and decisive element. In fact, the 
lands that have to be identified and titled to these communities would be those that 
indigenous peoples traditionally have had under their possession; this means that 
“possession of land should suffice when it comes to obtaining official recognition of 
the property and the consequential registration.”68 Indeed, bearing in mind the 
unique and enduring ties that bind indigenous communities to their ancestral lands, 
the Court has emphasised that “...in the case of indigenous communities who have 
occupied their ancestral lands in accordance with customary practices –yet who lack 
real title to the property– mere possession of the land should suffice to obtain official 
recognition of their communal ownership.”69  
The recognition of the protection of the communal understanding of the right 
to property, according to the traditional normative systems of the indigenous 
communities, has –as one of its fundamental consequences– the modification of the 
requirements for its legal domestic recognition and titling. In fact, States Parties of 
the American Convention cannot argue, after the authoritative interpretation made by 
the Court70, that the lack of registration or real title of property, in the specific case 
of indigenous communities, makes impossible or unfeasible its legal recognition.71 
                                                 
67 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Interpretation of the Judgment of 
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 12, 2008. Series C No. 
185, para. 15 et seq.  
68 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Interpretation of the Judgment of 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, cit., para. 8. 
69 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
Judgment of February 8, 2006. Series C No. 145, para. 131. 
70 In this sense, Article 62(1) ACHR clearly states that “[a] State Party may, upon depositing its 
instrument of ratification or adherence to this Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that it 
recognizes as binding, ipso facto, and not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court 
on all matters relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention.” 
71 According to the former UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Martínez Cobo, “...[m]illenary or 
immemorial possession should suffice to establish indigenous title to land, official recognition and 
subsequent registration, in the absence of specifically applicable legislative or executive measures 
explicitly extinguishing aboriginal rights.” And, in order to explain why the traditional possession 
should prevail over any domestic limitation, he added that “…[a]s these rights are not “created” by 
legislation, neither should they be extinguished by unilateral acts.” Even if this last statement could 
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Domestic requirements or regulations cannot and must not limit or restrict the 
recognition of the conventional rights or modify the consequential obligations lying 
on the Member States’ shoulders.72 Moreover, according to the jurisprudence of the 
Court, for the involved communities, possession relates to traditional occupation73, 
and the latter to the recognition of the right to communal property.  
Therefore, from the above argumentations, we can conclude that the 
establishment and elucidation of the factual existence of the traditional possession is 
essential for the recognition of indigenous’ property rights over the claimed lands 
and territories. In this sense, the natural flow of the argumentation shifts toward the 
analysis of the traditional possession in itself, to its elements and burden of proof, 
and –in particular– with especial regard to its cultural aspects which are the very 
nutshell of this enquiry.  
                                                                                                                                          
be interpreted in a sense that the foundation of the indigenous people’s right to property would be 
grounded in ‘natural law’ or in pre-existed legal systems (vis-à-vis the national modern legal orders), 
that have no real importance because the protection granted by the Court is based in none of these 
argumentation. The Court’s acknowledgement is exclusively based on the formal and conventional 
recognition of the right to property made by the Convention. The fact that the indigenous’ communal 
understanding of the right to property is conventionally protected, has to be considered as a reflexion 
of the original decision made by the Member States when they decided to draft and adopt the 
American Convention. Of course, not under the original reading of that particular momentum but 
according to accommodative reading made by the Court, which is the authoritative organ 
predetermined by the States for the final and authentic interpretation of the Convention.  The factual 
situation of the immemorial possession becomes juridically relevant exclusively because it is 
considered as enshrined within the scope of protection of conventional the right to property (Article 
21 ACHR). In fact, if we read the following paragraph the of the ‘Cobo’s Study’ when he expressly 
admitted that “…[r]ecognition here means acknowledgement of a ‘de facto’ situation that provides a 
basis for the existence of a right…”, we can probably conclude that what was the real intention of the 
author was to stress the historical process of the emergence of the indigenous rights in international 
law. See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, Study of the Problem of discrimination Against Indigenous 
Populations, Volume V, Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, New York, 1987, para. 214-217. 
72 As it has been pointed out before, pursuant to Article 2 of the Convention, “...States not only have 
an affirmative obligation to adopt the legislative measures necessary to guarantee the exercise of the 
rights recognized in the Convention, but must also refrain both promulgating laws that disregards or 
impede the free exercise of these rights and from suppressing or modifying the existing laws 
protecting them.” See I-ACtHR, Case of Dacosta-Cadogan v. Barbados. Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 24, 2009. Series C No. 204, para. 68. See 
also, Case of Castillo-Páez v. Peru. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 1998. Series 
C No. 43, para. 207; Case of Heliodoro-Portugal v. Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of August 12, 2008. Series C No. 186, para. 57; and I-ACtHR, 
Case of Salvador-Chiriboga v. Ecuador, cit., para. 122. 
73 Possession remains central for the recognition of the right to property; nevertheless, in connection 
with the right to use those lands not exclusively occupied by these communities, possession is not an 
essential requirement. What is relevant in the latter case is the fact to have had traditionally access to 
them for the purpose of their subsistence and the development of traditional activities. The same could 
be applied with regard to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this respect (See, 
Article 14(1) of the ILO Convention No. 169). 
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4.1. Traditional possession: international legal standards  
 
As it has been pointed out before, a rightful departing point in connection 
with the international standards applicable to indigenous people’s land-tenure 
systems, and in particular to their traditional possession, is the ILO Convention No. 
169. In fact, with regard to the latter, this instrument states –in its Article 14(1)– that 
“[t]he right of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands 
which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised…” Additionally, it clearly 
imposes a convergent obligation to the States Parties, who “...shall take steps as 
necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally 
occupy...”74  
In the same line, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
holds, in its Article 26(1), that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to the lands, 
territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise 
used or acquired.” Moreover, in order to clarify which lands are included within 
these rights, the following paragraph clearly states that “...the right to own, use, 
develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason 
of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use...”75 
From the join reading of these two instruments, it would be possible to 
conclude that the ‘traditional occupancy’, in terms of possession or different use of 
the lands or territories, has to be regarded as essential for the recognition and 
enjoyment of these culturally tailored rights. But, what does it mean to ‘traditionally’ 
occupy a land? Which are the elements of ‘traditional occupancy’? Has the Inter-
American Court elaborated upon these two questions any consistent jurisprudence? 
Within the following paragraphs, we will attempt to provide a reasonable answer to 
these questions.  
First of all, if we focus on the interpretation made in the ILO Guide of Article 
14 of the ILO Convention No. 169, the lands traditionally occupied are defined as 
those “...lands where indigenous peoples have lived over time, and which they want 
                                                 
74 Article 14(2), ILO Convention No. 169. 
75 Article 26(2), UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  
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to pass on to future generations.” In addition, the guide expressly emphasises the 
fact that “[t]he establishment of indigenous peoples’ land rights is thus based on the 
traditional occupation and use...” 76  
As we saw within the previous chapters, ‘traditional practices’, in connection 
with the regime of possession and occupancy of the lands, are regarded as vital for 
the construction of the indigenous peoples’ identity.77 In fact, it has been stressed 
that it is the particular way through which these communities relate with their lands, 
and the centrality these lands have in their spiritual conception of the world and life, 
that make them –as a group– different and distinctive from the largest part of the 
modern societies.  Indeed, the justification of the protection of right to communal 
property, under a differential legal regime is precisely grounded on the need of 
protect their culture, traditions and worldviews, which are seen as reflected in their 
traditional attachment to the land, and –in other words– in their traditional possession 
and use.78    
Therefore, under the light of the ILO Convention No. 169 regimes, 
traditional possession or use of the lands requires the objective or material 
subjection of these lands to traditional practises and traditional ways of life. That is, 
cultural practices that have been practised since immemorial times and which are 
intrinsically connected with the self-perceived traditional distinctiveness of the 
involved indigenous communities.79 Without the objective existence of material and 
spiritual practices that culturally connect these communities with their lands and 
which are regarded as reflected in their traditional possession or use, it would be 
quite difficult to argue that the members of these communities have a ‘unique’, 
                                                 
76 See ILO, Indigenous & Tribal Peoples' Rights in Practice. A Guide to ILO convention No. 169, cit., 
p. 94. 
77 See, Chapter III, Section 4, and Chapter IV, Section 2.4. 
78 See, our considerations in Chapter IV, Section 4, and Chapter IV, Section 7. 
79 In the Yakye Axa Case, one of the expert witness who testified before the Court declared with 
regard to the possession of indigenous land, that “[o]ccupation is expressed in a different manner and 
is not always evident due to the cultural mode of production that does not include the practice of 
massively transforming nature, due to the noteworthy adjustment to the environment attained by these 
peoples in the course of many generations. Despite the subtlety of the signs of possession, sites 
periodically settled, watering places, water deposits, hunting territories, gathering or fishing areas, 
almost imperceptible cemeteries, and so forth, are an indelible part of the historical memory of these 
peoples. This historical memory, inseparably associated with geography, is the main sign of 
traditional possession.” See I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; 
Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs, cit., para. 38(d), Statement by José Alberto Braunstein, 
expert witness. 
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‘special’ or ‘all-encompassing’  relationship with them.80 The following could be 
considered as examples of these material and spiritual practices: settlements or 
sporadic cultivation, seasonal or nomadic gathering, hunting and fishing, in 
connection with the former; and religious ceremonies, sacred places, ancestral burial 
grounds, etc., with regard to the latter.81  
In fact, without the presence of these objective elements or ‘indicia’ it would 
be quite difficult to identify the existence of “traditional occupation” of those lands, 
in the legal sense of the terms enshrined within the ILO Convention. Hence, it would 
not be possible to justify the existence of a particular and special legal regime 
addressed to protect a different cultural understanding of property rights. Why? Just 
because it would be no longer possible to identify a distinguishable or culturally 
differential understanding of it! 
Notwithstanding, some scholars have also argued that traditional occupation 
does not mean ‘in a traditional manner’, in a sense that also includes the 
development and changes in their lifestyles and traditions.82 Of course, cultures and 
cultural traditions are always in evolution or –better– in permanent change according 
to and under the influence of different factors and circumstances (e.g. geographical, 
historical, sociological, etc.), and in this sense indigenous cultures are not an 
exception.83 Every single culture is in a permanent movement and evolution, under 
                                                 
80 This is, of course, without entering into the question of essentialization that this kind or reasoning 
ontologically has. For more detailed explanations in connection with this argument, see Chapter IV, 
Section 2.4. and 4.  
81 The importance of the burial practices for the difference societies has been emphasized through the 
centuries. As an example of its human relevance, in one of the founding works on the field of 
international law, Hugo Grotius stated that the ‘Right of Sepulture’ has been voluntarily instituted by 
the Laws of the Nations, in the (implicit) understanding that “...the office of burial is conceived as 
rendered, not so much to the man, that is, the particular person, as to Humanity, that is, to Human 
Nature.” See, H. GROTIUS, The Rights of War and Peace (De Jure Belli et Pacis), 1st. ed. 1625, 
London, 1853, II, Chapter XIX , p. 218. Today, under the light of the jurisprudence of the Court, it 
would be possible to say that the recognition and protection of the right to burial is connected with the 
principle of human dignity. Therefore, its protection would include the protection of the 
cultural/religious/spiritual practices related to it and –through the materialisation of those practices– 
would be extended to the physical place in which those practices are carried out or to which they are 
intimately connected. See on this topic I-ACtHR, Case of the Moiwana Community v. 
Suriname. Merits, Reparations and Costs, cit., Separate Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, 
para. 60 et seq. 
82 See, P. THORNBERRY, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights, Manchester, 2002, p. 353. 
83 According to the UN Special Rapporteur Ms. Daes, “[i]t must be acknowledged that legal concepts 
and rights and, indeed, indigenous peoples themselves cannot be frozen in time. Indigenous 
communities and societies change and evolve like all other societies.” See, E.-I. A. DAES, Indigenous 
peoples and their relationship to land. Final working paper prepared by the Special Rapporteur Mrs. 
Erica-Irene A. Daes, cit., para. 118. 
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the influence of other cultural manifestations, in a mutually enriching process. Those 
that are regarded as petrous or impermeable to changes upon time, would probably 
be so because they would most likely be expressions of extinguished populations or 
groups, which have perished and do not exist anymore at the present time.84  
However, it would be important to stress –for the sake of the argument– that 
the fact that traditional practices can suffer modification with the passing of the 
time, and –hence– can accommodate themselves to the new technologies... does not 
mean that they are no any longer traditional! When hunting practises are conducted 
with the help of fire arms instead of bows and arrows, it does not mean that the 
practise of hunting –as part of indigenous tradition– has despaired; in this case it 
would be only possible to talk of cultural ‘adaptation’ of the practise through the use 
of modern devises. What is important (and legally relevant) is the fact that hunting 
practices (together with all the other practices) remain as a manifestation of the 
traditional use or possession of the land, and hence justify –under the wording of the 
ILO Convention and the jurisprudence of the Court– its special protection.85    
The identification of objective cultural practises, that connect indigenous 
peoples with those lands that they claim as ‘their traditional lands’, correspond –of 
course– to the ‘spatial’ or ‘objective’ characteristics of the very same traditional 
occupancy. But –we must say– this is not the only element that has to be identify in 
order to grant special protection to the right to property claimed by these 
communities.86 As you can imagine, the second complementary element that has to 
be considered is the temporal requirement.  
                                                 
84 See, UNESCO Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, adopted by the World Conference on 
Cultural Policies, Mexico, 6 August 1982, para. 4. See also, our considerations in Chapter I, Section 
2.2.; and Chapter IV, Section 2.2.3. and 2.4. 
85 See, UNESCO Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, cit., para. 4. According to the UN 
Human Rights Committee (HRComm.) the right to enjoy one’s culture (Article 27 of the ICCPR) 
cannot be determined in abstracto but has to be placed in context, which means that “...article 27 does 
not only protect traditional means of livelihood of national minorities […]. Therefore, that the authors 
may have adapted their methods of reindeer herding over the years and practice it with the help of 
modern technology does not prevent them from invoking article 27 of the Covenant.” See, Human 
Rights Committee (HRComm.), Communication No. 511/1992, Ilmari Länsman et al. v. Finland, 26 
October 1994 (CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992), para. 9(3). 
86 Traditional occupation does not mean ‘exclusive occupation’. It just depends on which is the right 
that is under stake; if what is claimed is the right to property, then exclusivity is required but if the 
claimed right is the right to use the land in a traditional way, this is not a requirement. In the latter 
case Article 14(1) of the ILO Convention only requires to have “…traditionally had access for their 
subsistence and traditional activities”, such as in the case of nomadic pastoralists, hunters or shifting 
cultivators in a rotational or seasonal basis. As we can see, in this latter case, what is protected is the 
CHAPTER VI 
328 
 
In fact, if we pay attention to the wording of Article 14 of the ILO 
Convention, the present tense in which the verb “to occupy” is used, could lead us to 
the conclusion that “…the occupancy must be connected with the present in order for 
it to give rise to possessory rights.”87 In fact, the ILO Convention not only use the 
expression ‘traditionally occupy’ in its Article 14(1) –which recognises the right to 
ownership and possession– but as well the same expression is used in its second 
paragraph, which stresses the obligation of the State Parties in the identification of 
the indigenous’ lands. Indeed, Article 13 the ILO Convention refers to the lands that 
indigenous ‘occupy or otherwise use’, in connection with the importance of those 
lands in their culture. In addition, the use of the same present tense is also extended 
to their rights that concern natural resources (Article 15) and to the right to return in 
case of removal (Article 16), according the clear disposition contained in the second 
paragraph of the mentioned Article 13. In the same line, the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in its Article 26(2) recognises the right to own, use, 
develop or control the lands that they ‘possess by reason of traditional ownership or 
other traditional occupation or use’, stressing the same present tense and as well as 
the objective requirement of ‘traditional’ occupation or possession. 
Therefore, the reasonable and logical conclusion of the combined reading of 
these two instruments would indicate that, in order to successfully claim the right to 
communal property over traditional lands and territories, the members of the 
indigenous communities would have to demonstrate that they ‘traditionally’ occupy 
those lands. In addition, they would have to prove that that occupation is a ‘present’ 
or a ‘current’ one.  
Notwithstanding the reasonability of the above conclusion, it cannot be 
absolute. First of all, the recognition of the right to return in cases of forced 
displacement (Article 16 of the ILO Convention) implies –a contrario sensu– the 
possibility to be dispossessed or deprived of the traditional lands at the time of the 
introduction of their claims. Therefore, in this case, the exercise of the right to 
property would be considered as incompatible with requirement of present 
                                                                                                                                          
traditional access to land and territories (not traditional and exclusively possessed) for the 
performance of traditional activities, hence those intrinsically connected with their cultural identity. 
See on this point, P. THORNBERRY, op. cit., p. 355; see also ILO, Indigenous & Tribal Peoples' 
Rights in Practice. A Guide to ILO convention No. 169, cit., p. 95. 
87 See, S. J. ANAYA, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, New York, 2004, p. 144 et seq. 
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occupation, viewed in absolute terms. Secondly, to see the requirement of present or 
current possession in absolute terms could lead toward a sort of empty or even 
abstract recognition of the right to communal property. In fact, it would not offer 
protection to those that would have been unwillingly or forcibly deprived of their 
lands in relative recent times.88  
For the above mentioned reasons, the ILO Guide on the Convention No. 169 
has stressed that “[i]indigenous peoples’ lands might in some cases include lands 
which have been recently lost or lands that have been occupied by indigenous 
peoples in more recent time…”89 The position adopted by the ILO Guide has to be 
considered as an intermediate position between those that have interpreted 
‘traditionally’ as a recognition of land rights whenever occupied and those ones that 
recognise only rights of lands presently occupied.90   
In those situations where indigenous communities have been deprived of their 
lands, it has been argued that it would be sufficient to establish a ‘present 
connection’ with the lost lands, in a sense that have to be demonstrate –at least– the 
existence of a ‘continuing cultural attachment to them’, but not only. It would be 
necessary –in addition– to respect a reasonable time framework, between the act of 
dispossession and the claim regarding the affected lands, in order to be able to 
exercise the right to return (or even the right to be compensated in case of their 
definitive loss). This also means that the right to return (which is based and is a 
complement of the right to property) does not and must not cover claims grounded 
exclusively on historical or ancestral lands whose possession had been lost in the 
colonisation process or in the formation of the modern States.91  
In conclusion, without a recent traditional possession or occupation of the 
claimed lands, it would not be successfully possible to claim property rights over 
those lands. These requirements have to be considered as indispensable for having a 
successful legal claim; their absence would most likely vanish any possibility to 
effectively claim the lands back and –consequently– to return to them. In fact, the 
                                                 
88 See, P. THORNBERRY, op. cit., p. 354.  
89 See, ILO, Indigenous & Tribal Peoples' Rights in Practice. A Guide to ILO convention No. 169, cit., 
p. 94. 
90 See, among others, P. THORNBERRY, op. cit., p. 353 et seq.; A. XANTHAKI, Indigenous Rights 
and United Nations Standards, Cambridge, 2007, p. 82. 
91 See, A. XANTHAKI, op. cit., p. 82. 
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dispositions of the ILO Convention do not recognise any historical claim in 
connection with those lands or territories that have been lost long time back in 
history.92  
 
 
4.2. Traditional possession and its jurisprudential interpretation. The recognition 
of the traditional title  
 
The Inter-American Court has been very conscious of the practical problems 
connected with the identification, demarcation and titling of the indigenous’ 
traditional lands. In fact, since the beginning of its jurisprudence in these matters –
with the Awas Tingni Case– it has not only emphasised the central responsibility of 
the States in the demarcation process but also has stressed the key role played in it by 
their cultural traditions, and customs and –in particular– by their traditional way of 
possession and occupancy. 
As it has been stressed before, because indigenous peoples are living in their 
traditional territories since immemorial times, under their own customs and 
traditions, they have been recognised with the rights to own and use them according 
to their own specific cultural and normative framework (within the limits of the 
recognised international legal standards).93 This increasing international recognition 
has not left the I-ACtHR impassibly or imperturbably.  
In fact, since the beginning, the Court has emphasised the importance of the 
indigenous peoples’ customary law practices in the regulation of their right to 
communal property94 and, hence, it has expressly recognised the centrality of 
traditional possession in its regulation. In this sense, the Court has stressed that 
                                                 
92 Without entering at this stage into the legal requirements of the right to return, it is important to 
clarify that in the case of historical dispossession, besides what has been said by some scholars, it 
would be very difficult to talk –in strictly legal terms- of compensations. Instead, this situation would 
have to be framed within the positive measures that Member States have to take vis-à-vis the most 
vulnerable groups of the society. And, in the case of indigenous populations, States would have to 
take into account the cultural relevance that lands have in their life and –in that sense– grant them with 
new lands in order to make sustainable their way of life (e.g. according to Article 4 of the ILO 
Convention No. 169). For a contrary position, see S. J. ANAYA, Indigenous Peoples in International 
Law, cit., p. 144. 
93 See, Chapter IV, Section 4. 
94 See I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, cit., para. 
151. 
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“...the right to the communal territory they have traditionally used and occupied, 
derived from their longstanding use and occupation of the land and resources 
necessary for their physical and cultural survival...”95  
The interpretation of the American Convention made by the Court in 
connection with the ‘traditional’ possession goes hand in hand with the ILO regime 
that has been analysed above. In fact, keeping the centrality of the possession in the 
recognition of the right to communal property, as guaranteed within Article 21 of the 
American Convention96, the Court has expressly stated that “...traditional possession 
entitles indigenous people to demand official recognition and registration of 
property title.” Indeed, the recognition of the centrality of the customary practices in 
the case of indigenous communities, has permitted the Court to affirm –as a matter of 
principle– that “...possession of the land should suffice for indigenous communities 
lacking real title to property of the land to obtain official recognition of that 
property, and for consequent registration.”97 In addition, the Court has clarified that 
“[i]n order to obtain such title, the territory traditionally used and occupied by the 
members of [indigenous and tribal communities] must first be delimited and 
demarcated, in consultation with such people and other neighbouring peoples.”98  
Moreover, from the reading of the Court jurisprudence, it would be possible 
to affirm that the Court followed the same understanding of traditional possession 
contained within the ILO regime. That is, the need for material and temporal 
traditional occupation or possession of the lands, in order to gain protection under 
the conventional recognition of the right to property (Article 21 of the Convention). 
In this sense, the Court has stressed –alongside its jurisprudence– that the material 
relevancy of the traditional presence or occupancy of these communities over the 
claimed lands and territories. Confirmation of this line of though can be found in the 
reading of a contrario sensu of the last quotation, but not only. In fact, a clear 
reception of this interpretation is held in the Sawhoyamaxa Case in which the Court 
                                                 
95 See I-ACtHR, the Case of Saramaka People v. Suriname; Judgment on Preliminary Objections, 
merits, Reparations, and Costs, cit., para. 96. 
96 See –among others- I I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. 
Nicaragua, cit., para. 151; see also, Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, cit.,  para. 131. 
97 See I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, cit., para. 
151. 
98 See I-ACtHR, the Case of Saramaka People v. Suriname; Judgment on Preliminary Objections, 
merits, Reparations, and Costs, cit., para. 115. 
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has expressly recognised that “traditional possession of their lands by indigenous 
people has equivalent effects to those of a state-granted full property title”, and –
hence– “traditional possession entitles indigenous people to demand official 
recognition and registration of property title”.99  
Therefore, following these interpretative lines, we can even conclude that as 
long as these communities possess or occupy their territories and lands in a 
traditional way, they would be able to claim property rights over them. Of course, 
this traditional occupancy has to be proven in a courtroom in order to generate a 
successful claim, and the burden of proof would be assign –according to a general 
and basic principle of law– to the party making the allegations of facts on which the 
claim is based on, merely the members of the indigenous communities.100 However, 
the question that remains unanswered here is precisely how to do it, how to prove the 
existence of the traditional possession or occupancy over the claimed territories in 
order to be granted with the conventional protection. 
First of all, in order to establish the presence of traditional occupancy, what 
has to be demonstrated is the existence of cultural practices that would display the 
preservation over time of the ‘unique’ or ‘all-encompassing’ relationship that these 
communities have with their lands and territories.101 These relevant cultural practises 
would be those that reflect the especial attachment that these people have with their 
lands and –consequently– stress the differences that these populations have with the 
larger parts of the society.102 Of course, these practices may vary among the different 
communities because, it has been rightfully pointed out by the Court, the “[s]aid 
relationship may be expressed in different ways, depending on the particular 
indigenous people involved and the specific circumstances surrounding it...”103, and 
–in this sense– they have to be determined case by case. Among them, the Court has 
referred (without any pretention of exhaustiveness in its enumeration) to “...the 
                                                 
99 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 128. 
100 See –among others- J. M. PASQUALUCCI, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Cambridge, 2003, p. 210 et seq.; L. HENNEBEL, La convention Américaine 
des Droits de L'Homme. Mécanismes de Protection et Étendue des Droits et Libertés, Bruxelles, 2007, 
p. 216 et seq. 
101 See our comments in connection with this topic, in Chapter IV, Section 2.2.4. 
102 See E.-I. A. DAES, Indigenous peoples and their relationship to land. Final working paper 
prepared by the Special Rapporteur Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, cit., para. 14 et seq. From the same 
author, see also, E.-I. A. DAES, Indigenous Peoples' Rights to Land and Natural Resources, cit. supra 
note 59, p. 78-79. 
103 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 131. 
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traditional use or presence, be it through spiritual or ceremonial ties; settlements or 
sporadic cultivation; seasonal or nomadic gathering, hunting and fishing; the use of 
natural resources associated with their customs and any other element 
characterizing their culture.”104  
Moreover, we have to bear in mind that lands and traditions –in indigenous 
culture– are closely interlinked. Therefore, in order to determinate the presence of 
traditional possession or occupation in connection with specific territories, it would 
be necessary to take into account “…their oral expressions and traditions, their 
customs and languages, their arts and rituals, their knowledge and practices in 
connection with nature, culinary art, customary law, dress, philosophy, and 
values.”105  
If relation with their lands is intrinsically cultural –as stated by the Court–, 
then the demonstration of the existence of traditional occupation upon them has to be 
necessarily displayed through the exhibition of cultural practices or expressions. It 
would be in the history of each community, in their cultural heritage106, in which 
their special relationship with their lands can be traced back into immemorial times 
and, for this reason, especial attention would have to be given to their oral traditions 
as recorded within the memories of each community.107 Is in this sense that Judges 
Cançado Trindade, Pacheco Gómez and Abreu Burelli affirmed that in the case of 
these populations “…their link with the territory, even if not written, integrates their 
day-to-day life, and the right to communal property itself has a cultural dimension. 
                                                 
104 Ibid. In this particular case, the Court took as proven the relationship through the demonstration 
within those lands of ‘traditional hunting, fishing and gathering activities’.  
105 See I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, cit., para. 154. 
106 According to the UN Special Rapporteur Mrs. Daes, “[t]he heritage or indigenous peoples has a 
collective character and is comprised of all objects, sites and knowledge including languages, the 
nature or use of which has been transmitted from generation to generation, and which is regarded as 
pertaining to a particular people or its territory of traditional natural use.”  See, E-I- A. DAES, 
Report of the seminar on the draft principles and guidelines for the protection of the heritage of 
indigenous people, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/26, United Nation, 2000, Annex I, para. 12. 
107 According to the expert opinion delivered by Rodolfo Stavenhagen Gruenbaum, former UN 
Special Rapporteur, anthropologist and sociologist, in the Awas Tingni Case, “One must understand 
that the land is not a mere instrument of agricultural production, but part of a geographic and social, 
symbolic and religious space, with which the history and current dynamics of those peoples are 
linked. [...] This linkage of humans with the territory is not necessarily written down, it is something 
lived on a daily basis.” See I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. 
Nicaragua, cit., para. 83(d).  
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In sum, the habitat forms an integral part of their culture, transmitted from 
generation to generation.”108 
The Court, taking into consideration the above mentioned reasons, has 
emphasised the importance of the “historical memory” of these communities, in 
which the possession of the traditional territories is ‘indelibly recorded’ precisely 
because, in the process of sedentarisation, most of these communities “...took on an 
identity of its own that is connected to a physically and culturally determinate 
geographic area.”109   
Therefore, in order to prove the existence of traditional possession or 
occupancy in a given case, the involved indigenous population would have to make 
use of expert witness (e.g. anthropologist, sociologist, historians, etc.), or witnesses 
as such (e.g. those members of the community that are guardians or oral transmitters 
of their culture110). These witnesses would ideally be able to recall, from the 
ancestral memories of these populations, their traditional connection with the 
claimed and possessed territories.111 In fact, for the Court, “...such historical memory 
and particular identity must be especially considered in identifying the land to be 
transferred to them.”112    
Notwithstanding, the testimony of witnesses –in order to support the property 
right claim– would have to be based on the present possession or occupation of the 
claimed territory or –at least– would have to be able to show the existence of a 
sufficient present connection with them (especially in the cases of relatively recent 
expulsions or displacements). In fact, if the testimony is based only on the 
                                                 
108 Ibid, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges A.A. Cançado Trindade, M. Pacheco Gómez and A. Abreu 
Burelli, para. 6. 
109 See Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, cit., para. 216. 
110 In the Plan de Sanchez Masacre it has been proved that the death of the women and elders, oral 
transmitters of the Maya-Achí culture, caused a cultural vacuum, precisely because it affected the 
reproduction and transmission of their culture. See I-ACtHR, Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre 
v. Guatemala. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 19, 2004. Series C No. 116, para. 
49(12) and 87(b). 
111 Perhaps one of the most clear statements in this matter has been produced by Judge Cançado 
Trindade, when has emphasised that the “…delimitation, demarcation, tilting and the return of their 
traditional territories [are] indeed essential. This is a matter of survival of the cultural identity of the 
N´djukas, so that they may conserve their memory, both personally and collectively. Only then will 
their fundamental right to life lato senso be rightfully protected, including their right to cultural 
identity.” See Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Interpretation of the Judgment of Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, cit., Separate Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, para. 20. 
112 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Interpretation of the 
Judgment of Merits, Reparations and Costs, cit., para. 23. 
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‘remembrance of the greatest past’, on the re-evocation of ancestral or pre-colonial 
possession of the claimed lands, it would only have to be considered as a 
circumstantial or indirect evidence113 and therefore –by itself– it would be 
insufficient as full supportive evidence of the claim.114  
In other words, the ancient memories and immemorial traditions are 
definitely important for the maintenance and development of indigenous people 
identity (as they are for any other cultural tradition), but not certainly enough for the 
recognition of a property right.115 Land’s claims must be based on more concrete 
indicia, on substantive elements, that is, physical and temporal evidence that would 
presently link those traditional memories with those specifically identified lands that 
are the object of the claim. Concrete indicia, such as “...the traditional use or 
present, be it though spiritual or ceremonial ties; settlements or sporadic cultivation; 
seasonal or nomadic gathering, hunting and fishing, etc.”116  
Because what is at stake is the right over ‘traditional’ lands, the activities that 
reflect their customs and traditions have to be uninterruptedly performed, since 
‘immemorial’ or ‘historical’ times. Therefore, both historical records and concrete 
and physical evidences of possession or occupancy of the claimed traditional lands 
are required in order to be granted with the protection offered by Article 21 of the 
American Convention. In conclusion, as the Court plainly pointed out, “...in the case 
of indigenous communities who have occupied their ancestral lands in accordance 
with customary practices –yet who lack real title to the property– mere possession of 
the land should suffice to obtain official recognition of their communal 
ownership.”117  
                                                 
113 Circumstantial evidence refers to indirect evidence that is not based on the personal knowledge or 
observations of a witness, as it could be considered –in this case- the recollection and transitions of the 
collective history of these groups. Present facts are able to be witnessed; history can only be 
transmitted. See in connection with the juridical estimation of this kind of proof, J. M. 
PASQUALUCCI, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, cit., p. 
212 et seq. 
114 As it has been said before, the right to property does not cover compensation for the great injustice 
suffered by these populations at the time of the colonisation or the formation of the current national 
states. See on this point, A. XANTHAKI, op. cit., p. 82. See also our consideration in connection with 
the conceptual implications of the temporal element, within the notions of indigenousness, in Chapter 
IV, Section 2.2.1., and 2.4. 
115 See Chapter IV, Section 2.2.5. 
116 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 131. 
117 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
Judgment of February 8, 2006. Series C No. 145, para. 131. 
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However, it is not uncommon that the claims for the recognition of the 
communal property over traditional lands have had –as an object– not the legal 
recognition of a present or current possession. Instead, often happens that those 
claims pursue the restitution of those possessed territories from which indigenous 
population have been recently expelled or whose titles have been considered lost.118  
In these cases, the Court has recognised to the displaced communities –as a matter of 
principle– the right to return to their lands (and as well as a form of reparation)119, 
beside the possibility for exceptional situations in which the relocation of these 
communities to other lands becomes unavoidable, because the existence of objective 
and fully-justifiable grounds for it.120 In fact, for the Court “...the member of 
indigenous peoples who have unwillingly left their traditional lands, or lost 
possession thereof, maintain property rights thereto, even though they lack legal 
title, unless the lands have been lawfully transferred to third parties in good 
faith.”121  
In connection with the right to return to traditional territories and lands, and 
its exercise, different questions arise, in particular with regard to the legal and 
jurisprudential requirements regarded as indispensable for its realisation. But also 
with regard to its exercise vis-à-vis those third parties who currently and lawfully 
possess in good faith the very same traditional territories from which these 
communities have been removed; or even the time framework in which this right 
could be successfully upheld. Additionally, and perhaps even most importantly in 
connection with this study, it would important to inquire on the transversal role that 
the protection of cultural diversity plays in connection with all of these questions.  
Within the following sections, I will try to answer these and other connected 
questions that the right to return impose to this enquiry.  
 
 
                                                 
118 For detailed examples of different situations in which indigenous communities find themselves 
deprived of their so-called aboriginal title, see E.-I. A. DAES, Indigenous peoples and their 
relationship to land. Final working paper prepared by the Special Rapporteur Mrs. Erica-Irene A. 
Daes, cit., p. 13 et seq. 
119 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Interpretation of the Judgment of 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, cit., Separate Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, para. 10. 
120 See Article 16(2), ILO Convention No. 169. 
121 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 128. 
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5. The right to return to traditional lands: The legal value of the cultural 
connection with traditional lands 
 
First of all, if we scan the instruments that form part of the international 
human rights system or –in the words of the Court– corpus juris122, we will find that 
the right to return is recognised in Article 16 the ILO Convention No. 169. In fact, it 
is incorporated as a complementary face of the right to not be removed from the 
lands which indigenous peoples ‘occupy’.123 In effect, one of the basic principles of 
this Convention is that indigenous peoples shall not be removed from their lands. 
The core idea is the protection of the ‘current’ or ‘present’ possession of their lands 
and territories, as is possible to deduct from the present tense of the verb ‘occupy’ 
used in the first paragraph of this article. Again, it is possible to identify the 
centrality that traditional possession or occupancy of lands and territories has on the 
structure of the ILO Convention, and consequently the outstanding protection that 
this emblematic instrument confers to the special and unique relationship that 
indigenous peoples have with their traditional lands.124  
Nevertheless, it could happen that exceptional circumstances impose the need 
for the relocation of these people, such as –for example– the case of pastoralist and 
small island communities that would be severely affected by changes in the global 
                                                 
122 See, I-ACtHR, Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, cit., para. 120; and 
see, I-ACtHR, The right to information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees 
of the Due Process of Law, cit., para. 115 
123 Article 16 of the ILO Convention No. 169, reads as follow: “(1). Subject to the following 
paragraphs of this Article, the peoples concerned shall not be removed from the lands which they 
occupy. (2). Where the relocation of these peoples is considered necessary as an exceptional measure, 
such relocation shall take place only with their free and informed consent. Where their consent cannot 
be obtained, such relocation shall take place only following appropriate procedures established by 
national laws and regulations, including public inquiries where appropriate, which provide the 
opportunity for effective representation of the peoples concerned. (3). Whenever possible, these 
peoples shall have the right to return to their traditional lands, as soon as the grounds for relocation 
cease to exist. (4). When such return is not possible, as determined by agreement or, in the absence of 
such agreement, through appropriate procedures, these peoples shall be provided in all possible cases 
with lands of quality and legal status at least equal to that of the lands previously occupied by them, 
suitable to provide for their present needs and future development. Where the peoples concerned 
express a preference for compensation in money or in kind, they shall be so compensated under 
appropriate guarantees. (5). Persons thus relocated shall be fully compensated for any resulting loss 
or injury.” 
124 The same principle can be found within the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
when establish in its Article 10 that “[i]ndigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their 
lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the 
indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where 
possible, the option to return.” 
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climate.125 The application of the general principle of non-removal in such cases 
would impose not only the consideration of the said displacements as exceptional but 
also temporal.126 This means that as soon as the reasons that justify the relocation of 
these communities are no longer valid, they should have guaranteed the possibility to 
return to their lands, as is stated in Article 16(3) of the ILO Convention.127  
Therefore, it would be possible to say that the right to return is 
complementary and functional (or has a complementary function) to the mentioned 
principle of non-removal. In other words, because indigenous peoples have 
recognised the right to their traditional lands (right to use and to property), they 
consequentially have the right to stay and to not be removed from them. However, if 
their removal and relocation became absolutely indispensable and justified in a 
pluralist and democratic society, then –immediately after the cease of those 
exceptional circumstances– they would have the right to return to their lands and 
territories, precisely because they already have the right to use and own them. In 
sum, the return to their lands and territories is grounded in the right to property or 
use, as guaranteed in Article 14 of the ILO Convention, which they already had over 
‘their’ traditional lands, merely over the lands that they traditionally ‘occupy’.128 In 
this sense, as I argued before, the right to return cannot be claimed and exercised in 
connection with those territories which had been lost as result of processes of 
colonisation or formation of the modern national States. In fact, the right to return 
cannot be understood as a compensation for historical injustices suffered by these 
populations.129  
Moreover, because the right to return is complementary to the right to 
property, its exercise would be possible only in connection with those lands and 
territories that indigenous populations “occupied” before their removal or relocation. 
Hence, it would be possible to conclude that what is really at stake and protected by 
the ILO Convention is the ‘present’ or ‘current’ traditional occupation/possession 
                                                 
125 See ILO, Indigenous & Tribal Peoples' Rights in Practice. A Guide to ILO convention No. 169, 
cit., p. 98. 
126 See, P. THORNBERRY, op. cit., p. 357. 
127 Article 16(3) of the ILO Convention No. 169 states: “Wherever possible, these peoples shall have 
the right to return to their traditional land, as soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist.” 
128 As it has been said supra, according to Article 16(1) of the ILO Convention No. 169, indigenous 
peoples “...shall not be removed from the lands which they occupy.”  
129 See, A. XANTHAKI, op. cit., p. 86. 
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(which is equivalent to a property title) and not the remembrance of historical 
immemorial occupancy or settlements that existed at the time of colonisation or 
formation of modern national states.130  
However, ‘present’ occupation cannot be considered –for obvious reasons– as 
an indispensable requirement for the exercise of the right to return in the case of the 
displacement of indigenous populations. Thus, we have to necessarily conclude that 
what is indeed required is to demonstrate the existence, before the removal, of an 
effective traditional occupation, use or possession of the claimed lands that still 
maintain connection with the present. This could be the case –for instance– of 
relative recent expulsions.131    
Furthermore, Article 16(2) of the ILO Convention, after reaffirming the 
exceptional character of the removal of these populations from their traditional 
territories, has subordinated its relocation to new lands to their ‘free and informed 
consent’. In this sense, because of its importance within the scope of this work, and –
even perhaps most importantly– due to its rising importance within the current 
international debates related to the consultation of indigenous populations before the 
implementation of measures that could potentially affect them, the following section 
will be entirely be dedicated to this topic.   
 
 
5.1. The principle of consultation and its cultural implications 
 
As I have already argued132, the principle of consultation –with the concerned 
indigenous communities– means to actively seek their consent prior to any action 
that may affect them (directly or indirectly) and in this sense it has to be considered 
                                                 
130 In this latter case, indigenous population would have the right to be the beneficiaries of positive 
action tending to their advancement in the society, to eliminate discrimination, promote tolerance and 
dissemination of their cultural understanding, and the continuing improvement of their economic and 
social conditions. These effective measures have been widely incorporated within both UN 
Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples and the ILO Convention No. 169.  
131 In the same sense that the ILO Convention, the UN Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples 
recognises the right to restitution (Article 27) of those lands and territories “...traditionally owned or 
otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged 
without their free, prior and informed consent.” The ground for the right to restitution (or return) is 
the same: the former possession or occupation of the traditional lands. See on this point, A. 
XANTHAKI, op. cit., p. 80 et seq. 
132 See, Chapter IV, Section 3.3. 
CHAPTER VI 
340 
 
as an obligation of ‘means’ and not of ‘results’.133 Within this normative framework, 
the ILO Convention imposes on the Member States the obligation to deploy all 
efforts in order to gain the ‘free and informed consent’ of the involved communities, 
and this has to be done ‘prior’ to their relocation, but not only. The obligation to 
consult, as an overarching principle that guides the entire relationship between 
Governments and indigenous communities134, includes as well the phase of 
evaluation and decision making involving all decisions that can affect them. In this 
sense, it has to be considered as including those measures that would have –as a 
collateral effect– the displacement of these communities from their traditional lands 
(e.g. the construction of a dam, or other larger infrastructure projects, etc.).135  
However, it could happen that, after all genuine efforts that have been 
deployed by the States in order to reach an agreement, the consent of the affected 
communities cannot be obtained. In this case, the legality of the relocation would 
depend –under the lights of the provision of the ILO Convention– on whether it has 
been taken after ‘...following appropriate procedure established by national laws 
and regulations, including public inquires where appropriate…’136 This paragraph 
clarifies the character of the obligation to seek consent among the affected 
communities, which clearly is an obligation of ‘means’. In fact, what is truthfully at 
stake here is the conduct, good faith and the will of the States in following the 
                                                 
133 See in this matter, S. J. ANAYA, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development. Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, James 
Anaya, cit., in particular para. 46-49.  
134 According to the ILO Guide, “[t]he obligation to consult indigenous peoples arises on a general 
level in connection with the application of all the provisions of the Convention. In particular, it is 
required that indigenous peoples are enabled to participate freely at all levels in the formulation, 
implementation and evaluation of measures and programmes that affect them directly.” See, ILO, 
Indigenous & Tribal Peoples' Rights in Practice. A Guide to ILO convention No. 169, cit., p. 61. 
135 The obligation of consultation in all phases of the process of relocation is grounded in the 
combined reading of both Article 16(2) and 6 of the ILO Convention No. 169. In fact, the tripartite 
Committee of the ILO Convention has stated that “...the concept of prior consultation established in 
Article 6 should be understood in the context of the general policy expressed in Article 2, paragraph 
1, and 2(b), of the Convention...”, this means as one of the actions that governments have to take in 
order to protect the rights of indigenous peoples. See, Report of the Committee set up to examine the 
representation alleging non-observance by Colombia of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Central Unitary 
Workers' Union (CUT)and the Colombian Medical Trade Union Association. Submitted:1999; 
Document No. (ilolex): 161999COL169B; para. 58.  
136 Cfr. Article 16(2) of the ILO Convention No. 169. 
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appropriate procedures with the genuine objective of achieving consent, 
independently of the result obtained.137  
Therefore, when the relocation becomes unavoidable, because it pursues the 
realisation of a general interest that is fully justified in a pluralist democratic society, 
the ILO Convention does not recognise a veto right at the hands of the affected 
population.138 Instead, it does stress the legality of the decision-making procedures, 
which means that the decision of relocation has to be taken following appropriate 
procedures established by national laws139, but not only. In addition, it also enhances 
the possibilities of these communities to effectively participate in these procedures, 
through –for example– public inquires in which they would be able to, not only fully 
expose their own views, but as well to politically influence the outcome of the entire 
democratic process.  
Finally, if the relocation is only temporal, as soon as the grounds for it cease 
to exist, the affected communities would have the right to return to their traditional 
lands, in full accordance with the exercise of their right to property, as has been said 
above. But, if the relocation develops into a permanent situation, then the affected 
population would have the right to be fully compensated, specially by means of 
receiving ‘...lands of quality and legal status at least equal to that of the lands 
previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and future 
development’.140  
                                                 
137 As we already have said, democracy has to be considered essentially as a method to take common 
valid decisions and peacefully resolves disputes. See, Chapter II, Section 1 and 5; and Chapter IV, 
Section 3.3.  
138 See, Chapter IV, Section 3.3. 
139 According to the tripartite committee, “...the appropriate procedure is that which creates 
favourable conditions for achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures, independent of 
the result obtained. That is to say, the expression “appropriate measures” should be understood with 
reference to the aim of the consultation, namely to achieve agreement or consent.” And concluded 
emphasizing that “[i]t is not necessary, of course, for agreement or consent to be achieved.” See, 
Report of the committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Mexico of 
the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO 
Constitution by the Union of Workers of the Autonomous University of Mexico (STUNAM) and the 
Independent Union of Workers of La Jornada (SITRAJOR). Submitted: 2001; Document No. (ilolex): 
162004MEX169A; para. 89. 
140 Cfr. Article 16(4) of the ILO Convention No. 169. A similar provision on compensation can be 
found at the UN Declaration on the Rights to Indigenous Peoples, when in its Article 28(2) establish 
that “[u]nless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall take the 
form of lands, territories and resource equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary 
compensation or other appropriate redress.” 
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Furthermore, in the process of choosing these alternative lands, the States 
have to conduct faithful negotiations with these populations in order to reach an 
agreement concerning the quantity and quality of the lands; but in case of 
disagreement the final decision remains –nevertheless– on the hands of the States, 
through the establishment of the already mentioned ‘appropriate procedures’. But 
again, what is absolutely indispensable here –according to the rationale of the ILO 
Convention– is the truthful involvement of the affected communities in the decision-
making process of all of those decisions that would affect them, in order to guarantee 
the protection of their cultural diversity and the preservation of their traditions and 
customs.141 Moreover, this participation has to be granted in accordance with their 
own representative institutions in order to reach a prior, free and informed consent 
regarding the displacement and return to their lands, or –in the case of unavoidable 
final relocation– on the identification of alternatives lands. 142  
Ultimately, Article 16(5) recognises the right to be ‘fully compensated for any 
resulting loss or injury’ as a consequence of the relocation process in both temporal 
and final displacement of the affected communities. The right to be compensated is –
again– another consequence of the recognition of right to communal property over 
traditional lands, because what has to be compensated are the damages (material or 
immaterial) generated by the restriction on the enjoyment of the right to property as 
guaranteed by the ILO Convention No. 169 in its Article 14(1).  
Moreover, the right to be compensated would cover ‘any resulting loss or 
injury’ even when what is at stake is only a temporary deprivation on the enjoyment 
                                                 
141 According to the ILO tripartite committee, “if an appropriate consultation process is not 
developed with the indigenous and tribal institutions or organizations that are truly representative of 
the communities affected, the resulting consultations will not comply with the requirements of the 
Conventions.” See, Report of the committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-
observance by Mexico of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), cit. supra 
note 139, para. 102. 
142 As in any case in which consultation with indigenous communities is involved, the ILO 
Convention imposes on Member States the obligation to conduct the negotiation in a cultural sensitive 
manner. This does not mean –of course– that the procedure has to be subjected to the procedures or 
decision-making and methodologies traditionally in force among the involved communities. The letter 
have the right to internally conduct their decision-making processes according to their own traditions 
and cultures; but they do not have the right to impose those cultural understandings on the general 
public sphere, and therefore to the public laws and regulations in force in the national State in which 
they live and are part of. Indigenous communities can have indeed the political aspiration to culturally 
influence the general public decision-making process. Again, as apples are not pears, cultural political 
aspirations are not rights. In connection with this issue, see our considerations in Chapter I, Section 
4.2. 
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of this right. The compensation has to be ‘fully’ in a sense that has to take into 
account the all-encompassing relationship that indigenous people have with their 
traditional lands and –hence– the compensation has to be integrative and cover both 
material and immaterial damages. Indeed, in case of definitive deprivation of their 
traditional lands, merely when the relocation is final and unavoidable, the 
compensation should focus on the provision of alternative lands, in agreement with 
the affected communities, but not only; all other damages connected with the 
suffered restriction have to be compensated, especially those connected with the 
spiritual aspect of the relations.143    
 
 
6. The right to return as guarantee by Article 21 of the American Convention  
 
The Inter-American Court took position in connection with the right to return 
for the first time in the Case of Moiwana Community v. Suriname144, and developed 
its own jurisprudence in two subsequent cases regarding the State of Paraguay, 
                                                 
143 According to the UN CERD Committee, in the exceptional cases in which the relocation of 
indigenous peoples is considered necessary, the compensation established in Article 16(2) of the ILO 
Convention No. 169, in order to be fair and equitable would have to provide “...relocation sites 
equipped with basic utilities, such as drinking water, electricity, and washing and hygiene facilities, 
and with appropriate services, including schools, health-care centres and means of transportation.” 
Without any doubts, these are indispensable means for the advancement of indigenous people in the 
society, under equal condition vis-à-vis the majoritarian part of the society, but certainly not part of 
the compensation for restriction in the enjoyment of the right to communal property. I would rather 
advice to avoid confusion between positive actions, that States are obliged under Article 2 and 4 of the 
ILO Convention and Article 21of the UN Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples, with the 
right to be compensated for the loss and injury generated for their relocation, as recognised in Article 
16(5) of the ILO Convention or Article 28 of the UN Declaration. The contrary can only amount to 
unclarity and confusion in this highly controversial matter. In connection with the CERD Committee 
interpretation, see Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of reports 
submitted by States parties under article 9 of the Convention. Concluding observations of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Guatemala. 76th session, 19 May 2010 
(CERD/C/GTM/CO/12-13). 
144 As it has been said before, this case was about the massacres perpetrated on November 1986 by 
Suriname’s military forces against members of the Moiwana villages, descendants of former slaves 
who had escaped into the jungle and established autonomous communities in the 17th Century, and 
consequential the destruction of the village and forced displacement of the survivors. See I-ACtHR, 
Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Merits, Reparations and Costs, cit., para. 86 et seq. For 
more information about this case, see –among others– C. MARTIN, The Moiwana Village Case: A 
New Trend in approaching the Rights of Ethnic Groups in the Inter-American System, Leiden Journal 
of International Law, 19, 2006, p. 491 et seq.; and L. HENNEBEL, La Protection de l'"Intégrité 
Spirituelle" des Indigènes. Rèflexions sur l'arrêt de la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l'homme 
dans l'affaire Comunidad Moiwana c. Suriname du 15 juin 2005, in Rev. trim dr. h., 66, 2002, p. 253 
et seq. 
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merely the cases of the indigenous communities of Yakye Axa145 and 
Sawhoyamaxa.146 In these cases, the Court dealt –basically– with indigenous 
communities that had been displaced from their traditional lands and territories. 
However, in the latter two cases, the displacements were not connected with internal 
armed conflicts or massacres perpetrated by state agents, as happened in the first 
case. Instead, these cases were related to the historical processes of gradual but 
progressive removal of indigenous communities from their traditional habitats, due 
to their “invasion” and occupation of these territories through a variety of processes, 
mostly by their destination to modern extensive/intensive agriculture exploitation.  
In general terms, it would be possible to say that the interpretation of the 
American Convention made by the Court –in connection with the right to return– 
follows the already existing regulation of this right, specially within the framework 
of the ILO regime. Nonetheless, because the American Convention has not literarily 
incorporated this right among its articles, its effective inclusion –as integrative part 
of the right to property– was an interpretative operation made by the Court. In fact, 
in the case of the displaced communities, the recognition of their communitarian 
property –as protected under Article 21 of the Convention, interpreted under the light 
of the above mentioned provision of the ILO Convention No. 169147– would most 
likely include the recognition of their right to return to their traditional lands from 
which they had been removed. However, because the displacement intrinsically 
means that the possession over those traditional lands and territories has been lost (at 
least temporarily), the recognition of the right to return could clash –in certain cases– 
with third parties’ possession that could have been consolidated over the time.  
Hence, it would be important for the purpose of this study to analyse the 
implications of the recognition of the right to return, as an integrative part of the right 
to communal property, vis-à-vis third parties in possession of the claimed lands, or 
even with regard to those cases when the exercise of this right could be seen as 
incompatible with the general public interests of the society. In addition, it would be 
                                                 
145 I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, cit. 
146 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit.. 
147 For the legal justification of the interpretative use that the Inter-American Court has made of the 
provisions contained in the ILO Convention No. 169, see our considerations in Chapter V, Section 
6.1.1. 
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also relevant to inquire on the role that the protection of the cultural diversity of 
these populations plays in the appraisal of these potential conflicts.  
As it has been said before, what is essential for the recognition of the right to 
communal property is the traditional possession that indigenous people exercise over 
their territories and lands since immemorial times. Furthermore, it is this particular 
kind of possession that entitles them to additionally demand and obtain the official 
recognition and registration of the property title in order to have guarantees for non-
violation in the future of their property rights (guarantee of non-repetition).148 
However, because in cases of displacements the affected communities have precisely 
lost possession of their traditional territories, then the Court has established an 
exception to this general rule, in order to deliver a real and concrete protection to 
them (principle of effectiveness).149  
In fact, the regional tribunal has declared that “...the member of indigenous 
peoples who have unwillingly left their traditional lands, or lost possession thereof, 
maintain property rights thereto, even though they lack legal title, unless the lands 
have been lawfully transferred to third parties in good faith.”150 According to this 
jurisprudence, when communities have been displaced, they nevertheless would have 
conventionally guaranteed the exercise of their right to return to their lands, as long 
as their right to property still remains alive.  
Additionally, their guaranteed return would be subjected –at least– to the 
potential concomitant existence of a more powerful reason (a prevalent 
conventionally protected interest) that would justify –in a pluralist and democratic 
society– the subordination of the right to return to the prevalence of another private 
or public interest. In other words, in case of a potential conflicting interest (public or 
private) with the indigenous’ claim to return to their lands, the latter right could 
perhaps not prevail when the realisation of the former interest has become more 
                                                 
148 See I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, cit., para. 
151; Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 127 & 128. 
149 In connection with the jurisprudential implication of the principle of effectiveness or effet util, see 
our considerations in Chapter V, Section 5. See also, among other authorities, I-ACtHR, Case of the 
Constitutional Court v. Peru. Competence. Judgment of September 24, 1999. Series C No. 55, para. 
36. 
150 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 128. 
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pregnant in an open, pluralist and democratic society, due to its adjustment to the 
attainment of a legitimate collective interest.151      
Therefore, even when traditional possession remains as the cornerstone for 
the regime of communal property, in cases of displacement it is not –for obvious 
reasons– an indispensable requirement for the official recognition of this right, as 
guaranteed in Article 21 of the American Convention. What the Court has 
established as a requirement for the recovery of the possession –and hence the 
enjoyment of the property rights– are two conditions: a) the unwillingness of 
members of the affected communities in connection with the displacement; and b) 
the inexistence of good faith in the third parties that are currently in possession of the 
lands.152  
In connection with the first requirement, there is no need for extensive 
explanations. This is simply because if the members of the communities have 
voluntarily or willingly left the possession of their traditional lands (that is with the 
intention of abandoning them), it must be understood that they have renounced or 
waived their traditional possession and –consequently– their property rights over 
those territories. Beside the intrinsic clarity of the precedent situation, it is 
contextually important to highlight that the willingness or unwillingness of the 
members of these communities would have to be carefully verified by judicial 
authorities. This is especially because of the vulnerable position in which –in 
general– these communities live; but also –and perhaps most importantly in this 
specific context– because the potential cultural misunderstandings that could have 
been interfered in the interaction between these communities and external third 
parties, within the cultural milieu of the former. Nevertheless, it is important to bear 
                                                 
151 This could be the case –for instance– when the displacement was generated by the construction of 
larger but essential societal infrastructures, such as dams, but not only. In connection with this topic, 
see our considerations in Chapter IV, Section 5. See also, among other authorities, I-ACtHR, Case of 
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs, cit., para. 
145-146; Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 136-138.  
152 The fact that the Court mentioned the lawfulness in the transference of the lands to the third parties 
has to be considered as included within the requirement of good faith, in a sense that cannot be a good 
faith if the lands have not been transferred in full respect to the legal procedures and regulations.  
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in mind that not all potential cultural misinterpretations would or could possibly 
have legal implications and relevance.153    
In fact, as a guiding principle, the Court has stressed, when assessing cases in 
which indigenous communities are involved, the need to “…take into account the 
specific characteristic that differentiate the members of the indigenous peoples from 
the general population and that constitute their cultural identity.”154 Moreover, in 
cases in which the Article 21 is at stake, the Court has also added –as an specific 
application of this principle– that it would take into account “…the special meaning 
of communal property of ancestral lands for the indigenous peoples, including the 
preservation of their cultural and its transmission to future generations…”.155  
Therefore, under the interpretative light of this jurisprudence, in the 
assessment of the willingness or unwillingness of the dispossession or displacement 
of these communities, it would be important to also focus on their internal decision-
making mechanisms and on the interrelated relevant cultural elements (e.g. language, 
tradition, legal cultural institutions and understandings, etc.). However, this kind of 
interpretation could possibly lead –if not correctly understood– to an inaccurate or 
misleading concern and understanding of its legal consequences. In this sense, it is 
important to remember that the peoples concerned are the only ones who can 
primarily decide upon their own priorities and in connection with their own 
development, as a societal cultural aggregation and as individuals, as the ILO 
Convention No. 169 chiefly established in its Article 7(1). And this –of course– is 
applicable to their relationship with their lands. However, that self-decision-making 
power can only be achieved if they fully understand the legal and social aspects of 
their actions, in particular vis-à-vis the majoritarian part of the society and the 
dominant legal system.156  
                                                 
153 As we saw in our previous chapters, culture is essentially a dialogical process, and hence, 
misunderstandings are and should be considered as a physiological cultural feature. In connection with 
this, see Chapter I, Section 2.2.; Chapter II, Section 2.2.; and Chapter III, Section 4. 
154 See I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, cit., para. 51. 
155 Ibid., para. 124. 
156 Article 7(1) of the ILO Convention No. 169 reads as follow: ‘[t]he peoples concerned shall have 
the right to decide their own priorities for the process of development as it affects their live, beliefs, 
institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands that they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise 
control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development. In addition, 
they shall participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes for 
national and regional development which may affect them directly.”  
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In sum, cultural sensitivity, toward the relationship between these 
communities and their lands, is regarded as an essential condition for the assessment 
of the willingness/unwillingness of the displacement.157    
If the answer to the presence of the first requirement (unwilling displacement) 
is positive158, then the existence of the second requirement has to be assessed in 
order to grant recognition and protection of the right to return under the American 
Convention. As we already said, this additional requirement consists on the 
inexistence of good faith and lawfulness in connection with third parties that 
eventually could be founded in possession of the same claimed lands, at the time of 
their reclamation.  
I would argue in these pages, that the above mentioned requirement 
constitutes an essential element in the configuration of the jurisprudence of the 
Court, because it opens the door for a balancing exercise between two rights (or 
legally relevant interests) that –in principle– deserves equal conventional protection 
(e.g. both private and communal rights to property), but not only. Its centrality is also 
based on the fact that indirectly introduces one of the most controversial discussions 
in connection the right to return, namely, the claims for the restitution vis-à-vis 
historical process of dispossession of lands, and the connected restitution and 
reparation claims for those past wrongdoings. In those cases, the most pregnant legal 
feature is connected with the problem of long-passed statutes of limitations or laches, 
that could reduce the strength and viability of any reclamation for the restitution of 
                                                 
157 At this stage, it would be possible to ask whether this requirement of cultural sensitivity should be 
also applied to all other cultural manifestations in society. If the answer to this question is a positive 
one, then it would be rooted in the principle of equal valuative function that all cultural manifestation 
fulfil vis-à-vis all of those individuals who recognise themselves in them (See Chapter I, Section 4.2.). 
On the contrary, if this interpretative principle is exclusively applied to the case of indigenous 
communities, then it would be ontologically connected with the very notion of indigenousness (see 
Chapter IV, Section 2.2.3.), which also would hypothetically mean that indigenous culture and 
identity, because of their specific relations with their lands and philosophical world views, deserve a 
differential treatment, a treatment with cultural sensitivity. Indeed, if the latter would be the case, then 
it would be –perhaps– possible to say that this is nothing but an ulterior essentialization (see Chapter 
IV, Sections 2.4. and 4).  
158 If the answer would be negative, merely that these populations willingly left their territories, then 
these mean that the possession and –therefore– their right to communal property has been waived. The 
same conclusion could be drawn in the case of laches or consolidated status of limitations. On this 
topic, see –among other authors– D. SHELTON, Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: The Present 
Value of Past Wrongs, in F. LENZERINI (ed.), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples. International & 
Comparative Perspectives, Oxford, 2008, p. 57 et seq. 
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territories that have been lost long time back in the past.159 Furthermore, when we 
talk about status of limitation, its implications and interconnections with the 
overarching principle of legal certainty must not be disregarded.160  
Coming back to the judicial requirements in connection with the right to 
return, the inexistence of the lawfulness and good faith on the possession of the 
questioned lands held by third parties would have to be proved –in principle– by the 
claimants in a given case. In fact, judicial cases have to follow one of the basic 
principles of procedural law that establishes the assignment of the burden of proof to 
the party making the allegations of the fact over which the claim is based. In the 
cases under review, this burden would be allocated on the side of the indigenous 
communities, whom plead their cases through the Inter-American judicial system.  
Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that international human rights courts 
always have greater latitude to evaluate the evidence on pertinent facts161, in 
accordance with the principles of logic, and following the rules of sound criticism, 
based on experience. In fact, the I-ACtHR has concluded –in this sense– that, in 
receiving and weighing evidence, “...particular attention must be paid to the 
circumstances of the specific case and to the limits imposed by respect for legal 
certainty and the procedural equality of the parties”.162 This means that –according 
                                                 
159 See, in connection with the different problems raised by the reparation of the past wrongs, the 
excellent and very stimulating essay written by Aviam Soifer, in which it has been emphasised that 
“[i]t may be expecting too mucht of judges and of a regular legal system to begin to make amends for 
drastic wrongs. It may also be asking too much of popularly-elected officials in other branches of 
government to attempt to afford justice to those who have suffered grievous wrongs in the past. 
Excessive focus on what ends are just tends to diminish attention to mundane, everyday needs” See, 
A. SOIFER, Redress, Progress and the Benchmark Problem, in Boston College Third World Law 
Journal, 19, 1998, p. 525 et seq. See also, E. K. YAMAMOTO, Race Apologies, in Journal of 
Gender, Race & Justice, 1, p. 1997, p. 47 et seq. 
160 One of the legal arguments advanced by the Court in support of the surrendering by the States of 
legal titles in connection with the indigenous traditional lands and territories, it was the need to ensure 
their legal certainty vis-à-vis to the entire community. In fact, the title will provide not only publicity 
but as well legal security to its holder. But this need for legal certainty is not unidirectional, in a sense 
that it only tends to guarantee the position of the indigenous communities and their possession but also 
could produce the same effect with regard to private owners who hold a title and effective possession 
of their land undisturbed since a considerable period of time. See, a contrario sensu, I-ACtHR, the 
Case of Saramaka People v. Suriname; Judgment on Preliminary Objections, merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, cit., para. 115. 
161 See I-ACtHR, Case of Castillo-Páez v. Peru. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 
1998. Series C No. 43, para. 38. 
162 See I-ACtHR, Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs of June 23, 2005. Series C No. 127, para. 108; Case of Fermín Ramírez v. 
Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 20, 2005. Series C No. 126, para. 45; 
Case of Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of March 11, 2005. 
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to the circumstance of the case and bearing in mind the vulnerable cultural-legal 
position in which most of these communities live– the allocation of the burden of 
proof could be changed and reversed if the defendants are situated in a better 
position to prove both elements, viz the lawfulness and good faith of the third parties’ 
possession.163   
Once established the existence of the above mentioned two requisites, plus –
of course– the accreditation of the traditional possession or occupation of the 
claimed lands for immemorial time before their displacement, members of 
indigenous communities would be able to successfully exercise their  conventionally 
recognised right to return and restitution in connection with those same territories. 
But solely as long as their special relationship with their lands still exists.164 In other 
words, according to the axiological position assumed by the Court, it is precisely 
because of the existence of the special relationship that the displaced communities 
have (or claim to have), that the rights to return and restitution for these lands are 
recognised and protected under Article 21 of the American Convention.165 Therefore, 
the maintenance of this especial relationship with the claimed lands is regarded –by 
the Court– as an additional requirement for a successful recognition of the right to 
return. As the Court clearly stated, “[a]s long as said relationship exists, the right to 
claim lands is enforceable, otherwise, it will lapse.”166  
Moreover, it is important to clarify that, in order to assess the existence of the 
mentioned special relationship, particular attention has to be paid to the presence of 
any external cause that could restrain or hinder these populations in the maintenance 
of their spiritual or material traditional contact with their lost lands. In fact, for the 
Court, in case of the existence of reasons beyond their control, “...which actually 
hinder them from keeping us such relationship, such as acts of violence or threats 
against them, restitution rights shall be deemed to survive until said hindrances 
                                                                                                                                          
Series C No. 123, para. 42; Case of the Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador. Preliminary Objections. 
Judgment of November 23, 2004. Series C No. 118, para. 33; and Case of Lori Berenson-Mejía v. 
Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2004. Series C No. 119, para. 64. 
163 For instance, this would be the case if States would not have collaborated in good faith, through the 
incorporation into the procedures of those relevant documents and other evidence that are exclusively 
in its possession, such as property records. On this topic see, J. M. PASQUALUCCI, The Practice 
and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, cit., p. 210-211. 
164 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 131. 
165 See I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, cit., para. 147. 
166 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 131. 
JURISPRUDENTIAL DIMENSION OF THE RIGHT TO TRADITIONAL LANDS 
351 
 
disappear.” 167 This is nothing but absolutely logical. In fact, if indigenous 
communities have been prevented –after their dispossession– to return or to keep 
material/spiritual contact with their traditional lands, by illegal means, such as 
physical violence, intimidations or different kinds of threats or by the impossibility 
to access adequate judicial remedies, then this period cannot be counted as a 
voluntary waive of their claim.168 
Notwithstanding, this last quotation could also be possibly read contrario 
sensu. That is, in a sense that if the members of the displaced communities did not 
continuously maintain their especial relationship with their traditional lands, in all of 
those cases in which they have not been prevented or hindered to do so by external 
factors, their right to claim back those lands could lapse. Moreover, this 
interpretative rule could even find application in those cases where the displacement 
has been effectuated against their will or consent. In other words, if after being 
dispossessed from their traditional lands the displaced communities have not kept 
alive their traditional connection with them, through immaterial/spiritual or material 
activities, or through the exercise of an available and adequate judicial remedy (when 
the traditional practices were hindered), they would face the lapse of their right to 
return.169 
As a continuation, I will address this question, together with other possible 
restrictions recognised –by the Court– as applicable to the right to communal 
property, as constructed under the protective umbrella of Article 21 of the American 
Convention. 
 
                                                 
167 Ibid., para. 132. 
168 This was the case of the N’djuka and other Maroons communities in Surinam which were forced to 
flee their villages after their destruction and the killings perpetrated by state agents, and they were 
prevented to return to their lands (for almost 18 years) by the permanent presence of the military 
forces in the zone in question. In this sense, in the Moiwana Case, the Court has emphasised the fact 
that “...the ongoing impunity has a particularly severe impact upon the Moiwana villagers...”, adding 
that “...because of the ongoing impunity for the 1986 attack, they [the members of the attacked 
villages] suffer deep apprehension that they could once again confront hostilities if they were to 
return to their traditional lands”.  It is clear how structural and deeply rooted impunity has put the 
affected population into a permanent threat, and therefore it has prevented them to return to their 
traditional lands. See I-ACtHR, Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, cit., paras. 95 and 97, respectively. 
169 As we said above, the recognition of the right to communal property over traditional lands, has to 
be considered as part of those positive actions that States Parties of the Convention have to enact for 
the protection of indigenous communities allocated in a situation of vulnerability, and in particular for 
protection of their right to a dignified life. 
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6.1. Restriction to the Right to Return: the protection of the diversity and its 
boundaries 
 
As it has been stressed in the precedent paragraphs, according to the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court, the right to return –and hence the right to 
communal property in itself– can lapse, or can be subject to time-restrictions, 
conforming to the circumstances of the case.  
In fact, the contrario sensu interpretation of the Court’s finding in the 
Sawhoyamaxa Case170 –as referred before– leads us to the preliminary conclusion 
that the right to reclamation for the restitution of the lost traditional lands could be 
considered extinguished. This would be particularly the case of those situations in 
which the existence of long-passed periods without performing any traditional 
activities would be confirmed; activities that would eventually have had –direct or 
indirect– effects of keeping alive the especial relationship that the involved 
indigenous populations used to have with the claimed territories. Thus, without the 
existence of those traditional activities that mirror traditional possession, the said 
rights would have to be considered lapsed. The same applies in those cases in which 
they have been prevented to do so, when it is proven that they did not exercise any 
defence or initiate any formal reclamation for the recovery of the said territories, 
when –of course– adequate and effective legal remedies were available to them.171  
The above interpretation sounds very logical, not only because is based on a 
contrario sensu reading of the Court argumentation but –most importantly– because 
                                                 
170 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 131-132. 
171 We must always bear in mind that the legal remedies, in order to be available and effective, must 
be “adequate” for the protection of the fundamental rights that have been claimed as violated, that is, 
it has to be suitable to address the infringement of that specific right, and, in addition, they must be 
“effective” in a sense that would have the potential, the capability –according to the circumstances of 
the case- to produce the anticipated result, this means to restore the alleged violation through the 
delivery of justice. See –among others– J. M. PASQUALUCCI, Preliminary objections before the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Legitimate issues and illegitimate tactics, in Virginia Journal 
of International Law, 40, 1999,  p. 24. In connection with the Court jurisprudence, see among other 
authorities, I-ACtHR, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. 
Series C No. 4, para. 75; Case of Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment 
February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74, para. 136; Case of Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru. Merits. Judgment 
of August 18, 2000. Series C No. 69, para. 164; Case of Bulacio v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations 
and Costs. Judgment of September 18, 2003. Series C No. 100, para. 127; and Case of Durand and 
Ugarte v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of August 16, 2000. Series C No. 68, para. 121. 
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it is aligned with the principle of legal certainty, in a sense that allows the legal 
consolidation of those factual situations that have existed unmodified since a very 
long time. However, it must be said that this interpretative reading is quite far 
reaching for being entirely representative of the Court’s jurisprudence at this current 
stage. In fact, the Court never entered directly into the treatment of the question of 
status of limitations; its analysis focused only on the material (viz. cultural) 
connection with the claimed traditional lands but almost disregarding the temporal 
considerations of that connection.  
Coming back to the reasoning of the Court, an accurate analysis of its 
jurisprudence has shown that current possession by the involved communities could 
not be considered –in certain specific cases– as an indispensable requirement for the 
existence of the right to restitution of the traditional lands.172 In the case of displaced 
communities, this point of departure is nothing but absolutely logical –or even 
obvious– because, in their case, any restitution claim must be constructed –inherently 
speaking– over the factual situation of dispossession and displacement. Nevertheless, 
in cases of displacement, the restitution of the said lands would be subject to the 
corroboration of the presence of the material element, that is, the current existence 
of the mentioned especial relationship between the displaced communities and the 
traditional lands. As it has been said before, as long as the said special relationship 
with those lands exists, the right to claim and return to them would be enforceable.173  
Notwithstanding, because the Court did not expressly consider, together with 
the presence of the above mentioned material element, the need of any special 
temporal requirements, it would be possible to hypothesise a situation in which, after 
many decades of the claimed lands being under peaceful non-indigenous possession 
and ownership, they –nevertheless– would have to be surrendered to the involved 
indigenous communities. This would be the case, precisely because those indigenous 
communities would have successfully managed to keep alive their traditional ties 
with the demanded territories. To put it bluntly, as long as those ties still exist; the 
right would be there. Hence, following these interpretative and argumentative lines, 
the material and factual determination of the current existence of those special 
                                                 
172See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 128. 
173 Ibid., para. 131. 
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cultural ties should be regarded as a central question, especially because their proof 
would open the door for the special protection of the attached the said rights.  
Within the following section we will attempt to build on this question, paying 
special attention to the indicia gave by the Inter-American Court in this matter, but 
not only. General principles of procedural law will be also applied.  
 
 
6.1.1. Special relationship with traditional lands and its material demonstration  
  
A first and perhaps less attentive reading of the jurisprudence of the Court, 
could lead us to believe that it would be enough for the displaced indigenous groups 
–in order to have a successful claim– to demonstrate the presence of a mere spiritual 
connection with their dispossessed traditional lands (e.g. presence of traditional 
graves, spiritual or religious ceremonial ties, etc.). Additionally, it could also 
persuade us to consider that, in order to prove the existence of those spiritual ties, it 
would be sufficient for the involved indigenous communities to use –as central 
evidence in a given case– the transmitting memories of their very same 
community.174 Let me explain more in detail this first interpretative impression, 
which –as I will argue– would be quite inaccurate.  
The reasoning incorporated in the precedent paragraph could be rationally 
deconstructed in the following manner. In the case of indigenous groups, lands are 
regarded as closely linked to their oral expressions and traditions, their customs and 
languages.175 In addition to this, it has to be stressed that indigenous cultures, 
traditions, history and institutions are transmitted orally and not by the use of written 
words.176 Therefore, taking into account both observations, the affirmation of the 
Court that “[p]ossession of their traditional territory is indelibly recorded in their 
                                                 
174 In this sense, the Court has expressly stressed the fact that “[s]uch historical memory and 
particular identity must be especially considered in identifying the land to be transferred to them”; the 
reason for statement it has been given by the same tribunal has affirmed that “...throughout its process 
of sedentarization, the Community “adopted a particular identity, associated with a physically and 
culturally determined geographical area.”” See I-ACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community..., cit. supra note 57, para. 23. 
175 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Interpretation of the 
Judgment of Merits, Reparations and Costs, cit., para. 154. 
176 See, J. R. MARTÍNEZ COBO, op. cit., para. 103. 
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historical memory”177, could sound quite logical and in accordance with the above 
identified principle of cultural sensitivity.178 Further in this line, it would be also 
relevant to rightfully consider the weight given by the court to the cultural 
implication of the traditional lands, and its relevance to the formation and 
maintenance of the indigenous’ identity.179 In fact, this latter consideration could 
fairly lead us to conclude that it would be even possible, for the judicial recovery of 
lost or dispossessed traditional lands (and enough from a legal/procedural 
perspective), to solely demonstrate that their spiritual significance and relevance is 
still impressed and engraved within the historical memories of the involved 
community.180  
To put in another way, the Court has almost said that as long as the claimed 
territories are still marked or presented in the ancestral memory of the members of 
                                                 
177 See I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, cit., para. 216. 
178 A very interesting work, in connection with the (hierarchical) distinction between oral and literate 
traditions, from the ethnographic perspective, is the work of James Clifford, who wrote a very vivid 
narrative in connection with the case of the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council who sued a 
defendant class representing landowners in the town of Mashpee under the Indian Nonintercourse Act 
(25 U.S.C. s 177), in order to recover possession of tribal lands (Case of Mashpee Tribe v. New 
Seabury Corp., 592 F. 2d 575. C.A.Mass., 1979. February 13, 1979). The case was dismissed on the 
grounds that the plaintiff was not a “tribe” at all relevant times. Bearing in mind the outcome of the 
case, Clifford said that “[t]he Mashpee trial was a contest between oral and literate forms of 
knowledge. In the end the written archive had more value than the evidence of oral tradition, the 
memories of witnesses, and the intersubjetive practice of fieldwork.” In fact, because of the 
difficulties that oral tradition generated on the evaluation of the case and, in finally, on the allocation 
of the rights, the same author finished his thoughts by asking: “In the courtroom how could one give 
value to an undocumented “tribal” life largely invisible (or unheard) in the surviving record?” It 
seems that the I-ACtHR has answered this question in a rather holistic way. See, J. CLIFFORD, The 
Predicament of Culture. Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art, 
Cambridge/Massachusetts/London, 1988, p. 339 et seq.  
179 For a further reading in connection with the identity assessment of indigenous people’s claims, see 
A. EISENBERG, Reasons of Identity. A Normative Guide to the Political & Legal Assessment of 
Identity Claims, Oxford, 2009, in particular Chapter 6, p. 119 et seq. 
180 In fact, in the Sawhoyamaxa Case, the Court has concluded that their right to restitution of the 
traditional lands has not lapsed, in spite of the fact that the members of the community have been 
dispossessed and their access to the claimed lands has been denied, because they were still able to 
carry out traditional activities in them and they still consider those lands as their own. But, if we look 
closely the relevant testimonies that have been used by the Court to ground its judgment, it would also 
be possible to conclude that the only connection that still remain alive with those lands is just the 
spiritual one. The Court stressed the impossibility for the members of this community to restore their 
traditional medical knowledge, to practise and teach their own language and transmit their costumes 
and practises, or to carry on proper burials, because of the lack of access to their traditional lands. 
Exemplificative of it is the testimony given by of one member of the community, which the Court 
quoted in its reasoning, who said “[t]hose lands are the ones best enabling us to live, we are not 
claiming them just for the sake of it, but because they are the only ones still to hold traces of our 
grandparents”. See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., 
para. 133. 
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the said communities, and as long as their cultural identity as distinctive people is 
still intrinsically linked to those territories, they would have their right to property 
protected and recognised under the American Convention. Consequently, the 
involved communities would have the possibility to return to their traditional lands 
even if those same lands have been under the undisturbed possession by third parties, 
for a long period of time. In other words, a preliminary lecture of the Court’s 
jurisprudence could possibly lead us to affirm that even when the alleged special 
relationships with traditional lands only lingers within the ancestral memories of the 
said communities, that would be enough to regard that said relationship still alive and 
–hence– sufficient to consider the right to return as not having lapsed. So far, so 
good.181  
The latter interpretation, even when it could be understood as showing 
highest level of cultural sensitivity, is actually not pursuable because it would mean 
that the introduction of a sort of ‘self-created proof’, which would generate –with 
highest levels of provability– a complete imbalance between the two different 
interests at stake (e.g. individual property claim vis-à-vis the communal claim). In 
fact, the admission of this kind of evidence would also imply that the resolution of 
the controversy would be put almost entirely on the hands of one of the involved 
parties (the indigenous one). And this, would indeed be in deprivation of the non-
indigenous counterpart’s minimum defensive guaranties, especially according to the 
procedural principle of equality of arms or principe du contradictoire.182 But also –
                                                 
181 As we saw above, the conceptual reduction of the notion of “special relationship with traditional 
lands” to the mere maintenance of spiritual ties, or even memorial ties, without any reference to 
specific material and identifiable element or indicia of concrete objective connection, is nothing but 
an ulterior essentialization of the very notion of indigenousness. In fact, the already mentioned 
dogmatic equation (indigenousness = relationship with traditional lands), would suffer a subsequent 
modification in a sense that it would be integrated as follows: indigenousness = memories of a special 
relationship with traditional lands. The reductionism is quite evident, and its practical implication too. 
It would be enough to say that almost every nation, every cultural societal identities have memories of 
past possessed territories. The question –of course– would be whether they would be able also to 
claim effective restitution of those territories based on their traditional memories. Of course, it would 
be possible to argue that the case of indigenous people is different in that the case of other ethno-
cultural aggregations, and therefore only them would be able to seek this kind of judicial remedy. If 
the latter argument is correct, then we would arrive at the conclusion that some cultures are more 
“unique” than others, and for that reason, some cultures would be entitled to a differential treatment 
in order to match their cultural uniqueness.  As we already explained in Chapter IV, Sections 2.2.4. 
and 2.4., this is nothing but an ulterior essentialization.   
182 The principle of equality of arms (du contradictoire) not only has its legal reception in the role of 
procedure of the Court, in its articles 35(e) and 57(1), but as well, and perhaps more importantly, in its 
own jurisprudence, when –for instance– it stated that “[a]s regards of the weighing of evidence, the 
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and even most importantly– by confusing the current existence of an enforceable 
right to the remembrance of its past existence (or its past enjoyment by their 
ancestors), would certainty hit the principle of legal certainty and –consequently– it 
would hardly match with what is required in a pluralist and democratic society. 183   
The line between present and past, between reality and memories (even 
collective ones), between right based claims and aspiration (or perhaps moral) based 
claims, cannot and must not be exclusively drawn within and by the memories of one 
of the involved parties in a legal procedure. What is required, as a minimum standard 
for the achievement of justice and respect of rule of law, is an objective 
manifestation of the alleged special connection with the claimed lands.  
In other words, what it is required –as standard of proof– is a clear 
embodiment of the claimed special relationship with traditional lands in one or more 
external and tangible manifestations. In this sense, the objective externalisation or 
concrete manifestation –through external and objective elements– of the said 
collective historical memories, would presumably provide a vivid and current picture 
of the alleged traditional or special relationship with the claimed lands. To accept 
the contrary, would generate the subordination of the enjoyment of a conventionally 
protected right, that is, the right to property of the non-indigenous part, to the 
existence of a mere remembrance of the claimed special relationship, by the 
indigenous counterpart. Thus, the subordination would be to an special relationship 
that does not exist any longer; or –better– that exist only  and exclusively in the 
memories of the involved communities. This, without decreasing –of course– the 
                                                                                                                                          
contradictory principle is applied, in order to respect the right of defense of the parties. Such 
principle is embodied in Article 44 of the rules of Procedure [according to 2003 version of it] 
regarding the time of offering the evidence, in order for the parties to stand on an equal footing.” See, 
I-ACtHR, Case of Baldeón-García v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 06, 
2006. Series C No. 147, para. 60; and also Case of Acevedo-Jaramillo et al. v. Peru. Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 07, 2006. Series C No. 144, para. 
183; Case of López-Álvarez v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 01, 
2006. Series C No. 141, para. 36; and Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, para. 61. 
183 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Interpretation of the 
Judgment of Merits, Reparations and Costs, cit., para. 24. In connection with the practice of the 
ECtHR, it has said that “[t]he Court’s usual practice in its quest to assess the proportionality of an 
interference would normally begin by establishing a “legitimate aim”, followed by an examination of 
the material facts at issue. It would then proceed to assess the presence and strength of the different 
values involved by engaging in a balancing exercise.” See, L. CARIOLOU, The search for an 
equilibrium by the European Court of Human Rights, in E. BREMS (ed.), Conflicts Between 
Fundamental Rights, Antwerp/Oxford/Portland, 2008, p. 261 et seq.; and See, J. CLIFFORD, op. cit., 
p. 339 et seq. 
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societal importance of the above mentioned supportive format (oral transmission of 
information), which has been traditionally used by these populations for recording 
their account of history. But again, as apples are not pears, history and reality are not 
the same; and what the American Convention184 protects are existing rights and not 
those that are lapsed back in history.185   
As it has been mentioned above, only a preliminary interpretation of the 
Court’s jurisprudence could possibly lead us to consider as still alive –and therefore 
legally relevant– the existence of the special relationships with traditional lands 
which exclusively linger upon the recorded ancestral memories of the said 
communities. I said “only” because if we carefully analyse this jurisprudence, it 
would be possible to find a potential different answer. In fact, we would find that it 
actually does indeed require the presence of objective and tangible elements from 
which deduct the current existence of the traditional connection with the claimed 
lands. Let me explain this better.  
When the Court has referred and taken into account the dual nature of the 
said relationship with the traditional lands (viz spiritual and material), it has stressed 
the fact that the “[s]aid relationship may be expressed in different ways, depending 
on the particular indigenous people involved.”186 This affirmation does not provide 
great clarification in this matter, but if we connect it with the elucidative examples 
furnished by the Court, then we would be able to arrive to the conclusion introduced 
above, merely on the need of an objective current connection with the referred lands. 
In this sense, the examples provided by the regional tribunal have included “...the 
traditional use or presence, be it through spiritual or ceremonial ties; settlements or 
sporadic cultivation; seasonal or nomadic gathering, hunting and fishing; the use of 
                                                 
184 See Article 47(b) of the ACHR.  
185 Interpretation of a treaty’s provision, like the American Convention, even when it is done in an 
evolutive manner (following the dynamics of the society), cannot be interpreted as allowing the 
creation of new rights through the judicial action. In fact, what is under evolutive or accommodative 
interpretation is an existing right (provision), and not a political claim (even when it can be considered 
based on a fair conception of justice). Judge Matscher clearly reaffirmed this principle when said 
“...dans certains cas, la Cour a atteint les limites qui circonscrivent l’interprétation d’un traité 
international. Parfois, elle semble même les avoir dépassées, en s’aventurant dans un terrain qui n’est 
plus celui de l’interprétation d’un traité mais celui de la politique législative qui n’appartient pas à 
une cour de justice, mais qui est du domaine du législateur (ou, dans le cadre international, des Etats 
contractants).” See, F. MATSCHER, Les Contraintes de l'Interprétation Juridictionnelle. Les 
Méthodes d'Interprétation de la Convention Européenne, in F. SUNDRE (ed.), L'Interprétation de la 
Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme, Bruxelles, 1998, p. 24-25. 
186 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 131. 
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natural resources associated with their customs and any other element 
characterizing their culture.”187 As we can see, all these examples imply an 
externalisation of concrete current actions and material connections vis-à-vis the 
pretended traditional lands, even in the case of “spiritual or ceremonial ties”, they 
necessarily have to be linked to the lands through “traditional use or presence”188, 
this means through an objective channel.  
The same above mentioned examples have been referred –by the Court– in 
the most recent case of the Xákmok Kásek indigenous community, in which the 
Spanish version of the judgment made even more linguistically evident the need to 
the presence of a physically tangible element together with the spiritual one. The 
judgment clearly states that “[a]lgunas formas de expresión de esta relación podrían 
incluir el uso o presencia tradicional, a través de lazos espirituales o 
ceremoniales…”189 
Therefore, the fact that the claimed lands could be still “permanently marked 
in the “ancestral memory” of the members of the said community”190 is not and must 
not be considered in itself as sufficient for the recognition and successful exercise of 
the right to return to the lost or dispossessed traditional lands, as protected by Article 
21 of the Convention. However, it could still be considered as an important indicia 
that would have –nevertheless– to be complemented by the demonstration of the 
existence of concrete, material and current connection with the said lands.191   
                                                 
187 Ibid, para. 131. In this particular case the Court took as proven the relationship through the 
demonstration within those lands of ‘traditional hunting, fishing and gathering activities’. 
188 The use of a present tense by the Court is indicative of the contemporaneity of the connection.  
189 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010. (Only in Spanish) Series C No. 214, para. 113. 
190 I-ACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Interpretation of the 
Judgment of Merits, Reparations and Costs, cit., Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado 
Trindade, para. 1 
191 Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the indicia mentioned by the Court could indicate not 
only the existence of right to property but as well the presence of the right to use, in accordance with 
the distinction established by Article 14(1) of the ILO Convention No. 169, which reads as follow: 
‘The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they 
traditionally occupy shall be recognized. In addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to 
safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to 
which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities.’ According to 
Prof. Thornberry, “[t]he syntax may suggest that the greater rights [right to communal property] 
accrue only to lands ‘exclusively’ occupied by the peoples.” Nevertheless, he also précised that the 
right to property “…does not explicitly demand that occupation must be exclusive…” See, P. 
THORNBERRY, op. cit., p. 355. 
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Moreover, we have to always bear in mind that the exercise of the right to 
return is in itself an exceptional situation, in a sense that is connected with a situation 
of dispossession or displacement from the claimed traditional lands. The golden rule 
with regard to the exercise of the right to communal property –as recognised within 
Article 21 ACHR– remains the traditional possession; this is the element that 
“entitles indigenous people to demand official recognition and registration of 
property title”192, and –as a general principle– only admits very few exceptions. 
Hence, the exceptionality of the exercise of the right to property (through the 
exercise of the right of return, which is enshrined in it) when the claimants are not in 
possession of the pretended traditional lands, should naturally guide the interpreter 
toward a restrictive and cautions interpretation of the circumstances of the case. This 
restrained interpretation, would eventually lead to a conclusion of the existence (or 
not) of the said especial relationship and –therefore– to the current recognition (or 
not) of the claimed right to communal property. 
But (there is always a “but”), an attentive and knowledgeable reader would 
certainly introduce a very strong criticism on what has been said before. His or her 
objection would most likely consist on the fact that this interpretative construction 
does not provide a reasonable answer to those cases in which the involved 
populations were prevented –or banned– in their tentative plea to keep material and 
objective traditional contact with their ancestral lands and territories. Especially after 
being displaced or unwillingly removed from them by the use of different means 
(e.g. use of force, lack or structural legal deficits in the recognition of the communal 
property, inexistence of adequate and effective remedies, etc.). This observation 
would be perfectly valid. However, as I said before, the objective requirement of 
traditional current possession, as a ruling principle, accepts some few exceptions. 
And, as you can imagine, this is one of them. In fact, the Court has considered this 
issue, when it has concluded that “...restitution rights shall be deemed to survive 
until said hindrances disappear.”193  
                                                 
192 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 128; in 
the same vein, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, cit., para. 
151;  
193 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 132. 
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In other words, the indigenous people’s special relation with their lands not 
only has to be present but also possible. This means that the involved communities 
should not have been averted –for reasons beyond their control– from the realisation 
or accomplishment of those cultural activities that reflect –and prove– the 
permanence, current existence and continuity of their traditional relationship with 
the claimed lands.194 
The latter affirmation of the Court leads us to two different observations. 
First, a contrario sensu reading of it could allow us to affirm that after the 
disappearance of those impediments, after the banishment of those hindrances, the 
right to return and –consequently– their right to traditional communal property 
would lapse. This would be the case, if the members of the involved community did 
not re-establish their special relationship with the claimed lands, and did not display 
those traditional activities that are able to mirror the cultural distinguishability of the 
said relationship. Why? Simply because, as any other non-absolute right195, the right 
to property could be restricted or even considered –for instance– as lapsed when 
entered in collision with the protection or attainment of legitimate objectives or even 
foundational higher values in a democratic society, such as the principles of legal 
certainty and rule of law.196   
In fact, is in the protection of the above mentioned principles, that the legal 
introduction of prescriptions or status of limitations could be recognised as a 
legitimate and necessary interference to the conventional protection of the right 
return and recovery of the dispossessed traditional lands. Therefore, taking into 
consideration these potential limitations, in those cases where it would not be 
possible to identify external signals or manifestations of effective exercise of 
traditional possession, that situation could be taken as a logical and concrete 
evidence of the lack of exercise of the right to property (when –of course– that 
exercise was possible). In addition, if the said external absence is maintained during 
a relevant period of time, then it would be possible to conclude that the involved 
indigenous communities –who used to have an special connection with those lands– 
                                                 
194 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay, cit., para. 113. 
195 See Article 21(2) of the ACHR. 
196 See, I-ACtHR, I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, cit., p. 144-145. 
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have waived or lost their interest in the conservation of the referred traditional 
possession and communal property. 
Furthermore, beside the application of the general principle of equality and 
non-discrimination in the enjoyment of the conventional rights197, the reasoning 
behind the protection of the traditional communal property lies –as we saw– on the 
protection of the essential and constitutive connection that traditional lands have with 
indigenous cultural identity and cultural distinctiveness. Therefore, when the 
involved communities voluntarily waive their special connection with the said lands, 
it logically and inevitably means that that connection is in itself not essential any 
longer.198 In fact, the Court has rightfully recognised the perishability of the said 
special relationship, when it has bluntly affirmed that “[s]i esta relación hubiera 
dejado de existir, también se extinguiría ese derecho [de propiedad].”199 Thus, in the 
case of voluntary (explicit or implicit) waive of the said special connection with 
traditional lands, the right to return and –consequently– the right to communal 
property have to be considered definitely lost. 
The second observation that could be drawn, from the jurisprudence of the 
Court under analysis200, consists of the fact that –again– the regional tribunal kept 
silence in connection with what would have happen if those hindrances, those 
material (factual or legal) impediments would have remained in place for a very long 
period of time, perhaps for several decades or even centuries.201 Forced 
displacements, unjust or even illegal deprivation of lands (according to national or 
even international law existing at the time of the events), lack of redress, or 
insufficiency or inadequate and ineffective legal remedies, could be the broad picture 
                                                 
197 See Article 1(1) and 24 fo the ACHR. 
198 As the reader can imagine, the latter affirmation is constructed within the process of understanding 
of the jurisprudential regulation of the involved rights. Hence, for our own understanding in 
connection with the essential constitutive character of the special relationship with traditional lands 
with regard to indigenous identity and culture, see our considerations in Chapter IV, Section 2.2.4. and 
2.4. 
199 In the author’s own translation: “If this relation would no longer exist, it would extinguish that 
right also.” See I-ACtHR, Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay, cit., para. 
112; see also, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 131. 
200 In connection with this topics, Chapter V, Section 2. 
201 This, for instance, could be the case of Mapuche population in Chile and Argentina, which in very 
high percentage lives as an urban population, since a very long time (in some cases even from more 
than 100 years), which –according to certain field studies- “[v]ery often they have lost awareness of 
their identity, as it has been undermined – some would say systematically – by state-imposed 
education, religion and the media...” See, L. RAY, op. cit., p. 20-21. 
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that represent most cases that we have to deal with, when we analyse the fate of 
many indigenous communities in Latin America.202 All of these actions can be 
considered indeed as historical injustices and moral wrongdoings (according to the 
contemporaneous moral standards203 and –perhaps– to those existing at the time of 
their actualisation204), but –unfortunately– it cannot be considered as a valid legal 
justification for the protection of a specific currently recognised right before an 
international tribunal. Seeking redress for historical injustices, and to have the right 
to a judicial reparation or redress, is not –and must not be– the same.205  
Therefore, even in those cases in which the dispossessed communities have 
been prevented since a very long time to re-establish their traditional contact with 
what used to be their ancestral lands, the pursuing of a general interest in a 
democratic society and –hence– the application of both, the principle of legal 
certainty and the rule of law, would require us to consider the claimed right to 
communal property as lapsed. The remembrance of the claimed possession –which 
does not exist any longer–206 could still be indeed vivid within the traditional 
memories and –therefore– could still have an important role in the formation of the 
communal identity of the members of the involved communities. In fact, it could 
perhaps be an immaterial pivotal element for the maintenance of their internal 
                                                 
202 See, R. STAVENHAGEN, Indigenous Peoples in Comparative Perspective - Problems and 
Policies, cit., p. 2 et seq.  
203 For a current perception of historical wrongdoings, see –for instance– the Report of the World 
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.189/12, 2001, p. 12, para. 14. 
204 See e.g. F. B. DE LAS CASAS, Brevisima Relación de la Destruicion de las Indias, Sevilla, 1552.  
205 Professor Brooks, meanwhile addressing the question of reparation claims for slavery, which is –of 
course- highly controversial, has said that “not all responses to an atrocity are reparations. Some are 
intended to be remorseful; others are intended to simply make the matter go away, to get over the 
hump, as it were. Thus, a clear distinction is made between “reparations” and “settlements”. The 
latter, unlike the former, refers to an unremorseful, unapologetic perpetrator response to an atrocity.” 
See, R. L. BROOKS, Getting reparations for slavery right - A response to Posner and Vermeule, in 
Notre Dame Law Review, 80, 2004, p. 259. In addition, see our considerations in Chapter V, Sections 
2.2.2., 2.2.5. and 2.4. 
206 In this sense, Professor Savigny has said, in connection with the causes that generate the loss of the 
possession, that “[l]a primera condición de la continuación de la posesión, consiste en una relación 
física con la cosa poseída, por la cual nos es posible ejercer sobre ella nuestra influencia. No es 
necesario que esta influencia sea inmediata, actual, […] basta con que esta relación de poder sea de 
tal naturaleza, que se halle en estado de producirse conforme a la voluntad, y de ese modo la 
posesión no se pierde sino cuando la influencia de nuestra voluntad ha venido a ser enteramente 
imposible.” It is clear that in this case the relationship with the claimed traditional lands became 
impossible and hence extinguished. See, F. C. v. SAVIGNY, Tratado de la Posesión. Según los 
Principios de Derecho Romano, Madrid, 1845, p. 176 et seq. 
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societal cohesion.207 However, because the presence of other essential principles 
which lie down at the very base of the democratic construction in any given society, 
the protection of cultural diversity and potential distinguishable identities, and –
consequently– those potential differential cultural understandings of property, find 
their limits.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We started this chapter with the analysis of a new element that has been 
jurisprudentially incorporated into the multifaceted conceptual notion involved 
within the so-called “special relationship with traditional lands.” That is, the 
possibility to enjoy a life in dignity, or a dignified life, which is enshrined –according 
to the Court– within the scope of protection of Article 4(1) ACHR, interpreted in a 
broad sense (lato sensu).  
In fact, the Inter-American Court has identified within the scope of protection 
of the conventionally protected right to life, and therefore, as part of the obligation 
assumed by the States Parties, the prohibition of its arbitrary deprivation (negative 
obligation), but not only. It has also identified within that scope, the generation of 
those necessary conditions that would allow or make it possible to have access to a 
decent life. That is, a life which respects those minimum conditions that would 
protect the dignity of each human being. 208  
However, it is important to bear in mind that the notion of a dignified life has 
to be necessarily considered in context. Therefore, in the case of indigenous 
populations, the positive measures that States have the obligation to implement 
(Article 1(1) ACHR), have to necessarily take into consideration their regarded 
cultural distinctiveness and –most in particular– the protection of their special 
relationship with their traditional lands. In fact, because the said special relationship 
is regarded –by the Court– as a constitutive and essential part of the indigenous 
people’s identity, the recognition of the right to communal property over traditional 
lands has to be considered as part of those positive actions that States Parties of the 
                                                 
207 See, L. RAY, op. cit., p. 20 et seq. 
208 See I-ACtHR, Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras, cit. para. 110. 
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Convention have to enact for the protection of indigenous communities. Indeed, the 
recognition of the right to communal property is regarded as a necessary instrumental 
vehicle to make possible culturally tailored dignified lives.209 In this sense, special 
attention has to be paid in connection with those members of indigenous 
communities living in a factual situation of vulnerability.210  
Therefore, according to the jurisprudence of the Court, in the specific case of 
indigenous communities, the lack of recognition of the right to property to their 
traditional lands, would amount not only to a violation of Article 21 of the American 
Convention. In addition, it would also imply an infringement of the right to life as 
protected by Article 4(1), when read in accordance with the dispositions contained 
within Article 1(1) and 2 of the same instrument (Obligation to Respect and 
Protect).211      
Moreover, in the view of the regional tribunal, States’ obligations include –as 
positive actions– the necessary processes for the identification, demarcation and 
titling of those traditional lands, for the effective benefit of the involved communities 
(principle of effectiveness).212 In order to perform these obligations, due attention 
has to be paid to the traditional possession of the affected lands, which should also be 
regarded as a sufficient official recognition of the right to property and its due 
official registration.213  
Furthermore, in those cases where indigenous communities were displaced 
from their traditional lands, and therefore temporarily dispossessed, their right to 
return to the claimed traditional lands is also recognised as protected by Article 21 
ACHR. However, the possibility to return is not absolute. It would be maintained, as 
long as the members of the involved communities would be able to conserve alive 
the regarded special and ‘unique’ relationship with their traditional lands. When that 
                                                 
209 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., Separate 
Opinion by Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 30. 
210 See, I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 170.; see 
also, The Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, cit., para. 111-112 
211 See, I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, cit., para. 168. 
212 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 120.; see 
also, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Interpretation of the Judgment of 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, cit., para. 23 
213 See I-ACtHR, The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, cit., para. 
151. 
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relationship ceases, their right to communal property ceases too; and –as a 
consequence of that extinction– the possibility to return would lapse too.214   
Nevertheless, in those cases in which this relationship has been hindered by 
acts of violence or threats, the right to return to those traditional lands (as a 
component of the right to property) ‘shall be deemed to survive until said hindrances 
disappear’.215 Accordingly, after the disappearance of those impediments, it could 
happen that the possession or traditional use of the lands is not re-established, or 
even that those impeditive grounds remain for a very long time without being legally 
challenged. Then, in those cases, after the passing of a certain period of time (for 
example the period 90 years established in the case of the prescription from time 
immemorial216 –or even less– according to the different national regulations)217, the 
right to return and –consequently– the right to communal property has to be 
considered definitely lost.  
This interpretation could be seen as in line with the substantial provisions of 
the ILO Convention no. 169, in which the recognition of right to return is always 
connected with an unwilling loss of the former possession of the claimed traditional 
lands (temporal connection), but not only. It could be considered as fundamentally in 
line with the regulation of the right to property as protected by the American 
Convention, in which the latter right is recognised as a non-absolute right and –
hence– potentially subordinated in its exercise and enjoyment to –for instance– the 
general interest of the society.218 This could be indeed the case of the protection and 
enforcement of foundational principles of modern democracies, such as the 
principles of legal certainty and rule of law.219 
The interest of the broader society, organised in a pluralist and democratic 
form, operates –in this particular case– as a limit for a further protection of the 
cultural diversity or cultural distinguishability of a given ethno-cultural entity.  
                                                 
214 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 131. 
215 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cit., para. 132. 
216 See ECtHR, Handölsdalen Sami Village and Others vs. Sweden, Decision as to the Admissibility 
of February 17, 2009 (Application no. 39013/04). 
217 The regulation of this time limit indeed falls into the national legislative jurisdiction of each 
Member State of the American Convention. 
218 Article 21(1) American Convention. 
219 See, I-ACtHR, I-ACtHR, Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay; Judgment on 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, cit., p. 144-145. 
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Last but not least, allow me to analyse the above consideration from a 
different angle, merely from the perspective of the theoretical framework that we 
have developed within the first part of this study. In fact, if we come back to the 
notion of special relationship with traditional lands, from a conceptual point of view 
we have already said that intrinsically enshrines a sort of essentialization of 
indigenous people’s identity. In other words, indigenous identity is conceptually 
reduced to the existence of a single objective element, a sort of dogmatic equation in 
which indigenousness is equalised to the factual circumstances of the said 
relationship.220 In addition, we have also concluded that, under the understanding of 
the Court, this equation has gained a sort of multifaceted conceptual notion that has 
been characterized as a “fivefold circular relationship”, integrated by the interrelated 
and interdependent notions of: traditional lands → culture → identity → right to 
dignified life → right to communal property over traditional lands.221  
However, if we add to the said multidimensional notion the new elements that 
we have incorporated in this chapter (beside the right to dignified life that has 
already been introduced), it would be possible to consider the above mentioned 
conventional need for the adoption of positive actions –as it has been interpreted by 
the Court– as a new integrative element of this conceptual chain. Therefore, instead 
of a fivefold multifaceted conceptual notion we would have a sixfold circular 
relationship, composed as follows: traditional lands → culture → identity → right 
to dignified life → positive actions → right to communal property over traditional 
lands. Within the latter right, we have to consider included the right to return (which 
is one of its components), especially in those cases of forced displacement.  
Moreover, if we precisely focus on the specific situation of the indigenous 
displaced populations, which –in most cases– are indeed in a situation of 
vulnerability, it would be quite logical to conclude that the most adequate positive 
action –in order to revert their factual situation– would be the recognition of the right 
to property over their traditional lands and their consequential restitution. However, 
if we take into consideration that this specific positive action is based –according to 
the understanding of the Court– on the existence of the above mentioned special 
                                                 
220 For more detailed explanations in connection with this dogmatic equation, see Chapter IV, 
Sections 2.2.4., 2.4. and 4; and Chapter V, Section 2 and 7. 
221 See our conclusion in Chapter V, Section 7. 
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relationship with those traditional lands from which they have been displaced, we 
would have to necessarily conclude that the inexistence or loss of the latter would 
unavoidably affect the legitimacy of the former. Nonetheless, as it has also been 
stated above, there are exceptions to this general conclusion.  
Finally, if we consider that the said special relationship is regarded as the 
essential component of the notion of indigenousness, and therefore indispensable for 
the configuration of indigenous cultural identity222, then the consequence of the loss 
of that special relationship would inevitably generate the deprivation of the said 
identity. Thus, in those cases in which the displaced populations would not have the 
possibility to return to the lands from which they were displaced, what would be at 
stake would be their impossibility to retain their own identity, as indigenous people, 
at least from a conceptual point of view.  
The above way of thinking could be logical but not practical (or even 
accurate). Cultural identities are dialogical, dynamic and changeable.223 They cannot 
possibly be reduced to the existence of one single element, namely, the said special 
relationship with traditional lands. As a very last remark, perhaps it would be even 
possible to say that, in this case, it seems that more notions remain tied but also 
trapped together in what we have called the ‘essentialist trap’. 
                                                 
222 See, Chapter IV, Section 2.2.3.  
223 See, Chapter III, Section 4. 
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The present work has examined the question of cultural diversity and cultural 
identity, and the claim of ethno-cultural entities or groups for the recognition of their 
distinguishable cultural identity, through the allocation of a differential set of rights, 
able to reflect and mirror their cultural diversity. In addition, special attention has 
been given to the specific claims of indigenous people and –in particular– in 
connection with their claims for the acknowledgement and recognition of the special 
(cultural) relationship with their traditional lands.  
Hence, this study has addressed the above mentioned topics from two 
different angles. First, from a theoretical perspective, this study has been conducted 
through the examination of the logical argumentative construction of those central 
notions contained within the socio-political, axiological and legal discourses related 
to this topic. Secondly, our analysis shifted toward the concrete situation of 
indigenous people and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American System in connection 
with their claims for the recognition of their rights over their regarded traditional 
lands. This second part has been thought as a concrete case study in order to assess 
how the theoretical framework –developed within the first part– works in practice. 
Coming back to the first part, in Chapter (I) we analysed the multiculturalist 
proposal as a potential answer for the above mentioned claims, which basically 
means the equal recognition of the different ethno-cultural entities or groups present 
in a given society. According to our analysis, the multiculturalist’s plea has to be 
regarded as both axiologically and ontologically incorrect.  
Axiologically incorrect, because multiculturalist proposals lead to an 
axiological paradigm that could be summarised as ‘equal in differences’, which is not 
the same as ‘different but equal’. The former stresses the equal acknowledgement of 
our cultural differences –what we do not have culturally in common– through 
recognition of a different culturally tailored set of rights that would lead to the 
existence of different legal status based on group membership. On the contrary, the 
latter stresses our commonality, what make us equal beside our potential cultural 
differences or alliances. In short, this means that the centre of multiculturalist 
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axiological protective system is not based any longer on Article 1 of Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which is human dignity, but on the dignity of each 
ethno-cultural entity or group.  
Secondly, this proposal has to be considered as ontologically incorrect 
because it is based on a fallacy, namely, the ontological equal value of cultures. The 
latter has to be considered as a dogmatic assumption, due to the fact that cultures 
cannot be ontologically compared. The reason is the lack of external parameter. 
Their value is culturally attributed, and therefore axiologically relative. However, all 
cultures perform an equal valuable function in the society, regardless of their 
attributed moral value. Every individual finds in his or her own culture an equal 
functional system of values and the necessary understandings of life.  
Last but not least, this study has shown that the fact that cultures have equal 
functional value does not mean that they would have equal societal success. In 
providing their societal function, some cultures could be more successful than others, 
and therefore they would receive more substantial support in the society. Cultures are 
ontologically changeable and dynamic, they change across time and space; their 
perpetuity is not guaranteed. Hence, the existence of cultural majorities is nothing 
but a manifestation of their own cultural success.   
However, in open, pluralist and democratic societies, members of cultural 
minorities are not unprotected. As individuals, their right to freely enjoy their own 
culture –in community with the other members of their group– is indeed guaranteed 
(e.g. Article 27 ICCPR). As a societal aggregation, as a differential ethno-cultural 
group, this study has concluded that what is guaranteed is their possibility to openly 
engage in dialogical process of avocation, seeking cultural support for their 
differential views and understandings. Nevertheless, these political/cultural 
aspirations are not enforceable as rights; their cultural/institutional success is 
subordinate to what has been called “the democratic game”. In this study (Chapter 
II), the latter has been defined as a dialogical process that permits the possibility to 
methodologically channel all political aspirations and cultural understandings and 
views into a common societal decision-making process. Yet, it has also been found 
that this game does not guarantee any socio-political and cultural success.  
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In addition, this study has highlighted the fact that common societal cultural 
institutions (including the legal systems) are constructed through societal consensual 
agreements among all its members, including –of course– minority members. 
However, in democratic societies, consensus is essentially a result of an inclusive 
dialogical and procedural mechanism, which does not guarantee culturally tailored 
substantial outcomes, only participation. Indeed, minority members can make full 
use of the democratic dialogical procedures, advocating for the goodness of their 
differential cultural understandings in order to gain broader support in society, and 
perhaps even to culturally reconstruct (or deconstruct) common societal institutions. 
But, because in a democracy, numbers count, their political aspirations are not 
guaranteed. 
Nevertheless, because democracy and human rights are interdependent and 
mutually reinforced concepts, the latter operates as an ultimate limit of the –most 
likely– majoritarian outcome of the said democratic game. In fact, when members of 
ethno-cultural minorities are completely marginalised from the dialogical decision-
making process, this study concluded that international human rights standards 
would grant them with the possibility to exceptionally exercise the so-called right to 
internal self-determination, not just as members of societal minorities, but as 
“peoples” (common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR). This means that they 
would have the possibility to seek and to rightfully claim –within the boundaries of 
national States– the recognition of political autonomy and self-government in 
accordance with their own cultural understandings and traditions.   
Moreover, in case of threat to the very physical existence of the members of 
an ethno-cultural minority, just because of their membership in a group (such as the 
case of genocide), then it would be even possible for that specific societal entity to 
claim the full exercise of the right of self-determination. Therefore, they would be 
able to rightfully exercise a remedial secession, under the light of Article 1(2) of the 
UN Charter. Notwithstanding, both cases have to be regarded –as we have also 
concluded– as remedial arrangement for exceptional circumstances in which 
democratic societies do not function, and not as recognition of multiculturalist 
proposals for culturally divided societies.  
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As we can see, in an open, pluralist democratic society, the individual 
freedom to enjoy culture –in association with others– is fully protected, but not only. 
What is protected too is their cultural freedom, the possibility to engage in cultural 
creative activities, to freely express themselves. In fact, as we concluded in Chapter 
(3), without having the possibility to culturally express themselves, humans would 
become just mere instruments or tools subjected to the will of others. Therefore, our 
unavoidable conclusion was that cultural freedom is inseparable from respect for 
human dignity. This conclusion is quite different from the UNESCO’s views on this 
matter. For the said organisation, what is inseparable from the respect of human 
dignity is cultural diversity.1   
According to our views, the UNESCO’s understanding is based on the 
confusion between these two ontologically different notions. However, they are 
indeed interconnected. In effect, a diversity of cultural expressions could provide an 
enriched environment for a better development of individual cultural identities, but 
the cultural product (culture) –which is changeable and dynamic– cannot be confused 
with the dignity of its producer (the individual), which is not. Culture, as concluded, 
is (or should be) functional to the individual, not the opposite.  
In this sense, this work has also highlighted what has been characterised as 
UNESCO’s multiculturalist approach toward culture and cultural identity. In fact –
for this organisation– cultures would have values on their own that have to be 
protected and respected, regardless of their instrumental function vis-à-vis the 
individuals. And because individuals are those that have to respect that acquired 
dignity, it seems that –under this understanding– individuals have become functional 
to culture and cultural entities, instead of the opposite.2 In short, this could be seen as 
a sort of subordination of the cultural producer to his or her own cultural product.  
However, if we incorporate into this general understanding of culture and 
cultural diversity, the human rights based component, it would be possible to 
axiologically evaluate the functional content of cultures. In fact, international human 
rights standards –as we have concluded– operate as an external cultural comparator, 
                                                 
1 See, Article 4, UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. 
2 See, UNESCO Declaration of Principles of International Cultural Co-operation, of 4 November 
1996, Article I(2) 
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but not only. As an external valuative (moral) parameter, it also operates as a cultural 
restrictor too.  
The above conclusion is based on the fact that –as common standards– human 
rights norms have received broad and universal consensus from international 
community; even when not always fully respected, its norms are regarded as such, 
namely, as a common moral parameter or yardstick of the humanity. Moral 
principles and values are consensual and international human rights standards are the 
most accepted ones. For this reason, the respect for pluralism and the different 
cultural manifestations does not mean that it is extended to those practices that are 
harmful or disrespectful of international human rights law and standards; the former 
find their limits in the latter.  
In addition, the analysis –in Chapter III– of the notions of cultural diversity 
and cultural identity has also shown that these concepts are not ontologically 
connected with the potential political aspirations of minoritarian ethno-cultural 
entities or groups, claiming for more institutional visibility and structural societal 
participation, but not only. They also claim to be granted –due to their cultural 
distinctiveness– with a differential set of rights. These are political battles, which 
have to be fought within and under the rules of the so-called ‘democratic-game’. 
Notwithstanding, according to our conclusion in Chapter IV, it seems that 
international community has recognised one clear exception in connection with 
granting specific and differentiated set of rights based on ethno-cultural grounds. In 
fact, with the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(2007), it seems that these populations have received concrete international support 
for the recognition of their cultural distinctiveness, as distinguishable societal entity, 
as different peoples, with right to a differential and exclusive set of culturally 
constructed rights. In this sense, the adoption of the said instrument –by the UN 
General Assembly– can be regarded as a successful political achievement toward the 
construction of multiculturalist societies, based on differentiated, exclusive, and 
culturally constructed set of rights based on group ethno-cultural affiliations. 
The argumentative justification of this differential and exclusive legal 
treatment has been identified as the need for protection of their cultural 
distinctiveness, or what has been called their essential ‘indigenousness’. Therefore, 
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the critical analysis –in Chapter IV– is concentrated on the ontological implications 
of this notion, on its axiological legitimation as a societal concept that enshrines and 
reflects the unique and distinguishable societal nature of indigenous people, which 
would justify its differential (and exclusive) normative treatment. The enquiry 
showed that the claim of cultural “uniqueness” has no ontological foundation, in a 
sense that indigenous culture is “as unique” as all the other cultural manifestations. 
All cultures have equal functional value, indigenous or non-indigenous cultures 
alike. Hence, ontologically speaking, there are no cultures more “unique” than 
others.   
Moreover, this study showed that the so-called special relationship with 
traditional lands element, as the essential factor demonstrative of their cultural 
distinctiveness, within socio-political and legal discourses, involves in reality a 
dogmatic essentialization of indigenous people’s cultural identity. In fact, the 
equation indigenousness=special relationship with traditional lands, seems to be 
based on the dogmatic assumption of the unchangeable, timeless and even culturally 
uncontaminated character of indigenous cultures. This is not only opposed to the 
very idea of culture, which is essentially dynamic and dialogical, but also –and even 
most importantly– deprives of indigenous identity those large majorities of self-
identified indigenous people living in urban areas for generations. In fact, under this 
dogmatic essentialization of indigenous cultural identity, they would not be able to 
identify themselves as such any longer.  
In addition to what has been said above, the other factor regarded as essential, 
for the construction of their distinguishable cultural identity, has also been retained 
as ontologically problematic. This is nothing but the objective criterion of ‘being first 
in time’. In this case, given ontological relevance to the mere fact of being 
descendant of those first inhabitants that populated the current national territory of a 
given State, at the time of colonisation, invasion or otherwise unjust dispossession of 
their traditional lands, could –most likely– pave the way for biological and –hence– 
racially related connotations. 
For these reasons, without having clear objective justifications, it has been 
concluded that the claim of substantial cultural distinctiveness, is exclusively 
sustained by the subjective element of this notion, namely, their self-identification 
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and self-understanding as being culturally different. In other words, indigenous 
people’s culture should be regarded as “more unique” and different from other 
cultures, just because indigenous people’s self-perception of uniqueness.   
This study also pointed out, that self-perception of uniqueness and 
differentness –in cultural terms– is common to all cultural manifestations, precisely 
because all of them are “unique”. In addition, it has been shown that individual 
enjoyment of cultural self-identifications is fully protected in international human 
rights law, but that is not the case of group self-perception. In short, granting 
indigenous groups (or any other ethno-cultural group) specific and exclusive rights 
based on their self-identification as being ontologically different from the rest of the 
society, has been considered as axiologically connected with the multiculturalist path 
for the segmentation of human society in equal societal ethno-cultural entities or 
groups.  
However, because the said division would be based mainly on criterion of 
descendancy, it could potentially lead to a rebirth of societies based just on the 
criteria of ethnicity and race. Additionally, the rational and critical assessment of the 
proposal for the construction of divided and segmented societies would have –as a 
consequence– nothing but the allocation of humans in distinguishable unequal 
positions, according to their ethno-cultural appurtenances, that is, according to their 
cultural distinctiveness.  
In effect, at the end of this first conceptual part, this study has shown that the 
true question at stake is how human rights are ontologically considered. Either as 
equal minimum standards for all, based on our equal dignity and hence regardless of 
potential different ethno-cultural affiliations; or as equal rights for equal groups, 
culturally distinguishable and composed of individuals who would enjoy a 
differential set of rights and legal status, based on their ethno-cultural membership. 
The former interpretation ideally leads to a society of culturally diverse but equal 
humans; the latter, toward a society of equally diverse humans (in cultural terms), but 
not necessarily equals (in rights and dignity). Diversity in equality or equality in 
diversity, this is the question. 
In order to provide a practical answer to this axiological question, this study 
undertook the analysis of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human 
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Rights (I-ACtHR) in connection with indigenous people’s land claims (Chapters V 
and VI). The reason for this methodological choice can be found in the very same 
jurisprudence. This regional tribunal has –in fact– provided answers to the central 
element of indigenous people’s cultural distinctiveness, namely, their special 
relationship with their traditional lands, but not only. Most importantly, it has done 
so from a perspective of a regional instrument that recognises equal human rights for 
all individuals, regardless their ethno-cultural affiliations, that is the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).  
After reviewing –in Chapter V– the methods of legal interpretation applied by 
the regional tribunal in its case law and –in particular– in those connected with 
indigenous people’s cases, this study has shown that the Inter-American Court has 
applied an innovative and integrative method of legal interpretation. In fact, through 
a dynamic, systemic, evolutive, non-restrictive and effective interpretation of the 
regional and universal human rights instruments (as integrative part of the corpus 
juris of international human rights law)3, this Court has introduced specific 
indigenous people’s rights into the text of the American Convention. 
In particular, under the interpretative light of the said corpus juris has re-
elaborated the content of Article 21 of the American Convention, in a sense as to 
extend its scope of protection beyond the borders of a mere right to property; even 
far away from the mere recognition of the right of indigenous people to communal 
property over traditional lands. Indeed, the Court has extended the scope of the 
protection of this article to the protection of indigenous people’s cultural identity. 
This study has concluded that the reasoning applied by the Court started –in 
fact–with the acknowledgement of the special relationship that the involved 
indigenous communities have with their traditional lands. But the Court also 
understood the said special relationship as the essential and determinative factor of 
the distinguishable cultural identity of those communities. For this reason, the I-
ACtHR has arrived at the conclusion that without the enjoyment of this special 
connection, their indigenous identity –as distinguishable peoples– would be at stake. 
In effect, for the Court, without the recognition and protection of the said 
relationship, indigenous people’s possibility to enjoy a life in dignity –a dignified 
                                                 
3 See, I-ACtHR, Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion 
AC-18/03 of September 17, 2003. Series A No. 18, para. 120. 
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life–, according to their own cultural traditions, would be potentially violated. For 
this reason, the scope of protection of Article 21 ACHR was extended –by means of 
its systemic, evolutive and non-restrictive interpretation– far beyond the right to 
property, to the point of confusing its own limits with those of the right to life, as 
protected by Article 4(1) ACHR, but not only. 
In addition, and as a consequence of the above mentioned equation (special 
relationship with traditional lands = life in dignity), the I-ACtHR has interpreted –
according to the results of our inquiry in Chapter VI– that the recognition of the right 
to communal property over traditional lands has to be considered as part of those 
positive actions that States Parties of the American Convention have to enact for the 
protection of indigenous communities (Article 1(1) and 2 ACHR, obligations to 
respect and protect). Consequentially, the recognition of the right to communal 
property is regarded as a necessary instrumental vehicle for making possible –
culturally tailored– dignified lives.4  
The enquiry has also shown that these positive measures should include the 
necessary processes for the identification, demarcation and titling of those traditional 
lands, in order to guarantee the effective benefit for the involved communities. In 
addition, the official recognition of the said right requires special regard to be given 
to the objective and demonstrable existence of traditional possession. In other words, 
the latter element cannot be judicially ascertained by the sole and exclusive 
demonstration that, the claimed traditional lands still have spiritual significance and 
relevance within the historical memories or oral records of the claimant 
communities. Neither historical reminiscences of past traditional possession nor 
historical processes of land’s dispossession are included within the scope of 
protection of Article 21 ACHR. What is included under the protection of the 
American Convention are existing rights, which have to be objectively demonstrable, 
and not socio-political revindications for those “rights” regarded as lapsed back in 
history. This is, of course, without prejudice of the moral/political legitimation of 
claims for redress in connection with historical wrongdoings. 
                                                 
4 See I-ACtHR, Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations 
and Costs. Judgment of March 29, 2006. Series C No. 146, Separate Opinion by Judge Cançado 
Trindade, para. 30. 
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However, our study has identified one exception to the golden principle of the 
traditional current possession of the lands, namely, those cases where indigenous 
communities were recently displaced from their traditional lands, and –therefore– 
temporarily dispossessed. In these cases, their right to return to the claimed 
traditional lands is also recognised as protected by Article 21 ACHR. Nevertheless, 
this enquiry also showed that the possibility to return is not absolute. In fact, our 
analysis of the jurisprudence of the Court has demonstrated that the right to return is 
preserved, as long as the members of the involved communities would be able to 
conserve alive the regarded special relationship with their traditional lands. When 
that relationship ceases, their right to communal property ceases too; and –as a 
consequence of that extinction– the possibility to return would lapse too.  
I concluded that the extinction of the right to return, and therefore the right to 
property over traditional lands, has to be regarded as a direct consequence of the 
legal nature of Article 21 ACHR. In fact, in the latter Article, the right to property 
(including the right to communal property) is recognised as a non-absolute right and 
–hence– potentially subordinated in its exercise and enjoyment to –for instance– the 
general common interest of the society. And this could indeed be the case of the 
protection and enforcement of foundational principles of modern democracies, such 
as the principles of legal certainty and rule of law. 
Finally, from the critical appraisal of the jurisprudence of the Court, under the 
light of the theoretical framework developed within the first part of this study, it has 
been concluded that the interpretative action of the Court enshrines a specific 
understanding of the ontological role played by the notion of special relationship 
with traditional lands.  
In fact –for the Court– the above mentioned notion is regarded as the pivotal 
element over which it has constructed a multifaceted ontological understanding that 
has been characterised by the author as a ‘sixfold circular relationship’. This 
axiologically constructed notion enshrines different conceptual elements, tied 
together by the presence of the mentioned notion of “special relationship with 
traditional lands”. Its composition can be described as the following:  traditional 
lands → culture → identity → right to dignified life → positive actions → right to 
communal property over traditional lands.  
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Indeed, our critical analysis of the jurisprudence of the Court has shown that 
the said special relationship with traditional lands is interpreted as essential for the 
culture of indigenous people, and –in that sense– also for the maintenance of their 
distinguishable cultural identity as a differential societal aggregation; that is their 
indigenousness. Additionally, the enjoyment of their cultural identity is regarded as 
essential in order to have the possibility to enjoy a life in dignity, which is interpreted 
as a life with the possibility to be conducted in accordance with their cultural 
traditions and understandings (right to life in lato sensu).  
Thus, our enquiry has arrived at the conclusion that –for the regional 
tribunal– in order to protect and ensure the indigenous people’s enjoyment of their 
life in dignity, it has been regarded as indispensable the protection of their special 
relationship with their traditional lands by means of the adoption of positive 
measures by States Parties of the American Convention. In this sense, positive 
actions would include indeed the recognition of the right to property over the 
claimed traditional lands. Additionally, they would also encompass their 
identification, demarcation and titling, and the recognition of the right to return to 
those lands, in cases of forced displacement of communities, as long as they still 
maintain a current and objectively demonstrable special relationship with the 
regarded lands (Article 1(1), 2, 4 and 21 ACHR, jointly read). For this reason, we 
have concluded that this sixfold relationship has to be seen as having a circular 
conceptual configuration, but not only. 
In effect, this study has also shown that the Court has incorporated into its 
jurisprudence a conceptual equation which is regarded by the author as a dogmatic 
essentialization of indigenous identity, by means of its reduction to the existence of a 
single element. In fact, the equation, indigenousness = special relationship with 
traditional lands = dignified life,  has –as an epistemological consequence– the 
deprivation of their self-identified indigenousness of those large indigenous 
majorities living in urban areas for generations, who have continuously asserted their 
self-perceived indigenous identity. Moreover, from an ontological point of view, it 
has to be regarded as based on an ulterior or additional essentialization, which is 
nothing but the assumption of the unchangeable, timeless and even culturally 
uncontaminated character of indigenous cultures.  
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However, because cultural identities have to be regarded as dialogical, 
dynamic and changeable –as this study has also shown–5,  indigenous identity cannot 
possibly be reduced to the existence of one single element, namely the said special 
relationship with traditional lands. In this sense, this conceptual reductionism has 
been regarded –from an ontological point of view– as a sort of an essentialist trap; or 
–from the perspective of the socio-political theories– as an axiological 
multiculturalist trap.6 The latter could be described as the segmentation of the 
common society into culturally distinguishable societal aggregations or groups 
(according to their essentialzed main ethno-cultural features), in which human 
members would enjoy equally distinguishable but –at the very end– unequal rights. 
In other words, what is trapped in it is our axiological golden rule enshrined in 
Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that is, that “[a]ll human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” 
Last but not least, allow me to say that the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court regarding indigenous people’s land claims, has shown that legal 
culturally tailored answers could be found without the need to pursue the 
multiculturalist construction of segmented societies across the lines of ethno-cultural 
differences. Indeed, this enquiry has shown that the harmonious and respectful 
coexistence of all individuals in the society could also be achieved under the 
guarantee of universally designed human rights instruments like the American 
Convention on Human Rights. The future challenge for the regional tribunal could 
be, perhaps, to be equally able to deliver concrete answers for specific situations 
where human rights are at stake, without being trapped in ontological or axiological 
essentializations.  
This is what I believe is the best way to accommodate cultural differences in 
the society, that is, through the reinforcement of what all of us have in common as 
members of the very same human family, namely, our ontologically common dignity 
as humans. In other words, through making the enjoyment of fundamental human 
rights and freedoms available for all, without discrimination and distinctions of any 
kind, and not through the deconstruction of our common societal structures, 
institutions and organisations, in culturally divided and exclusive entities, 
                                                 
5 See, Chapter III, Section 4. 
6 See, Chapter I, Section 4.2. 
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constructed upon what circumstantially (time and space) or contextually (dialogical 
exchange) make us different. That is, our cultural preferences or ethno-cultural 
chosen identities. 
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